Intergroup contact and the rice allocation via a modified dictator game in rural Cameroon.

Manuela Thomae, David Zeitlyn, Sascha Sebastian Griffiths, Mark Van Vugt

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Abstract

Economic games in field settings have been subject to criticism concerning their ecological validity. We use social identity theory and the intergroup contact hypothesis as a framework to illustrate how economic games can be applied to field settings with higher ecological validity. A quasi-experiment in two rural Cameroonian villages studied participants’ allocation of rice to co-inhabitants of their village. The villages are characterized by different degrees of contact between the ethnic groups and the sexes. Our results indicate that women who are segregated from each other disadvantage other women more than men or women who experience higher amounts of contact. These findings are interesting from a theoretical and methodological perspective since we utilized a nonmonetary stake in naturalistic intergroup settings.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)74-90
JournalField Methods
Volume25
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 Dec 2012

Keywords

  • Dictator game
  • Cameroon
  • Ecological validity
  • Intergroup contact

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