Abstract
For Rousseau, there are only three things he does not reason away apart from reason itself: self-interest, the good and, at least until Emile, pity. This paper argues that it is Rousseau’s original formulation of pity in the Second Discourse that is able to provide the extra-rational conception of ethics that his political and educational philosophy lacks when limited to a reading of the Social Contract and Emile. This paper will also show how the reconceptualisation of these existential predicates is usefully aligned with a reading of Derrida’s conceptions of immunity and autoimmunity. By reconceiving Rousseau’s educational and political thinking in terms of the primacy of pity rather than reason, this paper will present a kind of philosophical prototype for beginning to rethink contemporary educational and political logic in terms of the primacy of pity more generally.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 131-140 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Ethics and Education |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 5 May 2016 |
Keywords
- Derrida
- immunity
- pity
- reason
- Rousseau