Educational Resistance

Introduction

Education, as an experience in general, cannot be resisted. It is instead the dominant manifestation of education in the humanist idiom (Author 2020) that can and might provoke resistance. Given the pervasiveness of humanistically informed education, and, at the same time, the limiting historical and cultural connotations common to what is specifically called 'humanist education', I refer in this article to the resisting of 'education'. By 'education', I here mean the dominant and humanistically informed ideologies and practices of education, most obviously manifested in schooling and higher education systems, and the cultural prejudices and orientations that accompany them. Such a shorthand is a little ironic, as most academic research in education takes for granted that these practices and orientations are all that is relevant to their study, while I have argued repeatedly that many forms of educational experience far exceed its scope and are worthy of attention (Author 2018; 2019; 2020). However, the argument presented here is less in aid of any specific form of educational alternative, than a meditation on the possibilities of resisting these dominant forms, albeit in a manner that might, nonetheless, be somewhat educational.[1]

Education is with ever greater urgency being defined and determined by common measures. These are imposed measures of appropriate content, habit formation, good practice, and successful outcomes, that all are expected to agree with and adopt. This is not just a feature of bureaucratised education systems but also of the work of many of their critics. The purpose of education is being ever more carefully demarcated and installed as signposts along its compulsory and non-compulsory segments. Any aspect of education which cannot be audited or harmonized successfully is ever more likely to be excised or destroyed, either on purpose or as a by-product of audit or harmonization. Alternative conceptions of educational good find themselves either assimilated, sometimes in good conscience of their authors, rejected vehemently, or, most commonly, ignored. And while many of these

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[1] The form of resistance explored in this article is not overtly political, even if it has political connotations. For an engagement with more explicitly political forms of educational resistance see Author 2020.

alternative conceptions are frequently intellectually and emotionally stimulating, this essay does not join them in attempting to construct another. In fact, to replace one dominant definition of institutionalizable education with another is completely contrary to the version of resistance to education developed here. Resistance to education does not just mean resistance to contemporary educational norms but also the theoretical or practical imposition of any educational norms. This resistance is not absolute. It would be extremely difficult and, in most cases, probably quite undesirable, to disengage from all positive articulations of institutionalized education, including the audit-orientated model which is dominant at the moment. This is not least because, for those who work in state regulated education systems, a resistance must take on a much more compromised role. In spite of this, though, there may still be many roles for philosophical thought in education, or in resistance to institutional education, at a multiple levels of operability.

This article engages in three levels of argument and critique. The first is in developing Jean-François Lyotard's notion of 'anamnesic resistance', and orientating it towards educational questions and contexts. The second is in reading Lyotard's approach up against Bernard Stiegler's educational propositions, as well as his critique of Lyotard, aiming to illustrate the issues inherent in the type of position that Stiegler takes, and, in so doing, reveal more about the nuances of Lyotard's. While inspiring some educational reflections (e.g. Dhillon & Standish 2000; Irwin 2018), Lyotard's thinking on resistance has only been more substantially touched on in the context of education by Kirsten Locke (2017), whose analysis of Lyotard's 1985 exhibition at the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris, *Les Immaterieux*, 'highlights the importance of finding spaces of resistance to contemporary information-drenched reality, and highlights the importance of disrupting the assimilation of the unknown into the known in relation to education.' (p. 1279). This article aims to take Locke's reflections on Lyotardian resistance in the context of education further, looking in greater detail at what Lyotard means by 'resistance', and reading this resistance up against the increasingly influential work of Stiegler, whose own educational proclamations and critique of Lyotard are here utilised as a means of clarifying Lyotard's position and outlining how it has been misconceived in aid of exactly the kind of position to which Lyotard was opposed.

The third dimension is a supplementary but novel application of a creative practice-as-research approach (Barrett & Bolt 2007; Candy & Edmonds 2018) to theoretical elaboration;

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utilising sound as a means of illustrating, supporting, expanding, undermining, and exceeding the limits of academic philosophical argument; all in the spirit (and practice) of anamnesic resistance. This practice-as-research component attempts 'an original investigation undertaken in order to gain new knowledge, partly by means of practice and the outcomes of that practice' (Candy & Edmonds 2018, p. 63) and consists of three sound works, principally associated with – and titled with reference to – Lyotard's notions of breaching, scanning, and passing, also elaborated theoretically below. [2] This supplementary dimension has been purposely kept out of the main body of the article to emphasise its role in figuring a formal and educational resistance to contemporary forms of scholarly expression in philosophy of education. To synthesise it fully would be in contradiction to the argument and principles of anamnesic resistance developed here.

Anamnesic Resistance

Resistance is not inaction. By resisting the theoretical or practical imposition of overbearing, positivistic educational norms and expectations, as well as claims that solutions to societies' problems are necessarily educational, education can be reframed. On the one hand, as an activity or experience that is not necessarily 'good', even (or perhaps especially) in its 'ideal' form; on the other, as inclusive of dissonant educational experiences that might sometimes confound us and which cannot be premeditated by others, or even ourselves. Resisting the narratives and technologies of educational impositions that claim to save or redeem us does not mean we can or, given contemporary circumstances, would want to fully escape them. However, it might provide some distance and helpful language with which to critique them, as well as purportedly 'progressive' alternatives that nonetheless seemingly seek to quell resistance.

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[2] The sound files accompany the online article, and are available for streaming and download under the 'Supplemental material' tab. References to the sound works in the main body of article are limited to footnotes, so that their application does not synthesise with the article's more traditional style of academic argumentation, remaining 'unharmonizable' (Lyotard 1991, p. 4). This approach is a first attempt at reversing the emphasis of practice-as-research scholarship, from a focus on creative practitioners, developing their work as and in the context of scholarly research, to the utilisation of creative practices as means of furthering research by those whose starting point is not necessarily or principally creative practice. The intention is to develop this practice more explicitly, as the main subject of a future research output.

Resistance to education is, in the sense developed here, the fact of dissonant educational experience which exceeds instructional educational imposition: it is an education *against* collective, social, institutionalized, 'individualizing' education. Resistance to education, though, can also be a practice, an activity that implicitly or explicitly questions educational impositions. In this sense, resistance to education is both normative and descriptive, having something in common José Medina's 'epistemology of resistance', for whom, '[resistance] can feel more like being pulled in different directions from the inside, like being torn from within. Experiencing resistance can often be like feeling a rupture that one does not know what to do with (at least initially), like feeling perplexity.' (Medina, 2013, p. 16).

Central to the development of Lyotard's notion of resistance is his interpretation and application of anamnesis and 'anamnesic resistance' (Lyotard, 1991, p. 57). Recent scholarship (Gaillard 2019; Tomiche 2016) has begun to focus critical attention on the significance of Lyotard's references to anamnesis, as well as the Freudian influence on it. This influence comes more from Freud's notion of 'Durcharbeitung' or 'working through' (Freud 1950, p. 155) than Freud's more explicit references to anamnesis, which are focused on the recollection of specific experiences (Freud 1962, p. 191). Even Freud's 'Durcharbeitung', though, is more about working through resistances to psychoanalysis, while Lyotard's 'anamnesis' is 'non-psychoanalytical' (1991, p. 56), and instead used to describe the means by which, for example, 'writers and artists' resist what he calls 'breaching and scanning' (which effectively refer to externally imposed habit formation and memorization, respectively; closer readings of these terms are given below).

Lyotard's interest in anamnesis is not as a process of remembering specific occurrences from one's past (c.f. Plato, Freud, and common use). It is, instead, associated with what he calls 'passing'; a form of remembrance undedicated to remembering anything specifically identifiable or classifiable. It is more of a 'technique' and a 'generativity', a 'set-up' which allows thought to go beyond what has already been learned (Lyotard 1991, p. 54). It is a practice dedicated to thought which exceeds learned habits and memories. It is, to put it as reductively as possible, *a memory of the thought that thought can exceed what has been learned and what can be taught*. And, more than this, it is also the specific practice exploring this type of thought, through means such as writing, art, or music.

To translate this more (and probably too) succinctly into the context of education: *anamnesis is a form of (educational) resistance to imposed education*. Imposed education being determined here as the subject formation of individuals in terms of their habit formations and memorisations. One of the clearest examples Lyotard gives of anamnesic resistance is in the context of music and music education, where he suggests that 'the task of composers was to go through an anamnesis of what was given them in the name of music':

> The timbres imposed by classical, baroque, modern instruments; the durations and rhythms measured by the time-signature and counterpoint; pitches defined by modes and scales, even intensities – these regulations transmitted by schools and *conservatoires* appear, not necessarily outdated, far from it, but certainly not necessary. Analyzing them brings out an elementary material, the vibration of air, with its components which are themselves analyzable: frequency, amplitude, duration and other finer ones: colour, attack. (p. 168)

For Lyotard, 'Only a mind engaged in this work of anamnesis can, after the event, see the musical habits that have sustained it as constraints, at the same time as they remain what they are – ways in which it can exercise its skill on the universe of sound, and enjoy it.' (p. 168). He then proceeds with readings of, and references to, numerous examples of post-war music and music writing which has engaged in this form of anamnesic resistance to 'the regulations imposed by schools and *conservatoires*', including John Cage and David Tudor's *Mureau* and Pierre Boulez's *Répons*. Crucial to his argument here is not only the movement of anamnesic resistance itself but the clear non-rejection of more traditional forms and approaches.

What Lyotard rejects is not past accomplishments and their potential or actual educational significance, or the possibility of enjoying them, but rather the notion that they are necessary and therefore justifiably imposed, or definitive of the limits and qualities of a field of study or practice. Anamnesis resists the imposition of restrictive and preventative habit formation, as well as memorisation as a means of imposing knowledge limitation and hierarchical valuation. Such impositions, breachings, and scannings, are not only facilitated by educational institutions but also by culture more broadly, through media, social

organisations and institutions, the market, and local, national, or international groups of individuals in various forms, including the family and local or online communities.

Forgetting Differends

Bernard Stiegler is, in this article, taken as the antithesis of Lytoard's position. This is not only because he strongly advocates for specific impositional practices in the context of state education, but also because he actively critiques Lyotard's position as a means of defining his own. Stiegler, as well as being a participant in an ongoing critical engagement with Lyotard, also here represents those who are interested in reconceptualising society and entire education systems, proposing alternatives, often based on their own diagnoses of educational and associated social issues, and advocating their own solutions to them. Lyotard, on the other hand, as well as his own specific theoretical contribution, also represents those who might be less self-assured in diagnosing the problems and even less confident in proclaiming what changes should be made to educational practice, especially at a national or international level, and instead advocating forms of resistance at a distance from, although sometimes in response to, dominant cultural and educational impositions. Lyotard might even align with those that are not at all convinced that the solution to the most pressing of societies' issues are necessarily educational (in the imposed sense) at all (see Warmington, 2015, pp. 280-281), and that claims to the contrary should be resisted and critiqued, especially when what it means to be educated is all too clearly and exclusively defined by humanistically and hyper-bureaucratically informed orientations and practices.

Bernard Stiegler's approach to educational prescription comes closer to the definition Lyotard gives to the intellectual, keen to forget differends (an irresolvable conflict between at least two parties) for the sake of political (and educational) hegemony:

> One's responsibility before thought consists […] in detecting differends and in finding the (impossible) idiom for phrasing them. This is what a philosopher does. An intellectual is someone who helps forget differends, by advocating a given genre, whichever one it may be […], for the sake of political hegemony. (Lyotard, 1988, p. 142)

While critical of contemporary education, Stiegler's approach to educational institutions is one of harmonisation of the individual with the collective through the process of invention as subject formation. He sees the school as having the primary therapeutic and practical role to play in developing individuals and society (Stiegler, 2015a, pp. 103-104, see below for a more detailed discussion of these pages) where invention is the individuation of the individual by substantial means of the state educational apparatus; a process some radical educational thinkers might go so far as to refer to as 'indoctrination'. Individuation is, for Stiegler, in this context, the forming of the subjectivity of the individual, primarily by means of their relation to a 'collective'. By approaching children as subjects requiring greater harmonisation with the collective (especially in terms of inter-generationality), his argument is the antithesis of resistance to (especially institutionalized) education. While Stiegler does not explicitly refer to his proposals as 'harmonising' the individual and collective, my argument developed below aims to show how this, and orientation towards 'political hegemony', might be implied, as well as its consequences and resistant alternatives. Stiegler's reduction of the experience of anamnesis, to a part within the positive pharmacology of education, is read against Lyotard's insistence on anamnesic resistance to harmonisation. The issue raised is that Stiegler seems to want to find philosophical grounds – by means of dismissing Lyotard's philosophy – for being a kind of philosopher-king who 'invents' new ways of socialising the young, so as to 'save' them from stupidity (i.e. the risk of disindividuation, or dissimulation/non-individuation of the subject) and inattention. On the one hand, this does not take seriously the nuances of Lyotard's thought, and its potential significance for educational philosophy, practice, and experience. On the other hand, it greatly overestimates the legitimacy of the philosophical justification available (at least in how it is developed in opposition to Lyotard) for Stiegler's forceful and insistent educational proclamations.

Breaching, scanning, and passing[3]

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[3] Provided as supplements to these readings of breaching, scanning, and passing, are three audio files which attempt to both figure and enact the meanings of these terms. All files are based on an audio recording of a citation from Lyotard: 'memory-effects of technological inscription in general: breaching, scanning and passing, which coincide more or less with three very different sorts of temporal synthesis linked to inscription: habit, remembering and anamnesis.' (1991, p. 48). The original audio file of the reading of the quote is processed with the open-source granular sound synthesiser, *EmissionControl2*, developed at The Center for

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In 1986, Lyotard presented a text at a conference organised by Stiegler that took gentle but sure aim at the latter's work. Lyotard's paper is, in turn, confronted in a striking chapter from *States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century*, where Bernard Stiegler not only brusquely dismisses (through what I will argue is an oversimplification of) the logic of Lyotard's closing provocation, even going so far as to say that Lyotard 'clearly does not believe' his own 'hypothesis' (Stiegler, 2015a, p. 99). By thinking through why Stiegler might be so quick to reject Lyotard's 'hypothesis', which centres on the notion of 'anamnesic resistance' to what could broadly be called educational technologies (Lyotard, 1991, p. 57), I will suggest that not only does Lyotard believe what he says (while trying to avoid a 'dialectical' relation to Stiegler's position) but that the problems these thoughts raise for Bernard Stiegler's central educational theses, as well as conceptions of imposing philosophically loaded educational practice more generally, are significant. While Stiegler seems convinced of the school's necessary role in the process of individuation (i.e. subject formation), Lyotard's thesis lends itself more to a conception of an important, and perhaps

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Research in Electronic Art Technology (CREATE), University of California, Santa Barbara, USA by Curtis Roads, Jack Kilgore, and Rodney Duplessis (2020). While too substantial of a topic to engage with as a footnote, the granular synthesis (cf. Roads 2001) engine in E*missionControl2* literally scans already existing audio files, producing 'grains' of sound from the source file, varying from minor to extreme in their transformative sonic effects. The human controller of the programme can vary the type and degree of these effects. If the source file is taken as a straightforward, habitually informed reading of a quote in an academic context, its basic scanning uses the 'memory' of that file in various ways, which chop and change the position of the scan and the sounds produced. Supplementary file 1, 'Breaching', utilises a basic looping of the quote, with slight variations, figuring repetition in the work of habit formation. Processes of forming specific habits may vary while still conveying a relatively unified conception of the desired effect on the subject. Supplementary file 2, 'Scanning', employs the scan feature of the programme more aggressively, moving through the quotation, first removing its meaning from relevance in the sound, and then 'finding' it again, in part by producing limited repetitions of particular phrases. Scanning is still strongly connected to original 'lesson' of the quote, while still having to actively 'remember' it in different contexts. Supplementary file 3, 'Passing', engages in the process of anamnesic resistance to the repetition and remembering of the lesson/quote. By technical means and with an inscribed outcome, this piece nonetheless produces something original and unanticipable. Primarily by reducing the grain duration (the length of time a fragment is played) and increasing the scan speed and indeterminacy within *EmissionControl2*, a radically transformed sound object is produced. Loose and complex rhythms of percussive sounds are created from the sound source reading of the quote. Its lesson is not only resisted but almost annihilated and unlearned for the main duration of the piece, returning, however, slightly, in fragments, towards the end, as a reminder of its existence and influence. Anamnesis qua passing does not and cannot exist in isolation from other forms of experience and education; it does not negate them. It is rather a dispositional means of resisting and working through their influence to learn or produce something they could not, and perhaps would not want to, account for. Breaking habits, refusing received understandings, and yet still proceeding, usually through technical means, with the work of thought and inscription: this is anamnesic resistance.

unavoidable, nonetheless educational, resistance to the claustrophobia of schooling, education, culture, and imposed educational technologies.

Lyotard's essay begins by positioning his argument in the context of the conference it was being presented at, with specific reference to Stiegler. He outlines what he sees as the 'basic hypothesis of Stiegler's work':

> namely that all technology is an 'objectification' – i.e. a spatialization – of meaning, whose model is writing itself, in the common sense of the word. And that inscription, putting into traces, on the one hand – because it is 'legible' (decodable, if you like) – opens a public space of meaning and generates a community of users-producers, and on the other (?) because it is endowed with persistence by its being marked on a spatial support, conserves the sign of the past event, or rather produces it as available, presentable and reactualizable memory. (Lyotard, 1991, 47-48)

He then outlines the direction his own argument will take, notably in terms of three (non-exhaustive) 'memory-effects of technological inscription in general: breaching [*frayage*], scanning and passing, which coincide more or less with three very different sorts of temporal synthesis linked to inscription: habit, remembering [*rémémoration*] and anamnesis.' (p. 48). The essay is then split in to three sections, explaining each of these terms and their relevance. Habit is associated with breaching understood as 'a putting in to series of elements' (p. 48), and described as being part of cultural and sub-cultural modes of production, exchange and consumption (p. 49). Lyotard draws attention to Stiegler's argument that new technology delocalizes and detemporalizes breachings, and agrees with him that 'specific modes of inscription (and therefore memorization)' should be made available to individuals (p. 51). Lyotard aligns the need for this telegraphic (i.e. technologically facilitated) education with the historical teaching of writing in school. However, Lyotard, again in line with Stiegler, is sceptical about whether educational institutions would even be capable of implanting telegraphic breaching and that 'States are not the agencies of control' of this general process (p. 51).

Lyotard then goes on to describe remembering/scanning as distinct from habit/breaching because 'the synthesis of remembering implies not only the retention of the

past in the present as present, but the synthesis of the past as such and its reactualization as past in the present (of consciousness). Remembering implies the identification of what is remembered, and its classification in a calendar and a cartography.' (p. 51). Lyotard distinguishes between the inscription of habit and memory through the capacity the latter has for active recall of past experience or learned information and the predisposition of the former to reactivity (i.e. habitual reaction to experiential stimuli), however, he is clear that both are forms of 'techne' (pp. 52-53). Both more so than 'passing', a form of memorization which, in the final section, Lyotard associates with a generalized notion of 'writing', as well as 'working through' and 'anamnesis' (pp. 54-55).

Passing resists the synthesis of breaching and scanning by passing 'beyond synthesis in general', 'beyond the reminder of what has been forgotten', and 'recall[ing] what could not have been forgotten because it was not inscribed' (p. 54). Lyotard is not unaware of the complexities of this proposition, asking, 'Is it possible to recall if it was not inscribed? Does it even make sense?' (p. 54). However, he also provides an answer to this question, arguing that, 'It makes sense to try to recall something (let's call it something) which has not been inscribed if the inscription of this something *broke* the support of the writing or the memory.' (p. 55). He draws a connection between this solution to the problem and, the 13th Century Japanese Zen Buddhist philosopher, Dôgen's *Zenki* treatise from the *Shôbôgenzo*, where 'there can be a presence that the mirror cannot reflect, but that breaks it to smithereens.' (p. 55). This breaking, which is analogized with passing, working through, a generalized conception of writing, and anamnesis, 'is not a forgotten inscription, it does not have its place and time on the support of inscriptions, in the reflecting mirror. It remains unknown to breachings and scannings.' (p. 55). This latter proposition would mean that it also remains unknown to habit and remembering, and is precisely what breaks their syntheses. Breaking or abandoning pre-inscribed syntheses of breachings and scannings lets, 'in a free-floating way, what passes: the signifier, however senseless it may appear.' (p. 56). This passing, which Lyotard associates with a general (not just literal) form of 'writing' follows an 'a-technical or a-technological rule', which is 'an anamnesis of what has not been inscribed. For it offers the inscription of the white of the paper, blank like the neutrality of the analytical ear.' (p. 56).

Stiegler takes extreme umbrage to Lyotard's suggestion that 'writing', anamnesis, or passing, might be considered a-technological – but in Lyotard's understanding it *is not* a-

technological, *per se*, but rather it follows an a-technological rule (i.e. not habitual repetition or voluntary remembering of inscription). Its a-technological rule can (and in all the primary examples Lyotard gives – of writing, art, and music – does) utilise technologies of inscription. Passing, like breaching and scanning, is also still a memory-effect of technological inscription in general but it does not, like breaching and scanning, follow a technological rule; 'it is a technique with no rule, or a negative rule, deregulation. A generativity with, if possible, no set-up other than the absence of a set-up.' (p. 54).

Inventions

Stiegler's basic position on technology as an objectification and spatialization of meaning (and its concomitant legibility) has remained roughly the same since Lyotard's commentary and recently he has challenged Lyotard's critique. In *States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century* Bernard Stiegler asserts that Lyotard 'clearly does not believe' the 'hypothesis' he puts forward against Stiegler (p. 99). Stiegler want to go beyond Lyotard by

> thinking the school not just as a place of breachings, or even scannings, as does Lyotard, mourning the *Aufklärung*, in *The Postmodern Condition*. The school must be thought as the institution of a new process of psychic, collective *and technical* individuation, where tertiary retention becomes, as *pharmakon*, the object of a positive pharmacology, that is, of a therapeutic experience of anamneses – countering the short-circuiting of democratic and political forms of sovereignty. (Stiegler, 2015a, pp. 103-104)

Here Stiegler is referring to Lyotard's contribution to his conference, where breaching is the institution of habits and scanning is memorization, especially of classifications and identifications. By inscribing 'the therapeutic experience of anamneses' as a positive component of educational technology, he is explicitly setting himself up against the conclusion to Lyotard's essay, where he argues for anamnesic resistance to what could be called imposed educational technologies, especially insofar as they attempt to synthesise and harmonise their subjects. Making a similar point to that expressed in the context of music and music education, Lyotard, here, suggests a form of resistance exhibited by some artists and writers, and similar to that of Winston in George Orwell's *1984* might be possible as a

resistance to 'the syntheses of breaching and scanning' (Lyotard, 1991, p. 57). Which is to say, a resistance to imposed habit forming and memorization. To interpret this reading aslant, in the direction of education, Winston's journal writing (as a form of 'passing') could be understood as a means of what might provisionally be called 'anamnesic education'; or an educational experience resistant to aggressive cultural and educational impositions and expectations. While Lyotard doesn't expand on the reference to Orwell's novel in this essay, he does so in another essay, aligning Winston's journal-keeping – where he writes of love and friendship – with resistance in keeping with his notion of writing, passing, and working through:

> One writes against language, but necessarily with it. To say what it already knows how to say is not writing. One wants to say what it does not know how to say, but what one imagines it should be able. One violates it, one seduces it, one introduces into it an idiom unknown to it. When this desire disappears—this desire for it to be able to say something other than what it already knows how to say—when language is felt to be impenetrable and inert, rendering all writing vain, it is called Newspeak. (Lyotard, 1994, p. 102)

The practice of writing as means of saying what it does not yet know how to say is, then, a means of bringing about an educational experience that exceeds and resists imposed habit formation and memorization. It is resistant *and* inventive, passing *and* educational; an experience that educates not through a process of collectively framed individuation but by '[breaking the mirror] to smithereens' (Lyotard 1991, p. 55). In the context of his critique of Stiegler, again, this writing is a form of non-psychoanalytical 'working through' (or anamnesis) as resistance:

> A resistance to clever programmes and fat telegrams. The whole question is this: is the passage possible, will it be possible with, or allowed by, the new mode of inscription and memoration that characterizes the new technologies? Do they not impose syntheses, and syntheses conceived still more intimately in the soul than any earlier technology has done? But by that very fact, do they not also help to refine our anamnesic resistance? I'll stop on this vague hope, which is too dialectical to take seriously. All this remains to be thought out, tried out. (p. 57)

The thought that the breaching and scanning of education might refine a capacity for resistance to the synthesis they impose is a direct threat to philosophies of education that seek harmonisation and collectively framed individuation. This is perhaps why Stiegler is so concerned to emphasise that Lyotard couldn't possibly believe his own argument (presumably taking Lyotard's wariness at the dialectical risk of his final speculative questions as evidence of this) and also misses the resistant role anamnesis might play in the context of education and social experience more broadly. Instead, he emphasises therapeutic harmonization and synthesis in the name of collectively/socially framed individuation and democratic and political forms of sovereignty.

Stiegler's critique of Lyotard, mainly presented in the chapter, 'Après Coup, the Differend' from *States of Shock* (although also extending implicitly to the rest of that text), exists in the context of a broader argument against what he calls (following Gilles Deleuze) 'stupidity', in the name of 'attention'. For Stiegler, 'If we must learn how to live, it is because noetic life, which must be formed, is technical through and through.' (2015a, p. 159). Amongst several wide-ranging critiques of Lyotard, Stiegler critiques the differend as being 'essentially linguistic' (p. 94), which it isn't;[4] he accuses Lyotard of opposing 'technics and language' (p. 98), which he doesn't; and, perhaps most importantly that he accuses Lyotard of opposing 'telegraphy and writing' (p. 98), which he also doesn't and, in fact, Lyotard only ever claims (in another essay in *The Inhuman*) that thought and writing 'do not allow themselves to be subordinated to "tele-graphy"' (Lyotard, 1991, p. 76). Stiegler also outlines this final claim more fully and carefully in an essay collected in a volume dedicated to celebrating 30 years since Lyotard's 1985 *Les Immatériaux* exhibition at the Centre Georges Pompidou, where he explains that

> this exhibition does not have a didactic relation to its public, but because Lyotard sees
> the technical writing that he refers to as "telegraphy", which is the writing of

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[4] While this is a significant misrepresentation of the 'differend' as defined in *The Differend*, to expand on this point here, to the extent it deserves, would be beyond the scope of this essay. However, to put the point briefly, Lyotard writes extensively on ethical, as well as physiognomic, and aesthetic phrases – phrases being the key components of differends – none of which can be reduced to being 'essentially linguistic' in anything but a superficial, and certainly not 'essential', sense. And, even if this superficial interpretation were to be accepted, it would prove, in an overexaggerated manner (that I wouldn't want to imply), the next point: that Lyotard does not oppose technics and language.

"development", as being in opposition to anamnesic writing, which according to Lyotard would be what "resists" this development. (Stiegler 2015b, p. 148)

It is notable that Stiegler does not make this distinction between technical and anamnesic writing in his more polemical piece on Lyotard from *States of Shock*. However, even this distinction is problematic, as Lyotard does not argue that anamnesic writing is not telegraphic and even suggests the opposite might be the case when he writes, with reference to his own essay, 'In any case, you will agree that this is a pretty good tele-graphy, an inscription from afar, from very far, and for very far, in time and space.' (Lyotard, 1991, p. 54). This is also the closest Lyotard comes to defining tele-graphy: an inscription from afar. The fact that art and literature might be examples of anamnesic resistance or working through, and yet results in inscriptions from afar, seems to invalidate the claim that anamnesic writing is neither tele-graphic nor technical. For Lyotard, anamnesic 'writing' does not avoid technics or tele-graphy, as Stiegler seems to assume, rather it follows an a-technical rule that characterises its resistance and allows for experience and inventions that don't revert to the syntheses of breaching and scanning.

Another of Stiegler's claims about Lyotard, presented in both *States of Shock* (2015a 98-99) and the essay commemorating *Les Immatériaux*, and again based primarily on a reading of the short essay from *The Inhuman* critiquing Stiegler, is that Lyotard is concerned with resistance, rather than invention. And for Stiegler,

> our goal must be invention, conceived as an individuation at once psychic, collective and technical, where individuation is defined *essentially* as a technical and technological situation in which *tekhnē* and *logos* must not be opposed to each other, nor conflated, but where *logos* must be treated as an historical modality of the transindividuation of *tekhnē* qua process of grammatization – and in a situation that, today, produces a process of generalized proletarianization, a situation that is a matter of overcoming through the *invention of a new libidinal economy*. (2015b, p. 157).

This falsely assumes that resistance cannot be inventive and clears the ground for Stiegler to suggest how irresponsible this is (while also attempting to supersede Lyotard's own 'libidinal

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economy'), and then, with an incredibly specific definition of invention, inherited from Gilbert Simondon, suggests how his own philosophy offers the solution:

> Lyotard suggests we must "resist". I believe that we must, on the contrary, invent. We must invent a pharmacological critique (for the duplicity of the pharmacological situation is what the default of the one really means), a pharmacological critique that calls for an organology both theoretical and practical, that is: inventing and configuring its instruments according to the therapies and therapeutics that are the anamnesic transindividuation processes wherein disciplines are formed. (Stiegler 2015b, p. 156)

Stiegler could here be seen to be drawing an opposition between what he constructs as the resistant, near passive, ineffective, and irresponsible philosophy of Lyotard, with his own inventive philosophy of social action through institutional management, for which, in Simondon's words, 'Invention is the emergence of an extrinsic compatibility between the milieu and the organism, and of an intrinsic compatibility between the sub-systems of action.' (Simondon cited in Stiegler, 2015a, p. 81).

The Unharmonizable

All of Stiegler's claims reduce Lyotard's arguments to binary oppositions and over-specifications that they do not hold. It is either compatibility *or* irresponsibility, invention *or* resistance, technicity *or* irrelevancy. It is notable that Stiegler does not base these claims on citations that evidence them but nonetheless proceeds in using them to build a context within which he is able to suggest that witnessing the differend is a distraction from political action; that technics and language, as well as telegraphy and writing, are not opposed; and, that Lyotard's philosophy plays into a social scourge of irresponsible disindividuation (i.e. the dissimulation of one's subjectivity) and stupidity that Stiegler's own educational proclamations seek to remedy (Stiegler, 2015a, p. 103). Stiegler's aim is to 'save youth […] save childhood, and even infancy.' (p. 153). This is because he sees 'the industrial exploitation of attention' as 'an extreme threat hanging over childhood, youth and, more generally, over intergenerational relationships.' (p. 154). Stiegler takes for granted that the youth need

saving from their own stupidity and lack of attention, problems that he not only diagnoses but for which he also offers the cure.

Of course, Lyotard's anamnesic resistance is not an example of the collectively framed transindividuation that Stiegler is concerned with, being at once far less social and far more anonymous; almost a form of dispossession. Nor is Lyotard's philosophy directly concerned with saving youth or society from an attention deficit (or anything else) and it seems likely that he would be quite sceptical of such assertions. Lyotard's anamnesis works in a manner contrary to, although not opposed to (which is why he rejects the rhetorical dialectical 'trap' he reflects on at the end of his essay on Stiegler), breaching and scanning and is at least as much a resistance of education as a product or component of it. By turning against the institutions of habits and memorization – as well as implicitly challenging the reduction of anamnesic resistance to dialectical, or any other form, of synthesis – Lyotard leaves room for counter- or extra-institutional educational experience and consequence. As this might imply, resistance to education might still result in educational experience in a much broader sense, even if it is also a resistance to harmonizing forms of public instruction and the technologies of education manifest as impositions, often purportedly redemptive.

Stiegler's conception of education is far more limited and specific than Lyotard's, being defined in terms of instruction, and, more specifically, public instruction. In the third volume of *Technics and Time*, he asks, 'Just what is the "existential" meaning of education in the widest sense?'. He then immediately delimits his response to question within the context of public instruction, arguing that, 'The meaning of "public instruction" […] is precisely the interiorization of a subjective principle of differentiation, which in turn means that it is the substrata allowing the implementation of such a principle, which is nothing without them – but which themselves are nothing without *it*. (Stiegler, 2011, p. 164)

For Stiegler the 'interiorization of a subjective principle of differentiation' would be nothing without public instruction, and public instruction would be nothing without it. This synthesis of the interiorization of a subjective principle of differentiation with public instruction would seemingly excise anything like Lyotard's counter- or extra-institutional examples of educational experience. For Lyotard, there is, importantly, something that is not harmonizable: 'the unharmonizable' (1991, p. 4). He writes about this (in a manner perhaps

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quite compatible with Medina's 'epistemology of resistance') with direct reference to education in his introduction to *The Inhuman*, the book containing his critique of Stiegler (Lyotard, 1991, p. 3-5). The unharmonizable not only exceeds the reach of educational institutions and its cultural impositions, it is also the means of resisting them and their influence. There remains for him something that cannot but be left alone or at least somewhat dissociated from educational institutions. While Lyotard's non-psychoanalytical anamnesis associates this disharmony with resistance, Stiegler implants a psychoanalytic notion of anamnesis *within* the system of institutional education. For Stiegler, anamnesis is reversible in the sense that it, if correctly framed and implemented, can be used in the service of public instruction.

Conclusion

The Lyotardian resistance to Stiegler's position, especially when brought more explicitly into the context of education, raises important issues at a time when the latter's ideas are becoming prominent and influential, especially in France, but also internationally. The point is not to delegitimate Stiegler's position but rather to re-legitimate a resistance to it (and that which it represents), that, this essay has argued, is significantly more valid than his own critique of it would suggest. Equally, by developing this resistance to Stiegler, I have sought to intimate why and how a more generalised notion of this resistance might inform contemporary educational philosophy and practice.

While Stiegler hopes to enhance the technological reach of education to better account for and serve that which might elude it through therapeutic means, Lyotard sees in this a danger and wants to hold in reserve that which resists and is 'unharmonizable'. What Stiegler sees as a path to 'trans-individuation', Lyotard sees as the capacity for anamnesic resistance to educational and other social institutions and their technologies, including their therapeutic technologies. Stiegler seems convinced of the school's necessary and primary role in the process of individuation, while Lyotard's thesis lends itself more to a conception of a (non-psychoanalytical) resistance to the claustrophobia of schooling, education, culture, and educational technologies.

The point is not that schools should be abandoned in favour of resistance but rather that educational resistance cannot be quelled or synthesised with schooling and educational culture. It follows a different logic and strikes out from another starting point. Though it is educational and inscriptive, anamnesic resistance cannot be incorporated into the impositional logic of educational culture because its very 'technique', 'generativity', and 'set-up' (Lyotard 1991, p. 54), is precisely oriented towards challenging, evading, and superseding anything imposed within that frame. My supplementary resistance, through the incorporation of sound as a means of philosophical figuration, is an attempt to show (or audiate) how anamnesic resistance must come from the 'outside', even if, following its inscription, it might slowly become incorporated within that which was resisted. It is the experience and education of anamnesis itself which is resistant, not the product of that 'passing'.[5]

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[5] I have explored the trace of the event that a product of anamnesic resistance leaves on its invented surface in a complementary work to this article (Author 2021), informed by Lyotard's thinking that, 'To lend an ear to an event is the most difficult thing in the world. An event is not what occupies the front page of newspapers. It is something that supervenes, that comes out of nowhere. As such, this thing is still nothing: we don't know how to explain it or even to name it. We are not ready for it, we don't have what is needed to welcome or to account for it in a system of signification, what is needed to identify it. And yet, if it occurs, it must touch some 'surface' where it leaves its trace: a consciousness, an unconsciousness, individual or collective. Perhaps it even had to invent this surface in order to leave such a trace.' (Lyotard 2009, 37).

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