

UNIVERSITY OF WINCHESTER

Facilitating reflective practice in higher education professional programmes: reclaiming and redefining the practices of reflective practice

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Doctor of Philosophy

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for a postgraduate research degree of the University of Winchester.

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ABSTRACT

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The aim of this thesis is to reclaim, redefine and re-imagine reflective practice in the context of higher education. Literature concerning mainstream understanding and practice highlights how reflective practice, popularised by Donald Schön, takes the form of reflection-on-action, retrospective critical inquiry into one's implicit and explicit social professional practice judgements, decisions and activities. Contending that only by fully scoping the discipline of professional practice can one come to a rich, deep appreciation of the professional artistry involved and the essential role and nature of reflective practice, this thesis offers Professional Practice: Connected Practice. Yet bringing that theory into juxtaposition with lived experiences of 16 "percipients" (Myers, 2008) engaged in reflective practice during Practice-Led-Research via Reflective Practice Groups brings to light significant issues: reflective practice has always, or has become, appropriated by neo-liberalism formulating it as a reified, cognitively dominated, panoptical form of therapeutic analysis and professional assessment, a narrowing process into which students/practitioners are 'broken-in' (Lefebvre) through a slow incremental violence of imposed habitualised and repetitive routines. 'Percipients' (Myers), purposefully employed, values their lead in the entire research process, through which the method of critical phenomenology approached via dialogue emerged. Here they signified reflection-in-action, the least theorised, most confused element of Schön/Schönian-inspired reflective practice. In the liminoid space of social science and the arts, and drawing on European phenomenology, the contribution of this thesis is to theorise understanding and practice of percipients 'threshold concepts' of: *Gaze*, mainstream reflection-on-practice, offering a reimagined creative, playful alternative; *Glance*, embodied and bodied reflection-in-action informed by Gendlin's Focusing; and, the 'insight cultivator' of *Leaving Go*. These being interwoven, 'rhythm' and 'rhythmanalysis' (Lefebvre) lends to further appreciation and their facilitation. Named *Mittere*, the frame for the rhythm of this radical reclaimed, redefined and re-imaged reflective practice is proposed, becoming organising chapters for the thesis.

Key words: radical reflective practice; higher education; social professional education; reflection-in-action; Practice-Led research; *Mittere* and the rhythm of reflective practice.

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PREFACE: STARTING OUT

From the title it is clear this thesis concerns reflective practice. Broadly, 'reflective practice' refers to critical inquiry into one's judgements, decisions and actions, so the assumptions, values, beliefs and theories that implicitly and explicitly shape and inform opinions, decisions made and actions taken, to better understand oneself, one's behaviour, and effect future interventions. To illustrate, Osterman & Kottkamp (2015:1) define it as a "systematic" process involving "self-awareness, self-understanding, and critical thinking [to] create meaningful and enduring change by changing [oneself]". Widely attributed to American philosopher Donald Schön and his research into the practice of architects, town-planners, and 'science-based' professions (Schön, 1983), he positions it as essential to the practice of professional artistry. His theory was swiftly adopted by the social professions, initiating, in Schön's (1991:5) words, "the reflective turn" that created "a kind of revolution". Social professions are the interest of this thesis, those that

comprise practitioners whose role it is to work with [individuals, groups, communities] who are regarded as in need of support, advocacy, informal education or control. They work within a shared set of values stressing a commitment to individual and social change, respect for diversity and difference and a practice that is participatory and empowering (Banks & Nøhr, 2003:8).

The key resource for their work in its multifaceted, complex, rich interactions is oneself: practice is mediated through the practitioner. Thus, systemic inquiry of the kind referred to above is essential in their day-to-day engagement, and, consequently, because higher education programmes are "charged with" responsibility for the transition of "aspiring professionals [as they] are prepared for the challenges in their chosen profession" (Dall'Alba, 2009:35) and for providing opportunities for continuing professional development opportunities afterward, reflective practice:

- is part of the hegemonic practices embedded into undergraduate and postgraduate programmes;
- has become central to relevant underpinning higher education teaching approaches; is expressed in curricula and programme expectations; and,
- is named in (UK) professional standards to which those programmes are mapped.

To illustrate, the National Occupational/Professional Body Standards for youth and community work (QAA, 2019), nurses and midwives (MMC, 2018) social work (Social Work England, 2019) and teachers (TDA, 2010) explicitly reference ability to and engagement in reflective practice. Indeed, reflective practice has become more broadly recognised as

significant to 'graduateness' in general, a sector term for the "orientating framework of educational outcomes that a university community agrees its graduates should develop as a result of completing their studies successfully" (Hill *et al*, 2016:156), linked to engaging in research inquiry, a skill required for employability and lifelong learning, and named in information and digital literacy (Barnett, 1997).

In sum, Hill *et al* (2016:156) describe reflective practice as facilitating

intellectual curiosity, analytical reasoning, problem-solving and reflective judgement; effective communication; leadership and teamwork skills; ...[and] personal attributes such as self-awareness, self-confidence, personal autonomy/self-reliance, flexibility and creativity; and personal values such as ethical, moral and social responsibility, integrity, and cross-cultural awareness;

and Barnett (1997:13) goes further, reflective practice as key to 'the business of university' through which "the civic character of society is extended and deepened".

In terms of how reflective practice is facilitated, Slade *et al* (2019:7) explain whilst "unique to each learner, it does not occur by chance. Educators must provide exercises, strategies, and practical tools to promote" it. Therefore, as will be discussed in more detail later, in the higher education programmes outlined above this typically takes the form of tools based on writing (diaries, journals, logs, portfolios, blogs) and dialogue (individual, group and peer supervision, action learning sets, reflective practice groups, practice session review/debrief), with the expectation or requirement that students engage in whichever or all of these as deemed necessary by teaching staff, constructively aligned with curricula, assessment, Learning Outcomes, programme aims, National Occupational Standards, Quality Assurance frameworks and any public body professional requirements related to the programme. As noted above, the main aim of reflective practice is change - of self, and individual, shared and organisation professional practice, 'practice' defined as a "sequence of actions undertaken by a person to serve others" (Argyris & Schön, 1974:6).

Thus, I define reflective practice as a rigorous, disciplined approach for noticing, attending to, and inquiring into aspects of practice, where 'practice' means service to others. My own interest in this and it being a focus for research tells a tale in itself. Whilst a research project has an "arbitrary starting point of entry" [*emphasis added*] (Trimingham, 2002:57), Trimingham explains that as researcher/author I bring my "own level of understanding and knowledge" to it, and this has a "natural history" (Silverman, 2013:352). In the words of Bordage (2009:313), "We all have assumptions, explicit or implicit, about the way things are

and how they work. It is the researcher's and author's responsibility to make [them] explicit".

To do so begins to illuminate the scope, focus and organisation of this thesis, and its doctoral worth in its radical reclaiming and redefining of the practices of reflective practice is evinced at the end of chapter 2.

*

I am a Senior Lecturer¹ and Head of Academic Professional Development at a university in the south of England.

This has not always been the case.

20 years ago I was working as a youth worker, community worker and psychotherapist. I worked in those roles for 12 years in the UK, Western Asia, and on projects in South America and the Caribbean, with individuals, groups and communities on issues of abuse, violence, mental health and well-being, before moving into higher education to teach those areas in professionally qualifying undergraduate and postgraduate programmes and continuing professional development for the social professions. In other words, having practiced in the social professions I engaged in the education of future and current social professionals and more recently am responsible for the teaching development of lecturers of all disciplines in higher education.

I am a 'mid-aged' cisgendered White woman living in a predominantly economically comfortable geographic area in south west England. I happily juggle my doctoral studies and full-time job, with working, living and commuting across three counties, and with being a mother of a daughter, and a daughter myself.

I am of working-class roots, previous generations employed in foundries, coal mines, retail and domestic service, my parents striking out, wanting something different for themselves and their family. My two sisters and I were first-generation university, our parents viewing education as a path to change.

¹ 'Lecturer' is also a recognised role in Further Education (Post-16), however this doctorate focusses on higher education (18+ education provision).

I like to dance, sing, run, write, read, and I adore being a mother and daughter. I enjoy the creativity, spontaneity and improvisation all these bring to life – and thus also appreciate the value of creativity, spontaneity and improvisation in professional practice.

I am dyspraxic. This was only identified in my late 40's whilst studying for my PhD. Whilst the diagnosis may have been irrelevant or paralysing, for me it was liberating, an explanation for past experiences and a way to articulate those of the present. It also provides context for my resilience, as well as my lifelong valuing of creative thinking.

I am...

I am...

What to include, what to leave out?

*

For me the answer to that question lies in reflective practice. Characterising my work - professional, parental, and personal - is the myriad of implicit and explicit decisions I am called to make, am affected by, and effect - the macro, meso, and micro levels of influence and influences (Mulvale *et al*, 2016). This, along with the extent of my awareness of them, involves:

- thoughts, images, feelings and emotions triggered by infinitesimal actions, behaviours and dynamics in myself and others;
- the impact of changes within and between the spaces and places we inhabit;
- the occurrence of welcome and unwelcome associations and memories triggered as I interact;
- my (and our) evaluations, judgements and prejudice; and,
- the multitude ways that all these interact, within me and between myself and every other person, directly and indirectly, overtly and tacitly, consciously or not.

Informing, influencing, constructing and shaping all these elements are individually held and collectively shared values, beliefs and assumptions: our interactions do not exist in a vacuum. 'Values' are "principles to live by, [so] what is important to the individual", 'beliefs' being "indicative of a particular understanding of the way the world works", and 'assumptions', the "premises or understandings that underpin values and beliefs, i.e. what the individual takes for granted" (Fisher, 2003:321). Applied to professional practice *reflective practice* is a process of, and tools for, being/becoming aware of and analysing these as elements and their influence on decisions and activities, with a view to

development. Importantly, however, this is development not for its own sake 'in the service of me': whilst engagement in reflective practice might be personally cathartic, self-revealing, even therapeutic, it is *not* personal therapy because its purpose is to critically consider and as a result develop service to others. It is indeed a 'practice'.

The "profound philosophical" (Fisher, 2003:321) implications of this whilst 'constructing an epistemology of practice' (Schön, 1983:31; 2001:194) in my own career trajectory led me to become a passionate supporter and practitioner of reflective practice. Working in communities with people of all ages who were struggling, at times unpredictable, violent (internally, externally) and distressed, then moving to be a lecturer to support others to do such work in the less volatile but equally free-flowing higher education classroom contexts, reflective practice was, and remains, my anchor in the 'hot action' (Eraut, 1994:53) of professional practice. Furthermore, becoming an academic meant that I could also explore its scholarship, bringing theoretical underpinning to that passion.

During that time, I became intrigued by the extent to which the concept and practice of reflective practice permeates social professional education. Indeed four decades on from Schön's 1980s writing, in the UK and the rest of Europe, as well as America, Canada, Australia, and emerging in Japan (see Tamai *et al*, 2016) and Indonesia (Cirocki & Widodo, 2019), reflective practice is embraced in a "wave of euphoria" (Horgan, 2005:33 cited in McGarr & Moody, 2010:580), "a natural fact of life that furnishes the 'fix', the 'this is it'" (Gergen & Gergen, 2008:11) of higher education and professional practice programmes, therefore also understood and approached as "the bedrock of professional identity" (Finlay, 2008:2). So, embedded as an imperative to learning and development, reflective practice has become "relied" on (Clegg *et al*, 2002:131) as a "promised land" (Papastephanou & Angeli, 2007:604) of salvation for students/practitioners and practice alike.

The course of that inquiry took a pivotal leap, indeed lurch, when I came across Ecclestone & Hayes' (2009) critique of reflective practice (see Trelfa, 2016b²). In contrast to typical understanding and facilitation of reflective practice in higher education as a neutral tool for engagement in professional practice, their contention is that it is a particular ideological and cultural script imposed on students through assumptions and expectations travelled out via its required practices. Therefore Saltiel (2010) marks reflective practice out as a

² Full references for my own work can be found in Appendix A

discourse, striking when appreciated that ‘discourse’ means “not what is said [but] that which constrains *and* enables what *can* be said” [*emphasis added*] (Barad, 2003:819).

It brought my passionate support of reflective practice up short. I questioned whether in my own practice, the professional programmes I taught on, and indeed social professions and its education in general, reflective practice had always been, or had become, a standardising mechanism that controls the process and outcomes of what otherwise could be an unfettered inquiry into one’s own experience in professional practice.

I set about exploring the features that might have that effect, as well as those that enable a more positive reflective practice, via Masters research with undergraduates and postgraduates on social professional programmes in two universities in two jurisdictions of the UK by garnering their perspectives on the purpose of reflective practice. It revealed fundamental issues in theory, rhetoric and practice of reflective practice (Trelfa, 2010), findings that echoed Cranton’s (2006:111) argument that reflective practice is - or has become - a process that

allow[s] educators ‘inside the heads’ of learners and encourage[s] self-surveillance as people try to write what they expect the teacher to want [and] feel obligated to live up to the (often implicit) ideas

of what reflective practice is and involves. Its conclusion offered that the practice of reflective practice does not capture nor result in that which is claimed in its mainstream literature. I followed that MA with smaller exploratory research with a colleague involving trainee teachers in a university in a different continent, the same broad findings arising there too (Trelfa & Tamai, 2014). Consequently, Starting Out³ on this doctoral research began from there although it struck me that typical absence of this critical regard by those who facilitate reflective practice risks its practices being adopted as if inherently positive, embedded as if entirely neutral, leading to uncritical assertion of reflective practice as a controlling process with those unintentional (I assume) outcomes. Thus, rather than its original roots of enhancing and articulating professional artistry, reflective practice comprises/had come to be about control of self and situation through controlling practices. Yet I *also* knew from my own experience as well as some accounts in the Masters research, *and* from students I taught, reflective practice as an anchor, enlightening, valuable. So, this

³ I use capital letters to distinguish words in their action as thesis concepts from what would otherwise be generic usage. They are: Professional Practice: Connected Practice and its elements (The Trappings, Connected Practice, Being Prepared, Performance, and Qualities of Me); Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go; and Mittere and its elements (of Starting, including Starting Out, and Starting On, as well as Capturing, Describing, and, Narrating).

doctoral research also Started Out with curiosity: would new research come to the same or different conclusions of my earlier research, and if typical mainstream understanding and practices of reflective practice were not enabling and enhancing professional artistry what did it need to involve? In sum, would it be possible to reclaim and redefine the practices of reflective practice so that they centre on professional artistry and service to others?

PROLOGUE: STARTING ON

The same reasons that make it important to express oneself as author into a thesis apply to being explicit about the world of the research inquiry. As an analogy I conceive this as a gateway, so, I invite you, the reader, to imagine yourself at the gate of this thesis through which you can see a vista comprising familiar features that you would expect to see in a PhD, those of theory, practice and research, but it is now understood as vital that I describe those features to convey its particular landscape. In doing so I utilise three metaphors as devices for descriptive effect, those of **'spirals'** (*cf.* Trimmingham), **'strands'** and **'props'**⁴.

- **Theory:**

This thesis draws on established theory of reflective practice that forms the platform that is taken for granted and commonly understood platform of principles, aims, practices and facilitation in professionally qualifying programmes, continuing professional development, and gradueness in higher education. Referred to from here-on as **'mainstream literature'**, by this I am not claiming the theory to be exhaustive, nor that there isn't variation, not the least because literature emerging in Schön's wake is "vast" (James, 2019b), but as shorthand to literature that is widely accepted, understood and used in higher education. This thesis also draws on and in theory other than that of reflective practice of course, this being led by the primary research.

- **Practice:**

The centrality of practice to reflective practice means it is a theme that runs throughout the thesis, introduced now and critically interrogated in chapter 2. Indeed, this thesis takes the view that to fully appreciate reflective practice one first needs a rich, complex, critical of professional practice, 'practice' defined as service to others, here being lecturers/facilitators as they 'serve' students/practitioners who are developing their own 'service' to current and future clients.

- **Research:**

Therefore the focus of my primary research is also practice, the lived experience of students as they practice reflective practice in their own practice settings. I apologise in advance, that sentence a case in point! Given the focus of reflective practice, the latter

⁴ Words appearing in bold in the text (not headings) of this Prologue are included in the appended Glossary.

word being unavoidable in its label, and 'practice' being the way it is facilitated, *and* the contexts in which it happens, 'practice' is a word that appears a lot. Even so, relevant in this section, as Trimmingham points out, not all practice is research: it "is relevant to it" but will not necessarily contribute unless and until it is "subject to analysis and commentary" (2002:54). Moreover, and of further significance to this thesis, practice is messy which does not easily lend to the tidy ordering implied here, a central motif in my research inquiry that in more general terms also faced Trimmingham in her work. She developed her research through '**spirals**', "where progress is not linear but circular, a spiral which constantly returns to its original point of entry but with renewed understanding" (Trimingham, 2002:56), a frame that I adopted. My research comprises five spirals of activity that happen broadly to correspond to: 2012-13; 2013-14; 2014-15; 2015-17; and 2017 to submission. Therefore, to discuss the features of my research I depict the spirals as follows,




Figure 1: five spirals

but given their centrality to the research they are detailed in chapter 1.

Four strands

These are not free-standing spirals as it were. Weaving through them, linking their elements and features together, are four **strands**. Therefore, describing the world that my research inquiry Starts On requires their articulation.




Figure 2: five spirals and four strands

The four strands are explained in order of appearance rather than priority or significance. Indeed, they are of *equal* importance. The strands also have relevance to reflective practice, thus are related to the focus of the whole thesis.

The *first strand* is the overall structure and style of the thesis.

Structure is indicated by the chapter titles. The title of each chapter relates to their focus created from themes that emerged through the research process: **Starting, Capturing, Curating, Describing, Narrating, and Mittere**. Each chapter title (excepting the final one) is followed immediately by a brief description in italics, and together the concepts and their relationship to reflective practice are the focus of Mittere, the final chapter. Therefore, Mittere focusses on the process of inquiry through which the findings of the other chapters emerged, offering this to be central to a reclaimed radical reflective practice.

Style is conveyed through my writing. In this I am inspired by Cixous' (1976:876) rallying call for "women's writing", her contention that women "have been driven away [from writing] as violently as from their bodies – for the same reasons, by the same law, with the same fatal goal". So "Woman must put herself into the text – as into the world and into history – by her own movement" (*ibid*). Noted already, the subscript to this thesis reflects my personal journey from working class silence in academic contexts wherein academic writing was "too high", "reserved for the great" therefore "too great for me" (1976:876), to discovering my Voice in and through academic writing as "an act [...] marked by seizing the occasion to speak" (1976:880). I characterise my writing style as clarity and complexity, simplicity and multidimensionality, criticality and reflexivity, that "arrives, vibrant, over and again" through an intention to "un-think" (1976:882). More, as shall be seen, that description has resonance with a radical reflective practice.

The *second strand* that weaves through this thesis is closely related to the first but still a strand in its own right: my deliberate use, where relevant, of ‘personal in pronoun’ (Cixous, 1976:888). Use of (judicious) first-person “creates the conditions for reflexivity and makes power relations more visible” (Erdmans, 2007:8): it points up my authorial privilege as researcher and writer, and in doing so marks out a perspective that is different to claims of objectivity behind which the researcher hides. My use of ‘I’ acknowledges *my* decisions tensioning argument from Preface to Epilogue. However, in use of ‘I’, I also trouble my positionality. This second strand, then, is about how, in aim and intention, this thesis is “never simple or linear or ‘objectified’, generalised” (Cixous, 1976:881); *I* am embedded in process and text. This too is concomitant with a radical reflective practice.

It is salient to highlight that these two strands reflect a feminist “standpoint” to, and in, my work (Harding, 1986:26). Feminist standpoint theory emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s, its primary concern not of specific changes for women but with questioning who creates knowledge, what kind of knowledge, and to what ends. Yet even in its growth its foremothers were asking whether there *can* be such a perspective given that “women’s (or feminists’) social experience is divided by race, class and culture” (Harding, 1986:26). Intersectionality is key here: I am *this* woman: of working-class heritage in a middle-class life, White, ‘mid-aged’, culturally English and for generations, with an invisible disability, etc. So, in the evolution of feminist standpoint it became clear it does not imply homogeneity but applies the questions about knowledge to ‘philosophy, epistemology, methodology and political strategy’ (Harding, 2004:2) to consider who is privileged and how, to what ends, and who is excluded. One might denote a contradiction between this and my use of the word ‘woman’ (or any other singular term I use to signal forms of social relations), therefore clarity is required. Thinking with Cixous (1976:875-876),

When I say ‘woman’, I’m speaking of woman in her inevitable struggle against conventional man; and of a universal woman subject who must bring women to their senses and to their meaning in history.

That is, they are linguistic signals to the body of scholarship that recognises them as “key organiser[s] of social life”, and to the belief that “understanding how things work is not enough” (Sprague, 2016:3), action is required.

The *third strand* that runs through the spirals of this thesis is theory. It is, as noted, a feature one would expect to see in an academic doctoral endeavour. However, in my work Sutton & Staw’s (1995:378) “strong theory” is relevant. Strong theory is “a set of convincing and logically interconnected arguments” created from “connections among

phenomena” leading to “a story about why acts, event, structure and thoughts occur”. Developing strong theory requires “burrowing deeply into microprocesses, laterally into neighbouring concepts, or in an upward direction, tying itself to broader social phenomena” (*ibid*). Development of strong theory informs this thesis – and strong theory is also important to practitioners as part of reflective practice: it illuminates that which is otherwise unseen by a “naked (or theoretically unassisted) eye” (1995:378). Although discussed in detail in chapter 1, a brief explanation of ‘practitioner’ and ‘professional’ is pertinent at this point. They appear throughout the thesis sometimes interchangeably as a stylistic choice to avoid word repetition but there is a difference. Whilst both refer to the “active” and accountable “practicing of a learned occupation”, ‘practitioner’ refers to an individual who can and is performing a specific set of practice skills but who may, or may not, be formally qualified (Reid & Green, 2009:166); whilst ‘profession’ (and professional) refers to

an occupational group with specific higher education, expert knowledge and a professional integrity framework that underpins community trust, respect and recognition (Professional Standards Council, 2015:5).

Finally, and of course, theory is important to research. Research needs to have “catalytic validity” (Lather, 1986:67) via its location *in* established scholarship *and* its contribution *to* understanding, here being reflective practice and its facilitation in higher education. Therefore, these three strands weaving through the thesis are informed by Lather’s (1986:67) notion of ‘impact’, the “consciously channelled” aim that the work will be “reality-altering”.

The *fourth* and final *strand* weaving through the thesis is the voices of research ‘**percipients**’. Deliberate adoption of the word ‘percipients’ is integral here, reflecting Myers (2008) use of a term with broader meaning to describe a particular approach to research and involvement of those more typically referred to as ‘participants’, or even ‘subjects’. Percipients are recognised in terms of their “active, embodied and sensorial engagement” in process and outcomes (Myers, 2008:173), aligning this strand to the first three as well as to a radical reflective practice. My adoption of the term also represents a methodological journey that began with my Masters research (Trelfa, 2010), described earlier, where I considered those involved as participants and so I continue to use that term when referring to that work, as well as to research where position is unclear or unknown. The centrality of percipients means that they lead this doctoral research, its process and

outcomes; and stylistically where their voice must be the foreground, mine moves into the background – as will be seen, for example, in chapter 4.

Core props

The strands that weave throughout the spirals of research and therefore this thesis, connecting elements and features together, would need to be extremely rigid if only secured at two points of the thesis, its beginning and end! Therefore, there are a number of core ‘props’ linked to and supporting them along their way.




Figure 3: five spirals and four strands with four props

They are the props of:

- “radical research” (Neill, 1960; Freire, 1996; Schostak & Schostak, 2008);
- the liminoid (Turner, 1974) space of art with social science;
- Practice-Led research; and,
- the value and significance of emerging research method from the research process itself.

Each prop is explained in chapter 1 (following this Prologue), although it is germane to highlight that the props as well as the strands they support became pronounced *through* and *by* the research, in which the percipients and I were a part of a “creative social/relational process [that occurred through] dialogue, collaboration and co-ordination” (Bava, 2014:168). As I (re)create this in the thesis I hope to convey “the liveliness, the involvement, and even the passion” (Reason & Hawkins, 1988:79) of the percipients’ engagement in their experiences of reflective practice.

*

So here we are at the gateway to the thesis! An introduction to reflective practice, the roots to the research, and the world of the inquiry now expressed, I invite you, the reader, to pass through the gate and enter!

Welcome!

*

CHAPTER 1

Starting

Doctoral research – like reflective practice - Starts somewhere; and indeed, with a nod to Heidegger and Sartre, one could argue it is always-Starting, always-becoming. However, for research and writing, but also germane to any period of reflective practice, there is a Start somewhere. As has been seen Trimmingham (2002:57) writes of the “arbitrary starting point of entry” to which we bring our “own level of understanding and knowledge”. Having set out my own ‘starting point’ in the Preface (or, ‘Starting Out’) and the ground on which this thesis being framed in the Prologue (or, ‘Starting On’), this chapter details the scholarly Start of the thesis.

1. Introduction

As for reflective practice, this thesis, in Preface and Prologue, Started with me, because as explained “no two people would start at the same point” (Trimingham, 2002:57).

Understanding this from a research perspective, the ‘four strands’ show concern with “consciousness that emerges from personal participation in events” (Foss & Foss, 1994:39).

Accordingly, it is now understood that, and how, the personal participation of researcher is always present in research; at issue is the extent to which this is expressly acknowledged, and, of what the researcher is conscious. The influence of feminist standpoint in social science can be seen in the work of Bordage (2009): he describes researcher leverage “on choices and interpretations” at every stage of a research project, likening it to a lighthouse that illuminates some parts of an ocean whilst leaving other parts dark (2009:313). So, in contrast to embracing hegemonic patriarchal positivist claims of neutrality and objectivity (Ellingson, 2009), my Starting is that “I occupy a specific social location and am informed by a specific biography, which operate together” (Sprague, 2016:3). Inherent within this is that you, the reader, should be able to determine for yourself the extent to which and when this is imposed unhelpfully and, indeed, the reach and impact of this general perspective is that it is now viewed as *essential* in qualitative research methodologies (May, 2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 2013).

Thus, my Starting in Preface and Prologue began with introducing myself and my interest in reflective practice, the ‘natural history’ (cf. Silverman) of appreciating reflective practice as enhancing and articulating professional artistry, this being defined as the ‘art of implementation and improvisation’ that characterises professional practice (Schön, 1987:13), to questioning whether and the extent to which it is or has become reduced to ‘knowledge work’ (Quill, 2011:328). That is, rather than development – or change – in a

student/practitioners service to others, they learn, adopt, adhere and perform expected knowledge of the practices of reflective practice, controlling themselves appropriately through controlling practices. Here, then, there it is suggested that what could/should have been a liberal endeavour has been turned on its head by and in neo-liberalism in its relationship to freedom and democracy. Given that liberalism “has become a nebulous concept” with ‘varied usage’ (Einar Thorsen, 2010:191), for clarity the position here sits between modern liberalism and libertarianism. Similarly vague, neo-liberalism/neoliberalism can be used “pejoratively” as a “catch-all term of abuse” (2010:188). Instead, Einar Thorsen explains that it can be conceived as a new positive paradigm, a continuum of liberalism, or a ‘great reversal’ (Palley, 2005 cited 2010:196) turning the liberalist practices of democracy and freedom into stability through self-regulation by a “State which reserves for itself the right to intervene in the market only in order to preserve the market economy as such” (2010:199). Depending on conceptualisation, then, the purpose of this is to liberate human potential and well-being (e.g. Harvey, 2005); or, to protect the interests of some by dehumanising others cruelly, as if disposable, through corrupt, ‘illiberal anti-democratic’ practices (Giroux, 2019:28). In my argument, I draw on the latter, a neo-liberalism (hyphenated to emphasise this position), characterised as “a crisis of agency, representation and resistance” (2019:38) in which higher education has a vital, essential role to play, either by reinforcement or questioning and troubling capitalist institutions and discourse that provide the ‘incubator’ for neo-liberalism (2019:39; Quill, 2011). Giroux refers to the latter as ‘profane illumination’, i.e. a process

by which the dominant common-sense assumptions of a capitalist hegemony are subject to the process of denaturalisation, critical analysis and the shock of new forms of recognition. This is a practice of making the familiar unfamiliar by treating it as a source of astonishment (2019:40).

1.1 Research aim

Thus, the central aim of the research, to

reclaim reflective practice from neo-liberal appropriation that formulates it as a reified, cognitively dominated, panoptical form of therapeutic analysis and professional assessment, a narrowing process that imposes habitualised and repetitive routines (via models and pro forma) on to what otherwise could be innovatory practices.

Starting that endeavour here, this chapter:

- introduces theories of reflective practice;

- explicates the vital elements of ‘experience’ and the self who is experiencing;
- elucidates the four core ‘props’ to the research introduced in the Prologue as radical research, the liminoid space of art with social science, Practice-Led research, and, the value and significance of an emerging research inquiry from the research itself;
- and, closes by introducing the chapters that follow.

2. Introducing theories of reflective practice.

Reflective practice was defined earlier as critical inquiry into the assumptions, values, beliefs and theories that implicitly and explicitly shape and inform decisions made and actions taken (Osterman & Kottkamp, 2015). The context of professional practice has been marked out as the scope of this research inquiry, and therefore my *own* definition of reflective practice is of a rigorous, disciplined approach for noticing, attending to, and inquiring into aspects of practice, where ‘practice’ means service to others. To better understand this, and in context of the ‘vast’ (*cf.* James) growth in literature on reflective practice and its varying array of priorities, preferences and dimensions, it is useful to Start at its roots, Schön’s most commonly cited theory of the 1980s.

2.1 Adult learning and critical thinking

Schön’s work is widely respected as “inspiration” (Moon, 1999:54) for the growth in popularity of, and literature on, reflective practice that has blossomed, his most frequently cited texts being *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think In Action* (1983), and, *Educating The Reflective Practitioner* (1987). He built his theory on the Pragmatist Movement of the Chicago School and John Dewey. In essence, the challenge offered there was too late 19th century empirical claims of universal truth wherein ideas were rational, “static, inert” ends in themselves (Dewey, 1916/2007:156), which, in turn, extended from earlier work of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Briefly, Peirce’s theory of communal meaning offered that ‘our conception of effects is the whole of our conception of the object’ (1878/1992:132), which was developed by James in his theory of individualised truth:

ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, to summarize them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession of particular phenomena (1909/2000:x).

These Pragmatist roots in their claim of truth *as reality as it means to those who are perceiving it* can be seen in Schön's theory of reflective practice.

Dewey extended Pragmatism through his notion of "instrumentalism":

knowing is literally something which we do, that is ultimately physical and active, that meanings in their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes and methods of behaviour towards facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification (Dewey, 1916/2007:331-332).

In this context an adult's ideas for action are "prospective", "intentions (plans and methods)" (1916/2007:156) that make learning and change possible, with emphasis on "progress rather than with lapse and fail" (Dewey, 1920:116). Consequently, the world cannot be fixed: it must be "uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable and hazardous" (Dewey, 1925:71), even "precarious and perilous" (1925:42). On that basis adults actively experience the world through "initiative, inventiveness, varied resourcefulness, assumption of responsibility in choice of belief and conduct" (Dewey, 1920:194). Through this lens he contrasts four different *kinds* of thinking:

1. thought in its broadest sense, so "everything that [...] goes through our minds", such as "idle fancy, trivial recollection, or flitting impression" without sequence (1910/1991:2);
2. "imaginative incidents and episodes" that have "a certain coherence, hanging together on a continuous thread" (1910/1991:3);
3. thought that "denotes belief resting upon some basis [...] real or supposed" (1910/1991:4); and, finally,
4. "reflective thought".

The first is reflection, a concept described by Cirocki & Widodo (2019:16) as "probably as old as educational discourse itself"; the second, dreaming; the third just as described. It is the fourth, reflective thought, that Schön took forward. For Dewey, reflective thought is where 'judgement is suspended' (1910/1991:13) and inquiry follows into the reasonableness, probability or improbability of the content of ones thinking, beliefs and behaviours via 'close study, scrutiny, revision of evidence, working out the implications of various hypotheses" (1910/1991:5). It involves conscious and deliberate critical signification through "Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends" (1910/1991:6). In that way "clear and coherent" meaning is made, with control experienced in situations that were previously "obscure, doubtful and perplexing" (1910/1991:120). Thus, when Schön first wrote of reflective practice as "a

dialogue of thinking and doing through which one becomes more skilful (1983:31) he did so in the context of gaining control as a “learning system”:

A learning system [...] must be one in which dynamic conservatism operates at such a level and in such a way as to permit change of state without intolerable threat to the essential functions the system fulfils for the self. Our systems need to maintain their identity, and their ability to support the self-identity of those who belong to them, but they must at the same time be capable of transforming themselves (Schön, 1971:70),

a statement that announces Schön’s Pragmatism in uncertainty of the world *and* its control via self and situations as adults learn and think critically. Schön’s concern was with applying this to professional practice as practitioners engage with perplexing situations they encounter and find solutions: reflective thought that “converts action that is merely appetitive, blind and impulsive into intelligent action” (Dewey, 1933/2008:125) has salience to practice artistry.

2.2 Practice

Schön was explicit in his assertion that reflective practice is what practitioners *do*, it *is* their professional artistry (Schön, 1983) and through it, in his words, practitioners can ‘acquire new skills or insights’ and as a result ‘construct an epistemology of practice’ (Schön, 1991:5). Indeed, it was this application that, by his own assertion, “induced” (Schön, 1991:1) the widely established popularity of reflective practice outlined earlier.

To better understand his claim, ‘practice’ requires clarification. Although introduced briefly in the Prologue as service to others, it is complex such that Schatzki refers to “a *field of practices*” [*emphasis added*] (2001a:2). Practice is therefore integral to chapter 2 to ‘get at’ a rich appreciation of reflective practice. To lead into that discussion, it is prescient to consider its meaning in the term reflective *practice*. An often referred to example used in mainstream literature is taken from *Educating the Reflective Practitioner* where Schön describes the “topography of professional practice”:

[...] there is a high, hard ground overlooking a swamp. On the high ground, manageable problems lend themselves to solutions through the application of research-based theory and technique. In the swampy lowland, messy, confusing problems defy technical solutions. The irony of this situation is that the problems of the high ground tend to be relatively unimportant to individuals or society at large, however great their technical interest may be, while in the swamp lie the problems of greatest human concern (1987:3).

For Schön, then, 'practice' in reflective practice both describes *how*, and enables a practitioner *to*, control the "messy, indeterminate situations" (Schön, 1987:4) of professional settings so that they *can* provide effective service to users.

When considered in relation to the range of theories blossoming out of Schön's originating work, it will be seen that some place predominant or sole emphasis on adult learning and critical thinking, others on practice, others still a combination of both. Although one might regard these as intertwined, it will be argued that more often adult learning and critical thinking, and practice, are problematically conflated, creating significant confusion in understanding and practices of reflective practice.

3 Experience and the 'self' who is experiencing.

I have established that reflective practice is mediated through the self of a student/practitioner and their experience. So, in the spirit of articulating the 'beam of light' (*cf.* Bordage) of Starting, it is necessary to unpack 'experience' and the 'self who is experiencing' in their centrality to this thesis and to all theories of reflective practice. Typically not named and defined in mainstream reflective practice literature, the concepts have been "explored, turned over and dissected in almost every conceivable way" (Walters & Unwin, 2016:np), over time, and from a range of perspectives. Whilst full exposition would distract from the focus of the thesis, clarifying *my* own conceptualisation supports a careful research inquiry (and holds to the metaphor of strand two weaving its way through this thesis).

First, rather than 'experience' per se, the focus of this thesis is '*lived* experience'. Even if stylistically I use the former, *lived experience* "announces [my] intent to explore directly the originary of prereflective dimensions of human existence as we live it" (van Manen, 2016:39). Clearly lived experience has fit with a research focus of reflective practice. Further, and resonant with the original Pragmatism of reflective practice, the subjectivity of lived experience is such that it is inscribed on and through body, felt sense, and cognitive processes, through culture, beliefs, language and values (Varela & Shear, 1999; Cixous, 1976). From this view there is no distinction between physical phenomena and one's percept of it, so no 'public and objective' that contrasts with 'private and subjective'. So,

while perceived objects are in one sense 'physical' (there really are objects there that have appearances), they are in another sense 'psychological' (the way that they appear depends not just on the objects themselves but on the way that those appearances are

constructed by our visual systems) [...] we don't have any experience of an object 'in our mind' or 'in our brain' in addition to the object as perceived out in the world. Rather, such phenomenal objects constitute what we experience (Velmans, 2009 in Velmans 2017:15).

Secondly, definitions of the 'self' who 'lives experience' are just as contested, so by the same argument I will not explore that in full but will clarify what I mean by the term as used in this work.

Thinking with van den Hengel (1994:467) and linked to my notion of lived experience, I take a view of 'self' as a "complex interplay" of

constancy (a self that remains the same, hence "sameness"), [and] with a self that, on the other hand, projects itself into the future and commits itself to change and transformation (a self that is not yet but becomes).

Here, self is both "sedimented" (Ricoeur, 1992:167) *and* "stabilised" (1992:122), an identity that endures, "identified again and again as being the same" (van den Hengel, 1994:467) *and* can be 'refigured' (Ricoeur, 1992:164) through innovation, initiative and change, "the fragmenting plurality of ever-changing shards of selves" (van Manen, 2016:139).

Conceptualised in this thesis, self is not a fixed "logical or scientific certainty" (Pellauer, 2016:np), but a "lived conviction" (*ibid*), which, again, clearly has fit with a research focus on reflective practice.

This self as a lived conviction is held in "narrative" (Samuel, 2015:2), that is, "the identity of a person lies in the story that self narrates" (van Manen, 2016:138). Ricoeur (1992:141) uses the term "emplotment" to signify the production and nature of this narrative, describing its emergence from the dynamic interplay of

competition between a demand for concordance and the admission of discordances, which, up to the close of the [narrative], threatens [...] identity.

Van den Hengel (1994:467) stresses that in one's narrative self can also "[become] other without losing personal identity", a Phenomenological perspective that emphasises the 'mystery and indeterminacy of consciousness' (Samuel, 2015:3).

Thus in articulating my conceptualisation of 'experience' and 'self' I came to van Manen's *Phenomenology of Practice* (2016), specifically his connection of lived experience to professional practice, a text providing nuanced understanding of the sedimented, stable, changing, and emplotted self in the context of professional practice. As will be seen, it became central to my research inquiry into reflective practice.

Having articulated key concepts underpinning the research inquiry, it becomes relevant to explicate the four 'props' that undergird the five spirals of research process (introduced in the Prologue).

4 The four 'props'

- Prop 1: radical research

It will have been noted I have declared the work of my research to be exploring and theorising a *radical* reflective practice. A common interpretation of 'radical' is 'revolutionary', a big claim that I am not making. I draw on the term in two ways: the first in the spirit of Neill's (1960) "radical approach" to learning and being and the "radicalism" of education proposed by Freire (1996); the second in accord with Schostak & Schostak's (2008) 'radical research'.

Neill, Freire – and I, if I may mix myself with such esteemed company – refer to 'radical' in its Latin origins of *radicalis* and *radix*, meaning 'roots', so, *getting to or expounding the roots*. To elaborate, Fromm's elegant foreword in Neill's *Summerhill* (1960:iix) describes 'radical' as "true principle [...] without fur". Thus, emphasis in my thesis is on reclaiming reflective practice from its neo-liberal appropriation to get back to or expound its roots of professional artistry, to its 'true principle without fur'. In this way it is radical.

Referring to 'radical research', Schostak & Schostak (2008:15) clarify an inquiry self-defining in this way "implies some counter-stance to the world as it is, a stance that is active, engaged and committed to bringing about change". The 'counter-stance' of this thesis is to hegemonic understanding and practice of reflective practice. Be that as it may, I am mindful of neo-liberal appropriation of this too, the risk of a radical stance becoming hollowed out to exist in appearance only (Talpade Mohanty, 2013). How would my research into reflective practice which "has [already] been turned on its head by the neoliberal individualisation of experience" maintain its stance to "think provocatively, critically and reflexively" (Baer, 2014:197-198)? The 'prop' of radical research is helpful here.

- Prop 2: the liminoid space of art with social science

For research to be 'radical' it must work across disciplines and 'refuse' "to be reduced to the confines" of traditional structures (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:8). From the outset I

elected to 'home' my research within the Faculty of Arts at the University of Winchester. With a "study provision" of English, Creative Writing, American Studies, Media, Film, and, Performing Arts (University of Winchester, nd), its relationship to social professional education in general, and reflective practice in particular, was not immediately obvious. Yet, it struck me that cross-fertilisation of social science and arts theory and practice (from here on referred to as 'the arts') could offer synthesis beyond that of one or the other, a "transcend[ing of] existing disciplinary norms" through 'collaborative fusion' that might enable me to "advance dialogic encounters between different formations of knowledge production and creativity" (Puwar & Sharma, 2012:46). Working in this liminoid space (Turner, 1974) offered exciting promise to an aim of radical engagement with reflective practice in contrast to the socially structured and maintained order of liminality. For Turner (1974:65) liminoid spaces are interstitial, "an independent and critical source" of "creative activity" rather than "a distorted mirror-image, mask, or cloak for structural activity", and offers the potential for "radical change", matching Schostak & Schostak's radical research as "a kind of critical philosophical refocussing of research and action on the political, the cultural and the social without splitting them into separate disciplines" (2008:8).

- **Prop 3: Practice-Led research**

Clearly, then, maintaining research as 'radical' would not come from an inductive position of wanting to 'strengthen or problematise well-established theories' of reflective practice, nor from deductively working on a hypothesis "based on existing theory" (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014:5). My project was based on abductive curiosity and aspiration to "create new narratives about the phenomenon" (*ibid*) of reflective practice. Whilst *writing* a thesis necessarily involves "deductive and inductive consistency and clarity" (van Manen, 2016:344), abductive *research* is "a creative inferential process aimed at producing new hypothesis and theories based on surprising research evidence" (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014:5), achieved through "describe[ing] the moment when a sudden leap occurs that makes insight possible" (van Manen, 2016:344), a description that mirrors processes of professional and reflective practice, and, it transpires, perfectly sums up the research process that took place.

Apart from the 'trans-disciplinarity' (*cf.* Puwar & Sharma) possibility of University of Winchester's Faculty of Arts, it was also their embrace of 'Practice-As-Research' that drew my attention. Growing out of arts-based scholarship as a response to the neo-positivist and Cartesian roots of traditional doctorates, Practice-As-Research challenges "some of the

fundamental assumptions about ‘research’ and knowledge” (Nelson, 2013a:4) through its concern with

the creation of new knowledge [...] generally taken to mean ‘new readings’, ‘approaches’ and ‘interpretations’ of existing data, processes and/or practice which is supplemented by the contribution of your own work in your chosen field (Boyce-Tillman in Boyce-Tillman *et al*, 2012:14).

Clearly of relevance to my abductive endeavour, on further exploration according to Candy (2006) because my research would not actively and directly draw on *arts* practices Practice-As-Research would not fit. But she proceeds to describe ‘Practice-Led-Research’, “concerned with the nature of practice [...] lead[ing] to new knowledge that has operational significance for that practice” (2006:3). This *did* have relevance, a compelling way forward, and one that was also supported in the Faculty of Arts. So, Practice-Led-Research became the broad frame of my work, which in turn contributed to the creation of my research sub-aims:

- To explore, discuss and propose innovative and creative ways to consider, work with, and facilitate reflective practices in radically different ways within higher education programmes as a meaningful and political personal, individual and collective engagement;
- To engage with the liminoid space between the disciplines of social science and Arts and the rich messy nature of professional practice in action research (as a spiral method) that involves students as percipients; and,
- To present and disseminate the radically different way/s of approaching, facilitating and working with reflective practices in appropriate and relevant formats.

- **Prop 4: the value and significance of an emerging research method from the research process itself**

Schostak & Schostak’s (2008:8) contention is that ‘radical research’ cannot follow form as a “straightforward recipe [...] culled from a textbook and applied mechanistically”. Instead it should involve critical consideration of “what counts as proof”, transparent key concepts (2008:9), and, an “overall motivation [...] to drive democracy further down to individuals” (2008:13). It is as if they were speaking directly to my intentions documented so far, epitomised in centering percipients.

Originally attributed to Leighton (1916:128) in his articulation of ‘percipients’ as “localised centres”, he distinguishes between percipients and a ‘real world’ that exists objectively, clearly not a view I extoll. However, adopted and further developed by Alfred North Whitehead (a contemporary of Dewey), in his 1919 lectures published under the title of *The*

Concept of Nature (1920/2015) he notes the preoccupation of science with that which is perceived yet “We do not ask about the percipient or about the process” - “percipience is taken for granted” [*emphasis added*] (1920/2015:20). In my research the percipients and their processing and process/es are *not* taken for granted. To this end North Whitehead (1929/1978:212) goes further, conceptualising each person as a “multiplicity of private centres of feeling” wherein “origin” and lived experience have “unity”, and “ingress into the situation” (1920/2015:153). These are ‘brought forth, begot, produced’ in a “particular form [...] infusing its own particularity into creativity” (1929/1978:213). He elegantly refers to this as a “percipient event”, explaining

The complete foothold of the mind in nature is represented by the pair of events, namely, the present duration which marks the 'when' of awareness and the percipient event which marks the 'where' of awareness and the 'how' of awareness (1920/2015:70).

In *Process and Reality* (1929/1978:312) he beautifully (I feel) encapsulates this as “the witness of the body”. Whilst he developed the term essentially to describe forms of experience, Myers (2008) utilises it in ways explained earlier to contrast with participants as prescribed and inscribed objects in a research process. In this thesis it declares that the shape and detail of any counter-stance will come from the percipients and not (just) my own world-view.

This said, North Whitehead’s exposition of the process of percipience as the “concrecence of prehensions,” (1929/1978:35) by which he means ‘growing together’ into something ‘concrete’ enabling individuals to ‘grasp’ albeit not necessarily consciously, spoke to the possibility of the research process itself. In other words, “process is the becoming of experience” (1929/1978:166) which matched the nature and intent of the form I wanted the research to take.

Alongside and in-keeping with my feminist standpoint, it still follows that I *explicate* the research methodology, ‘methodology’ being “the constitutive character of the conceptual frameworks within which [my] understandings of the world subsist” (Buckler, 2011:73). Given that a methodology articulates the “fundamental or regulative aims which underlie” the research (Lazar, 2005:8) and the “fundamental assumptions and characteristics” of its underpinning perspective (van Manen 1990:27), a feminist standpoint to research advocates its ‘disclosure’ so that researcher and reader “confront and justify their own ideas, beliefs and positions” (Bates & Jenkins, 2007:57). Merely stating it will ‘concesce’ is not be enough! However, research *methods* stem directly from and in correspondence with methodology, the researcher solidifying the set of choices and creating the path to be

followed by participants through the research process (Silverman, 2013), a 'path-dependence' (Bates & Jenkins, 2007:56) that creates a neat meta-narrative over, and as if more valid than, the messy subjective experience of the percipients themselves. But, I wanted the percipients to develop their *own* research process, not one that I contain and control by *my* chosen methods; as Ashworth (1999:716) puts it, "it must be the research *enterprise itself* in its attempt to reveal the lifeworld which should suggest methods, not certain methodological presuppositions" [*emphasis added*]. This was not only a political standpoint. It more closely resonates with principles of process in professional practice: a practitioner has professional values and assumptions, but the *method* by which they work with, for and alongside users becomes most effective when it is responsive, collaborative, with emphasis on being user-led (Fish, 1988). Thus, research method that is fresh and responsive, honouring the process of *practice* as a messy, rich, co-constructed engagement from and within complexity, temporality and embodiment, entangled with context, was essential to my research process; *and* fitting to an exploration of reflective practice cut free from external control and imposition. Hence the 'prop' of valuing and signifying emerging research method from the research process itself.

5 Inquiry, not methodology

I recognised this to be ambitious, but, in exploration, Reynolds' (2014:13) focuses on "engagement with *inquiry*" [*emphasis added*] rather than 'methodology' proved fruitful: "inquiry allows for the messy, fluid, emergent dialogues" and is "more generative and useful than categories, evidence or truth". Therefore, *inquiry* and not methodology offers a fitting Start in my research context, structure *and* multi-emerging, of moving with and where the flow takes the work. That said, in the social sciences 'inquiry' is typically understood as interrogation to get at the truth of something, to expose and gather facts (Woodward, 2013), not the association I wanted. So it was positive to note in the arts an 'inquiry' refers to the way in which "multiple perspectives" are garnered (Taylor, 1996:39) through creative processes that enable 'a possible new perspective or rethinking of an ingrained belief' (1996:44). Therefore, research *inquiry* as opposed to methodology, and as conceptualised within the arts, is a relevant 'prop' to my endeavour.

Even so, the building blocks of this inquiry still require articulation.

A cursory interpretation of Preface and Prologue might be that my perspective of what knowledge "looks like, what units make it up, and how these units interact with one

another" (Blaikie 2007:3) reflect a Realist perspective, that "pre-existen[t] structural and cultural emergents shape the social environment to be inhabited", meaning in and of past actions transferred into current situations. However, my emphasis was that *I* make decisions, *I* interpret my world, i.e. recognising structural and cultural influences: I am this *particular* woman. Interpretivism acknowledges the social creation of knowledge, focus not on observable cause and effect but the subjective meaning attached to them: an interpretivist researcher gathers, interprets and offers understanding of those meanings (Filmer *et al*, 2005). Of concern, however, was this would/could put me in an omniscient position of gatherer and interpreter in relation to the percipients. Whilst there is a reality to this, I am the researcher, I have authorial privilege, it is my desire is to *acknowledge* and *work* with this rather than it be the platform *of* the research, and indeed and anyway being researcher is only one intersection of several dynamics at any point in time in a researcher-percipient relationship with which it would be important to work.

Critical Theory troubles relationship, power, role and context dynamics in its consideration of reality as a "state of tension and contradiction" resulting from "the 'presentation' of what 'appears to be'" (Carroll, 1996:76). Its focus is problematizing the surface by unearthing what lies beneath. Critical Theory also "deliberately refutes the dichotomy of researcher and researched by classifying *all those involved* as [...] researchers" [*emphasis added*] (1996:73). This has fit albeit I would be wrong if I thought of it as a truly "democratic partnership" (Gray, 2009:313) given my role as lecturer to some percipients (students), and known to be employed *as* lecturer by all.

Yet my description of percipient, self and experience introduced above was framed as *Phenomenological*, a paradigm that acknowledges specific, unique and personal lived experience through explication of an individual's own meanings and interpretations (van Manen, 1990). In its "philosophy of experience" (Stoller, 2009:707) this *must* have relevance to reflective practice *and* an inquiry into it, indeed this Start has already indicated a presumption towards valuing subjectivity. Further, not only is reflective practice first-person and subjective in focus and method, it is accessed through introspection: introspection "make[s] possible an apprehension of subjective experience" (Vermersch, 1999:17) and is core to Phenomenology.

So, my work is a research inquiry, shaped by a feminist standpoint, Critical Theory and Phenomenology.

There are two problems here. The first stems from a traditional Kuhn-ian perspective in social science that a researcher must select a *single* paradigm on the position that “one must choose sides” (Donmoyer, 2006:16), and here I have three.

The second problem lies with the element that distinguishes Phenomenology *from* the other paradigms, its method, and method was the aspect I did not want to impose.

In response to the first problem, it is reassuring to note Denzin & Lincoln’s (2013:11) point that more recently qualitative research sees no need to ‘privilege any single approach over another’, developing the concept of “qualitative-researcher-as-bricoleur” (2013:8). Rather than one or another ‘competing perspective’, the researcher “works between and within” (2013:11) as required and as generated by the research context and question. Therefore, my work *can, and does,* work between and within a feminist standpoint, Critical Theory and Phenomenology as generated by the research.

In terms of the second problem, it is the extent and nature of introspection as method that provides the ground for Phenomenology, so its method cannot be severed from it. And, in some quarters, introspection has been discredited (Bitbol, 2019), criticism ranging from rejecting it altogether (e.g. Behaviourism, positivism) to recognising its role but only in conjunction with and validated by other methods (Vermersch, 1999). Under question is the validity of gathering plausible judgements of percipients about their experiences when those judgements exist prior to and independent from it, in the sense of what this can tell about the experience itself, in our case about reflective practice? (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

But reflective practice – and therefore my research – *is all about* those plausible judgements that practitioners draw on during their professional practice: the research *is* inquiry into the impact of, in the words of Vermersch (1999:19), the “‘presentification’ of past lived experience”, in our case, in the context of professional practice. Rather than grounds *not* to carry out research based in and on introspection, concern instead is with *how* to capture it and to what ends. In my research inquiry this involves integrity to ‘percipient’ such that how and to what ends would emerge through and from them, an approach in common with Tuhiwai Smith’s (1999:i) call for “researching back”, i.e. “disrupting the rules of the research game towards practices that are more respectful, ethical, sympathetic and useful”.

Finally, and linked, despite having pointed up issues related to research as a ‘democratic partnership’ (*cf.* Gray) in light of my position as researcher, my research inquiry has

integrity *because* of this: lecturers facilitate and assess the reflective practice of their students. The research works with and understands that dynamic as well as recommends ways forward.

But, would this mean I could not confidently refer to my research as Phenomenology?

Added to this, in classic form the “scientificity” (Patkul, 2016:76) of Phenomenology requires focus on reduction via researcher questions to invite ‘bracketing’ of ‘natural attitude’ to get to ‘pure consciousness’ (Husserl, 1913/1982) but ‘pure consciousness’ was not a concern of my work.

Finally, whilst indeed wishing for rich description of “that which shows itself in itself” (Moran, 2000:229), *my* research aims are that the action of this would be to conceptualise and explain a radical reflective practice, and ‘conceptualise’ and ‘explain’ are *not* the auspices of Phenomenology (Finlay, 2011).

So, if I framed my work as Phenomenology (with feminist standpoint and critical theory) would it merely produce weak research?

In exploration of Phenomenology and its (to me, confusing) branches and various instructions on how to do it (so to speak), Wild’s (1942:85) assurance of no “specialist technique” just different “disciplines and points of view” was reassuring, asserting Phenomenology should “not be confused with the opinions of certain Phenomenologists”. His work being somewhat dated, I was assured by van Manen’s (2016:29) more recent reinforcement that phenomenology “cannot be fitted to a rule book, an interpretative schema, a set of steps, or a systematic set of procedures”. Indeed, his interpretation of Husserl’s ‘epoché’ is of “enter[ing] a space of openness to the experience or phenomenon we are trying to understand in its prereflective sense” (van Manen, 2014b:np), which had fit to the practice and spirit of my endeavour. Moreover, Varela & Shear (1999:3) assert a distinction between Phenomenology in its classical sense, and *phenomenology*, non-capitalised. In contrast to a capitalised version, the focus of phenomenological inquiry explores “conscious experience and subjectivity” (*ibid*) but is both hermeneutic *and* critical. The relevance of this to a focus on experiences of reflective practice, on how those engaging in it interpret that experience, and to the critical frame apparent in my work, is significant. As Welton (1987:xiii) offers, phenomenology

becomes critical when it discovers that a simple, reflective apprehension of ‘the things themselves’ is not possible and that analysis involves a ‘dismantling’ of what would otherwise not speak.

Whilst prioritising subjective aspects of conscious experience at the same time it “remains cautious”, seeing it as neither “incorrigible, complete or unrevisable” (Velmans, 2007 in Velmans, 2017:77). In the words of critical phenomenologist Hannah Arendt, rather than being truly “faith[ful] to experience as it presents itself” phenomenology “is enclosed within theoretical commitments arising out of” it (Canovan, 1992:102), a critical stance that must lead to ‘action’, a theme that has significance later in this thesis. Her critical phenomenology recognises the accounts of experience from percipients and researcher, acknowledging that they “refine” each other (*ibid*), having fit with my research intentions and principles, and the way that I use words and sentence structure in chapter 5 reflects the percipients phenomenology (explained further in the chapter overviews).

6 The course of the doctoral inquiry

Identification of critical phenomenology emerged towards the end of (and within) spiral 2 of the research inquiry. Essential to include here whilst signposting the scholarly ground of this thesis it is important to note that I *Started* the research with a clearly articulated scope (reflective practice in professional practice education to support professional practice); a clear focus (identified through the aims of radically reclaiming and redefining reflective practice and its sub-aims); but questions about its paradigmatic frame (as tracked above and reflected in my upgrade writing). I knew I would ‘research back’ (*cf.* Tuhiwai Smith) with method that was fresh and responsive, led by the percipients, honouring the process of practice as a messy, rich, co-constructed engagement from and within complexity, temporality and embodiment, entangled with context; *and*, I had found supervisors grounded in Practice-Led-Research who appreciated and could support the nature of such an inquiry. The methods would emerge.

Inspired by Reason’s (1988) ‘co-operative inquiry group’ I identified that it would take the form of Reflective Practice Research Groups (RPRGs). Given its focus and scope, the percipients needed to be working with reflective practice as part of their higher education programmes, and although all were based in a single university in the south west, their undergraduate and postgraduate *programmes* were at two different higher education institutions. My facilitation of those RPRGs was informed by my community development practice skills, described by Gilchrist (2009:37-8) as “the seven ‘e’s’: ‘enabling, encouraging, empowering, educating, equalising, evaluating, engaging communities to do things for themselves’.

The make-up of the RPRGs is described in more detail later, but to aid clarity, the doctoral inquiry is depicted below in terms of the 13 RPRGs and their relation to each of the five spirals of research:




Figure 4: The five spirals of the research inquiry

In the context of understanding professional practice to richly appreciate reflective practice, **spiral 1** involved informal interviews with six professionals, two lecturers, two actors and two community workers in the charity sector, to excavate 'practice' beyond my own experience and opinion, identifying the elements of difference and in common. This forms the focus of chapter 2.

Spirals 2 and 3 centred on the RPRGs, the percipients discussions of their ongoing lived experiences of reflective practices and their/our experiments with a range of created (and creative) reflective activities, this informed by van Manen: by "focusing on a particular situation or event" (2016:313) the percipients were encouraged to describe their experience "as much as possible in experiential terms" (*ibid*) without "causal explanations or interpretive generalisations" (2016:314) to "develop a richer and deeper understanding of" reflective practice (*ibid*). This method emerged *from* the research process. Preceding that, and linked to the RPRGs being initially set up with open membership, the predominant methods called forth were group interview (Denscombe, 2010) and focus group (Krueger, 1988). Membership, along with the impact of this being open, is explained below and discussed further in chapter 4, but by the end of **spiral 2** and throughout **spiral 3** critical phenomenological inquiry was the *only* method called for from percipient engagement.

Spirals 4 & 5 involved transcript analysis. Working with transcripts is a "complex and creative process of insightful invention, discovery and disclosure [...], a free act of 'seeing' meaning" (van Manen, 2016:320), and, continuing to draw from van Manen, included several stages. First is "wholistic reading", attending to the 13 transcripts as a whole work, the "phenomenological meaning or main significance" (*ibid*) of them as an entire text. This was followed by "selective reading", i.e. noticing "what statement(s) or phrase(s) seem particularly essential or revealing about the phenomena being described", which are articulated in "thematic expressions", so 'possible gems for developing and writing the text' (*ibid*). At that point, 'insight cultivators' emerge, reflecting the 'gems' in the RPRGs. Van Manen defines 'insight cultivators' as the emergence and realisation of that which

give us the sense of 'Oh now 'I see'!' [that] help us to interpret lived experience, recall experiences that seem to exemplify these insight cultivators, and stimulate further creative insights and understandings with respect to our phenomenon under investigation (2016:324).

This leads to "detailed reading" of the transcripts, where 'every sentence and sentence cluster' is considered in light of "what [it] may reveal about the phenomenon or experience being described" (*ibid*). At this stage, two of the percipient 'insight cultivators' took on life as "threshold concepts", that is they became concepts that enabled crossing a threshold,

akin to a portal, opening up a new and previously inaccessible way of thinking about something. It represents a transformed way of understanding, or interpreting, or viewing something without which the learner cannot progress (Meyer & Land, 2003:1).

Finally, another 'detailed reading' explored 'what every sentence and sentence cluster revealed' about their lived experience of those threshold concepts.

Mindful of the research form of groups, it was important that I remained attentive to *each* percipient's "own private phenomenal" experience (Velmans, 2007 cited in Velmans, 2017:67) whilst identifying shared understanding. This is always a tension for phenomenological inquiry with groups, but more so in the context of critical phenomenology in its purpose of action, in our case, research aiming to discuss and propose innovative and creative ways to consider, work with, and facilitate a radical reflective practice in higher education programmes. Helpfully Velmans (2007, in 2017:68) writes of "intersubjective agreement". He explains that whilst *a/ways* subjective, there can also be 'intersubjective experience', where views and descriptions are shared, converging in the expressions of lived experience. As will be seen, the overall degree of 'intersubjective experience' in the RPRGs was strong, whilst at the same time I honour individual difference, although the potential problematic of strong intersubjective experience is considered in the Epilogue.

Transcripts of each audio-recorded RPRG were read through before the next meeting, although where not possible due to time pressures the recording was played back (and transcribed as soon as possible) so that I could mindfully mark the percipients discussion, themes, and potential insight cultivators to re-mark them in the subsequent RPRG. Thus, and in-keeping with the research process and its underpinning principles, these were shared, named and described by the percipients, held by my responses as they emerged and (re)marked to stimulate their ongoing inquiry.

7 The RPRGs

The evolution and nature of the research inquiry, along with the process for emergence of methods and analysis, reveal a finely grained line of direction, principles and actions that informed and shaped this thesis, which are relevant *and* commensurate to a focus on reflective practice. So it now follows that I clarify membership of the RPRGs.

The RPRGs comprised combinations of 16 self-selecting percipients over a two academic-year journey, all of whom were involved with reflective practice as part of their university programmes. Volunteering their engagement, the percipients were:

- undergraduate students on a range of programmes that involved professional fieldwork and would ultimately qualify to work in the social professions, some of whom were also in part-time related employment;
- undergraduate students on generic social science degrees who were also employed or volunteering in the social professions; and
- postgraduate students who were specialising in their careers in the social professions by taking Level 7 and 8 study at two universities.

They ranged in age from 18 who alongside studies were leaving home for the first time, to individuals joining higher education later in their lives, and in this project some of these had caring responsibilities⁵. The RPRGs met on dates agreed between the percipients, and ranged in frequency from two to six weeks in the academic year structure (i.e. two sets of 12-week semesters, September to January, January to June).

During spiral 2 of the project, 14th November 2013 to 29th March 2014, the first year of the RPRGs, I started with inclusive participation: percipients could join at any time. In reality this meant that four out of the six RPRGs in that period were themselves 'Starts' (as shown in Figure 5). This unintended consequence blocked process given that dialogue was not able to travel far from what became well-trodden ground. This was still their research process, of course, and important in that too, but spiral 3 was distinguished by closed membership: percipients could still withdraw (consent and/or involvement) at any time, but there was a 'Start' period after which the RPRGs were closed to new members.

The stated aim to which percipients volunteered their engagement was to share, listen, explore, discuss, and experiment with their experiences of reflective practice. Posters announcing the research invited interested people to meetings where the scope, focus, and starting place of principles and purpose along with the underpinning research ethics were explained, including the necessity to have an ongoing practice to which they could apply reflective practice. Those electing to take part signed consent forms (with copies returned) and the date of their first RPRG agreed. The RPRGs are listed below. Throughout this thesis percipients are referred to by pseudonyms and I have removed personal information that might easily lead to their identification.

⁵ Further distinction by identifying which individuals fall into these 'categories' is not relevant to analysis, and, more crucially, to do so could risk identification.

	Reflective Practice Research Group meetings												
Percipient pseudonym	14 Nov 2013	15 Nov 2013	28 Nov 2013	29 Nov 2013	29 Mar 2014	6 Oct 2014	18 Oct 2014	21 Nov 2014	6 Dec 2014	10 Jan 2015	7 Mar 2015	4 April 2015	30 May 2015
Joseph	√ (1 st)												
Jeanette	√ (1 st)		√		√								
Becky	√ (1 st)		√		√								
Dawn	√ (1 st)												
Duma		√ (1 st)											
Sadie		√ (1 st)		√			√	√					
Carol				√ (1 st)		√	√	√					
Mary						√ (1 st)		√					
Clare						√ (1 st)		√					
Jason							√ (1 st)	√	√	√		√	
Debra							√ (1 st)	√	√	√			√
Geoff							√ (1 st)		√	√	√	√	√
Rob							√ (1 st)		√	√	√	√	√
Jack							√ (1 st)						
Dasia							√ (1 st)				√	√	√
Sally								√ (1 st)					

Figure 5: Percipient engagement in RPRGs

8 Signposting the thesis that follows

Having now presented an analysis for navigating theories of reflective practice; explicated the vital elements in this of ‘experience’ and the self who is experiencing; and, elucidated the four core ‘props’ and spirals of research inquiry, to close I will set out the layout of the thesis, signposting to aid its reading.

8.1 Thesis writing

First, whilst working to ensure that the ‘counter-stance’ (*cf.* Schostak & Schostak) of the thesis would be led by the percipients, I am not implying a corollary of me as ‘neutral researcher’: not only am I in the research, as discussed, I am in the thesis construction. But I dance these lines with care: my aim is that from Preface to Epilogue the thesis will not be the positioning of a “coloniser writer”, *and*⁶ I will ‘keep intact its wholeness’ (Erdmans, 2007:8); indeed, by doing this I will not be adopting the very trajectory already levelled against typical approaches to reflective practice in higher education. In this regard, in the words of van Manen (2016:20), “writing is not just a process of writing up or writing down the results of a research project. To write is to reflect; to write is to research”. In my work a deep appreciation of the notion of percipient holds colonisation in check: it ensures that the writing ‘recovers and expresses’ (*ibid*) the ways that the percipient narrative was constructed; that *their* lived experiences expressed in the research process are told ‘as lived’ (*ibid*); and therefore whilst I acknowledge my role I work to ensure that when appropriate and necessary my voice is quiet to ensure those of the percipients is loud – and where my voice *is* expressed it is led by the percipients. In doing this the quality of the thesis and research can be “scrutinised” via van Manen’s “criteria” of:

- “Heuristic questioning: Does the text induce a sense of contemplative wonder and questioning effectiveness?”
- Descriptive richness: Does the text contain rich and recognisable experiential material?
- Interpretive depth: Does the text offer reflective insights that go beyond the taken-for-granted understandings of everyday life?
- Distinctive rigor: Does the text remain constantly guided by a self-critical question of the meaning of the phenomenon [in our case, reflective practice]?

⁶ Included in thesis writing I use italics in four ways: as a tool for emphasis, a common form of drawing attention to a word or phrase; Latin words italicised for clarity; formatting style immediately after a chapter title to describe the word; and, percipient quotes to distinguish them from literature quotes.

- Strong and addressive meaning: Does the text ‘speak’ to and address our sense of embodied being?
- Experiential awakening: Does the text awaken prereflective or primal experience through vocative and presentational language?
- Inceptual epiphany: Does the study offer us the possibility of deeper and original insight, and perhaps an intuitive or inspirited grasp of the ethics and ethos of [reflective practice] commitments and practices?” (van Manen, 2016:355-6).

8.2 Thesis structure

In broader terms writing took place during all five spirals of the doctoral project, but the final spiral comprised doing so in depth and detail – specifically, to work such that the research retained its integrity and authenticity through content *and* structure. Whilst inevitably in this process the percipients lived experience becomes fixed by words, it was also crucial that their original vibrancy and dynamism was not lost, frozen, or ‘stripped of meaning, depth and subtlety’ (van Manen, 2016:42). Thus spiral 5 involved me “revisiting the point of entry, and reviewing theory in the light of the journey just undertaken” (Trimingham, 2002:57) to fully articulate the percipients themes, insight cultivators, threshold concepts, and the process through which these emerged.

In outline, the structure of the thesis is as follows, identifying the contribution of each chapter (with core chapter-relevant terms in bold):

This chapter, **Chapter 1: ‘Starting’**, in conjunction with **Preface: *Starting Out***, and **Prologue: *Starting On*** has worked from the informed position that a doctoral project, like reflective practice, begins somewhere. I have introduced my interest in reflective practice and my own journey from reflective practice being a ‘natural fact’ to regarding it critically, and how, consequently, I became curious whether and how it was possible to reclaim and redefine the practices of reflective practice to return to its roots of professional artistry. I have set out the focus of this doctoral research and explicated key terms. In-keeping with its main aim and sub-aims, set within a frame of ‘radical research’, it is articulated as Practice-Led inquiry, in the Faculty of Arts, underpinned by a feminist standpoint, critical theory and critical phenomenology paradigms, with methods that would emerge through deliberate siting of percipients as central, this being resonant with professional practice. Chapter 1 has described the form and nature of RPRGs, the process of transcript analysis, identified ‘scrutiny criteria’ (van Manen) for the research and thesis, and emphasises my intention to

convey “the liveliness, the involvement, and even the passion” (Reason & Hawkins, 1988:79) of the entire endeavour.

Chapter 2 is entitled ‘**Capturing**’; it ‘Captures’ literature and practices involved in and by theories of reflective practice, but does so distinctively. Chapter 2 argues that only through a rich, complex appreciation and comprehensive examination of the messy nature of professional practice can reflective practice be fully understood, this being alternative to mainstream texts that miss the depth this brings. The “discipline” (Clark, 1995:563) of professional practice is scoped through Professional Practice: Connected Practice, a heuristic tool from spiral 1, Capturing the complexity of professional practice through **The Trappings, Connected Practice, Being Prepared, Performance and Qualities Of Me**. The contention here is that individually and collectively, practitioners are prescribed and inscribed in particular professions, working in and with agreed notions of person, procedure and policy, in a landscape wherein these territories are contested and discourses clash. The Trappings is about a rigidity and fixing of practice and self in professional education, of adopting and adhering to, building on Schechner, the relevant **Identity-Of** a professional in a specific profession. But with **reflective practice** at the core of the heuristic scoping tool, it shows how practitioners weave The Trappings in their daily, indeed moment-by-moment, decisions, actions, thoughts, feelings, of what it is to be that *particular* profession and professional, in that particular situation *and* context of space and place. In their **Identity-As** that professional in their profession they scribe their practice. This analysis leads to a rich appreciation of and for reflective practice, Capturing key themes, tenets and claims in its mainstream literature. The action of Capturing works in the liminoid space of social science and arts theory, enriched through the critical perspective it enables, and brings to light analysis of theories of reflective practice related to **reflection-in-action** and **reflection-on-action**. Reflection-in-action is Captured as the least theorised element of Schön’s work, and one that he confuses and conflates with reflection-on-action, a situation that persists in mainstream literature and understanding.

Chapter 3 is ‘**Curating**’. Rather than applying research to a literature review as if instructions to “solve puzzles”, “radical research begins with a drawing out [...] a calling forth of questions” with a view to “dis-solv[ing] the puzzles” (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:13). In this thesis that takes place through Curating, “bring[ing] the elements” (Ulrich Obrist, 2015:1) of Captured mainstream key themes, tenets and claims of reflective practice from chapter 2 “into proximity with” (*ibid*) and jostled by percipient lived experiences of

reflective practice from the RPRGs. It is a 'meddling' (McWilliam, 2009 cited in Kershaw, 2009:5) that creates 'unexpected combinations' (Puwar & Sharma, 2012:44): Curating "makes junctions, opens new routes" (Ulrich Obrist, 2015:1) and in this way 'draws out' and 'calls forth' critical questions about reflective practice, discussing them through relevant theory. The argument 'drawn out' shows mainstream reflective practice to be a domesticating process that inscribes and prescribes practitioners, and reveals this to be experienced as a slow, incremental violence of being 'broken in' (Lefebvre, 1992/2004) to its required assumptions, expectations and practices.

Chapter 4: 'Describing', is the act and process of giving semblance (Langer, 1953). In this case, it is the act and process of giving semblance to, or the "logical expression" (Ryan, 2012:210) of the 'junctions and routes' Curated in chapter 3. The "dynamic patterns and ideas" (2012:210) within percipient lived experiences of reflective practice, as well as their 'vision of what might be' (Hicks, 1988:81-82) are Described, but crucially two vectors stand out here. First, Describing is not mapping *something* out, but expressing *somebeing*, that is, conveying meaning *as it was* meant by the percipients, this informed by critical phenomenology. To do that work, chapter 4 'dwells in' the percipients voices, so to *their* act and process of semblance. Here, then, the "writerly space" (van Manen, 2016:363) of chapter 4 is devoted to "grasp[ing] the naked now" (2016:369) expressed by the percipients *themselves*, in its "rich, subtle, complex and depthful character", with minimal authorial "overlay" (2016:324) from me/my voice. Second, in the context of the aims and sub aims of the research towards action, the content of Describing is based on percipient 'intersubjective experience' whilst also noting individual difference. In this way, Describing is a vehicle for revealing the percipient phenomenological lived experience of reflection-in-action as the central aspect of a reflective practice for professional artistry. Chapter 4 expressing the nature and qualities of their 'insight cultivators' (van Manen, 2016) and 'threshold concepts' (Meyer & Land, 2003) of **Gaze** (reflection-on-action) and **Glance** (reflection-in-action) , and a final 'insight cultivator' that broadens understanding of reflective practice further still, that of **Leaving Go**, the deliberate activity of *not* engaging in reflective practice.

Chapter 5: 'Narrating', takes the 'naked now' of chapter 4 and builds it into a Narrative. In this way, Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go are "rescue[d] from the just now" of percipient lived experiences (van Manen, 2016:363) and 'emplotted' (Peters & Besley, 2012:119) in Narrative. Of significance is that this Narrating is not an "exercise of imagination" (*ibid*),

nor is it controlling and domesticating the messiness of their experiences into a neat “story” (Cobley, 2014:5). It is a process that is steeped in, connects, frames, and gives expression to that which has been Described, ‘drawing’ Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go into a ‘plot’ (Peters & Besley, 2012:119) by: reflecting the phenomenology through word usage and sentence structure; and, connection with relevant theory to illuminate the insight cultivators and threshold concepts through European critical phenomenology of: Henri Lefebvre (1992/2004), Eugene Gendlin (1962; 1978; 1984; 1996; 1997; 2004), and Hannah Arendt (1958; 1971) (along with her renowned commentator, Canovan, 1992). In this way reflective practice is reclaimed from neo-liberal appropriation that formulates it as a reified, cognitively dominated, panoptical form of therapeutic analysis and professional assessment, a narrowing process that imposes habitualised and repetitive routines on to what otherwise can be innovatory practices. Narrating of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go broadens the relevance of the percipients lived experiences to a radical reflective practice.

Chapter 6: Mittere, acknowledges the significance of the process through which this radical reimagined and redefined reflective practice emerged. Set within a summary of chapters 1-5, and retaining the principle of being percipient led, a frame of Mittere is proposed, a term offered in the spirit that “language opens and transcends itself into image – the image wherein meaning speaks and resonates” (van Manen, 2016:370). It is a Latin word, the etymology of ‘mess’, but means letting go, a surprising synergy with the theme to not domesticate and control running throughout the thesis. I revisit the transcripts with this in mind, a final “detailed reading” (*cf.* van Manen), and through this offer Mittere as stepping into the unknown in order to creatively and innovatively emplace oneself and one’s practice, its nature being dialogue, courage, and the “necessary discipline” (Trimingham, 2002:57) involved in delaying storytelling and prioritising creativity, such that what emerges is authentic and fresh, refusing the watchful eye and scrutiny of performativity. In turn this leads me to pick up on a growing thread, that simply replacing the Gaze of reflection-on-action with insistence and expectation of Glance of reflection-in-action is an unhelpful duality and falls in to the same trap that has beset reflective practice in its insistence of the former, and furthermore omits Leaving Go. So, I offer Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go as a **rhythm** (Lefebvre), building on the rhythmic qualities and nature of percipient Descriptions, but also the rhythm of moving in (reflection-in-action), out (reflection-on-action) and away (Leaving Go). Where established mainstream theory considers reflection-in-action, if it does at all, it gets snagged in a vortex of what constitutes ‘in’ action, and when ‘in’ becomes ‘on’ (as in reflection-on-action). Given its possible similarity to *currere* (Pinar),

Mittere is compared to and *distinguished* from this. Mittere is understood as facilitating the rhythm of the reclaimed and redefined reflective practice, comprising **Starting, Capturing, Curating, Describing,** and, **Narrating**. Thus, the Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go of the radical reflective practice are vehicles in its practice, not forms to become new normative drivers. What *is* offered as normative is the new knowledge of rhythm of reflective practice facilitated through Mittere, an alternative radical perspective as well as different practices.

The **Epilogue: *Starting Out Again***, precis the thesis, determining this to be the Start for what comes next, i.e. post-doctoral work. The epilogue also highlights shortcomings of the research so they might be avoided in future developments.

*

Articulating the thesis structure, it is compelling to note Schostak & Schostak's (2008:12) outline of the way that 'radical research' must comprise four integral "moments":

- description ("what's going on");
- analysis ("deconstruction – reframing");
- action ("implementation of innovations"); and,
- evaluation ("setting in train a further cycle of description, analysis, action and evaluation").

In this regard, the Preface, Prologue and chapters 1 and 2 can be understood as 'what's going on'; chapter 3 as 'analysis and deconstruction/reframing', chapters 4 and 5 'action, implementation of innovations', whilst chapter 6 and the Epilogue 'sets in train a further cycle'. In outcome *and* process this thesis is radical.

9 Core contribution of this thesis.

Having positioned this thesis as radical in outcome and process and the contribution of each chapter to that endeavour, it is fitting to a doctoral project in departing chapter 1 to determine the overall contribution being made to knowledge and understanding.

This thesis works within the liminoid space of social science and the arts through Practice-Led Research, an execution that reveals the value of the arts to social science, to the cross-fertilisation of these disciplines.

This thesis contends that to appreciate reflective practice a rich understanding of the complexity and messiness of professional practice is required, and offers the heuristic tool of Professional Practice: Connected Practice to that end.

This thesis presents a robust critique of reflective practice, and theorises the qualities of Gaze, reflection-on-action, and Glance, reflection-in-action. It contends that where reflective practice means Gaze this should be stated and would do better to be aligned with the established standards and practices of critical thinking. In its theorising of Glance this thesis contends that there is need for language and practice that positively connotes embodied knowing and offers theory and facilitation to those ends. It also contends that Leaving Go, the deliberate activity of not engaging in reflective practice through mind-wandering tasks is as important to reflective practice as Gaze and Glance. This thesis proposes Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go as a rhythm, together the rhythm of reflective practice.

Finally, this thesis contends that in contrast to mainstream understanding and practice of reflective practice, the rhythm of reflective practice facilitated in higher education through *Mittere* reclaims and redefines the practice of reflective practice from neo-liberal appropriation that formulates it as a reified, cognitively dominated, a narrowing process that imposes habitualised and repetitive routines on to what otherwise are innovatory practices, such that, as a result it is returned to its roots of professional artistry in the service of others.

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Having set out the Starting landscape of this thesis and its research, attention now turns to chapter 2 and Capturing the literature and practices involved in and by reflective practice through a rich, complex appreciation and comprehensive examination of professional practice via the heuristic tool of Professional Practice: Connected Practice.

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CHAPTER 2

Capturing

Capturing is reliant on noticing. Noticing is active attention and marked consciousness; it is an awareness to be honed. Indeed “every act [of practice] depends on noticing: [...] what you do not notice, you cannot act upon; you cannot choose to act if you do not notice” (Mason 2002:7). De Waal’s (2011:13) moments of “reverence and respect” could equally apply here. Here, then, one Captures what one has noticed.

In this chapter, focus is on Capturing theory to elucidate a rich description of professional practice and reflective practice, drawing from social and political science, social geography and performance theory.

1 Introduction

It is now established that the principle behind a Schönian understanding of reflective practice is that an effective practitioner is one who can systematically engage in and critically evaluate their professional practice. Its core proposition is that engagement generates awareness through which a student/practitioner better understands, develops, and changes their beliefs, values and assumptions that underpin their practice in order to effect enhanced control over self and situation in professional contexts.

The concept and theory of reflective practice as a “specialised tool” for professionals (Moon, 1999:4) was, as charted in chapter 1, articulated in the mid to late 1980s by Donald Schön (1983; 1987a). To pick up where that earlier introduction left off, Schön’s research applied Dewey’s ideas about learning from experience to professional contexts, asserting it to be integral to the “artful practice” of practitioners (Schön, 1983:19). Although social professions were not the original focus of Schön’s research, it came at a time when they were seeking equity with occupational groups of higher status (Gobbi, 1975, cited in Platzer *et al*, 1997), making reflective practice a timely adoption.

However, more broadly (and relatedly), Schön was writing at a time of “crisis of confidence in professional *knowledge*” [*emphasis added*] (Schön, 1983:3), debate concerning the extent to which professions can and should have control of their own ideologies and practices, one that still persists (or never resolves) (e.g. see Yelloly, 1996; Grundmann, 2017). Reflective practice held political potential in its principle of starting ‘from within’ (Evetts, 2003) and moving outward to collectively held understanding of what makes for effective professional knowledge and practice in particular professions, an opposing dynamic to incursions on professional practice from external drivers, such as, economic

(only) based policy change, and imposed action that conflicts with professional values (*ibid*). Therefore, the work of reflective practice in approach and processes is an anchor for practitioners, practice and professions alike. In sum, and according to Barnett (1990:76), “It is recognised that a profession will be the stronger if its practitioners are used to plan, to execute, to accept responsibility for, and to critically evaluate their actions”.

Therefore, ‘reflective practice’ refers to process, outcome, *as well as* to the tools that facilitate it, and in this way Schön’s (1983:19) illumination of “artful practice” is intelligent inquiry in the hands of its professionals.

This said, Dohn (2011) and Gergen & Gergen (2008) assert attributing rapid growth in popularity of reflective practice to those reasons alone is over-simplistic. To appreciate this line of argument, one needs to attend to and amplify its core factors of professional practice, and the practitioners engaged in it. Accordingly, and in contrast to typical approaches in mainstream literature that foreground the what and the how of reflective practice within which reference to professional practice appears, I contend that a rich appreciation of professional practice is required *first* to fully understand reflective practice. Without this, appreciation of, and inquiry into, reflective practice will be limited in scope and reduced in focus.

But, *how* to convey and satisfactorily discuss the complex individual, collective and structural endeavour that is professional practice? Indeed, such a question may well offer insight into *why* it is a less travelled road to get to reflective practice.

Explained in chapter 1, the first phase of ‘radical research’ is “drawing out” (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:13), this being the intention of Capturing in the thesis. So, to explicate professional practice attention will turn to Capture the concepts of practice and professional, briefly introduced in the Prologue.

Wilding (1982) and Brint (1994) track early 20th century trait theorist assumptions of professions and professionals being inherently moral, and positively intervening for public good on to more recent debates about their role and value in society, specifically, whether their status is divisive and might overwhelm any claim to ‘good’. Detailed historical exposition is beyond the scope of this thesis, but in the spirit of clarity in terms, as well as entry to a rich appreciation of reflective practice, it is relevant to amplify the concepts of practice, professions and professionals.

2 Practice, professions, and professionals

Earlier I referred to Argyris & Schön's (1974:6) definition of practice as a "sequence of actions undertaken by a person to serve others". In that vein Brunner (2006:135) writes of the practice of professionals as "distinctive action to help solve the problems or realise the opportunities of others". Distinctiveness is important: according to Yelloly (1996:3) the actions of practice are shaped through an "area of expertise" within "boundaries" that are defined by and responsible for particular "discipline[s], standards and integrity" informed by a "service ethic and explicit ethical code". Rather than boundaries, Coulter (2001:38) refers to "activities", these being "partitioned off" into "membership categories" associated with specific professions in contrast to "categorically open" activities that anyone might engage in. Partitioned, closed membership activities are restricted sets of "institutional practices presupposing and/or instantiating the operations of macro-social phenomena" (*ibid*).

So, we can understand 'profession' to refer to a specific service organised around broad institutionally established activities determined for categorisable service to others; and 'professional' to mean those who have, to some level, studied the 'partitioned' knowledge this involves and are therefore qualified to deliver them.

Critical extension comes from Zygmunt Bauman's scholarship on modernity. Bauman (1999:xiv) contends that practice is "order making". Here, bounded or categorised, the practice of a profession 'trims down the range of possibilities' thereby increasing "the probability of certain patterns of behavior while diminishing, or eliminating altogether the likelihood of other kinds of conduct" [*sic*] (1999:xiv). His charge, then, is that 'practice' shapes, impinges on and restricts in its demand for 'obedience to desired preferences' (*ibid*). These 'desired preferences' are shaped over time by bodies of knowledge and professional narratives, which may take sudden trajectories in reaction to 'chosen traumas and glories' (Volkan, 1988:xxv), but more typically endure over time. As epitomised by Evetts (2003:397), professional practice is the "structural, occupational and institutional arrangements for dealing with work associated with the uncertainties of modern lives in risk societies".

Indeed, the practice of professionals grows in complexity when the contexts in which they operate become more contested. As highlighted, professional practice and the professions in which they work have always been contested arenas where "conflicting interests,

interpretations of reality, moral and ethical standards, visions and hopes” of employers, consecutive governments, professions, professionals, diverse communities, and multi-faceted global financial and social economies “exist next to each other” (Philippart, 2003:70). Around all of this, in the UK, Global North free-market domination requires citizens maintained and sustained as “compliant with the needs of the State” (Runswick-Cole, 2014:1118), a neo-liberalism that dissolves “public issues into utterly privatized and individualistic concerns” (*ibid*) through processes that delineate ‘us’, those who are compliant, from ‘them’, those who, for whatever reason, cannot or do not operate to the demands of the neo-liberal market. In this way, public structural issues become the private responsibility of professions and individual professional’s incompetence, frailty, or lack of action, i.e. their inability or incompetence to work to ‘their potential’ and bring ‘problem citizens’ into line. The daily professional practice of practitioners is the landscape wherein these tensions are enacted, incorporated, reinforced and resisted.

In sum, ‘practice’, ‘professions’ and ‘professionals’ are contested concepts and processes that are located culturally, politically and historically. Reflective practice also being a ‘practice’ can be considered in such terms *as well as* a vehicle of systematic inquiry to make meaning in those complex, contested working environments.

Yet even with that stated, it still reinforces Schatzki’s (2001a:1) contention that ‘professional practice’ is constructed as a “primary generic social thing”. It remains unclear what ‘professional practice’ *actually* entails, and the extent to which and how it might be the same or different *across* professions. Borrowing from Whicker & Kronefield (1994, cited in Macfarlane, 2004:54), it is somewhat of a “secret garden”. Therefore, Capturing theory for explication of professional practice *beyond* its generic meaning is essential for a rich appreciation of reflective practice.

3 The discipline of professional practice

In his work on professional practice, Clark (1995:564) points up that

No one is in favour of incompetence, and perhaps this partly explains why its antithesis is, on the face of it, so appealing, even incontrovertible. 'Competence' conjures the expectation of efficient and trustworthy service, the antidote to the frustration and waste which result when someone is incompetent.

Thus, steer to a more nuanced understanding of professional practice could come from elucidating what it is that social professionals need to be competent *in*, but Clark’s own response to this is telling. He highlights confusion created by epistemological differences

dependent on whether response is informed by “expert consensus”, ‘models or theory’, ‘the “natural history” of the practice, “job analysis” or “insider views”, a situation leading to ‘net outcome that is little more than fragmentary’ (1995:565). His way forward is through “discipline”, that is:

good practice must be based on a deep appreciation of the foundation principles, and the fundamental logic and method, of relevant fields of enquiry; this in addition to drawing on relevant findings from diverse topics (1995:570).

From this perspective, the *discipline* of practice comprises:

- observational knowledge, that which is taken for granted within a profession;
- contextual knowledge, application in the specific situation and circumstances of the action;
- abstract knowledge, such as social and cultural awareness, and
- theoretical knowledge, specific frameworks and explanations (Clark, 1995).

These elements work in different combinations, at different levels, at different times, and to varying visibility and awareness. Therefore, ‘discipline’ infers “adherence to canonical knowledge, and orthodoxy in the application of rules of evidence, methods of enquiry and standards of performance”, a “mastery” (Clark, 1995:576) reliant on “conformity to authority—precisely, to *be* disciplined” [*sic*] (1995:575).

At first this appears to take argument back to Bauman’s ‘ordering’ rather than moving it forward as hoped. But Clark argues differently. In contrast he offers the discipline of practice also involves “creativity” and “imagination” (1995:575), so, an “educated” (1975:576) “deliberate and premeditated” “rule-breaking” (1995:576). Clark’s notion of ‘discipline’ offers an exciting and alternative avenue through which to explicate ‘professional practice’, one that resonates with Schön’s own contrasting of mere competence with professional artistry. But even so it still frames professional practice as a ‘generic social thing’. A more determined scoping of the *discipline* of professional practice in the social professions is necessary, per se, but also if I am to Capture theory sufficient to develop a rich appreciation of reflective practice.

To this end I scope the ‘discipline’ of professional practice through Professional Practice: Connected Practice, a heuristic tool to Capture professional practice. Professional Practice: Connected Practice emerged during spiral 1 of my doctoral research, refined throughout the other four spirals that comprise this thesis, iterations tested and honed in conference presentations (Trelfa 2016c, 2017c) and published papers (Trelfa 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, & Trelfa & Telfer 2014). Broadly, Professional Practice: Connected Practice draws

on the rich liminoid space (defined earlier) between social science and the arts to Capture and convey its messy complexity, not to reduce it to “something orderly” (Newman, 2006:84) but for its heuristic value in enriching discussion through deep consideration of its elements, ultimately bringing into being a discussion of reflective practice, made rich through this critical lens.

4 Professional Practice: Connected Practice




Figure 6: Professional Practice: Connected Practice

I offer the discipline of professional practice mapped through five embedded circles:

- The Trappings,
- Connected Practice,
- Being Prepared,
- Performance, and
- Qualities of Me,

capitalised to identify them as being part of Professional Practice: Connected Practice. Specifically, embedded within Connected Practice are Being Prepared, and Performance. The overlapping area between them is Qualities of Me. All four are encompassed by The Trappings, and running through the core of all is reflective practice⁷. Discussing the discipline of professional practice starts from the outer circle and moves in to the core, so The Trappings leading to and ending with a rich appreciation of reflective practice.

⁷ This is *not* capitalised from here on given that it is the focus of the thesis.

4.1 The Trappings




Figure 7

The word 'trappings' has associations with specialised tack for riding a horse in its purpose of control, containment and restriction, becoming more broadly drawn in to lexicon that describes *anything* that has that same effect, a signifier of power, powerlessness, and control. In scoping the discipline of professional practice, I offer The Trappings to consider the circumstances, characteristics, symbols and artefacts shaped by ideology, discourse and policy that characterise and define as well as control and restrict a student/professional in their practice, a concept that incorporates the theories of Bauman, Coulter and Evetts discussed above, thus, by nature, exemplify the profession *and* demarcate its limits: The Trappings includes and excludes role and responsibility, *trapping* practitioners within the practice of what it is to be that particular kind of professional, therefore depicted as shaping, defining and suffusing all other aspects of professional practice. This aligns with Schatzki's (2001a, 2001b) position that such arrangements prefigure the individual actions of practitioners, and Kemmis & Grootenboer's (2008) 'practice architectures', the practice of professions and professionals being already designed and built-in to societies in which they are found. These Trappings may be implicit or explicit, but in contrast to the "primary generic social thing" (Schatzki, 2001a:1) of typical descriptions of professional practice, it is a concept that enables analysis to reveal them as defined and contained in ways that are distinct. Indeed, part of The Trappings is purpose. Put simply, a practitioner will identify with being a particular kind of professional in *any* context, but they would not have a role

or responsibility to act as such, nor recognition and expectation to do so from others (Barnes, 2001). Thus, purpose gives role and responsibility life.

Therefore, the three key aspects of The Trappings to be Captured and discussed are:

- ideology, discourse and policy
- purpose, and
- identity.

4.11 Ideology, discourse and policy

Ideologies are the “fundamental beliefs” of a community and its members which act by “structur[ing] [their] overall self-image [...] as well as [their] relations to other groups” (van Dijk, 2015:178) through discourse. Defined earlier as “not what is said [but] that which constrains and enables what *can* be said” [*emphasis added*] (Barad, 2003:819), discourses “express and reproduce” ideologies (van Dijk, 2015:176). Finally, social policy is the “web of decisions and actions” that work to regulate behaviour and “allocate values” (Easton, 1953:132) based on those ideologies. In this way ideology, discourse and policy work to determine, reinforce, influence and maintain each other – and, in our case, professional practice.

To further explicate their relationship to professional practice, a New Institutionalism perspective from social and political science proves useful. It sits within a broader school of theorisation about the role of institutions and their impact on individual agency, ‘bringing the State in’ to analysis in when it had become marginalised. It comprises several perspectives and is not without its critics (Lecours, 2005), too broad a discussion for this thesis, but offers fruitful ground on which to consider the impact of ideology, discourse and policy on professional practice. To this end I draw on the work of Hall & Taylor (1996).

Their contention is that whilst the State is “an overall system of interrelated parts”, its institutional arrangements “structure collective behaviour and generate distinctive outcomes” (1996:6), thus State and institutions are not ‘neutral brokers’ (*ibid*). Indeed, New Institutionalism amplifies how the ‘rules, procedures, norms, symbols, cognitive scripts and moral templates frame meaning’ (1996:14) in ways that ‘distribute power *unevenly*’ [*emphasis added*] (1996:9). Further, those scripts and templates are “relatively persistent features of the historical landscape” (1996:9), resistant to change “because they structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make” (1996:8). Consequently, practices can become “so ‘conventional’ or taken-for-granted that they escape direct

scrutiny" (*ibid*). All of this is put into social policy, and social policy is enacted by practitioners. It is a perspective that offers insight into The Trappings of professional practice, the enactment of institutional rules, procedures, norms, symbols, cognitive scripts and moral templates in professional contexts for the service of others, Trapping practitioners *into* what it is to engage in a particular profession whilst providing them with "degrees of certainty (Hall & Taylor, 1996:7) *about* practice (thus explaining *how* practice 'orders', *cf.* Bauman). To the same extent it also exposes the process by which professions are eroded via external incursions into and control of their practice. By this I am not suggesting that institutions and practice are one and the same. Institutions are "concerned with" the production of "external goods" and practice is the "bearer" (MacIntyre, 1981/2013:226), however they are weft and warp of relationship, an important discernment *and* appreciation in later discussion of reflective practice. In sum, ideology, discourse and policy determine 'doctrine' (aims and expectations), 'formula' (methods in accordance with the doctrine) and 'miranda', that which is "to be admired and emulated (Brunner, 2006:144), 'bound' into distinct categories, the specific activities of which being partitioned according to individual professions.

4.12 Purpose

To elucidate that distinctiveness, I could drill down into the 'ideas, beliefs, rules and norms' (*cf.* Barnes) that 'bound' each profession in turn but this would be a task of enormous proportions. Instead, I suggest a more effective line is consideration of purpose.

The 'bounding' together of ideology, discourse and social policy into "organised nexuses of activity" (Schatzki, 2001b:48) to which professionals of a particular profession are obliged to "cleave" (Barnes, 2001:17) provides purpose. Purpose bridges across time to retain consistency, *and* allows effective behaviours to develop. Indeed, and significantly, Csikszentmihalyi (1992:226) writes that 'by itself action is blind' and "reflection impotent": it is purpose that gives direction and enables connection of reflection with action. Thus, purpose can also counter the neo-liberal pull towards "a *loss* of direction, masquerading as openness to every direction" [*emphasis added*] (Kuspit, 1996:1). In other words, if understood generically, practice risks being devalued, fragmented and atomised (Dormer, 1994) and practitioners steered towards operating without a "hierarchy of values" (Kuspit, 1996:1) as if specialist knowledge can be taken "down from a supermarket shelf" (1996:38-39) and applied like 'components on a production line' (1996:30). Purpose ensures artistry

is not 'denied, subverted or made to be the least important aspect' of professional practice (Dormer, 1994:26).

So, whilst New Institutionalism suggests that professionals will rationally choose from the institutional 'rules of the game' and play that game in accordance with their own "fixed set of preferences or tastes" (Hall & Taylor, 1996:6), *The Trappings* reinforce this cannot be a free choice but critiques and extends that analysis. Although the choice of *this* or *that* with reference to purpose is held and managed by ideology, discourse and policy, within it practitioners express artistry.

4.13 Purpose: space and place

Advancing this is to consider the relationship of purpose to context (Coulter, 2001). Indeed, Boud & Walker (1998:196) assert that context is "the single most important influence" on professional practice, yet remains underdeveloped in mainstream literature on professional practice (Green, 2009a).

Context is best appreciated through the lens of space and place, or, put otherwise, practice is situated in and by space and place which has a direct relationship to purpose, and is therefore relevant to understanding *The Trappings* of professional practice. In light of limited attention to context in literature on professional practice, theory from social geography becomes useful.

According to Tuan (1977), 'place' refers to territories of space that are marked off, in our case, to places that particular professions operate in. Places have history, stories that are familiar and satisfy certain needs, and become synonymous with a profession. 'Space', on the other hand, is about 'openness, freedom and threat' (1977:6), the wider environment that becomes marked into 'place'. Clearly there is a tension here, so unsurprisingly people respond to and engage with space and place in ambivalent and "complicated ways" (1977:4). Applied to professional practice this can be considered in terms of: distance, intimacy, spaciousness and crowding; the stable objects that create and define the place; the artefacts that exist within the place; the passing of time and its impact on space and place; the myths, stories and stereotypes associated with profession's space and place; and, movement (ability, speed, range) within and through the space and place. These are distinctive in *The Trappings* of different professional practices, an appreciation that underscores Green's concern that this is unrecognised in mainstream literature on

professional practice. As Bachelard (1960/1969a:86) asserts, “we are the space where we are”.

4.14 Identity

Consequently, it also explains how The Trappings “constitute [the] most basic preferences and very identity” of professionals (Hall & Taylor, 1996:15), shaping “self-images” and “shared cognitive maps” (1996:17). Barnes’ (2001:17) notion of ‘cleaving’ points up the nature of that process, effect felt in terms of not only what “one should do but also [...] what one can *imagine* oneself doing in a given context” [*emphasis added*] (Hall & Taylor, 1996:15). In this sense ‘bounded’ professions demand a ‘relevant identity for the performance of the practice’ (Coulter, 2001:38). However, these theories stop short of exploring the relationship of individual practitioners *to* that construction. Without this, The Trappings alone could imply that professional practice is *entirely* externally determined albeit with some element of practitioner self-orientation. Yet, clearly argument above is developing practice as

undeniably experiential, at least part of the time, and perhaps [in] different ways and senses. One ‘experiences’ practice, one lives through it, aware that it is happening; one remembers it afterwards; one looks forward to it, or not. It is an object of fear, or fantasy, and always of imagination. It is therefore, as well as being undeniably material, a matter of consciousness, however defined (and also, of course unconsciousness) and of thought (Green, 2009a:8).

So, even though practice is routinized, stabilised and regularised (Green, 2009b), practitioners *are* its “carriers” (Reckwitz, 2002:250 cited in Green, 2009b:47), indeed this being Schön’s own observation. As such, then, we can consider that regularity need not be conflated with mindlessness. Green (2009b:49) writes of “*knowing practice* – of the knowingness in practice, as well as the activity of knowing itself regarding practice” [*sic*]. He asserts the significance of how one *represents* practice *to oneself* in contrast to, in our case, New Institutionalism’s prioritising of only that which is externally ‘privileged and endorsed as truth’ (2009b:52). Representation to oneself is a “resource [...] in and for how to go on, the *ongoingness* of practice” [*sic*] (2009b:52). Core to this is one’s sense of purpose, the relationship between an individual’s professional practice and their identity. To develop this further, arts theorist Schechner (2013:38) and his focus on performance proves fruitful, his contention that “historical and social context, convention, usage and tradition” determine what a performance “*is*”, compared to “any behaviour, event, action or anything can be studied “*as*” performance” [*emphasis added*] (2013:41). Borrowing

from this to lend to professional practice, I suggest that the relationship of identity, agency and The Trappings can be understood through 'Identity-Of' and 'Identity-As'.

4.15 Identity-Of

Identity-Of is epistemological; it is knowing the delineated pre-existent discipline and practices or 'sets of actions' (Schatzki, 2001b:48) that define what it is to be a professional of a particular profession and 'cleaving to' them (*cf.* Barnes). It is "practising a profession" (Green, 2009a:6) by knowing of "the orderings" (Tonso, 2008:157; Bauman, 1999) of what it is to be a professional of a particular profession which "[call] the tune for the piper to which all [its practitioners] dance" (Tonso, 2008:157). Thus, an individual would refer to themselves in terms of one profession rather than another and adhere to and adopt the Identity-Of that profession, an identity that is consciously, experientially, and unconsciously learned through professional education. Jarvie (1972:161) writes of the maps constructed in practitioners' minds of "possible paths which will lead them to their goals, and of the hazards along each path", inherited from the "whole tradition in which particular activities are related together as part of a social project or mission" (Golby, 1993:4). Students/practitioners experience 'competence and being recognised as competent' as they meet "expectations about how to interact, about how people treat each other, and about how to work together" (Schippers & Wildermeersch, 2007:167). Thus, Identity-Of describes the *process* of The Trappings as practitioners "[come] ever more fully into membership of a tradition of practice" (Golby, 1993:8) and through that allegiance organisations succeed in building and sustaining its particular service to others (Kleinig, 2013), one that can be considered as an arc commencing from an individual's own (variable) starting point to adopting the 'institutional rules of the game' (*cf.* Hall & Taylor). A practitioner might consider they are freely making their own decisions and choices, whereas in reality those are Trapped. Barnett (2008) sums this up in his provocative description of the current landscape of professional practice wherein professional judgement is no longer left to the individual. Their own voice and authenticity, in our case, through reflective practice, is 'dislocated' (2008:196), "under siege" (2008:201) wherein being 'swept' along rather than "stopping to think" becomes more likely (2008:199).

4.16 Identity-As

Yet it has now been understood that professional practice also requires 'knowingness' of practice and its representation to oneself (*cf.* Green) – or agency. Indeed in early writing

Schön (1971:30) characterises a general belief held in society of a 'stable state' yet notes that "all of our institutions are in *continuing* processes of transformation" [*sic*], and individuals react in different ways. Unhelpful reactions include calls for "localism" (1971:28) due to a myth of stability, or "revolution" (*ibid*), "reactionary radicalism" (1971:29), and the "mindlessness" of 'escaping the anguish and uncertainty' by "evading reflective consciousness itself" (*ibid*). To "avoid [their] perpetual disruption" his thesis is "we must learn to develop learning systems" (1971:201). Aligned with Dewey's (1958:178) advancement of interaction as a "cooperative activity" and Biesta's (2007:9-10) discussion of how "meanings are shared, recreated, and reconstructed", Identity-As underscores the learner in that system. Arendt's (1971) distinction between reason, thinking and work compared to knowing and action is significant here. Reason and thinking are passive, "the point at which mental activity comes to a rest" (1971:15); 'work' is the instrumentality of "means and ends" (Arendt, 1958:4); 'action' is untidy and unpredictable, but also "our potential to do something that has not been done before": it is about "invention and creation" of the "mundane" as much as the "exceptional and spectacular" (Biesta, 2007:12). Yet reason, thinking and work have become so tied together that they risk being conceived as one, externally determined, and valued above knowing and action. It is an argument that both reinforces the concept of Identity-Of, at the same time as underscores the problem if *only* Identity-Of minus Identity-As. Accordingly, from this view, Identity-As "is judged by its ability to disclose the identity of the agent, to affirm the reality of the world, and to actualize [their] capacity for freedom" (Passerin d'Entreves, 2014:np). So, whereas action in Identity-Of in *The Trappings* is "entirely eliminated" (Arendt, 1958:223), students/practitioners 'normalised', 'made to behave' (1958:40), with practice the "mere execution of orders" (1958:223), Identity-As enables "the unexpected [to] be expected" (1958:178).

Therefore, Identity-As suggests an ontological position of an 'imagined or supposed' (Tonso, 2008:154) sense of what it is to be a particular professional. Schatzki (2001b:49) writes of a person's 'mental states of affairs expressed in behaviour' that 'inform activity by determining what *makes sense* for them to do' [*emphasis added*]. To this end Green (2009a:6) refers to "practising professionalism" [*emphasis added*] because predetermined notions "neither provide accurate predictions [...] nor [capture] all behaviours" (Tonso, 2008:159) tacit or espoused, that are performed by a practitioner because these are "necessarily partial and will change over time" (Furlong, 2000:29). Moreover, professional identity is not only predicated on role and responsibility; it is intersected with gender,

ethnicity, culture, race, sexuality, age, disability. Identity-As appreciates that individuals “[act] and [interact] within a context of history, cultural norms, power relations and social institutions” (Litvin, 1997:206) and the extent to which these aspects of personal identities are “acknowledged or uncovered” (Schippers & Wildemeersch, 2007:166), per se and at a particular time. Therefore, Identity-As allows for participation in communities where we “learn and become who we are” (2008:167), the intersectionality of the personal and professional and its impact on practice, and an acknowledgement that being a particular professional is only one of multiple identities or constructions of self, the “idiosyncrasy” of appreciating that “one’s situation is too complex to be mastered by a single” concept of self at any one time (Kuspit, 1996:5). We can consider it in terms of “identity performances, revealing and concealing parts of the self across myriad situations” (Davis, 2017:771): practitioners

enact different versions of the self across time, across networks, and amid new settings [...calling] forth particular identity meanings [...working] to maintain these meanings through performance and interaction (*ibid*).

So, whilst a nurse/social worker/teacher (etc.) cannot be any kind of practitioner, in contrast to the arc of Identity-Of, Identity-As has “a definite beginning” (Arendt, 1958:32) or can “proceed from nowhere” (1958:190); “acts into a medium where each reaction becomes a chain reaction (*ibid*); “never has a predictable end” (1958:144); and, can comprise “action arising from their witnessing” in ways that are “subversive”, this being helpfully defined by Briskman & Zion (2014:279) as “act[s] of kindness” that are not ‘valued’ and might even be ‘prohibited’ by institutions. Identity-As also lends to a more nuanced appreciation of professional loyalty because through it we can comprehend *dual* and *competing* loyalties, from clients, colleagues, employers, State, as well as within an individual themselves. Indeed, in a climate “beset with alternative voices providing rival readings of the world” (Barnett, 2008:192) professional practice must focus on ‘being in the world’ (2008:2000).

4.17 Artistry

Thus, appreciating The Trappings through Identity-Of *and* the significance of Identity-As brings us to artistry (Schön, 1983). Whilst some practices and situations involve a higher proportion of routine and uncomplicated solutions, and some professionals hold less autonomy, Schön’s (1987a:13) thesis is that practice *always* involves the “exercise of intelligence, a kind of knowing” (Schön, 1987a:13) that is not about merely ‘knowing the

orderings' (cf. Tonso; cf. Bauman). Schön (1987a:22) explains artistry as a “high powered, esoteric variant of the more familiar sorts of competence all of us exhibit every day in countless acts of recognition, judgement and skilful performance”, in itself taking argument beyond elucidation of competence (cf. Barnes) alone. Moreover, student/practitioner artistry as the texture of everyday suggests it to be less mysterious than might otherwise be inferred, pointing up how it is *always* present in professional practice, hence Schön’s (1987a:13) emphasis that the judgement and skill it comprises makes it “rigorous in its own terms”.

The Trappings of professional practice elucidates the significance of ideology, discourse and policy; and analysis through New Institutionalism explicates the processes involved. Purpose and context extend appreciation of professional difference, but artistry and its relationship to identity invokes a deeper appreciation of this and the significance of practitioner agency. Identity-As underscores practitioners as not simply carriers of ideology, discourse and social policy.

Even so, focus now needs to turn to the *nature* of that agential practice. Whilst a finely grained analysis of each social profession would do this, as argued earlier it would distract from scope and focus. Therefore, attention turns to the second of the circles in *Connected Practice: Professional Practice*.

4.3 Connected practice




Figure 8

Whilst scoping the 'discipline' of professional practice through informal interviews with six social professionals in three different professions (spiral 1), it became clear that they share in common an intention behind their activities to forge Connection (with users, colleagues, managers and stakeholders). Purpose, context and the overarching Trappings, as well as individual Identity-As, will influence the shape and nature this takes, making it distinctive to professions and individual practitioners, but Connection is the goal.

In this I am aware it troubles the traditional assumption of 'relationship' being core to professional practice. Typically perceived as "essential" (Zandvliet *et al*, 2014:1) to best practice for social professions (Gibbs & Jenkins, 1992), if considered that 'relationship' involves security, belongingness and attachment (e.g. Argyle *et al*, 1985; Baumeister & Leary, 1995), it cannot be assumed as *always* desirable in professional contexts.

Consequently, Connection is more appropriate, evoked in respect of Field Belenky *et al*'s (1996) concept of 'connected knowing', where they distinguish between 'understanding' and 'knowledge': 'understanding' being "personal acquaintance with an object" involving "intimacy and equality", whilst 'knowledge' is "separation from the object and mastery over it" (1996:101). From here the authors distinguish between two different "epistemological orientations". 'Connected knowing' is empathic engagement and responsiveness, or "response to others in their terms" (Lyons, 1983 cited in Field Belenky *et al*, 1996:10), 'separated knowing' is objectivity, so detachment from feelings. It is their contention that women's ways of knowing relates to the former, although despite having established the feminist standpoint of this doctoral work, I am taking 'connected knowing' forward as applicable to *all* regardless of gender (and in doing so, support the point made by Baxter Magolda, 1992, and Schommer-Aikins & Easter, 2006).

Thus, Connected Practice declares practice having a goal of empathic engagement and responsiveness.

Social Exchange Theory (Thibault & Kelley, 1959) provides theoretical underpinning to why Connection is appropriate to understanding this element of professional practice in its contention that individuals weigh up 'outcome' by calculating the reward/s and cost/s of an interpersonal alliance in 'comparison' with alternative options. For example, a practitioner may be forced upon a user/client (e.g. teacher-student, nurse-patient, etc.) but their work of compassion, engagement and responsiveness to build a Connection is more likely to lead to this being their alliance of choice, which is more likely lead to positive outcomes. This is not to ignore or deny the wider context of The Trappings, indeed *Connected Practice*:

Professional Practice scopes Connected Practice as embedded within it. But analysis *through* Connected Practice also recognises the ways in which professionals counter or resist The Trappings, such as authenticity, “the courageous and resilient sticking fast to the true self when the surrounding circumstances are pointing in another direction” (Barnett, 2011:98). Whilst later in this thesis I take issue with ‘true self’, authenticity suggests conscious and deliberate agency in order *to* Connect. Akin to this definition of authenticity, Kuspit describes “idiosyncrasy” (1996:3) as an “inner conviction” generated by integrity and autonomy, which enables a professional to “survive” postmodernity (1996:4).

In sum, Captured through Connected Practice, the nature of professional practice as artistry that facilitates compassionate, authentic, and idiosyncratic engagement, responsiveness and awareness of self and other that can act to counter neo-liberalism is brought to light.

4.4 Being Prepared, and, Performance

With that in view, a deeper excavation of authenticity and idiosyncrasy becomes relevant, emerging in the 3rd and 4th circles of *Connected Practice: Professional Practice*, specifically ‘Being Prepared’ and ‘Performance’, understanding enriched by performance theory.

4.41 Being Prepared



Figure 9

Walkden (1995) likens artistry to building a brick wall, artistry being that which is *between* the bricks that creates a structure, not the individual bricks themselves. It has been

contended this involves the practice of Connection. However, Connected Practice does not happen by chance. Scoping the discipline of professional practice Captures Being Prepared as ‘a thread within a larger cloth of being wise’ (Smith & Smith, 2008:63).

Being Prepared involves “disposition” (Ryle, 1949/2000:46) and “innovation” (1949/2000:61), or “knowing how” (1949/2000:3), ingredients that Nelson (2013b:60) asserts are essential for “liquid knowledge”. ‘Liquid knowledge’ recognises “human subjectivity” as bound up in “the production of knowledge”, i.e. not everything can be “understood through measurement” and ‘knowledge comes from experience’ (*ibid*). Therefore, Being Prepared concerns rehearsing the regularities of practice but also rehearsing the ‘intelligence’ of applying specialist knowledge in a range of situations in specific professional context, the action of ‘carefully, skilfully and critically’ (Ryle, 1949/2000:29) Being Prepared for future practice. As Schön observes, “each kind of learning feeds the other” (1987:165). Indeed, one could assert it is the role and responsibility of a professional to Be Prepared (Brown & Atkins, 1988; Horgan, 2001), underscoring the significance of professional education, that which “precedes and/or gives rise to a performance” (Schechner, 2013:225).

4.42 Performance




Figure 10

Thus, Capturing Being Prepared builds appreciation that the discipline of professional practice involves ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’, which Ryle (1949/2000:31) discusses

through his concept of 'performance', hence, in our terms, Performance is embedded within a Connected dynamic and overlaps with Being Prepared.

Looking to definitions of performance, Conquergood's (1995:138) explication of it as "action that incessantly insinuates, interrupts, interrogates, antagonizes, and decenters powerful master discourses" strikingly resonates with Arendt's 'action' identified before. Therefore, what marks out Performance in *Connected Practice: Professional Practice* is practitioner action experienced by others, even if only tangentially or tacitly. Indeed, according to McKenzie (2001:50), a view of professional practice that involves appreciation of Performance creates a particular perspective of "spatial, temporal and symbolic 'in-between-ness' [that] allows for social norms to be suspended, challenged, played with and perhaps even transformed". On its own this has relevance to my research aim. Therefore Performance provides "an especially productive vantage point" (Bauman, 1992:xiv), in our case, to professional practice, conveying the way that knowledge from practice experiences, education/training and enculturation in the community of practice and its external drivers are enacted, interrupted, and critically, carefully considered in intelligent acts of Performance of practice artistry.

Identifying the ways this is the same or different between each social profession would be unwieldy for reasons posed previously, but important given that, as noted, Schechner (1998:361) contends *anything* can be considered 'as' performance. Therefore in scoping the discipline of professional practice, with regards to Performance brief reference to Bell's (2008) literature review framed around mimesis, poesis and kinesis proves significant

(i) Mimesis

Mimesis refers to performance theories focussing on imitating or mirroring the "action of life" (Bell, 2008:12). Applied to the discipline of professional practice, it points up practitioner Performance that mirrors behaviours *not* bound by the profession, so, for instance, verbal interaction based on turn-taking, observation of body language through visual scanning, and responses that engage with energy levels, i.e. mimetic professional Performance mirrors behaviours involved in effective *general* interaction (e.g. see Argyle & Trower, 1979). However, for Bell (2008) this can involve falsehood, faking and make-believe for the purpose of manipulating real emotions in the audience, in our case, clients/users, suggesting that the Performance of professional practice can be "mere show" (Geertz, 1980:172) with professionals "not to be trusted (Bell, 2008:12). Importantly, then, authentic or manipulated, mimetic Performance offers insight into professional practice

that emphasises the significance of intent and builds appreciation of practice beyond that of a 'generic social thing', even if it sits uncomfortably to consider a professional practitioner using their skills of 'praxis artistry' (Higgs, 2012:75) to 'trick and deceive' (Bell, 2018:12). Embedding Performance within Connected Practice suggests that at least the overarching goal might be one of compassionate connection, plus in that lens it is *refreshing* to acknowledge that in some circumstances falsehoods and fakery may be required, indeed the 'right' action to take. In that vein Higgs' (*ibid*) contention that everyday expressive devices should always be performed with "expertise, humanity, morality, and finesse embodied in high-quality graceful care" can equally apply to professional practice in Performance.

(ii) Poiesis

Poiesis refers to performance theories that focus on making and creating (Bell, 2008; Turner, 1994), stemming from the Greek root meaning "that which 'pro-duces or leads (a thing) into being'" (Whitehead, 2003:np). Applying this to professional practice, Performance *without* poiesis would equate to 'sterile' application and replication of a 'technical service to customers' (Rowland, in Rowland *et al*, 1998:134) or even a mimetically manipulated Performance of a "grandiose" nature (Green, 2009b:51). Such Performance may appear strong, secure and predictable, but, in reality, 'merely shows something' (Biesta, 2014:53), i.e. emphasis on outcome rather than the journey to get there. As such Biesta (*ibid*) calls for "*weak practice*" [*emphasis added*], i.e. Performance that may not be predictable but is responsive to risk and uncertainty, that recognises "something really entered our being from the outside" (*ibid*) as opposed to the pretence of it being in the practitioner's sole control. A poeistic approach to Performance works with the contingent nature of compassionate practice within – and at times despite - prescribed guidelines, expectations and conventions, in the 'beautiful risk' (Biesta, 2014) of creation; it is the art of varying activity and engagement appropriately and sensitively, a unique-to-some-degree professional Performance by a professional every time. Hence, Barba (1995:8) writes of "literally *put[ting]* the body *into form*" [*sic*].

(iii) Kinesis

Extending from there, and in the final element of Bell's (2008) analysis, *more* than creatively making Performance, kinesis refers to performance theories that 'break and remake' (Conquergood, 1995:138 cited in Bell, 2008:13) through "movement, motion, fluidity, fluctuation, all those restless energies that transgress boundaries and trouble

closure" (*ibid*). In this sense kinesic Performance makes Barba's 'body into form' the primary focus. Macintyre & Buck (2008:324) write of practices (teaching) as "bodily participatory engagement", and in his discussion of acting Oida (& Marshall, 1997:14) describe the importance of practitioners 'learning the geography of their body' through "active awareness". Thus, kinesic Performance "substitute[es] inert abstract formulations for a bodily involved and situationally attuned" professional practice (Bordieu 1976:77 cited in Green 2009b:51). The 'active awareness' (Oida & Marshall, 1997:14) this requires is described elegantly by Oida as a 'thread of concentration':

if the 'thread' of the actor's concentration becomes slack, the performance doesn't work. When the 'thread' remains taut yet invisible, the performance will look truthful and unmechanical: completely alive (1997:17).

Applied to Professional Practice: Connected Practice, rather than Performance as a smooth transaction possessed and produced by the performer-practitioner conveyed by mimesis and to an extent poiesis, it exemplifies 'active awareness' in messy, complex, 'bodily participatory engagement' that 'breaks and remakes' in *conjunction* with others (client, user, colleague, stakeholder). Kinesic Performance lends to appreciation of the *energy* of that engagement, Performance-as-Connection as a 'co-construction' (Walker & Burgess, 2011), and brings to the fore improvisation, defined by Smith (nd:np) as "creating on the fly", or "freedom-to" and "freedom-from" (Peters, 2005:301). To better understand this, Smith (nd:np) describes improvisation as a "natural technique" available to all if we 'open our eyes and give attention to that which is beyond ourselves but present', although for Peters (2005) it requires instruction. Instruction *for* 'creation on the fly' may seem a contradiction in terms, until understood as a skill that requires preparation and rehearsal (Barrett, 1998; Mirvis, 1998). In sum, improvised Performance is about process *and* outcome, but also could be negative and chaotic (Vera & Crossan, 2005), hence support "based on a realistic understanding of improvisation and what it involves" (2005:204) becomes salient. At the same time, it makes improvisation 'less intimidating, less of a mystery' (Peters, 2005:404) - and thus more possible. So, in *Connected Practice: Professional Practice*, Performance is in conjunction with Being Prepared, signalling that rather than 'freedom' 'on the fly' where practice happens 'naturally', it is skilled *and* alerts students/professionals to the need to 'carve out space for it, to produce it' (Peters, 2005:305).

Schechner (20013) goes further, linking improvisation to play, and the relevance of this to professional practice can be seen through Gordon's (nd:14) observation that "Creativity

produces artefacts, play produces possibilities”. Resonant with Oida and Barba, Bell (2008:73) emphasises the way in which play is “created in the moment in and through bodies”. Therefore, play can be considered as kinesic Performance in its aim of ‘fun, hav[ing] no immediate practical goal or benefit, consist[ing] of actions or thoughts expressed in novel combinations, and an indicator of well-being’ (Bateson & Martin, 2013:12). It calls on “playfulness” [*emphasis added*] (2013:13), i.e. a “positive mood state” (*ibid*) and “special state of mind” (Martin, 1991:35) involved in “spontaneous and flexible” (Bateson & Martin, 2013:12) Performance. Indeed Key (2013:186) highlights the *artistry* in “restless imaginative and creative practices and the inventive and playful activities” of professionals.

Thus, professional practice understood through the lens of mimetic, poiestic and kinesic Performance reveals the finer grained nature of professional practice and how it is different *between* professions, practitioners, their different contexts, and the artistry of individual engagement and interventions.

4.5 Qualities Of Me




Figure 11

Through this process of Capturing it is becoming increasingly clear that the discipline of professional practice “cannot be reduced to technique” (Palmer, 1998:10) alone, nor only knowledge, or theory, or the outcome of external drivers. It is a dynamic of phronesis *and* praxis, a ‘blend of practitioner qualities, skills and creative imagination processes’ (Titchen & Higgs, 2001:274-5) that

cannot be mapped effectively because it transgresses boundaries, it goes where it is not expected to be. It is inherently 'in between' and therefore cannot be pinned down or located exactly (Schechner, 1998:360).

Therefore, the overlapping area between Being Prepared and Performance in Professional Practice: Connected Practice is Qualities Of Me: Qualities Of Me creates the "magic" (Revell & Wainwright, 2009) of professional practice. Ellett's (2012:13) discussion of 'practical reason', or "how one should act" [*emphasis added*] has relevance to this but it is Stout's (1990) discussion of justice, courage and hope as well as Nussbaum's (1990:95) description of this as a "loving conversation" between the general and particular which supports this particular location of Qualities of Me.

To offer understanding here, Fromm's (1979) work in sociology and psychology proves helpful. He contrasts 'having', so the 'having' of knowledge, plans and procedures through subsumption where relationship between practitioner and user/client is "dead" (1979:77) (resonant with Field Belenky *et al*'s 'separated knowing', and Ryle's 'knowing that') with 'being', (or, 'connected knowing', and, 'knowing how'), where the relationship between practitioner and others is the *subject* of activity. 'Being' is the quality of that engagement. Applied to Professional Practice: Connected Practice, 'having' resonates with Being Prepared and 'being' with Performance, but the *interplay* of knowledge base, the ability to communicate that *and* engage in the processes involved (including make, break, play and improvise) are necessary for effective social professional practice. Connected Practice highlights the fundamental aim of this as connection with others; Being Prepared to learn, rehearse and prepare; with Performance that can be mimetic, poiesic and/or kinesic. Together these offer insight into the artistry involved and Qualities Of Me focusses attention on the "orientation" (Fromm, 1979:88) of the student/practitioner themselves.

Qualities of Me is about the extent of enthusiasm (Ramsden, 1992), so the tone and intensity of Performance, the ability to vary these according to the nature of interaction (Lacoss & Chylak, 1998), and therefore, behaviours and attitudes significant to specific situation, context and purpose (Macfarlane, 2004). Qualities of warmth, rapport, ability to arouse interest and curiosity through "discursive creation" (Barnett, 2008:204), and, thoughtful engagement in ethical and moral inquiry (Banks & Nøhr, 2003), are all germane here.

Intuition is also worthy of consideration, indeed, Claxton (2000) writes of this as *essential* in professional artistry, defined as "feelings, hunches, ways of recognising complex patterns"

(2000:28) that are unpremeditated, implicit, and sensitive, drawing on a “well of experience in novel, flexible and integrative ways” (2000:41). Intuition is “the ‘glue’ that holds together our conscious intellect and our intelligent action” (2000:36). Yet it is salient to note that “exclusive contemporary focus on more conventional ideas of knowledge” (Furlong, 2000:28) has led to it being an under-developed, under-theorised, and, even, at times, feared aspect of professional practice. Qualities Of Me posits that appreciation of intuition will significantly contribute to an ‘understanding of professionalism’ (Furlong, 2000:29). To such an end Claxton articulates it as “heightened sensitivity to cues” (2000:37) and “the abilities to make use of them (2000:38), challenging the ‘mystical, transcendental, supernatural’ way it can be referred to, the “fuzzy, emotional kind of gut feeling [...] ‘I just know it’ claim (2000:32-3).

It is for this reason that Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) discuss intuition as solely in the repertoire of *expert* practitioners, the stage when ‘knowing how’ is tacit and ‘knowing that’ is inexplicable. In contrast, Field Belenky *et al* (1986:54) consider it to be a core component of “subjective knowing” available to all, “novice” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) and expert alike because it concerns “a shift in orientation [...] from external authority, which binds and directs our lives, to an adherence to the authority within us” (Field Belenky *et al*, 1986:54). This clearly does not have to, and arguably should not only be, the auspices of experts, indeed one could argue that intuition is *essential* to the artistry of all recalling Evetts (2003:397) emphasis on ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ as characteristic of daily professional practice. Indeed, uncertainty and risk were the same elements of interest to Schön in his original writing on reflective practice (1983; 1987a), his premise being they are distinct to the lifeworld of professionals (1987a). In contrast to mundane and routine activity where technical and procedural responses operate through ‘inductive judgement’ (Dewey, 1910), the ‘swampy lowlands’ of complex ethical and moral decisions involved in the unpredictability of professional practice require a different response (Schön, 1983; Banks & Nøhr, 2003). The ‘formulae or blueprints’ of inductive judgement do not work, being unreliable or even inapplicable in particular unique sets of circumstances. In this he was building on Dewey’s (1910:94) ‘deductive judgement’, where “Ideas as they first present themselves are inchoate and incomplete” requiring reflection because this enables “their elaboration into fullness and completeness of meaning”. In this way Schön’s application of Dewey’s ideas to professional contexts valued artistry, and in doing so pointed up as insufficient established notions of professional knowing based on assumptions of unproblematic linear application of theory.

At the heart of this professional artistry, then, is reflective practice, signifying its place, role and purpose in professional practice, which explains why it has been ‘euphorically embraced’ (cf. Horgan). Through professional education programmes, “the personal knowledge base of working professionals which informs their judgement becomes embedded in their performance” (Eraut, 1994:17). Thus, Qualities of Me is not about some kind of ‘alienated narcissism and self-actualization’ (Crouch, 2007:107), but qualities and actions that support bringing about particular outcomes, those aimed at Connection, and Connection is always an ongoing process. We now also understand this ‘loving conversation’ (cf. Nussbaum) of ‘transgression, interruption and movement’ may intuitively or consciously involve trickery or deception, a useful antidote to the association that Qualities of Me in the service of others must always and inevitably equate only to a particular kind of practice.

4.8 Reflective practice




Figure 12

Therefore, we can now appreciate how and why reflective practice is situated at the core of Professional Practice: Connected Practice. Whilst The Trappings construct a practitioner as an entity deeply imbricated in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed (Hall & Taylor, 1996:8),

Capturing theory that explains Connected Practice, Being Prepared, Performance and Qualities Of Me points up practitioner agency in this, and together those five elements

reveal artistry as knowing and being, so when, how, *and* the skills, imagination and qualities to “go beyond” (Fish, 1998:56) in the “fumbling act of discovery” (Hamilton, 2005:288) of professional practice. Indeed, it is from such a frame that Schön’s (1987a:42) reflective practice describes professional practitioners as “*makers of artifacts*” [*emphasis added*]. As Fish (1998:88) warns, practice that is entirely “regulated by procedures, decided beforehand and outside the situation would be both dangerous to the public (because life is not like that) and inimical to professionalism”; it would be “act[s ...] from sheer habit, blind impulse, or in a fit of absence of mind” (Ryle, 1949/2000:40).

Professional Practice: Connected Practice reveals professional practice as imposed, stable, prescribed *and* created, expressive, creative, and subjective. Engaging in reflective practice means that a practitioner “become[s] aware of that which they know through [their] practice” (Moffatt, 1996:53) as they “bring forward” decisions made and actions taken related to situation, context, purpose and the ways and extent to which that is Trapped, “in a manner that it can be considered for inquiry and critique” (*ibid*). To this view, Titchen & Higgs (2001:275) refer to ‘practice wisdom’, “practice experience and knowledge together with the ability to use them critically, intuitively and practically”.

Capturing this complexity of professional practice by scoping it as a discipline leads to rich appreciation of reflective practice. It also directly responds to critique levelled against reflective practice, that “professional knowledge is so personal and so situationally specific that it *cannot* be defined or held to account” [*emphasis added*] (Furlong, 2000:29).

Discussion has shown professional practice to be complex, personal, situational, *and* institutional, but also that it can and should be named, described and accounted for. Schön (with O’Reilly, 1999:14-15) differentiates the “indescribable”, aspects of professional practice that are “hard to describe” (because they are complex, personal, etc.), from the “undiscussable”, that which a practitioner chooses not to, does not, or cannot discuss. His concept of reflective practice is underpinned by the view that ‘undiscussable’ practice ‘remains under the table’ and will become dysfunctional, out-dated, inappropriate, entrenched in bad/poor habits, and unconscious therefore out of reach. Through mindful identification and scrutiny of norms and practices of the profession from the perspectives of institutional and organisational drivers, users/clients and other stakeholders, as well as the individual practitioner’s *own* norms, qualities and values, they reflect on how these impinge on, predict, shape and inform their practice in response to others. So whilst The Trappings suffuse practice, such that a social professional cannot somehow sit outside of what it is to be a nurse/social worker/teacher (etc.), we can consider that every decision,

action and intervention is mediated through the person of the practitioner: *they* unpick The Trappings, it is *their* Being Prepared, Performance and Qualities of Me that influence engagement, and they can compare this to desired immediate and/or longer term outcome or impact, as well as imagined and possible alternatives – and then then take *that* learning in to future practice. Put the other way around, reflective practice is a process of becoming and being aware of the ways in which Qualities of Me interweave in Performance, Being Prepared, and Connected Practice, and their interplay within The Trappings. In this way, reflective practice is posited as a

meaning-making process that moves [an individual] from one experience into the next with deeper understanding of its relationships with and connections to other experiences and ideas (Rodgers, 2002:845).

It situates practitioners as inscribed, prescribed *and* scribes of professional practice, and professional practice as complex, multifaceted and multileveled. Practitioners critically unpack their practice “in ways that may reconstitute how [they] act and even reshape the very nature of [their] identity itself” (Ferguson, 2003:199), the ‘refiguring’ of ‘shards of self’ of chapter 1. To illustrate, consider the significance of context and its space and place Captured as part of purpose in The Trappings: a practitioner might grow in awareness of the impact of, their response to, and negotiation of, space and place, and as a result consider how they might inhabit it differently and/or make changes to advantage the clients/users. Mimetic, poiesic, and kinesic theories of Performance draw attention to their use of everyday expressive devices, creation of intervention through intuition and improvisation, and practice as embodied. In this way students/practitioners can grow their awareness of self-in-practice beyond perhaps the most obvious and initial areas that draw their attention.

It is for such reasons that mainstream literature of reflective practice describes it as transformative, a “tool for critical praxis” (Kilminster *et al*, 2010:3; Burgoyne & Reynolds, 1997; Mezirow *et al*, 1990; Cranton, 2006; Escobar *et al*, with Freire, 1994) that enables ‘radical movement for change’ (Bolton, 2006:6). Student/practitioners engaging in reflective practice become “active, engaged and responsible thinkers capable of developing [...] critical consciousness” (Canaan, 2004:3), and the professions in which they will or already work become “stronger” (Barnett, 1990:76).

Emphasis on the self of the practitioner does not negate the ‘selves’ of the users/clients. As shown in Connected Practice, Performance, and Qualities Of Me, those for whom professional activity is *for* are by no means passive or inconsequential. An interpretation of

Walkden's (1995) analogy of wall building in *Being Prepared* is of it privileging the position of practitioner, as if they alone define that which is between the bricks that create the structure. But he also writes of *all* contributions being meaningful and adding to the whole. So, whilst practice is the critical application of *specialist* knowledge by practitioners appropriate to context, plus their individual (and collective) professional agency, it is at the same time an experience *with* others and is responsive *to* others (Barnett, 2008). Drawing on the work of Martin Buber (1970), Rodgers & Raider-Roth (2006) discuss this in terms of 'I', the practitioner, 'It', the focus and purpose of professional activity, and 'Thou', others. As McCarron & Savin-Baden (2008:57) observe, clients 'respond, contribute and impose themselves and their views' in ways that are direct and indirect, subtle and forthright, such that they 'shape dynamic and direction' of practice. Reflective Practice encourages acknowledgement and awareness of this through the nature of Connection, mimetic, poiesic and kinesic Performance, and Qualities Of Me.

Reflective practice still requires that practitioners do not deny or ignore their own power. It is *their* "professional inquiry" (Shapiro, 2010:312) that holds the *broad* shape of practice so they should reflect on the ways in which they use and maintain their power *all* the time via their role and authority to intervene in people's lives. As Barnes (2001:20) states, "to engage in a practice is to exercise a power". More, power does not only stem from professional role: the extent to which the 'self' of a student/practitioner 'fits' with hegemonic notions of what is perceived as 'typical' in relation to age, gender, race, sexuality, ability/disability, subculture and economic status and thus inhabits and is ascribed linked privilege or powerlessness should also feature (Shohet & Hawkins, 1989), a complex intersectionality manifest in all elements of Professional Practice: Connected Practice and acknowledged in Identity-As. Bringing to awareness the ways these variables of power manifest and are utilised (Lukes, 2005; Orford, 1992), their action to undermine, support or take precedent over role power, and the impact on and in co-produced relationships and practice dynamics, are fields of focus for reflective practice.

Finally, emphasis on reflective practice at the core of professional practice does not negate The Trappings of professions themselves. It explicates the relationship *between* Identity-Of and Identity-As. In sum, the practice of reflective practice can be better appreciated as:

- supporting and encouraging professional decision making, action and intervention;
- promoting the unpacking and understanding of practice, policy, and the relational dynamic of these in practice context;

- promoting the unpacking and understanding of the relational dynamic with users and colleagues; and,
- valuing and promoting professional practice as an important way of knowing and being, a landscape wherein these territories are contested and discourses clash.

5 Professional Practice: Connected Practice, and Reflective Practice

In this thesis, my contention is that only through Capturing the discipline of professional practice can one come to such a rich, deep appreciation of the professional artistry of reflective practice as student/practitioners are prescribed, inscribed and scribes of practice. As such it can be appreciated why reflective practice is held up as an alternative paradigm to “linear thinking as the primary mode for professional problem solving and knowledge building” (Papell & Skolnik, 1992:20): reflective practice offered a “new epistemology of practice” (Schön, 1983:31; Schön, 1992; Schön, 1995) and a “high-impact pedagog[y]” (Slade *et al*, 2019:7).

Captured in this way also means that key tenets of reflective practice in its mainstream literature become clear: that the practice of Reflective Practice is widely accepted as clear and understood; that reflective practice involves the development of emotional, affective, self-awareness; that self-development happens and leads to positive change in practice competence of individuals; that individual development leads to change at an organisational level; and, that one needs to learn and develop reflective practice as a skill in order to be able to engage in it.

6 ‘Drawing out’ reflective practice

Capturing the discipline of professional practice ‘draws out’ (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:13) reflective practice, isolating and bringing to light key tenets. However, these have also been questioned by my MA research, my Starting to this thesis. Moving in to spiral 2 of the research inquiry I was curious to explore them further by bringing them alongside the lived experience of the percipients as they engaged in reflective practice in the RPRGs. Specifically, to what extent would jostling theory with their experience support the tenets or reinforce the argument of neo-liberal appropriation of reflective practice in my Starting? If the latter, I was curious whether reflective practice is needed, and if so, whether and how it would be possible to reclaim and redefine the practices of reflective practice so it is returned to centre on professional artistry and service to others.

CHAPTER 3

Curating

'Curating' follows 'Capturing', a process of bringing what has been Captured 'in to proximity' (cf. Ulrich Obrist), in our case, with lived experience of reflective practice, to see what is in common, what is different, what is distinct, and what surprises. Curation 'makes junctions and opens new routes' (ibid), and in doing so "calls forth" (cf. Shostak and Shostak) questions, here regarding reflective practice. The process of Curation is equal in importance to any outcome arising from it.

1 Introduction

The first phase of 'radical research' is "drawing out" (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:13). Capturing professional practice by interweaving social science and arts theories for scoping Professional Practice: Connected Practice has worked to 'draw it out' such that it can no longer be considered a "primary generic social thing" (Schatzki, 2001a:1). Doing so has also 'drawn out' a rich appreciation of the significance, role, and nature of reflective practice that, I suggest, would otherwise be missing. Indeed, in this way Capturing has shown reflective practice and professional practice to not just be 'intertwined' but 'entangled' (Barad, 2010:251).

The key tenets of the Captured and 'drawn out' reflective practice are that:

- (i) The practice of reflective practice is clear and understood;
- (ii) It involves the development of emotional, affective, self-awareness;
- (iii) This self-development happens, and leads to positive change in practice competence;
- (iv) This individual practice development leads to change at an organisational level; and,
- (v) One needs to learn and develop reflective practice as a skill to be able to engage in it.

In radical research, 'drawing out' must be followed by 'calling forth questions' because this facilitates critical exploration its key concepts, social conditions and "what counts as proof" (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:9). I propose Curation to be instrumental for this, in our case, Curating theory with percipient lived experience of engaging in reflective practice. Curation is the "art of carving out" (Davis, 2017:771), likened by Davis as "turn[ing] a sensory flood into a guided stream" (*ibid*). Ulrich Obrist (in the title description) works in the arts, and Davis (above) is writing on 'curatorial processes in everyday life" (*ibid*), but

both approach it as a process that is important in its own right, a deliberate way to re-imagine, rearrange and surface the possibilities of “new practices, new meanings, values and relations between things” (O’Neill, 2010:6), “unexpected combinations” that enables “becoming otherwise” (Puwar & Sharma, 2012:44), a process elegantly described by McWilliam (2009 cited in Kershaw, 2009:5) as “meddling” and “pruning”.

Curating, in this thesis, will be structured around each key tenet in turn, jostling theory with percipient experiences of engaging in reflective practice from the 13 RPRGs that took place in 2013-2015 during spiral 2 and 3 of the doctoral period, with the purpose of “burrowing deeply into microprocesses, laterally into neighbouring concepts, or in an upward direction [...] to broader social phenomena” (Sutton & Staw, 1995:378). Whilst I am the curator-as-author in this, my lead comes from the percipients in-keeping with the principle that they “alter and determine [the] process and its outcomes” (Myers, 2008:173), and the inquiry is to see if the ‘carved out’ (*cf.* Peters) elements create a “set of convincing and logically interconnected arguments” required of a ‘strong theory’ (*ibid*). The aim is not to generate “easy ammunition” (Ellingson, 2009:41) of critique for its own sake, but to see if and how Curation supports or troubles current mainstream understanding and practice of reflective practice. As Boud & Knights (1996:32) assert, reflective practice “has attained the status of being ‘a good thing’” but “there is a need for critical debate about the nature of reflection, its role in learning and its inclusion in university courses”.

Percipient quotes are picked out in italics and not indented to distinguish them from literature quotes, taken from the transcribed RPRGs, and indicated by: ‘date, month, year of RPRG, percipient pseudonym, transcript line’ (for example, 9Mar2014, Jeanette:130). To aid rendition, *consecutive* statements and single statements of three lines in length or more are tabulated.

2 ‘Drawn out’ key tenet (i): the practice of ‘reflective practice’ is clear and understood

Principally chapter 2 sets out the significance and constituents of the “reflective turn” (Schön, 1991:5) that took hold in the 1980’s and has been ‘euphorically embraced’ in higher education programmes for future and current practitioners working in the difficult landscape of social professional practice. In that enterprise a significant body of literature has built up, scholarship and practice widely and typically adopted in higher education programmes. Given the elements of Professional Practice: Connected Practice working within the “hot action” (*cf.* Eraut) and “stream-of-consciousness flow” (Lyle, 2002:212) of

professional practice, a messy process wherein they are not immediately obvious (Schön, 1983) and/or are unconscious, tacit and implicit (Argyris & Schön, 1974; Polyani, 1958), reflective practice offers a deliberate and conscious approach to develop self and situation control and higher education programmes enable students/practitioners to develop that stance. Without it they cannot “explicate full justificatory grounds for what they are doing, and they are not aware of the pattern of their activities” (Dohn, 2011:674). Reflective practice is not always easy, or necessarily straightforward, but at least professional practice would be ‘indescribable’ rather than ‘undiscussable’ (cf. Schön).

This is an experience expressed by percipients. Jeanette talks of working with “*messy lives and messy people*” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:130) and in a different RPRG, Jason and Geoff share similarly, this time related to a specific work-based session. Geoff says it was “*hairy [...] just like the whole night was a bit mad*”. With that in their minds as representative of their experience of professional practice generally, they go on to describe practice as:

24	Jason	<i>...fast, fast, fast.</i>
25	Geoff	<i>... going on all the time' you know.</i>
26	Jason	<i>So like Geoff said fast pace and you know those minutiae of decisions and information you're taking on all the time, [...]</i>

(10Jan2015)

In a different RPRG Sadie says, “*our practice is a difficult terrain*”, and the more “*we unfold in looking at it, looks to be a very difficult terrain*” (15Nov2013, Sadie:87). Invited to describe the ‘hairy’ session, Geoff tells of a fast-moving situation in which young men begin to fight, and his immediate reaction, that he did not action, was to grab and pull them apart. It wasn’t until he reflected on it later for his reflective diary which he was keeping for university course requirements that he ‘*stopped*’ to think about it: the activity of reflecting-on-practice “*made [him] stop and think ‘oh how am I going to do that because I can’t actually ...’*” (10Jan2015, Geoff:39) “*... hit them round the head or grab them or push them apart or split them up just in case I end up hurting them or they end up hurting me or something happens*” (10Jan2015, Geoff:44) to which Jason agrees saying “*that’s where later reflection is perhaps more positive than the initial*” (10Jan2015, Jason:52). As Sadie (15Nov2013, Sadie:24) puts it, they all have “*a responsibility*” to engage in a “*professional way*”, and it is reflective practice that makes this possible.

Indeed it is in this vein that Schön’s (1987:6) original exposition of “artistry” positively connoted and explained the way in which professionals work to *consciously* explicate their practice: they recall what happened, identify the contributory elements, and consider what

they would repeat and what they would do differently to more effectively manage and control themselves and the situations in which they find themselves. Thus, in what is essentially an extension of Deweyian (1910) deductive judgement, Schön (1983:50) describes how students/practitioners reflect “on the understandings which have been implicit” in their ‘actions and understandings’ through a process of ‘surface, criticize, restructure and embody in further action’.

His research identified two ways this happens, by ‘reflection-in-action’, i.e. when Geoff *didn’t* grab and pull apart the young men who were fighting, and, ‘reflection-on-action’, Geoff’s unpacking the incident later. Thus, reflection-in-action refers to the process whereby practitioners “think about doing something while doing it” (Schön, 1983:54) in “a stretch of time within which it is still possible to make a difference to the outcomes of action (Schön, 1995:np). Reflection-on-action, on the other hand, refers to how,

in the relative tranquillity of a post-mortem, [practitioners] think back on a project they have undertaken, a situation they have lived through, and they explore the understandings they have brought to their handling of the case. (Schön, 1983:61).

The focus of Schön’s writing of the 1980’s, along with the literature that has blossomed ever since, pays substantial attention, indeed for the most part sole attention, to theorising and honing the practice of reflection-on-action to which these percipients lived experience fit. Indeed, reflection-in-action is the least theorised aspect in Schön’s 1980’s work (Eraut, 1994) and where it does appear it is ‘incoherent and illogical’, focusing only on “the knowledge produced” (Gilroy, 1993:139 cited in Newman, 1999:154) rather than detailing its process and without clarifying how it is distinct to the process of reflection-*on*-action, particularly pertinent when ‘knowledge produced’ can only fully be defined as such by reflection-*on*-action anyway.

This dominance of reflection-on-action has firmly established a developmental perspective to mainstream understanding of reflective practice, one that devotes attention to increasing finer detail concerning the nature of suitable activities that foster the control of practitioner thought and situation. The broad forms these take in higher education were explained in the Preface, and students are expected or required to engage in whichever or all according to their programme of study.

The dominance of reflection-on-action, the widespread adoption of these activities, and the mainstream acceptance of its concomitant literature, means that reflective practice has come to be equated with, indeed *mean* reflection-on-action. Even a brief internet or

journal search using the key words ‘reflective practice’ shows this to be the case. Subsequently, popular integration of reflective practice (read ‘reflection-on-action’) into the social professions along with unanimity in mainstream literature indicates, conveys and reinforces the practice of reflective practice as clear and understood, and this follows into the way in which it is embedded in higher education programmes for social professionals. Given this backdrop there can be a number of specified module and/or course outcomes (Moon, 1999), but in common to them all is that they involve a necessary and essential expression of vulnerability, candour and disclosure.

When jostled with percipient experiences of engagement in reflective practice through Curation, three matters pertinent to a discussion of points raised here in relation to whether the practice of reflective practice *is* clear and understood are ‘carved out’ (*cf.* Peters), ‘calling forth’ questions about:

- what to reflect on;
- conflation of reflection and reflective practice and therefore confusion in definitions;
- and, the overarching transformative aim of reflective practice.

2.1 What to reflect on

Debra wonders about how to bring what is implicit in, and inherent to, her practice to the fore when she reflects-on-action. She asks “*how do you qualify*” something like “*having a way with young people*” (30May2015, Debra:113), and this when, in a different RPRG, Geoff points out that one’s practice is “*just you, it’s who you are*” (13May2015, Geoff:115). Jeanette attempts to describe the process of reflection-on-action from her experience, referring to it as “*dredging*” and “*layers*” – she says

22	Jeanette	<i>trying to dredge all this stuff up and lots of things have happened in-between and you think about it differently and you’ve got to dredge through all that stuff if you are going to get any reflection through the layers [...] and it’s easier not to</i>
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(29Mar2014)

Geoff speaks of practice followed by thinking about that practice as a cyclical ingression of “*emotional load*” (30May2015, Geoff:88) and, indeed, Sadie fears that if she *was* to work at being better at reflection-on-action the emotional load would mean she would become paralysed by thoughts of “*what is the right thing to do and I’m afraid of doing the wrong thing*” (15Nov2013, Sadie:72) leading to her “*going up [her] own fundament!*” (15Nov2013, Sadie:72). As observed by Davies & Gannon (2006:90), the practice of reflective practice requires practitioners to

invent [their] own methods of meaning-making as [they] go and catch [them]selves in the act of engaging in old practices and modes of meaning-making that [they] are in the process of deconstructing and moving beyond.

The experiences of Debra, Geoff, Jeanette and Sadie reinforce Davis & Gannon’s argument, that it is indeed a “fraught practice” (*ibid*).

It could be considered the intention behind the facilitated reflective activities of writing and dialogue is structure to help *manage* the load of this fraught practice (Gourd, 2014). Even so, it is not obvious *how* practitioners *can* capture the complexity of their professional practice. Therefore, it follows that *choice* of which elements of practice to emphasise and explore and which to leave out is essential and integral to reflection-on-action. Jason talks of his concerns about “*which bit you’re supposed to pinpoint and they all interact and interrelate and how are you supposed to make sense of all that*” (10Jan2015, Jason:44). Geoff shares how his practice is “*so ingrained [...] I don’t always notice it*” (30May2015, Geoff:92). Sadie differentiates between the process to reach a decision and the decision itself (15Nov2013, Sadie:91); the former is “*the backchat that’s going on in your head...[that] you have with yourself*” (15Nov2013, Sadie:70) and she struggles to identify which elements to focus on in her diary. Rob describes his practice as “*background*” (30May2015, Rob:110), Geoff agreeing, “*it’s so generic, it’s not like I did 60% this and 60% did that*” (30May2015, Geoff:109). Therefore, for Jason, to engage in reflective practice his efforts centre on diary construction, selecting “*which bits I will say more about, which I won’t say about*” (21Nov2014, Jason:121). Clare also “*produce[s] a lot more*” but “*picks [...] what ones I’ll put in [and] won’t put in*” (6Oct2014, Clare:113). Jeanette likens it to forcing her “*multifaceted*” practice

127	Jeanette	...into a table, like a grid, like they say ‘this is how you write your diary and your portfolio and this what you have to do’ and so you do it, you know it’s false. It contradicts itself
(29Mar2014)		

Indeed, Geoff describes writing a diary as “*a game to play*” (30May2015, 12:169), a process that is no different to writing an essay (30May2015, Geoff:173). Setting aside the inauthentic nature of this for now, mainstream literature jostled with these experiences points up how the practice of reflective practice is *not* clear.

2.2 Conflation of reflection and reflective practice

Their discussion of this fraught practice goes further, 'calling forth questions' about the nature of reflective practice itself, specifically querying the extent to which reflective practice is different to *reflection*, the latter being an important element in learning that comprises thinking about something and making connections with ones established schemata and associations (Finlay & Gough, 2003). To illustrate, in his review of literature on *reflection*, Lachman (1997:479) defines it as the

process by which a relatively stable modification in stimulus-response relations is developed as a consequence of functional environmental interaction via the senses.

Jeanette, Carol, Jason, Debra, Geoff, Rob & Dasia in four different RPRGs discuss *reflective practice* as a "life skill" (6Dec2014, Debra:275, Geoff:272, Jason:274) that is 'unconscious' (7Mar2015, Geoff:123), "natural" (7Mar2015, Geoff:108 & Geoff:112), "innate" (7Mar2015, Dasia:114, Debra:113), based on "common sense" (7Mar2015, Geoff:133). As Carol puts it, it is something "you do automatically" (18Oct2014, Carol:6) and Jeanette says that she "reflect[s] [...] on everything [...] it's like such a normal process if you like that you kind of forget about it" (28Nov2013, Jeanette:94), 'if you like that' suggesting, perhaps, that some have to put in more effort whilst for others it is more enjoyable or comes easier to them. In a similar vein but to the other extent, Dasia speaks of it as not always utilised or necessary, giving the example of people who "have everything they don't need to think" (7Mar2015, Dasia:145) or it being a "luxury" for people in survival situations (7Mar2015, Rob:143, Dasia:133). In the same RPRG Geoff and Dasia speak of not engaging in reflective practice when not required or encouraged to do so in one's job (7Mar2015, Geoff:98 & Geoff:123, Dasia:120, Dasia:122 & Dasia:126). Rob and Geoff wonder if it is a 'concept' that is only of significance in academic contexts (7Mar2015, Rob:101, Geoff:132). Similarly, having first described reflective practice as 'normal', noted above, Jeanette says that at university "they say 'reflection' you kinda think 'what's that, I don't know what that is, that's really hard'" (28Nov2013, Jeanette:94). Similarly, Sadie shares "I don't think I've reflected before and this is something very new to me" (6Oct2014, Sadie:8).

Here, then, they are talking *about* reflective practice, but appear to be referring to reflection as metacognition involved in learning, but then conflating and confusing the two. Equally, their expressions of 'natural', 'normal', etc., could evidence Ryle's (1949/2000:40) claim that 'knowing how' may only be an "interior acknowledgement" (1949/2000:31), meaning that "there need be no visible or audible difference between an act done with skill

and done from sheer habit” such that it has become “second nature” (1949/2000:41). However, Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) assert that ‘second nature’ performance is only the auspices of ‘expert’, and the percipients are ‘novices’ according to their theory, for whom conscious performance is essential. Indeed Bauman (1992:48) characterises performance as activities that are “shaped and crafted” through “intense engagement and contemplation”, here, then, a very conscious act.

Thus, taking the percipients conflation and confusion as a lead, and despite the seemingly apparent clarity of definitions and explanations of reflective practice in mainstream understanding Captured earlier, broader exploration of theory is required. This reveals similar conflation and confusion. For example, Vaughn (1990:ix) describes reflective practice as much a “state of mind as it is a set of activities”, which is the same for reflection involved in any and all learning. Going back to Dewey (1933/2008:3) on whose work Schön built his theory, *reflection* is described as “the kind of thinking that consists in turning a subject over in the mind and giving it serious and consecutive consideration”, similar to Boud *et al*’s (1985:20) later ‘model of reflection’ comprising “recollection of the salient event, the replaying of the initial experience in the mind of the learner or the recounting to others of the features of the experience” (1985:26). Similarly, Kolb’s (1984:26) “four stage learning cycle” sets out to explain the “process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience” via “the polarities of actor/observer and involvement/detachment”. Here stage one is the ‘concrete experience’, followed by two, ‘reflective observation’, three, ‘abstract conceptualisation’ and four, ‘active experimentation’. Gibbs (1988) work is expressly a “guide” (1988:9) to ‘stages for a reflective *debriefing*’ [*emphasis added*] (1988:49) comprising “description”, “feelings”, “evaluation”, “analysis”, “conclusion”, and “action plan” (1988:49-50).

All three concern reflection, and are commonly used sources and processes referred to in literature on and practice of *reflective practice*.

It is perhaps little wonder that percipients confuse and conflate reflection and reflective practice.

Even when attention turns to mainstream literature *explicitly* positioned as reflective practice, the difference is not always clear. For instance, Rolfe *et al*’s (2001) stages of reflective practice require that practitioners consider: ‘What’, the original experience, one’s feelings about it now and what one (thinks one) felt at the time; followed by ‘So What’, the meaning made of that reflection and how that links to theory; and finally, ‘Now What’,

feeding forward any resulting insight and learning into future practice. In a similar vein Kim (1999) writes of constructing a descriptive narrative, followed by connections with espoused theory and knowledge, and identification of how this will be applied. Comparing those well used models to Boud *et al*, Kolb and Gibbs work on reflection, how they are distinct is not obvious, and indeed *all* are typically used in higher education programmes for reflective practice interchangeably and without comment. Similarly, when describing control of self and situation as a result of *reflection*, Dewey uses the metaphor of ‘climbing a tree to get a more commanding view of a situation’ (1910/1991:11), an idea adopted by Brookfield (1987), Kemmis (1985), Mezirow *et al* (1990) and Moon (1999) in their theories of *reflective practice*. In Lachman’s (1997:479) discussion of *reflection*, he offers that “unless there is a change in behaviour [...] there is no evidence that learning has occurred”, which could equally describe the intention of *reflective practice*.

Perhaps this conflation does not matter, after all we can understand the authors’ intentions; or perhaps the overlap between reflection and reflective practice is so comprehensive that they are easily conflated. But, in which case this juxtaposition and jostling of percipient experiences of engaging in reflective practice with theory leads to the question why ‘reflection’ is not enough on its own. Yet in higher education it is typical to see reflective practice being unquestioningly treated as a ‘specialised tool’ in professional practice and professional identity formation. If that claim is to be upheld then it requires justification and clarification. In any case, Berry & Dienes (1993) warn that sovereign positioning of reflective practice *stalls* implicit learning given that people learn and act in complex situations and structures *all the time* without its conscious recall and Claxton (2000:36) points up that practitioners who are unaware but observant “master [...] faster than those who keep struggling for conscious comprehension”.

2.3 Definitions

Explanation could come from Adams *et al* (2002) and Burgoyne & Reynolds (1997:1) in their contrasting of ‘effective practitioners’ with ‘reflective practitioners’. In brief, they distinguish between practitioners who reflect, so merely ponder on situation, context and self, with those who do so deliberately and then make sense of that information by identifying alternative possibilities to better understand and control their professional practice and develop themselves as practitioners. Indeed, this differentiation could go *some* way to explain why the percipients are effective in their practice illustrations even whilst describing how they do not deliberately reflect on their practice. ‘Effective’ in these

terms would arguably be luck more than judgement given that in such stage theories of reflective practice, 'effective practitioners' are perceived as merely 'technically competent' (Gourd & Kingdon, 2014:214) and therefore inferior – or at least less desirable – than 'reflective practitioners', who

analyse or evaluate one or more personal experiences and attempt to generalise from that thinking. They do this so that in the future, they will be more skilful or better informed or more effective, than they have been in the past (Cowan, 1998:17).

So Sadie, Jason, Debra, Geoff, Rob, and Dasia would only be effective practitioners, and their practice would be inferior to peers who are reflective practitioners: they would not develop fully as practitioners and therefore presumably they would not progress in their higher education programmes. But considered in the context of the transcripts as a whole, this would appear not to be the case.

Either way this is further confused through another definitional variation, that of *critical* reflective practice. How or if this is different to 'reflective practice' is not always clear yet professional programmes and literature will often use the terms 'reflection', 'critical reflection/critical reflective practice' and 'reflective practice' interchangeably, or favour one without always clarifying why. Kim (1999) and Burgoyne & Reynolds (1997) characterise critical reflective practice as the formation of emancipatory connections and outcomes which are not present if engaged in 'effective' and 'reflective' practice. To illustrate, Burgoyne & Reynolds (1997:2) describe a critically reflective practitioner as one who is informed by a

rich and diverse mixture of descriptive, interpretative and critical theories and also an understanding of a range of rival normative theories to a preferred one.

Therefore, critical reflective practice would appear to be different *and* superior to reflective practice. Indeed, Gourd (2014:106) contends there to be "a great deal of difference" between them, although reinforcing my point, proceeds to discuss the former by conflating it with 'reflection'. Further, Gourd & Kingdon (2014:215) describe critical reflective practice as a "*prerequisite for professionalism*" [*emphasis added*] that it is uniquely performed by graduates, therefore implying one can only 'learn' critical reflective practice through a degree programme, and any other forms of learning (or, for that matter, via any other route) do not compare.

If not enough, further confusion arises in established literature through the term 'reflexivity'. Whilst Fook (2002) advises that it is no different to 'reflective practice' but

evolved specifically in social work, D’Cruz *et al* (2007) discusses reflexivity as a critical stance to location of self in contrast to reflective practice which only involves “[generating] theory from one incident that is generalizable to other incidents and situations” (2007:83). However, Bolton (2014); Bolton & Delderfield, (2018), Proctor (1993), and Thompson & Thompson (2008:27) (as well as myself) contend that an approach to reflective practice that does *not* adopt critical location of self “would produce poor-quality practice and, in some respects, dangerous practice”.

In any case, what *is* clear is that reflective practice is *not* clear and understood.

2.4 Transformative aim

The gold standard of reflective practice running through mainstream theories in higher education programmes is the epistemological and developmental goal of transformation, whether explicitly expressed and whatever the clarity or confusion of definition (Bleakley, 1999). It was introduced in chapter 2, reflective practice to transform self, practice and organisations for the betterment of service to others (Kilminster *et al*, 2010; Burgoyne & Reynolds, 1997; Mezirow *et al*, 1990; Cranton, 2006; Escobar *et al* with Freire, 1994; Bolton, 2006). However, the number of aspects in one’s professional practice that must change to be deemed ‘transformed’, in what way/s, and who decides it is transformation rather than mere change are all unclear. Further, mindful of The Trappings in the context of professional practice, to what extent *can* practice, structures and the way one thinks and acts transform anyway? A social worker/teacher/nurse must still act as a social worker/teacher/nurse, no matter how they interrogate their practice. What *is* ‘transformation’ in these circumstances? The reason for this point is that it is a confusion seen in the lived experience of reflective practice in discussions between percipients Carol, Mary and Clare in their RPRG of October 2014. Mary says

177	Mary	<i>Like I don’t know how to critically reflect on myself. I don’t know what that entails. I don’t know how to do it. All I know is that if I do something I’ll talk about it and think of a different way of doing it. That’s just how I see reflection. It’s hardly life-changing though is it</i>
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(6Oct2014)

Carol replies to Mary that she *is* accurately describing reflective practice (6Oct2014, Carol:181), but Mary comes back with “*critically, what makes it critical?*” (6Oct2014, Mary:183). Carol’s response to this is “*well you look at theory*” (6Oct2014, Carol:184) although Mary wonders if it is about “*looking at the other ways*” she could take action

(6Oct2014, Mary:185). To this Carol (6Oct2014, Carol:186) says it is about “*criticising, ‘did I do that right? Could I have done it differently?’*”, but Clare and Mary ask “*Who says I did it wrong?’*” (6Oct2014, Clare:188, Mary:189). Agreeing that reflective practice is about criticising, Clare and Carol tell Mary that she is already “*doing it*” after all (6Oct2014, Clare:191 & Clare:193; 6Oct2014, Carol:192 & Carol:194), she is “*a natural*” (6Oct2014, Carol:194). In a different RPRG, Geoff expresses similar confusion: “*might [reflective practice] just be me and how I think I should be reflecting, you know how deep I’m meant to go with it and maybe as a result I just get myself in a muddle with it*” (10Jan2015, Geoff:23).

Here, then, the meaning of ‘critical’ and confusing it with ‘criticism’, confusion about the purpose of theory, whether they should only focus on what goes wrong, whilst wondering who decides what is ‘wrong’, all makes it difficult for them to determine if and how their reflective practice transforms anything. Of course, picked out earlier, Dreyfus & Dreyfus might suggest this is because they are ‘novice’ practitioners, but in the literature on reflective practice transformation is the overarching purpose for *all*, regardless of length of experience, although and anyway it is obvious now that *how* that is the case is far from clear and understood.

3 ‘Drawn out’ key tenet (ii): reflective practice involves development of emotional and affective awareness and competence

The essential constituent in reflective practice of examining one’s feelings and emotions in practice situations to develop oneself as a practitioner and one’s practice was established in chapter 2. Indeed, Howe (2008:2) marks out professional practice as “*emotional work of a high order*” *because* of the involvement of, and toll on, emotions and feelings. We are, after all, “*creatures saturated by feelings*” (2008:1). Hochschild’s (2012:30) analysis goes further. She too describes the significance of emotion but additionally “*locates the position*” of the individual experiencing them as “*viewer*”, such that emotions act as a “*warning system*” and “*guidelines to the self-relevance*” of that experience. Applied to reflective practice it can be presumed that social professionals who are aware of their warning system and guidelines for self-relevance will be better able to “*understand how their feelings affect them as they work with users and engage with colleagues*” (*ibid*) hence its articulation as a “*core skill*” of emotional intelligence (Howe, 2008:2). For Howe (*ibid*) professional practice *without* emotional intelligence is ‘ineffective and lacks humanity’ (*ibid*). It is a theme that arises in the RPRGs, but first, given the weight of this claim a brief foray into ‘emotional intelligence’ is prescient.

Stemming from Thorndike's (1920:228) concept of *social* intelligence being the ability to understand, manage and "act wisely in human relations", a literature search reveals 'emotional intelligence' first appearing in 1966 through the work of Leuner, although widely popularised in the 1990's by Daniel Goleman (1995; 1998). Goleman built on Salovey & Mayer's (1990) model of five linked elements: self-awareness, managing emotions, motivating oneself, empathy, and handling relationships. A reflective practice that involves and supports development of this emotional intelligence can only be welcome in professional contexts (e.g. see Osterman & Kottkamp, 2015; Zwozdiak-Myers, 2012) as students/practitioners learn to identify, articulate and master their emotions and feelings. It reinforces the self as integral to understanding and practice of reflective practice; indeed, the self as interpreter, mediator, constructor, is involved in every element of Professional Practice: Connected Practice, including The Trappings. Jeanette speaks of the importance in professional practice of "*consider[ing] your own values and self on a professional level*" (14Nov2013, Jeanette:14), which for Sadie enables her to be "*more effective [...] in the workplace*" (15Nov2013, Sadie:100). It is in this way that reflective practice is, as Sadie puts it, a "*tool for professional work*" (15Nov2013, Sadie:100).

However, it is the questions 'carved out' (cf. Peters) by the percipient lived experiences of engagement in reflective practice that draw attention. Duma expresses "*fighting between my mind, my body and my soul so that I can bring them together and actually become one [...], become a person, become a person that I am*" (15Nov2013, Duma:130), pointing up the enormity of the task as he experiences it. Moreover, 'fighting' suggests the quality of that experience, not obvious in the theoretical claims of reflective practice where it seems that if one simply adheres to the staged models, reflective practice happens. If we consider 'fighting' to mean struggle then it finds further expression in the RPRGs. Geoff and Debra are talking about reflective practice and how

24	Debra	<i>...You don't want to be digging about in all of your stuff...</i>
25	Geoff	<i>...but you are feeling like you have to...</i>

(18Oct2014)

Jason joins in, commenting on the requirement to keep a reflective journal whilst knowing it will be read by others (lecturers, fieldwork supervisors) involved in their higher education programme:

26	Jason	<i>And I guess then there's showing that to people, like you were describing, showing</i>
27	Geoff	<i>Yes you choose to have a therapist and you know its confidential and private, you don't expect random people to be reading it</i>
28	Debra	<i>It would be like people coming and sitting in every now and then [laughs]...</i>

(18Oct2014)

Therefore, not only is the emotional load and intrusion of reflective practice keenly felt, it is compounded by the demand for that to be public. Becky describes the emotional load just from having to put things in “*black and white*” (29Mar2015, Becky:88), to which Jeanette concurs:

89	Jeanette	<i>Yes it's like saying 'I got that wrong' but then isn't that the whole point of reflection, like to see where you went wrong as well, but it's like letting someone else know that, and as soon as you let them you don't know what they will do with that information, it's like you are no longer in control of you</i>
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(29Mar2014)

It is not surprising in a different RPRGs, Sadie speaks of feeling ‘*exposed*’ and ‘*vulnerable*’ (29Nov2013, Sadie:14).

There are three arising issues here, then.

First, their lived experience of the developmental frame to reflective practice is ‘fight’ and struggle to construct themselves - and be constructed by others - as suboptimal and requiring growth. Indeed, it is such a point that leads Cranton (2006:59) to characterise the practice of reflective practice as being one can “only reintegrate at the end and [...] only be disorientated at the beginning”.

Furthermore, we can appreciate that this creates the need for someone who is (more) optimal in self and practice to read, instruct and guide that person’s reflection on their practice: it is on such a platform that reflective practice is embedded into higher education programmes. Whilst the form of activities was explained in the Preface, here we can see the extent to which students – and higher education programmes – associate reflective practice with writing (journals, diaries). The full implications of this are explored later.

The third issue is the lived experience of emotional toll from the development of self which necessarily requires a level of commitment, a focus on one’s interiority, as well as vulnerability expressed through disclosure and candour. More can be heard about this from Geoff whose expression of cyclical ingressions was referred to previously; he talks of the emotional load of “*dwelling on things*” explaining that he would “*rather leave it there*”

and not bother about it, not think about it, shut it away” but instead he is required to *“sort of dwell on it and it’ll get worse and I get myself more and more worked up about it and it ends up going in a massive vicious... [interrupted]* (18Oct2014, Geoff:31). Carol talks of *“sit[ting] and chew[ing] and then it starts eating me up”* (18Oct2014, Carol:32). On that note, Clare explains how her reflections on practice *“run[s] the next day”*, and she doesn’t know *“how to stop that”*, explaining *“Your emotions are going [...] and then you beat yourself up about, you’re beating yourself up”* (21Nov2014, Clare:58). In the same RPRG, Jason expresses his issue with having to be *“always critiquing”* because *“it can easily become that tipping to really giving yourself a hard time, self-critical all the time...”* agreed by Carol (21Nov2014, Carol:353). In a different RPRG, Debra speaks of *“over analysing, reflective practice is over analysing things”* (18Oct2014, Debra:33), and earlier says she is *“quite a pessimist when it comes to reflecting on”* herself (18Oct2014, Clare:20). Geoff responds that reflective practice *“play[s] into that, making you dwell even more”* (18Oct2014, Geoff:21). In a later RPRG he speaks of how the act of deliberately reflecting on his practice *“spoils it”* – so *“even if I can remember once I sit down to reflect on it, yeah, but once it becomes an actual thing you’re meant to be doing, and that spoils it”* (10Jan2015, Geoff:21). He elaborates, *“once you start to analyse you think then, I don’t know, maybe I try and go too deep or [unclear word] too much but it doesn’t always flow off, you know it’s...”*, tailing off (10Jan2015, Geoff:21), which means he ensures that his reflective diary is not *“too personal because when I write my diary you know, I know what I’m going to write and where it’s going to go”* (18Oct2014, Geoff:115). Debra explains *“how I feel at the time I may not want to share”*, an experience that is given shape by the requirement of her higher education programme to write down that which is private; she says writing it down means that *“anyone can see it”* (18Oct2014, Debra:18) and although she is *“an emotional person”* writing it down feels to be a very different and uncomfortable activity (18Oct2014, Debra:28).

3.1 Confession

In sum, their experiences of engaging in reflective practice illuminate the extent of emotional load incurred from confession and uninvited personal intrusion brought on by the expectation to (publicly) express disorientation to ultimately reintegrate. Looking to theory, Bleakley (2000:406) argues this stems from its Protestant Humanist roots (that are also seamed into the Pragmatism movement). To exemplify, Carl Rogers (1961:105), widely cited as bringing the wider Humanist movement to psychology, bases his theory on the self

being available to optimal development as “fully functioning”, this being the “ideal human condition”. Accordingly, “The good life is a process” (Rogers, 1961:186) within which the self is conceptualised as a natural, ‘organised, consistent, gestalt’ (Rogers, 1959:200) that can – and indeed should - develop if one wishes to be fully functioning, integral to which is developing conscience by confessing one’s wrongs (Remer, 1996). The fit with reflective practice captured in chapter 2 is obvious – but now it’s lived experience is also clear. It is, of course, difficult to see how effective scrutiny of practice *can* avoid oneself, but jostling the key tenet with percipient experiences reveals the impact of that Protestant Humanist (and, indeed, Global North) concept of self and notion of development which determines both means *and* ends, and creates emotional load, a “narrative frame” (Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992:2) that is incorporated “in the marrow of individual self-representation” (1992:5), within which pre-occupation to confess is wrapped up in notions of cathartic salvation (Fejes, 2013). With reflective practice being situated in this “confessing society” (2013:52) *and* dominated by self-representation then impetus to confess will drive engagement *even if* the facilitation is differently intentioned (Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009; Furedi, 2004; Bradbury *et al*, 2010). So, and despite those who endeavour to orientate/re-orientate the focus of reflective practice to criticality and service to others, such as Fook (2002; 2016), Fook & Gardner (2007), Newman (1999), Bleakley (1999) and Atkinson & Claxton (2000), the percipients experience of the key tenet of development of emotional and affective awareness is that the self is broken and needs fixing through confessional engagement. Indeed, Becky sums this up in her understanding that reflective practice means only learning from her professional practice when she “*doesn’t do well*” (28Nov2013, Becky:50) although worries, as a result, that her good practice “*gets forgotten*” (28Nov2013, Becky:48), an experience shared by Jeanette (28Nov2013, Jeanette:52 & 56), Claire (6Oct2014, Claire:107, 109, 111,) Geoff (18Oct2014, Geoff:19), Sadie (21Nov2014, Sadie:376) and Jason (21Nov2014, Jason:374).

3.2 Acceptable reflective practice

It could be that this particular lived experience of reflective practice stems from their *misunderstanding* of critical, confusing it, as they do, with ‘criticising’, and criticising tends to be emotionally negative work. It could also be that this is further compounded by the word ‘reflective’ if taken to be an emotionally laden never-ending cycle of soul-searching, and not, for example, a disciplined approach to practice for the service of others. For all that, though, and akin to discussion above, Jeanette, Becky, Geoff and Rob attribute

responsibility for this to wider society, so to how “*we become conditioned [...] to look at our failures. Our Western system, education system points, is to our failures all the time*” (28Nov2013, Becky:54), to “*targets and league tables*” (28Nov2013, Becky:70; 6Dec2014, Geoff:306), and the “*huge amount of pressure to do well*” (18Nov2013, Becky:70). Jeanette observes they have “*brought into that meritocracy*”, pointing out “*we, we’re actually for merit, we’re not here to just say oo I got to university, great, we are here to do the best we can, and even getting here is on merit that’s unfair*” (14Nov2013, Jeanette:38). For Rob and Geoff this all means a diminishing of emphasis on and valuing of “*thinking for yourself*” (6Dec2014, Geoff:304). Rob refers to a line from a song, “*from the moment I could talk I was ordered to listen*” (6Dec2014, Rob:299), adding “*the minute you start, it’s like ‘shut up’*” (6Dec2014, Rob:301), that “*thinking for yourself*” is “*something that gets squashed*” (6Dec2014, Rob:297), a sentiment echoed by Becky (28Nov2013, Becky:70). This is troubling given the centrality of self to reflective practice. Indeed, extending his own critique further Furedi (2004:66) characterises the “*cultural climate*” of the Global North as one that “*fosters suspicion about private behaviour*” [*emphasis added*] and emotions. Here, ‘the private’ is a problem unless and until it is open to public scrutiny albeit then judged to be a different kind of problem, in our case whether it evidences suitable reflective practice, professional behaviour, even suitability to practice at all in a particular profession indicative of a general “*erosion of the boundary that separates the private from the public*” inherent to neo-liberalism (Furedi, 2004:40). From the percipient experiences it can be offered that this dissolution has had a two-fold effect on Schön’s ‘reflective turn’, reinforcing, even propelling a focus on interiority beyond all else – which therefore, at the same time strengthens the external control of reflective practice. In this way reflective practice becomes – or considering its Pragmatist Humanist roots has always been - a certain version of presentation and a specialized form of self-culture (Lasch, 1991). So, starting her higher education programme feeling positive about reflective practice and planning to approach it as an ‘*authentic experience*’ (14Nov2013, Dawn:28), Dawn shares how she quickly began to “*lie and ham up*” her reflective diary because it is better to “*keep their private real anxieties and how they’re really feeling quiet*” (14Nov2013, Dawn:30). She explains this to be the consequence of “*trying to impress those deemed to be in high authority*” (14Nov2013, Dawn:28), i.e. *not* a misunderstanding of ‘critical’ or ‘reflective’ but a *correct* appraisal of reflective practice. Those “*at the top of the tree*”, her higher education lecturers, decide what “*constitutes a pass*”, and therefore students perform reflective practice accordingly (14Nov2013, Dawn:41). More specifically, if her university

tutors knew that she was “*feeling really low about this or weak or I’m not actually coping*” then she “*might not get the grade*”, likening this to an interview whereby if you “*reveal how you really are*” you “*might not get the job*” (14Nov2013, Dawn:30) and as long “*as that dynamic exists then people are always going to lie [...] it’s not in their interests*” to do otherwise (14 November2013, Dawn: 41). Jason says he “*know[s] [he’s] got to show some reflection*” in his diary (6Dec2014, Jason:94), emphasis on ‘show’ as opposed to anything deeper, and Debra talks about ‘*making something up at the last minute because [she] knows [she] has to do it*’ (6Dec2014, Debra:222, Debra:224).

So although the development of emotional and affective awareness and competence is a key tenet of reflective practice, not only are there impacts from and consequences to having to express ‘being broken in order to re-integrate’, the *performance* of this is analysed and judged by others in power therefore attention is taken up with doing it in an acceptable manner. As will be seen later, the percipients also speak positively *about* (some) broader *purposes* of reflective practice. But their lived *experience* patently points up dissonance between “overtly expressed beliefs about knowledge and learning” on the one hand and “actual ways of organising reflective activities on the other” (Dohn, 2011:674), these requiring “management of feelings” (Hochschild, 2012:7), i.e. the requirement “to induce or suppress feeling to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind” of being professional (2012:9). This ‘proper state of mind’ is conveyed through partitioning off the unacceptable and an acceptable “publicly observable facial and bodily display” (*ibid*), a state of affairs likely to lead to inauthentic outward expression of emotions (Lazányi, 2011), inhibition and restriction of spontaneous actions (Wharton & Erickson, 1993), and students/ practitioners becoming alienated from their actual feelings (Hochschild, 2012). In such circumstances students/practitioners are more likely to draw on thoughtless and clichéd repetition of behaviours (Stanislavski, 1945), resulting in separation between themselves and their client/users rather than Connected Practice of professional practice. All of this changes reflective and professional practice, with the risk/likelihood that students/practitioners end up feeling ‘guilt, cynicism and estrangement’ (Hochschild, 2012:187), apt descriptions that could characterise percipient experiences Curated above.

Curation around the first three key tenets of reflective practice with percipient experiences of engagement and using that as a track to direct an excavation of relevant theory ‘carves out’ (*cf.* Peters) significant issues.

4 'Drawn out' key tenet (iii): self-development happens and leads to positive change in practice competence

Attention now turns to the third key tenet Captured in chapter 2, that, essentially, reflection on experience 'x' will lead to positive personal (professional) change 'y' and in turn a positive practice outcome 'z'. For this to happen a practitioner's priority must necessarily be given to identifying which self and practice elements to focus on, making essential both conscious recall of events *and* accurate awareness of self.

4.1 Reflective practice leads to self and practice development

Curation requires understanding Schön's (1983) notion of 'knowing-in-action', "knowledge which has been sufficiently integrated into or connected with personal practice to be either automatically or very readily called into use" (Eraut, 1994:17). Knowing-in-action underlies his principle that when unpacking one's practice after an event, a student/practitioner can recall aspects for scrutiny and then integrate that 'new' understanding so it can be 'called into use' in future practice.

Yet, Schön's elucidation of this core pillar of reflective practice is confusing. He writes that reflective practice involves the creation *of* an account, therefore practice scrutiny occurs in its creation (Schön, 1987) but later positions scrutiny as being *on* the account, so scrutiny as taking place *after* its creation (Schön, 1992). It is a theoretical confusion unbeknown to the percipients but reflected in their experiences of diary keeping. Geoff talks about "*double-reflecting*" (10Jan2015, Geoff:62). When invited to say more he explains:

64	Geoff	<i>you put your initial reflections down and then you go back and look at it again and [...] it gives you more time to actually look at it properly and pull it apart and think 'right that was that, would I change that or would I do it exactly the same' and linking it back into theory</i>
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(10Jan2015)

At first take this appears just as Schön describes in his second elicitation of knowing-in-action and indeed Jason says that Geoff's 'double reflecting' is "*exactly what*" reflective practice is "*meant to be about*" (10Jan2015, Jason:71), adding when that professional practice situation "*come[s] up again*" (10Jan2015, Jason:76) the new understanding "*kick[s] in*" (10Jan2015, Jason:71). But, in that RPRG as a whole, reinforced by percipient experiences in other RPRGs, the picture is problematic. Jason says that he struggles to know "*which bit you're supposed to pin point*" (10Jan2015, Jason:44) in the written account and that his "*later reflection*", his reflecting *on* his reflective account, "*is perhaps more*

positive than the initial" (10Jan2015, Jason:52), such that, as a result, he starts *"to wonder 'am I reflecting or reporting'"* (10Jan2015, Jason:44). It contradicts his earlier statement that his reflection-on-action feeds forward to positively impact on his practice in the moment. He concludes *"So my question is how, how do we make those decisions in the moment. How do we get more effective in the moment?"* (10Jan2015, Jason:101). Debra is clear: creation of the account is *not* about practice development but proving to lecturers that she can *"handle something well"* (10Jan2015, Debra:78). Geoff shares another dimension, that his scrutiny of his reflective journal is *"personality driven"* (30May2015, Geoff:86) and this shapes how he reviews what he has written. Similarly, in a different RPRG seven months earlier, Debra shares that because she is *"quite a pessimist"* this is how she reflects on herself in her diary (18Oct2014, Debra:20), and, even though Geoff's supervisor encourages him to pay attention to the content of his diary accounts to learn about himself, his experience is that this only tells him about himself as a *writer* not practitioner. He posits that *"the writing could help"* but only if *"it has meaning, we're not just writing 'coz we have to"* (30May2015, Geoff:92) and writing a diary, he is clear, is definitely because he has to, it is *"a game to play"* (30May2015, Geoff:169). Consequently his 'double reflecting' *"doesn't help [him] deal with things"* when *in practice* (10Jan2015, Geoff:81). Debra describes how their accounts of practice merely *'sing the same tune'* (30May2015, Debra:133), no self and practice development, but a re-statement of what they already know about themselves appropriately furnished for task and audience.

Understanding this, it is pertinent that Schön (1992a:127) describes reflective practice as only taking place when ones 'knowing-in-action' does not accord with actual outcome: practitioners are prompted to "make sense" of "unique cases", triggered by surprise or breakdown in routine practice (Schön, 1983:5), so when there is "an error to be corrected, an anomaly to be [understood], an opportunity to be exploited" (Schön, 1992a:127). Presumably, then, if one's knowing-in-action *fits* with events as they play out a practitioner would not – indeed need not – engage in reflective practice at all. Perhaps this explains why, despite hours of working in his professional setting, Geoff speaks of *"struggling"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:102) *"to find something to reflect on"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:97), and of waiting for *"something that happens to change something"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:105) such as *"incidents"* as opposed to the *"mundane, the ordinary"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:91), experiences echoed by Jason (6Dec2014, Jason:100). Indeed, Jason says that his university tutor and supervisor *advise* this (6Dec2014, Jason:100), so they too appear to be waiting for

something out of the ordinary to warrant reflective practice. Thus, their experience could be perceived as entirely in-keeping with theory on 'knowing-in-action'.

Yet Schön (1983) also writes of novice practitioners' merely applying rules and following procedure unthinkingly, inference being that competent professionals would not do this. What is unclear is if he is arguing that novice practitioners have no knowing-in-action, empty vessel-like, so simply follow rules without reflective practice – although how this relates to his point of practice being 'undiscussable' is unclear. Or, perhaps he is arguing that they have yet to learn how to engage in reflective practice, matched later by Dreyfus & Dreyfus – but established is that he expresses reflective practice as something practitioners *do*, albeit honed through rehearsal. Finally, if novice practitioners lack knowing-in-action one could assume they are *constantly* 'surprised' in practice contexts and therefore would need or should engage in reflective practice *all* the time. In any case, established knowing-in-action assumes that in general it is up-to-date, it is *good* practice, need not be further developed, and therefore does not require scrutiny.

In contrast, Argyris & Schön's (1974:4) earlier work (which evolved into Schön's reflective practice) refers to "theories of action" that a practitioner holds, "espoused theory" to which s/he gives public "allegiance", but that it is their 'theory-in-use', their tacit underpinnings of practice, that "*actually governs his action*" [*sic*] [*emphasis added*] (*ibid*). This "may or may not be compatible" with that which they are conscious of and express, and significantly, they may not be aware of that discrepancy (1974:7). In essence, when practitioners express their knowing-in-action as compatible with events as they play out so there is nothing to reflect on, it may well be this fits with their *espoused* theory but not their 'theory-in-use' which *would* benefit from reflective practice. With 'knowing-in-action' suggesting gaps in what is focussed on – and 'theory-in-use' suggesting this will be more commonplace than a practitioner is aware – there is a contradiction with Schön's notion that 'under the table', unscrutinised practice will result in becoming dysfunctional, out-dated, inappropriate, entrenched in bad/poor habits, unconscious and therefore out of reach for any future reflective practice (Schön, 1999).

What is clear is that the ground on which the tenet of reflective practice rests regarding self-development happens and leads to positive change is, at least, shaky. It also points up how the 'vast' literature and higher education programmes that unproblematically integrates it into theory and practice also risk being problematic.

4.2 Linear dynamic with a positive outcome

We can also consider the assumed linear relationship between a change in self-development and positive change in practice competence, already 'carved out' (cf. Peters) through Curation as problematic, but the percipients experiences speak further to this. For Joseph reflective practice is "*mapping*" his practice (14Nov2013, Joseph:2), which is quite different to changing it in some way. Geoff says "*yeah you sort of focus as before*" (6Dec2014, Geoff:77), "*you describe things that went on, but focus as before, no changes*" (6Dec2014, Geoff:81), "*in hindsight we tell ourselves the same things even if we think we aren't*" (30May2015, Geoff:136) to which Debra agrees (30May2015, Debra:133), her experience of "*singing the same tune*" referred to above.

This patently contrasts with models that articulate the linear developmental stages that practitioners should move from 'effective' to 'reflective practice' and, for some, 'critical reflective practice' that are typically used in higher education programmes. Even if considered in terms of the complexity and messy nature of professional practice Captured in chapter 2, this already seems simplistic and one-dimensional. It is therefore little wonder that evidence of a linear dynamic between reflection-on-action and positive outcome of change is not obvious from the RPRGs. In any case, mainstream literature does not agree on the number of developmental stages involved nor, therefore, what they entail. So, along with Burgoyne & Reynolds, Kim, and Rolfe *et al*, van Manen (1977) writes of three stages, but for him the first is 'largely uncritical and unreflective' (1977:206), although it involves the 'technical application of knowledge and principles to attain a given end' (1977:226). His other two stages are "higher" (*ibid*). Yet, King & Kitchener (1994), whose work is also frequently referred to in literature on reflective practice, suggest seven stages, the first three of which are "*pre-reflective*" [*emphasis added*], and the *final* two, "*reflective*" albeit that their research is rooted in age-related development and concerns reflective *judgement*, a fact that is rarely noted when adopted in mainstream text books and higher education programmes. Sparks-Langer *et al* (1991) also suggest seven stages, but a different seven (three levels of language and four levels of thinking). Another often referred to stage model from Perry (1970) advocates *nine* "positions", the first being unreflective, similar to van Manen's first stage, so "*unconsidered*" dualistic (1970:66) 'obedient' (1970:10) thinking, but only the last three of his nine are reflective, and the final is not 'critical' but a lifestyle commitment to reflection as 'ongoing and unfolding' (1970:11). Moreover, his focus is intellectual and ethical growth as part of post-18

development during higher education, but again typically referred to in mainstream literature as if originating as reflective practice.

Setting aside adoption in higher education programmes to explain, facilitate and assess reflective practice *without* comment concerning original focus, which anyway brings to bear questions about whether, or the extent to which, they *can* be transferred to reflective practice, the final stage in all of them, even though different, is viewed as optimal in development, so the best evidence of engaging in reflective practice. Further, and significantly, common to them all is focus on the development of intellect and thinking (Furlong, 2000), a critique that Furlong levels against a Schönian reflective practice in general. Generally, different kinds of engagement and different kinds of knowing are neither considered nor advocated – nor, indeed, that other forms of engagement and knowing could be more appropriate at times, even overall. As Berry & Dienes (1993) and Claxton (2000:49) observe, there are a range of “ways of knowing” that are “ignored, marginalized, romanticized, or denigrated in mainstream educational cultures”. For instance, whilst *not* reflecting is positioned as the ‘lowest’ stage so therefore should be avoided, it could be the best or only strategy a practitioner *can* take in some circumstances, i.e. rather than suboptimal or indicative of lacking in skill or practice maturity, in the ‘hot flow’ of professional practice and the emotional intensity of different kinds of interactions and interventions it could be a wise practitioner who “turns reflection on and off to meet the demands of the situation” (Ferguson 2018:421). And if not reflecting is a wise strategy in the complexity of professional practice, then it would be equally wise for higher education programmes to facilitate discussion about *how* practitioners *can* not reflect in ways that do involve a “thorough-going closure down of the self rather than a temporary suspension and defence of that self” (Ferguson, 2018:423), to be able to skilfully utilise and be aware that they are not reflecting *as part of* their professional artistry.

4.3 Linear dynamic and a positive outcome

More broadly, then, this points up how the assumption of a linear dynamic does not give room to or possibility for a messy process, or multifarious, invisible, none, or, negative (however defined) outcomes. Therefore, mining what constitutes a positive outcome in mainstream literature is relevant. Already established is that its conceptualisation will reflect its Humanist and Protestant roots in the presumption of engagement enabling practitioners to realise their true, “core self” by ‘discovering who they really are’ (Brookfield, 2000:46) and ‘washing their practice’ from unwanted “stains” to be “more

authentic and integrated (Brookfield, 2000:46). It is an assumption that reinforces a belief of “no limits [...] on the capacity of the self to absorb feeling, on the mind to think and on the depths of reflection that are possible and needed” (Ferguson, 2018:417). Indeed, for Foucault (1986) this is a critique that can be levelled against Humanism in its entirety. More recently, Brookfield (2000:46) describes the foundational assumption as one of “imperious certainty” and “triumphalism”.

So, it is perhaps somewhat surprising to note in Schön’s (1983:59) original theory he writes that when outcomes from engagement in reflective practice are positive this is *not* “signs of success [...] in action but [of] information relevant to” the knowledge and theory one already holds. He could be suggesting that change in knowledge and theory does not have to equate to change in self or practice. Or perhaps his contention is that a ‘sign of success’ does not have to be exhibited. But either way this does not accord with his overall emphasis that reflective practice should lead to a positive change outcome in self and practice development, as well as the need to *demonstrate* that engagement in reflective practice which runs throughout his work as seen, for instance, in his showcasing of Petra and Quist (Schön, 1983; 1987).

It could be that this confusion arises in light of Argyris & Schön’s (1974:17) work on theories-in-use introduced earlier, in particular their assertion that practitioners strive to ensure and maintain “constancy” such that they actively “avoid changing” (*ibid*) their theories-in-use and strive to ‘*maintain* biographical identity’ [*emphasis added*] rather than effect change, ‘modifying and refining’ their perception and recall “to maintain and protect the self” (*ibid*). This could explain the inconsistency in Schön’s body of work; indeed Kinsella (2007a:398) picks out that Schön’s “failure to refer back to his earlier work with Argyris [...] contributes to some of the conceptual confusions surrounding the theory of reflective practice”. Even so a broader literature search shows this to be not only a matter of theoretical incongruity: individuals resisting change finds support elsewhere. Social science communication theory explains that we actively seek out information in our environments and interactions that *support* theories and expectations we hold and subconsciously and unconsciously *ignore* those that do not (Mortensen, 1997), referred to elsewhere as ‘myside bias’ (Johnson-Laird, 2006). So, if practitioners are invested in their professional identities and maintenance of a consistent internal and external account of themselves it ‘carves out’ (*cf.* Peters) questions about the purpose of engaging in reflective practice at all, let alone those related to the key tenet of a linear dynamic resulting in positive change.

4.4 The nature of change

This explain why the percipients express that their reflection-on-action does not lead to apparent change. However, another way to 'carve' this 'out' would be to explore the nature of change.

According to Tennant (2000), change involves a reorientation of attitudes and/or values, and/or beliefs plus associated understanding, which requires impetus to engage as well as receptiveness to the possibilities of change. So, to this view, perhaps percipient lack of change could be due to their lack of impetus and receptiveness and not problems with reflective practice. To unpack this further, an appreciation of the Concerns Based Adoption Model (CBAM) (e.g. Hord *et al*, 1987) from education theory, briefly understanding from the theory of planned behaviour from social psychology (Ajzen, 1985; 2011) proves fruitful.

CBAM, "arguably the most robust and empirically grounded theoretical model for the implementation of educational innovations" (Anderson, 1997:331), elaborately models 'measurement, describing, and explaining the process of change" (*ibid*) as practitioners put new ideas and practices into use. The model tracks engagement moving from oneself (confronting new information and feelings about the implications of the change), to task (responses and reactions to the consequences of the change for one's practice) and impact (working with others to implement the change or make minor modifications to the innovation for it to work better and/or fit the specific context more effectively) (*ibid*). The model also suggests how change can be facilitated. The theory of planned behaviour from social psychology complements CBAM through a set of propositions that explain the way in which people *react* to situations. Essentially it takes as its starting point CBAM's emphasis on an individual's initial attitude but develops further to consider: the role of social influence (the extent to which the individual feels pressured or supported to adopt the behaviour); normative beliefs (the extent to which the behaviour is adopted by significant others around them); and, how achievable they perceive the change to be (based on how much control they have and the extent to which it integrates into their current beliefs, norms and behaviours) (Ajzen 1985).

Whilst both CBAM and the theory of planned behaviour are not without criticism (e.g. see Ajzen, 2011; Anderson, 1997) if considered in relation to reflective practice they illuminate the process of change. We can see that *whether* someone changes cannot be a simple linear 'I have reflected on it therefore change happens' assumption that underpins

reflective practice. Secondly, CBAM and the theory of planned behaviour show change to be *socially* situated in contrast to the private, individual activity of reflective practice.

Whether considering maintenance of self, or the nature of change, jostling percipients lived experience of engaging in reflective practice with theory leads to appreciation of the complexity of change which suggests reflective practice as “a kind of self-understanding leading to some kind of enlightenment or learning” (Berman-Brown & McCartney, 1996:20) is terribly simplistic. Adding to questions regarding what transforms, how much, and who decides in the context of The Trappings, we can now add questions about whether there has to be change, the nature of that change (including whether it needs to be positive), the extent of change, and what makes ‘change’ transformation – and how, in any case, this is dependent on social and normative influences *in conjunction* with interiority and initial orientation.

Setting aside these ‘carved out’ (*cf.* Peters) questions, it could at least be argued that mainstream reflective practice literature directs attention to the deliberate and conscious deconstruction of the “meaning and application” (Davies, 2010:19) of specific elements of professional practice present in an action /intervention /interaction so that a practitioner can identify “alternative ways of framing the reality of his practice [...] and entrain awareness of dilemmas” [*sic*] (Schön, 1983:310) for themselves. Brookfield, (1995:2), for instance, directs students/practitioners to ‘hunt assumptions’. However, the percipients lived experiences attest to it being complex. Relating this to wider theory, we have seen that wise practice can include *not* reflecting, but also there is disagreement about whether reflective practice must involve questioning one’s personal and professional assumptions. For instance, Boyd & Fales (1983), Jarvis (1992), and Mezirow (2000) argue that it is not essential, and five years on from advocating ‘hunting’, Brookfield declares “there are *no* foundational defining assumptions waiting to be unearthed” [*emphasis added*] (2000:46).

A final visit to the RPRG transcripts ‘carves out’ (*cf.* Peters) one more issue concerning the tenet of change and self-development being a linear dynamic with a positive outcome.

Carol shares her experience of writing her diary and being preoccupied with

98	Carol	<i>being entertaining, so telling the story, the thing, in an entertaining way [...] so engaging the person who will read it, your, you know, so how could I not be worried about how it comes across</i>
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(18Oct2014)

The significance of this warrant's attention in its own right so I return it later in this chapter, but note here how percipients – and all students/practitioners – do not engage in reflective practice in a vacuum; they are doing so as part of their higher education programme. They are entirely aware of their reflective diaries as artefacts that evidence their engagement. Indeed, in her comprehensive review of the construction and assessment of reflective diaries/journals, Hargreaves (2004:200) identifies only three narratives that are given 'legitimacy' by assessors so these become performed by students as evidence of change: 'valedictory' (i.e. accounts constructed as 'there was a crisis, I recognised the problem, I turned the situation around, and won the day'); 'condemnatory' ('there was a crisis, poor decisions were made, the outcome was negative, no-one won, and I feel guilty, or angry'); and, 'redemptive' ('I confronted a situation that exposed my belief system/behaviour as faulty, I have reflected on it, and am as a result redeemed'). 'Condemnatory' is alternative to a positive outcome, but that's all that can be said here! More, it evidences impression management that performs prescribed expectations *about* change, i.e. they read the cues and understand what is required (Race, 2014). As we have seen in their lived experience of engaging in reflective practice percipients are aware of performing – and performing change - to satisfy the audience that will be assessing them.

In sum, the second element of the key tenet of reflective practice that self-development happens and leads to positive change in practice competence is problematic. There are fundamental issues with reflective practice models used to steer that developmental dynamic; there is an absence of appreciating the wise significance of not reflecting; a narrow and limited conceptualisation of change alongside confusion with regards to the nature of change; and, finally, a lack of acknowledgement about the context in which the expectation of change sits and its impact on authenticity.

4.5 Conscious recall of practice

In any case, inherent to the reflective practice process of development is that students/practitioners have conscious recall of their practice; they need this to remember the event and isolate its variables to be able to hold them up for scrutiny. In current understanding and practices it is unclear how reflective practice can work *without* this. A return to theories-in-use is helpful in excavating this further. As Barnett (1990:160) points out, "if you want to find out how professionals act, look not to their 'espoused theories'", the ones they can readily recall and speak about, but to their theories-in-use. He continues,

professionals *rarely* act through any explicit theory or articulated principles governing professional practice, and much more on the basis of *tacit* principles and knowledge which are embedded in their professional behaviour [*emphasis added*] (*ibid*)

Reflective practice, then, presupposes that: a practitioner is conscious of and can identify which components in their professional practice have salience in the event they are reflecting on; in which order (because a different order would have a different interplay); *and* that they are fully cognizant of resulting changes, already problematised. Jason characterises reflective practice as a process that “*sparks some memories*” (6Dec2014, Jason:74) to produce “*an account*” of what he is “*doing*” (6Dec2014, Jason:87).

Yet, *Connected Practice: Professional Practice* showed the interplay of practice elements in any moment to be complex, multi-layered and messy, *and* points up – along with theory on change - that they do not solely abide in the realm of the student/practitioner. It can be considered that to be able to consciously recall salient elements of this as part of reflective practice a practitioner would need to know, identify and articulate the relevant aspects of skill they used and how they used them; plus know, identify and articulate what was ‘present’ in the other/s; plus know, identify and articulate the mix of these that they responded and reacted to; plus know, identify and articulate the way in which they were influenced by the space and place they were in at the time; plus know, identify and articulate how the other/s were being impacted by space and place; plus know, identify and articulate how all, individually and together, understood the purpose of the interaction; and the mix of any of these at any one moment. It is a complexity of possibilities that ‘carves out’ (*cf.* Peters) an obvious question as to whether it is possible at all. Therefore, this section briefly considers neuro-processing; and memory, including the impact of stress and high emotion, plus time in relation to delay between practice and its recall. If the ground this ‘carves out’ (*cf.* Peters) is unclear, then so is the underpinning assumption that one can recall the elements of professional practice sufficient to engage in reflective practice, not generally considered in mainstream literature. Even Schön (1987a:25) acknowledges that descriptions of one’s practice “are always [...] conjectures” or as Kinsella (2007a:400) puts it, “constructions”, partial and representative interpretations that ‘attempt to impose stasis’ on “dynamic” practice (2007a:401). Indeed, according to Schön (1983:49),

Often we cannot say what it is that we know. When we try to describe it we find ourselves at a loss, or we produce descriptions that are obviously inappropriate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our

patterns of action and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing.
It seems right to say that our knowing is in our action.

It would suggest reflection-in-action would be a more appropriate concentration, but that is not the focus of his or mainstream literature based on his work, other than to assume reflection-on-action *will* automatically and inherently positively develop ones 'knowing-in-action'.

4.6 Neuro-processes

Recent neuropsychological research brings a layer of consideration to Curating reflective practice with regards to conscious recall of professional practice. Bargh (2017:3) discusses how "the conscious mind makes sense of our unconsciously generated behaviors *after* the fact, [thus] creating a positive, plausible narrative about what we are doing and why" [*emphasis added*]. Indeed, 'creating a plausible narrative after the fact' could be an apposite description of the percipient experiences of engaging in reflective practice. Geoff says that writing a diary "*all leads to a certain point, and you don't really notice it at the time, you think you are doing it..*", that is, fully reflecting on practice, "*but you are, in effect, like really you are writing the same thing over and over again*" (30May2015, Geoff:132; 30May2015, Debra:133), an experience shared by others as noted. Not only this, Bargh (2017:280) asserts that "conscious experiences in one situation linger into the next situation without our realising it and become the unconscious influences in the subsequent setting" and these too "direct our conscious attention to things relevant to [them]" (2017:281). It has relevance to 'myside bias' discussed earlier.

To understand this further it is helpful to consider Kahneman's (2011:13) "metaphor" of two different "systems" of thinking. "System 1" is the mode of thinking that "operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of control" (2011:20), providing fast impressions and making immediate responses possible. In contrast, "System 2" thinking consists of "subjective experience of agency, choice and concentration"; it is the deliberate and "conscious reasoning self" (2011:21). Thus, reflective practice is based on the assumption of System 2, that agency, choice and concentration are in a practitioner's cognitive control, their linear and positive development being the overall focus here. Yet Kahneman contends that "only a *fraction* of [the] capacity [of System 2] is engaged" [*emphasis added*] (2011:24) at any time. Moreover, System 2 is only "mobilised" when System 1 does not have an answer, is surprised or challenged, or 'to increase effort when an error is about to be made' (2011:24-25). On its own this could infer support for

Schönian reflective practice during surprising interactions in the 'swampy lowlands' of professional practice. However, System 2 is much slower than System 1, System 1 is the mode of thinking we operate in most of the time, and System 1 provides the information on which System 2 depends but System 1 thinking operates via illusions and biases including the confirmation/'myside' bias and anchoring effects of earlier. Here, then, we can understand that the 'conscious reasoning self' of a reflective practitioner is 'operating automatically and quickly' for most of the time and when they do deliberate it is based on illusion, bias and anchoring effects.

4.7 Memory

Secondly, then, is the issue anyway of *whether* students/practitioners can consciously recall their values, assumptions, influences and elements of practice. As Dohn (2011:678) puts it, it is

presupposed one can 'get at' the understanding and competence of the practitioner through the act of representation. [...] Tacit, embodied understanding and competence are presumed to preserve their nature through the process of representation and therefore not bound in any significant sense to situated embodied action as such.

Clare questions whether "*reflection can be in your head as well. It doesn't necessarily have to be written down*" (6Oct2014, 9:23), challenging the typical association of reflective practice with reflection-on-action via writing a diary/journal. Other forms are part of higher education programmes, however it is clear throughout the RPRGs the extent to which their higher education courses promoted and facilitated a reflective practice that relies on recall in written form. For example, Jason, Sally and Sadie express how reflective practice and diary writing are "*entwined*" (21Nov2014, Jason:136) such that "*that is what reflective practice is, a diary*" (21Nov2014, Sally:141), with Sadie adding that "*you don't think of it that you're reflecting if you're not actually writing it down*" (21Nov2014, Sadie:145). Setting aside for now the argument above regarding illusion, bias and confirmation, Herlihy *et al* (2012:662) review literature on autobiographical memory, "explicit memory of an event that occurred in a specific time and place in one's personal past", and the impact of passing time. As the gap between event and its recall increases, memories become dominated by association and stereotypical emotions, rather than the particular and distinct as required by reflective practice, significant given emphasis in mainstream literature on reflective practice is geared to reflection *on* an incident, session, or period of professional practice predominantly via writing in diaries, but also discussion in groups,

and/or talking in supervision, *all* of which involve a gap after the event. In that gap, as Sally describes

14	Sally	<i>the problem for me and maybe for modern day life is the whole reflection thing because you're so caught up, like you were saying earlier [referring to comments that other percipients had made], in juggling or in spinning plates or things you have to move on without reflecting. And you know so even having time to think about it let alone [...] write up a diary or whatever</i>
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(21Nov2014)

Later in that RPRG Carol also talks about having little *"time to really think and take things in"* (21Nov2014, Carol:185) and Mary agrees, *"it's just like skirting on top of thoughts about it, you don't really settle with it"* (21Nov2014, Mary:186), and later says *"life is one noise from the minute I open my eyes to the minute I shut my eyes"* (21Nov2014, Mary:220).

Being too busy, tired when they get home, and having more work to do once there including parenting are also common experiences for Rob, Becky, Duma and Mary (6Dec2014, Rob:117; 28Nov2013, Becky:44; 15Nov2013; 15Nov2013, Duma:152; 6Oct2014, Mary 12 & 29). A consequence of the delay for Jason in diary writing is *"what things are you going to choose. Generally the big things and you know it happened so long ago and a million things have happened since then so it becomes a story"* (21Nov2014, Jason:119).

Similarly, in the RPRG of 10th January 2015, Geoff is talking with Jason and they say:

12	Geoff	<i>The thing I find when you're on placement something will happen and you don't have time to write it down, when you come back later to your reflective diary 'coz so much happens through the day, you can't remember, 'who did that', you may remember who did it and what happened but how it happened or why it happened ...no...</i>
13	Jason	<i>...just the general gist of the story.</i>
14	Geoff	<i>...yes, you sort of lose a bit of it.</i>

Clare concurs, saying that reflective practice is *"a lot to do with time"* (6Oct2014, Clare:14).

Indeed, in a different RPRG, Becky says

153	Becky	<i>one of my biggest barriers was time, so I don't bother, but what I really mean is that I don't have the time or the inclination to go over everything in a way that you or you would understand, like I know what happened, I don't want to go over it all again but I do want...</i>
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(29Mar2014)

and Jeanette interjects, completing her sentence, *"...to make it meaningful..."* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:154). As a consequence for Becky (29Mar2014, Becky:155) and Jeanette reflective practice is *"a chore, people see it as 'oh I've been on placement, its eleven o'clock, why do I*

have to reflect, I want to go to bed, and I've got to write', so its real quick you know, a chore, job done" (29Mar2014, Jeanette:151). In a different RPRG, Jason explains how he *"scribbles something down"* and

70	Jason	<i>the next day I have a little look at what I scribbled before and if there's something else I can think of, tweak it. And I am gonna type it up so that then I maybe can tweak it some more. But again, with that I wouldn't say there's much reflection there</i>
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(6Dec2014),

an experience in common with Geoff (30May2015, Geoff:35). Rob describes that as *"writing reflections on your reflections"* and asks *"does that work?"* (30May2015, Rob:36), adding *"surely once you start doing more with them it is different?"* (30May2015, Rob:41) to which Geoff replies *"Only you are now telling a story, telling specific parts, like an essay"* (30May2015, Geoff:43). So it is that Jeanette talks of being *"totally diared"* (14Nov2013 Jeanette:58), explaining *"we change it in our minds before we even write about it"* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:115), and you

58	Jeanette	<i>forget about in the moment stuff...and so by the time you get home and you write about it you have forgotten about all of it and so it's easier to go home and change it and it changes it so you write 'I wasn't all that bad actually'</i>
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(14Nov2013)

In her next RPRG she talks again of writing a diary on practice and this being *"a different process"* because it is open to hindsight bias and *"Oh actually I wasn't that bad really"* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:46). Rob talks of trying to get into a habit of when to write his diary, but when he *"make[s] anything routine like that [he'll] get bored of it"* (6Dec2014, Rob:187) and even though he has been told that it is a *"good habit to get into [...] it just doesn't always work"* (6Dec2014, Rob:189, Rob:183, Rob:185). Clare and Mary compare writing their diaries to complying with any other university assessed work (6Oct2014, Mary:57).

In sum, with the activity of reflective practice relying on detailed recall of the components of practice and a gap between the event and its recall, there are significant issues at every stage and level. More, Deffenbacher *et al* (2004, cited in Herlihy *et al*, 2012:664) distinguish between an 'orienting response', an unfettered consideration and expression of information, and a 'defensive response', the kind that is triggered by pressure which arouses "the urge to escape or avoid". Whilst it might be intended, and indeed hoped, that reflective practice stimulates the former, the pressure of cognitive effort to 'get' reflective practice, the emotional labour it entails, the nature of activities practitioners feel they

should be reflecting on/have been directed to, and, the desire to be perceived positively in order to pass their course discussed through the percipients and Curated with theory would suggest that a 'defensive response' would be more likely.

As a result, we might question the point of the activity let alone the rhetoric that unproblematically extolls its purpose and value.

One might contend that the problem is less to do with memory and more to do with the activity of keeping a reflective diary per se, however, in alternative reflective activities several other issues *as well* come into play. Team debriefing meetings can follow immediately after a session but will still be at some distance from the specific practice event, and group and peer supervision will be less frequent so after what could be a month or more of sessions. Therefore, all points concerning the impact of delay still apply - but now overlaid with group dynamics such as free-riding (Börjesson *et al*, 2005), social loafing (Rich *et al*, 2014) and social influence (Forsyth, 2012). Likewise, individual supervision, *if* offered, is reliant on the skill of the supervisor and again typically takes place monthly at most, usually less frequently. In either case, the presence of a gap between practice and reflection exists. In fact, Carol, Mary and Clare talk about their supervisors *not* meeting with them for supervision (6Oct2014, 156-148), significant also because this was part of the requirements for the degree programme for professional qualification. They talk of their supervisors being absent due to illness (6Oct2014, Mary:158), too busy due to workload (6Oct2014, Carol:161 & Carol:163 & Carol:172; Mary:170; Clare:162 & Clare:165), and of making plans to meet but these not coming to fruition (6Oct2014, Clare:165; Carol:163; Mary:166). Clare talks of how she "*feel[s] bad asking...you feel like you're being a pain*" (6Oct2014, Clare:169), and Mary agrees, "*it's difficult isn't it*" (6Oct2014, Mary:174) (and this all being something they had not discussed with their lecturers for fear of failing). From their experience, then, alternatives or accompaniment to reflective journal writing are equally problematic.

Here, then, and aside from issues already 'carved out' (*cf.* Peters) in this chapter, Curation regarding the key tenet to reflective practice Captured in chapter 2 that self-development happens and leads to positive change in practice competence 'calls forth' questions regarding this being a linear dynamic with a positive outcome, and that a student/practitioner has conscious recall of their practice.

5 Drawn out' key tenet (iv): that individual practice development leads to change at an organisational level

The fourth key tenet emphasises that whilst reflective practice involves (a now problematised) notion of self-development, if the endeavour was *only* about self it would be “a self-indulgent form of speculation that makes no difference to anything” (Brookfield, 2000 cited in Cranton, 2006:45). ‘Practice’ meaning service to others, the ultimate purpose being that service becomes more effective (Slade *et al*, 2019). For Hilden & Tikkamäki (2013:78) reflective practice is the “fuel” of organisational change. Yet *how* that happens is neglected by Schön in his theory (Taylor & White, 2000).

It was a focus for Argyris & Schön (1978) however. In contrast to “single-loop learning” whereby a practitioner receives information or ‘detects an error’ and takes instrumental ‘corrective’ action but the organisation is ‘permitted’ “to carry on its *present* policies or achieve its present objectives” [*emphasis added*], “double-loop learning” is ‘correcting the error’ “in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying norms, policies and objectives” (1978:2-3). On this basis Senge (2013) developed his concept of “‘learningful’ conversations [...] where people expose their own thinking effectively and make that thinking open to the influence of others” (2013:8), in ‘learning organisations’, “places where people are continually discovering how they create their reality. And how they can change it” (2013:12). In fact, whilst Hilden & Tikkamäki (2013:77) signify reflective practice as fuel in organisational change, along with Taylor & White (2000) they advocate that “*more* emphasis needs to be placed on [it]”.

Yet this is not evidenced in the percipients lived experiences of engaging in reflective practice. Jeanette recounts being excited by the idea of reflective practice and going in to it “*all guns blazing*” but “*was told by [her] supervisor that [she] really should have thought more first, and about the organisation*” and so when it came to writing her reflective diary she “*made something else up instead, like it wasn’t a total lie, it was something, but it wasn’t the thing, do you know what I mean*” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:87)

In a different RPRG, Carol shares a similar experience, recalling when engaging in reflective practice in one particular organisation, “*there’s no way I’d talk about, like I’m just hanging on to that, there’s no way I’m telling anyone but at the moment I’m lucky*” (18Oct2014, Carol:34, Carol:32), the latter referring to her current place of employment, where, she explains, she *can* say “*I think I’ve really fucked up today*” (18Oct2014, Carol:32). Her statement is telling, however, that from her experience whether an organisation is

supportive of authentic engagement in reflective practice is a matter of 'luck' – and either way here she is not speaking of making a direct and explicit challenge to organisational practices, but to feeling able to acknowledge making a mistake. For such reasons Ecclestone & Hayes (2009), Furedi (2004), and Bradbury *et al* (2010) write of reflective practice as limiting and restrictive, appropriated to maintain status quo in the context of neo-liberalism rather than initiate organisational change. Geoff and Jason speak of coming to understand that their reflective practice has to “fit” (7Mar2015, Geoff:217) with the “protocols and the boundaries [...] laws and different regulations” (7Mar2015, Jason:216 & Jason:218) of the organisation in which they work. This could be perceived as them appreciating the significance of The Trappings as part of their professional practice, but in conjunction with their experiences already presented it is clear they mean censoring and manipulating their reflective accounts to 'fit'. In this vein, Brookfield (2000:46) points up as ludicrous the idea that any student/practitioner might be *able* to change The Trappings through a “single withering” reflective focus as if a “heat-seeking missiles locating and penetrating ideology”. In fact, having asserted the importance of reflective practice to organisational change, Hilden & Tikkamäki (2013:91) conclude by stating it “remains to be seen” whether reflective practice *can* “be established as a safe platform in practical organizations for mulling over and gradually taking on board the changes it triggers”.

Perhaps the percipient experiences of a lack of organisational change is due to them being 'novices', their limited reflective practice fitting its characteristics described earlier. Yet *even* if one accepted a view that the nature of engagement in reflective practice is determined by length of time in role, LaBoskey (1993) offers a more nuanced understanding of early career practitioners. She finds a distinction between 'alert novices' and 'common sense thinkers', the contrast being in open-mindedness and questioning that all novices can have, but in *either* case their engagement in reflective practice and thus its likelihood of impacting on organisation change depends on depth and quality of the opportunity and support *within* the organisation per se, not length of experience – and we have already seen that support was a hit-and-miss affair for the percipients.

It would appear, as in Schön's theory, current conceptualisation and practices do not consider or attend to the process of *how* organisational change happens because of an individual's reflective practice (Moon, 1999). The rhetoric just states that it will.

6 'Drawn out' key tenet (v): one needs to learn and develop reflective practice as a skill to engage in it.

The final tenet of reflective practice Captured in chapter 2 is that it is a skill that can be learned and honed. Indeed, this is a theme inherent to all four tenets explored so far. It is also central to the “developmental epistemology” (Bleakley, 1999:315; Slade *et al*, 2019) underpinning reflective practice that is core to professional qualifying programmes. Linked to its Deweyian and Humanistic roots, but also, and significantly the prioritising of *reflection* from that inheritance, reflective *practice* is (also) conceived and perceived as a natural dynamic involved with learning and metacognition that can be honed through specified methods in a disciplined manner in the context of education and professional practice. In fact, writing more than two decades before Schön’s work on reflective practice, Hullfish & Smith (1961:35) outline the process of reflection and therefore the ways in which teachers can (and should) hone its development. Describing reflection as “differ[ing] from the looser kinds of thinking primarily by virtue of being directed or controlled by a purpose – the solution of a problem” (1961:36) they set out the rationale and “procedures” for teachers so that, in their case, children develop the skill of “controlled use of sentience, memory, and imagination in a balance that is appropriate to the particular purpose or problem at hand” (1961:36-37) so that they will become future citizens who can “control [their] thinking” (1961:47) and “subsequent experience” (1961:205). Although discussing reflection and aimed towards children this has a striking resemblance to what Schön would refer to as reflective practice.

Whilst there is implicit and explicit agreement in mainstream literature that reflective practice is a skill to be developed, its nature is debated. To illustrate, first is the extent to which it is a natural capacity, or learned and linked to intelligence (e.g. Sternberg, 1986; Borkowski *et al*, 1987; Merriam, 2004). If the latter it would suggest that some students/practitioners might be unable to develop the skill of reflective practice to the same level as others, throwing up issues concerning its assessment in higher education programmes if nothing else. A second debate concerns the extent to which developing the skill of reflective practice is “slow and incremental” (Brookfield, 1995:240; LaBoskey, 1993; Dervent, 2015, Slade *et al*, 2019) as a practitioner gradually changes their “habitual ways of interpreting their practice, and learn[s] new ways of acting” (Brookfield, 1995:242); is “sudden and apocalyptic” (Brookfield, 1995:240) in the face of surprising or shocking experiences (Delamarter, 2015); or, dependent on the opportunity and quality of facilitation and supervision that *challenges* the individual to engage (Cousins, 2019). For

Mezirow (2000:5) this is a spectrum, although adds to it “mindless assimilation”, a return to earlier discussion on the significance of purpose and impact. A third debate concerns the extent of support for Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986) assertion that reflective practice is a skill that novice practitioners necessarily *must* learn to become expert. Benner (1984) argues that *only* experts can engage in professional practice in fluid and intuitive ways therefore *deliberate* development of reflective practice only required *early* on in one’s career, and it is to be recalled that Dewey’s (1910/1991) notion of ‘reflective thought’ that influenced Schön assumes developing reflection an imperative to maturation as part of education. In contrast, as noted, a significant number of theories articulate reflective practice as a ‘specialised tool’ for all.

Despite this lack of agreement, albeit exposing shaky ground, the developmental epistemology is embedded in higher education programmes relatively unproblematically, reflective practice as a skill to learn and perfect. Much attention in programmes and mainstream literature is given to how the skill should/could be facilitated and formally assessed. For instance, the staged models of reflective practice identified earlier are written into pro forma, students, lecturers and supervisors follow the stages for guidance and direction, and models are “useful because they simplify. They reduce complex and variable processes into a regular and standard pattern” (Greenaway, 2008:363). It is a standardisation that determines how journals and reflective essays are written and the shape that dialogue in supervision should take, in other words, how reflective practice should be understood, how students/practitioners should engage, what criticality is, on what one should be critical, and how all this must be performed. In this, the Schönian reflective practice of controlling practice, situations and self, in the context of developmental epistemology has parallels with a Kantian (1798/2006:54) perspective of an enlightened person who has the ‘propensity’ and ‘vocation’ to ‘cultivate, civilise and moralise’ themselves. Kant writes of this requiring ‘courage’, or, in the words of his translator, to be “dare to be wise” (1798/2006:273). A similar vein runs through the work of Hullfish & Smith and into that of Schön onwards, a spirit (or promise) that developing the skill of reflective practice involves, and will enable, ‘daring to be wise’.

Yet, jostled with percipient experience of such guidance and instruction, there is little evidence of this. Rather than enabling them to develop the skill of reflective practice and as result begin to ‘cultivate, civilise and moralise’ themselves, which of course assumes this as the desired outcome, and that they were not this already, and that reflective practice is the only way to develop these qualities, they tell a very different experience.

First, they are unsure if reflective practice *is* a skill. Geoff refers to it in those terms (6Dec2014, Geoff:368), and for clarification, the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training define ‘skill’ as “goal-directed, well-organised behaviour that is acquired through practice and performed with economy of effort”, differentiating this with ‘competence’, a “prerequisite” for developing skill (Winterton *et al*, 2006:7). This certainly has fit with those mainstream theories of reflective practice. But Carol says it is something “*You do automatically*” (18Oct2014, Carol:6), a view that Debra, Rob and Jason share, when recalling their earlier conversation of reflective practice as an unconscious, common sense, innate, life skill. Jeanette speaks of it as “*a normal process*” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:94) but then contrasts that with what she is asked to do in her higher education programme, marking out the two as different, although then adds that what happens through reflective practice activities at university is “*you just become more aware of it*” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:94). So, perhaps this *is* the purpose of reflective practice in higher education programmes, to raise awareness of one’s already established ability to reflect – and indeed in a different RPRG, Sadie shares a similar experience, that she had “*realised [...] that [she] was reflecting before but didn’t even know*” it until at university (6Oct2014, Sadie:2). However, in a later RPRG she says “*you don’t think of it that you’re reflecting if you’re not actually writing it down*” (21Nov2014, Sadie:145).

Setting aside their confusing of ‘reflection’ with ‘reflective practice’, it is useful to consider their experience by exploring how skill and competency are differentiated in theory. Defined above, writers distinguish between the innate (personal characteristics), with motivation, and, skill (e.g. Boon & van der Klink, 2002; Gangani *et al*, 2004), all three of which the percipients appear to experience as conflated. Yet, this is not surprising given that reflective practice is conceptualised as a skill in their higher education programmes, this being entirely integrated in its requirements, and for which they must find motivation to persist in complying with the instructed developmental activities for the duration of their course. To illustrate, McClure (2005:5) advises that “students need time to develop this skill” of reflective practice in higher education and sets about suggesting how to structure that time to make it happen. Moreover, this is within a context in which the programme itself is time-limited, and during that time individuals must learn other necessary and essential aspects of being a higher education student and their subject discipline. Dawn recalls the moment when she first heard about reflective practice:

77	Dawn	<i>most people were switching off or going ‘holy shit, not only have I got to do placement and write essays but I’ve got to write a diary to reflect on</i>
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		<i>practice, a learning contract and then how to write these and then on top reflect on it after</i>
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(14Nov2013),

with the consequence that “*reflective practice [is] this hoop for everybody to jump through*” (14Nov2013, Dawn:84). In a different RPRG Jeanette recounts reflective practice being introduced at the “*scary*” start of a degree programme. She says when

144	Jeanette	<i>like you’re learning how to write an essay, for the first time in your life, and you’re making new friends like it’s all scary... you’re told you gotta do this and that on top of all the essays to do then it’s just another academic piece to get done</i>
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(29Mar2014).

This can only exacerbate – and reinforce – the significance of provided guidance, instruction and pro forma on reflective practice and it being approached strategically and instrumentally. So, for example, even whilst Johns (2004:19) warns *against* “the orderly step-by-step progression” of staged models, his proposed ‘structured reflection’ (2004; 2009) through ‘six dialogical movements’ prompted through consecutive reflective cues framed as questions becomes just that, and, as established, numerous writers have dedicated research time to creating similar tools and models that have been used in that way.

Moreover, and compounding this further, it has been established that reflective practice guidance, stage models, and instruction within professional education programmes become diagnostics through which to assess evidence that students/practitioners provide of their engagement via its products. It is a matter taking on further complexity when recalling that engagement is compulsory, and performing correctly to the specified standards in specified ways is necessary to meet pre-determined Learning Outcomes to gain credits towards ones final Degree, as well as to meet the criteria for professional qualification. The percipients express the way in which the combination of this militates against any potentially positive experience in and from developing the skill of reflective practice. It shows up in four ways in the RPRGs:

- reflective practice as currently understood and practiced is unfit for purpose;
- reflective practice is performed with an audience in mind;
- percipients are preoccupied with constructing and telling a story; and
- predominantly, this story is made up.

These are expanded in turn below and, significantly, form the longest section in this chapter.

6.1 Reflective practice as currently understood and practiced is unfit for purpose.

Jeanette talks of how the current “systems” around reflective practice are unfit for purpose. Her experience is that they

130	Jeanette	<i>don't really allow for mess even though that's what we are about, we are about messy lives and messy people. It's like it reminds me, in the first year someone said, I think it was [names lecturer], that it was all about doing diaries and she said that someone once had put a CD in, you know recordings, and then had said 'but you've got to be really careful' and so it's like well I won't be doing that then, better not do that then, do you know what I mean [laughter] so it's kind of saying you can be creative but... you know, it goes horribly wrong so stick to the format</i>
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(29Mar2014)

So on the one hand they are told “reflection’s important” but on the other “there’s the template for it” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:147) and “It immediately loses its values, it becomes devalued in one sentence, a task to do” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:149), the “real quick you know, a chore, job done” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:151) noted above. As a result, she describes reflective practice as ‘flimsy’ (28Nov2013, Jeanette:28) to which Becky agrees: “I’ll just write it’, you know, ‘whatever!’”. She wonders how she might “keep it real” (29Mar2014, Becky:129), but the diary format she is guided to use is “not helping or fit for purpose” (29Mar2014, Becky:131). Indeed, when reading her journal back to herself Jeanette doesn’t “remember going to that meeting, or that thing [...], it’s meaningless literally” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:132). In an earlier RPRG, she explains “you get so focussed on that piece of writing, the problem, the task, so the purpose of it becomes only that” (14Nov2013, Jeanette:89). In sum, “because it’s not in the moment it becomes something else” (14Nov2013, Jeanette:91).

6.2 Reflective practice is performed with an audience in mind

Briefly referred to earlier but returned to here, the percipients also the key tenet of reflective practice being a skill to be developed through their experience of that task not taking place in a vacuum. The perpetual shadow of writing to and for an audience means they perform their reflective journals in necessary ways that evidence requirements to pass, like Debra’s reference to her reflective diary as an exercise of proof to lecturers that she can “handle” (10Jan2015, Debra:78) herself in practice situations referred to earlier. To expand, in her first RPRG and recalling that initially she responded positively to the idea of keeping a reflective diary, Jeanette speaks of very quickly becoming focussed on it as a product, or, in Geoff’s words, a “report” (7Mar2015, Geoff:176) and therefore

86	Jeanette	<i>actually forget[ing] the purpose of it, you just kind of write in the diary this is what I did, in the first person, this is what I did and this is why and you kind of get focussed on that piece of writing and you want to make it to look as lovely and neat and actually you hand it in and don't really consider that's your practice</i>
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(14 Nov2013)

Similarly, earlier in that RPRG she says *“doing your reflective diary knowing its part of something that is being marked, you are doing it for a reason [...] you don't want to fail or you don't want to get a 2:2”* (14Nov2013, Jeanette:36). In her next RPRG (28Nov2013), she mines this further, describing diaries as *“part of the problem”* because you *“change them”* (28Nov2013, 2:16) i.e. you *“use a bigger word to make it look good, well better”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:18). She speaks of this in terms of a *“boundary ‘no I'm not going to put that in’, [...]... I think that's why a lot of us make a lot of stuff up”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:85), because *“like you want to sort of [...] do you best and [...] your tutor be proud of you”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:28). By her third RPRG she refers to this as the *“audience”* to her diary (29Mar2014, Jeanette:46) and how it is *“against human nature to put down stuff that doesn't make you look good”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:91). So, she talks of her fear of getting her diary *“wrong”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:89) and the amount of *“pressure you put on yourself”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:68) to be good, and that she wanted to *“do a good journal, so edit it, make it neater, tidier”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:108). Indeed, the thought of not editing it when her supervisor suggested it to her was so difficult that she *“cried over it. It was a really painful process”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:104). She attempted to follow the suggestion but quickly resumed her crafted version to be assured of a good grade. Similarly, in Debra's first RPRG, she expresses concern that writing accounts of practice means *“it becomes official”* (18Oct2014, Debra:7) and Geoff agrees, *“How can you not be concerned about the audience, like you are doing it 'coz they've asked you to”* (18Oct2014, Geoff:108).

Jeanette recalls in her second year

134	Jeanette	<i>one, [names lecturer] was like, 'very good you've gone into a lot of effort', I used lots of different colours and highlighters, you know, but it's just that, she was marking the effort, it doesn't mean anything, like actually it doesn't mean anything</i>
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(29Mar2014),

which Becky describes as *“words with highlighters”* (29Mar2014, Becky:136), and Jeanette continues, that:

136	Jeanette	<i>it's not it, it's fun, no not fun, it looks good, it was effort she was right, but, not it, you know I thought it was at the time, you know 'I've got the emotion there because I've highlighted it pink' [laughs] but looking back at it now it's just words in pink</i>
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(29Mar2014),

a “process” that Becky sums up as having “gone through for nothing” (29Mar2014, Becky:137). I ask whether there is still something of significance in their discovery of how a diary could just be ‘words in pink’, a question that Becky echoes back as “does it rob them from that process?” (29Mar2014, Becky:139). But Jeanette thinks not; she says:

140	Jeanette	<i>it would be very helpful to look at all the third year [final degree year] diaries and talk to them because I don't think, like I really don't think they get it, like I think that they think that a word in pink is what it is about. They just, so they think that is the kind of thing to do, the majority don't use it as experience, they do it to get the grades, or, if they don't care about the grade then they just don't do it at all, so what's the point</i>
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(29Mar2014)

Becky concurs, “it’s pointless” (29Mar2014, Becky:141), leading Jeanette to ask the question, “So why are we bothering, if we know it’s pointless and they think it’s pointless?” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:142).

To understand this, extending earlier discussion that engagement in reflective practice in university programmes must be considered in terms of its broader landscape of education pedagogy is necessary. Here, it is argued, the nature of learning is ostensibly ‘knowledge telling’ (Sharples, 1999:22), characterised by the task of ‘learning to write’ (Allen *et al*, 1989), such that “not only are [students] taught what to write, but also how to write it” (Jasper, 2011:59). Consequently, even with a benign intention behind facilitation using models and pro forma to guide reflective practice, this wider landscape will influence the way that students approach it. Indeed, percipient Joseph shares how:

75	Joseph	<i>the actual process of diary keeping prohibited that exchange of truth and self and therefore that formula prevented self from ever developing... without me being able to share fears, anxieties, wants, needs, perception how can I ever then alter or reflect in a meaningful way, I can't build and create anything other than self-censor</i>
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(14Nov2013),

a similar experience shared by Geoff (7Mar2015, Geoff:164). Whilst Rob and Dasia reply that *some* kind of guidance is needed (7Mar2015, Rob:166 & Rob:168, Dasia:169), Geoff shares how currently this is much like guidance given to write essays because “it’s so it’s

easier to mark. *If from that thing I'm supposed to achieve an occupational standard or I'm supposed to achieve this they've only got to read that bit and tick that bit*" (7Mar2015, Geoff:170).

The critique they draw out here, then, is that the practice of reflective practice is organised solely to favour higher education systems, with Rob, Geoff and Dasia (7Mar2015, 171-177) adding that compliance with guidance on how to develop reflective practice might create a *"better story"* but not enable what one *wants* to express, so it becomes a *'tick box'* exercise, and therefore *"reporting on"* one's practice rather than reflective practice. In a different RPRG, and two year previously, Dawn speaks of people *"at the top of the tree"* deciding what *"constitutes a pass"*, meaning for her *"there's a good and a bad and I'm trying to be good"*, and consequently in relation to her reflective practice, the *"whole thing of a pass and fail creates lying"*, giving the example if *"you're having a bad day"* then you are going to *"make things up"* (14Nov2013, Dawn:41).

6.3 Percipients are preoccupied with constructing and telling a story.

Thus, rather than developing the skill of reflective practice, the focus of percipient experiences is of formulating their accounts in such a way that the intended audience will be able to understand them *and* judge them positively. Their reflective recordings take on the quality of telling a story, with a distinct beginning, middle and end, that emphasises positive outcome/change which may not be the case, and together this does not match the messy, complex and rich reality of their actual professional practice. In their diary accounts *"you can tell yourself anything"* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18), they are merely *"a version of us we want others to see"* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:106). Geoff says as soon as he begins to write he is *"now telling a story, telling specific parts, like an essay, it becomes more unnatural, bringing in theory, it takes the magic of the reflection out"* (30May2015, Geoff:43). Later, he asks:

173	Geoff	<i>is it a reflective diary or is it an essay? I get confused, which is it you want from me, they say where is the theory, integrate theory, whereas I want to reflect on that experience, isn't that experience enough, right, or have I got to put in someone else's experience to make it valid?</i>
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(30May2015)

Jeanette points out *"if you've lost the moment it kind of makes you wonder what the 'after' is for"* (14Nov2013, Jeanette:60). So, rather than generating free-flowing, open critical reflection on messy, complex, rich professional practice, the diary with its models and pro

forma, becomes a hoop to jump through and stories to perform that, at best, as Sadie puts it, one '*sorts thoughts out*', but this does not equate or lead to it being "*different the next time*" for self, situation, or professional practice (15Nov2013, Sadie:84).

Obviously, this contrasts sharply with the theoretical claims of reflective practice as 'knowledge transforming' (Sharples, 1999:22) and the essence of reflective writing and dialogue as 'writing [or conversing] to learn' (Allen *et al*, 1989). In sum, the aim of reflective activities being that practitioners will develop the skill of reflective practice such that by 'combining thinking and writing in a dialogue with themselves and others', they will "develop understanding and create knowledge out of experience" (Jasper, 2011:60) has not been borne out in percipient experiences. *Their* experiences show reflective practice to be a prescribed narrative to perform in a required manner, a chore that "*after a little while gets boring, it's like 'oh shit, I've gotta write in my diary' and you put any old thing in there*" (6Dec2014, Rob:172). Research with student teachers in Japan to explore the extent to which these experiences might be culturally or higher education/university specific revealed them to be very similar. Japanese student teachers spoke about "not doing reflective practice" once they had graduated, in reality meaning not keeping a diary, which at the same time reveals the extent to which they too associate the one with the other (Trelfa & Tamai, 2014). Moreover, and significantly, Nelson & Purkis (2004:205) highlight the *enduring* nature of bad and poor experiences of reflective practice, their research exposing how students will "[fall] back [to] the business of the education system" in their engagement in reflective practice once graduated and in work.

We have also seen that these issues do not only apply to diary writing. The "crucial" role of a supervisor in "being able to develop the capacity to reflect, self-analyse and contain [oneself] when interacting with service users" (Ferguson, 2018:418) is asserted in mainstream literature on reflective practice (e.g. Casement, 1985; Morrissey & Tribe 2001; Fook & Gardner, 2007; Gould & Baldwin, 2006; Johns, 2004; Rolfe *et al*, 2001; Jasper, 2011). It has been noted that Jeanette's supervisor encouraged her not to censor and tidy her diary, and Geoff's supervisor guided him to reflect on the way he writes about himself in his diary albeit this only told him about himself as a writer. Clare also shares positive benefits when her supervisor acted as a gateway to learning opportunities in the placement organisation (6Oct20145, Clare:130).

However, a mixed experience of organisationally supported supervision has been highlighted, and when positive other dynamics carry significantly more weight. As Jeanette

says, the reflective journal has still *“got to do what it going to do”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:79) so *“of course I have to keep a structure and tell people what happened, someone’s going to read it”* therefore she edits and censors to tell an appropriate story in the appropriate way (29Mar2014, Jeanette:81). In Geoff’s words, it remains a *“game to play”* (30May205, Geoff:169), a similar experience shared by Sadie (15Nov2013, Sadie:44) and resonant with Debra’s account of reflective practice perpetually *‘singing the same tune’* (30May205, Debra:133).

In sum, jostling mainstream theory with percipients experiences related to the key tenet of reflective practice as a skill to be developed shows up the impact of that epistemology. Carried out through ‘vehicles of expression that practitioners themselves have not chosen’, in ways that create ‘instrumentalist, superficial and formulaic’ responses (Saltiel, 2010:135), has the effect, it appears, of confusion, ‘compliance and cynicism’ (West, 2010:66), borne out in accounts of practice that are exaggerated, diluted, or entirely made up (Hobbs, 2007; Toll *et al*, 2004; Erlandson, 2004; Powell & Gilbert, 2006).

6.4 Predominantly the stories that percipients construct and tell about their professional practice are made up.

The extent to which percipients make up their reflective accounts to best effect is a core experience shared by Jeanette, Becky, Dawn, Sadie, Jason, Debra and Geoff and, given the context above, can be considered wise if it means they increase their chance of passing their higher education course. Becky talks about *“embellishing [her diary] all over the place”* (29Mar2014, Becky:61). Jason talks of constructing and censoring his diary story by choosing *“which bits I will say more about, which I won’t say about”* (21Nov2014, Jason:121). Geoff says that when he *“write[s his] diary you know, I know what I’m going to write and where it’s going to go”* (18Oct2014, Geoff:115). In her third RPRG, Jeanette says that *“a lot of the time, well we make our reflection”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:44). Debra dreads writing about herself (30May2015, Debra:99) to which Rob says *“Well no-one will know, you can say anything, you can make it all up”* (30May2015, Rob:100). In a different RPRG Sadie specifically talks of the shadow of judgement from a potential audience to which Debra says that she *“think[s] about it all the time”* which makes it a *“horrible”* experience (21Nov2014, Debra:91). Sadie says she:

89	Sadie	<i>think[s] about how [her diary and supervision] represent us”, likening it to “when someone comes round your house you kind of suddenly look round your house and go ‘oh god’ you know, like you want it to represent</i>
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		<i>something about you and it's not going to be this you know [laughter]. Educated books on the shelves!" [laughter]</i>
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(21Nov2014)

Interestingly, in their focus on reflective writing, Platzer *et al* (1997:113-114) stress “a *paucity* of studies related to the use of diaries as a medium to promote reflection” *[emphasis added]* on professional practice. They note Gerrish (1993), Burnard (1991) and Lyte & Thompson (1990) who highlight positive student experience but how even that research identifies student anxiety about committing personal reflections to paper, such that they “launder” their accounts (Wallace, 1995, cited in Platzer *et al*, 1997:114). On the other hand, Morrison’s (1996) research into student journal keeping draws entirely positive conclusions, and Moon (1999:187) finds “enthusiasm and expression of value”, although only refers to two sources to substantiate this point and acknowledges the situation of “few evaluative studies”. What is important, however, is, despite this, use of diaries is entirely commonplace in higher education programmes for facilitating reflection-on-practice: percipient experiences in this thesis builds a stronger case for the issues involved, these being linked to Identity-Of, the epistemological position of knowing the delineated pre-existent discipline and practices or ‘sets of actions’ (Schatzki, 2001b:48), in this case, of reflective practice, and cleaving to’ them (Barnes, 2001:17).

Paradoxically, then, we are led to see how the current practices of reflective practice as a skill *stresses* individual agency in their focus on professional engagement but assert this to be done through a “one size fits all” process that reinforces a “standardisation of people” (Russell, 1999, in Furedi, 2004:107). Engagement becomes, in the words of percipient Jeanette, merely ‘words in pink’ that do not allow for, or encourage reflective practice in its roots of artistry. It is an experience that has resonance with Furedi’s (2004) exposition of a wider therapeutic culture. The developmental epistemology of reflective practice as a skill is “guided by a cultural narrative [through] the guidance of professionals” that ‘compromises the ability of individuals to make choices’ and leads to a “diminished” sense of the power of self, a process and outcome (2004:107). Further, and relatedly, this developmental one-size-fits-all approach pivots on a view of a homogenous body of practitioners that engage with reflective practice in a neurotypical way (Boundy, 2008; Runswick-Cole 2014). ‘Neurotypical’ refers to a “preoccupation with” and presumption of a singular “experience of the world [as] either the only one, or the only correct one” (Muskie, 2002:np), a description that has clear resonance with percipient experiences and the processes of neo-liberalism identified earlier. Thus, we are led to the view that mainstream

literature and practice of reflective practice are “preoccupied with defining and maintaining the borderlands” (Runswick-Cole, 2014:1124) between those who effectively reflect and those who do not, rather than “recognition and acceptance of valuable [processing] difference” (Runswick-Cole 2014: 1120-1121). Whilst original theory concerning the concept of neurodiversity stems from studies of autism, Baron-Cohen (2015:np) refers to it as a “revolutionary concept” that points up processing diversity in *any* context, here, then, relevant to the context of developing the skill of reflective practice.

In sum, Curation that jostles theory with percipient experiences of engaging with reflective practice in relation to the tenet Captured of reflective practice being a skill that is learned and developed has surfaced significant issues.

7 Curating reflective practice

Capturing professional practice through scoping and interweaving social science and arts theories in chapter 2 led to a rich appreciation of reflective practice and identification of key tenets, which have been explored here by jostling and juxtaposing the rhetoric with percipients experiences of engaging in reflective practice from the RPRGs. That Curation has created a critique of reflective practice. This is not the first or only critique, and a range of those theories and debates have also been drawn in to the discussion. However, in this thesis those ‘carved out’ (*cf.* Peters) questions are fashioned from the percipients.

In summary, the fundamental issues Curated in this chapter are:

- Confusion concerning how, if, and in what ways ‘reflective practice’ is different to ‘reflection’; confusion in definitions of those terms, as well as ‘reflexivity’ and ‘critical reflective practice’; confusion about whether reflective practice can or should be transformative – or indeed create change – and in any case, what these mean and involve, and how all this aligns within a context of the messy, rich, complexity of professional practice.
- In relation to the *practice* of reflective practice, the ‘fight’ and ‘struggle’ of being constructed as suboptimal requiring growth is problematic and takes an emotional toll, one that has additional load when experienced as uninvited intrusion and confession, and when engagement is compulsory and assessed. It takes on the form of confessing one’s wrongs, part of a wider ‘confessing society’ wherein the ‘the private’ is a problem unless and until it is opened to public scrutiny albeit then judged to be a different kind of problem, in our case, whether it indicates suitable reflective practice, professional behaviour, and suitability to practice at all.

- Because of this, therefore not surprisingly, reflective activities are approached in particular ways, conforming to suppression of certain private emotions, and, performing public displays of a particular self that are channelled and directed toward evidencing linear and always positive change in self-development and practice competence, facilitated, expected, required and assessed through neurotypical staged models. Yet even the literature of stages is confused and confusing and cannot overlay actual professional and reflective practice. So, for example we have noted that non-reflection can be a wise choice and a reflective practice process need not be linear, indeed like the professional practice it comes from.
- Current literature around reflective practice does not consider that practitioners will actively resist, change and process situations from neural-processing based on 'myside-bias', illusion and anchoring effects.
- Using CBAM with understanding from the theory of planned behaviour, the process of change has also been shown to be significantly more complex than 'I have reflected on it therefore change happens': whether there is change, the nature of that change and the extent of change including whether the outcome is positive, is dependent on social and normative influences in conjunction with interiority, and is significantly more complex than suggested in mainstream literature.
- Whether that always has to involve awareness of personal and shared professional norms and values has been challenged, and whether it is possible to identify which components of professional practice have salience in the event they are reflecting on, and in which order (because a different order would have a different effect); or, have accurate memory recall; or, are fully cognizant of what has changed as a result of that reflection – have all been troubled.
- The individual reflective practice of a student/practitioner leading to change within an organisation, pointed up as a neglected area in Schön's original writing, has also been identified as problematic: the process is unclear, although the importance of the organisation in supporting and receiving reflective practice has been shown as essential, but this is not guaranteed – nor in the way and to the effect that mainstream literature sets out.
- Finally, given the developmental epistemology stemming from its Humanist Protestant roots, 'becoming civilised' by learning the skill of reflective practice means that higher education programmes and underpinning scholarship give significant time and attention to the way in which it is to be facilitated by lecturers, how it is to be developed by those engaging in it, and ultimately how it should be formally assessed. Here, competency, motivation and skill are conflated, reflective practice becomes another concept to learn amongst a vast array of concepts within a time-limed higher education programme, and the process of facilitating and evidencing one's engagement becomes an experience of compliance via made-up accounts that are performed appropriately to pass their courses.

Thus, this research supports my earlier (different) research that reflective practice has become, or has always been, an exercise of interiority, self-surveillance, impression management and control, with the practice of reflective practice “the tool of choice” in this regard “by regulatory authorities” (Nelson & Purkis, 2004:205). Practitioners explore and ‘integrate their instrumental, expressive, affective and cognitive’ processes (Gould, 1996:3) with institutional arrangements that determine priorities and agendas, a process of articulating externally determined relevant information for utilitarian purposes (Barnett & Griffin, 1997).

7.1 Engineering science not artistry

It can be concluded from this Curation of reflective practice that reflective practice is (or has become) a domesticating process that inscribes and prescribes practitioners, Identity-Of, rather than encouraging and enabling them as *scribes* of reflective practice or professional practice, Identity-As. This sits in sharp contrast to its roots of professional artistry, the “fumbling act of discovery” (Hamilton, 2005:288) wherein practitioners are, as referred to earlier, “makers of artifacts” (Schön, 1987:42). Fish (1998:42) goes further, articulating artistry as a “paradigm” that she describes as being about

recognising and responding to, understanding and valuing, the artistry of professional practice [...] the appreciation and connoisseurship of good practice, with a view to making it generally possible to enable people to ‘make such appreciation their own’ (to experience that appreciation from the inside, rather than being dependent on the judgement of others).

The Curated outcomes clearly do not reflect an artistry paradigm.

In fact, the ‘input-output, additive and cumulative’ (Vlair, 2008:459) nature of what has emerged in Curation, with its attention to standardising input to ensure parity and equal possibility of output meaning diversity becomes a “noise that should be minimised through accountability mechanisms” (2008:448) can be seen to be more in-line with an ‘engineering science’ paradigm (Soler *et al*, 2014). An engineering science paradigm is explained as:

Plug and chug: procedural ways of solving problems and completing assignments that ~1. allow you to get by without wasting time thinking, ~2. do not require you to really understand what you are doing, and ~3. protect your own limited understanding from being exposed.

Cram and flush: a general approach to taking tests, completing assignments, and meeting deadlines that involves ~1. anticipating what the evaluators want, ~2. stuffing your mind with whatever fits the above requirement, and ~3. dumping this stuff out at the appropriate time and place (Bella, 2003:33).

It is striking to note the extent to which this matches the percipient experiences of their engagement in reflective practice, an engineering science rather than artistry paradigm with a focus on input, output and time.

- **Input**

Additive and cumulative output is driven by the nature and quality of the input, in our case, the instructional skills, guidance, and facilitation of reflective practice in higher education programmes. The input and associated expectations are based on a limited and narrow notion of what it is to know and how one must and can evidence, indeed, perform this, one wherein cognition is sovereign and despite issues with what that entails.

- **Output**

This is followed by assessment of the nature and quality of the output - carried out by those who 'led' the input. Judgements are made about whether practitioners have developed sufficiently, against explicit and implicit notions of appropriate *process* for development as well as what 'sufficient' involves. To ensure this too has parity (otherwise how can equivalent sufficient development across individuals be judged), standardised measurements are used and, if all are to know what they need to produce and perform and then re-present this appropriately, focus must necessarily centre on its 'administrable features' (Vlair, 2008:448).

Thus the focus of facilitators and students alike is dominated by expectations, requirements, pro forma, handbooks, checklists, SMART-ness (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, timely/timeframe), and accessibility – delivered by facilitator-assessors such that all student/practitioners are enabled to access the same information at the same time. In this way it is assured that any lack of reflective practice is *not* the result of poor facilitator input, instruction and administration; responsibility for that must lie with individual student/practitioner laziness, lack of engagement and/or motivation, or their non-compliance.

Failing to produce and perform as required carries high stakes – students/practitioners will not get their desired qualification so they learn to perform “legitimate narratives” (Hargreaves, 2004:200), and become competent in the skill of “being seen to be reflective” (Barnett, 1977, cited in Rowland, 2006:54) in the service of themselves, rather than in the scrutiny of their professional practice for the service of others. Significant attention is given to *more* instruction (e.g. on how to approach and produce reflective journals) and *more* guidance (e.g. more guidelines concerning number, length and content of the recordings, or

more clearly specified Learning Outcomes, or better-defined assessment rubrics) in the spirit of being helpful. For a typical facilitator of reflective practice this is difficult to argue against when framed as being best for the student: it is hard to argue against the hegemony of a good thing, and established understanding and practice of reflective practice is of it as inherently and inevitably a 'good thing', thereby increasing instruction, guidance and its detail can only be a 'good thing' too. Divergence, whether student or facilitator-lecturer-assessor, becomes a cautious affair, if not avoided altogether, and, it is a wise student who knows where and how to seek out, interpret and perform the implicit and explicit cues presented to them about reflective practice to re-present it for favourable assessment.

- Time

For students/practitioners to learn all this and facilitator-lecturer-assessors to train them in it takes time; indeed, the deterministic significance of time to produce such effects are integral to an assumption of development and improvement. It is again, therefore, little wonder that emphasis on time proliferates percipient experiences of reflective practice, the time to learn and understand *what* is required and *how* they must perform and produce, and then the time to do that performing and producing. Moreover, in relation to current practices of reflective practice within higher education frameworks, they must all do these *at the same* time – so at specified times within a higher educational programme and specified times during their working week. The produced goods, whether reflective journals, assignments involving reflection on practice, dialogue /supervision, or even behaviour in professional contexts, are assumed to be additive and cumulative in their development of the practice-producers, and additively and cumulatively create 'good' individual practitioners and 'good' practice. Bleakley (2000:408) likens it to “techniques of personal growth and self-revelation equivalent to a fitness class”.

8 Curating reflective practice: 'Breaking-in'

Curating theory around the identified key tenets with percipients lived experiences reveals that mainstream understanding and practice of reflective practice does not encompass or support the complexity of professional practice, of knowing, of change, and of what changes. Change is socially situated, messy, and the outcome multifarious, even invisible, and indeed, change may not always be the outcome – in fact the opposite, we orientate ourselves to constancy.

We can also understand that percipient preoccupation with what they need to do and how to produce and perform in the correct ways comes to shape and characterises their experience of and engagement in reflective practice, even though they are aware of this, and even when they can imagine it could be different.

At best individuals *might* engage in reflective practice ‘in secret’ but this risks leaving professional practice ‘undiscussed’ (*cf.* Schön). It also risks reflective practice in its service to self to be accused of being self-indulgent (Issit, 1999, in O’Reilly *et al*, 1999; Brookfield, 2000).

Bleakley (1999:318) highlights the irony of this developmental approach in its reduction of complexity to a “technical operation”. Even when couched in critical and emancipatory terms he underscores their hollowness when such claims are ‘employed as if they were transparently an intrinsically worthwhile activity’ (Bleakley, 1999:320) *without* an interrogation of the process itself.

In final analysis, Curation draws attention to how reflective practice has become appropriated by a neo-liberal agenda as a form of accountability. A different route leads Brookfield (2000:46) to the same conclusion. He writes

Our narratives of critical reflection and self-disclosure are artifices – fictional creations in which we feature as the hero, but not to be confused with the chaotic fragmentation of daily experience.

Political philosopher Henri Lefebvre’s (1992/2004) concept of ‘breaking-in’ is relevant here, part of a broader theory to be explored further later in this thesis, one that is, to-date, a little-known scholarship and little used concept (Elden, 2004). Lefebvre (1992/2004) writes of ‘breaking-in’ or “dressage” in the context of enculturation. He relates it to breaking-in horses, surprisingly fitting given the earlier analogy of The Trappings in chapter 2 and the Curated discussion above. Breaking-in is when one “presents [people] with the same situation, prepares them to encounter the same state of things” in ‘ritualised, stereotyped rites’ (1992/2004:39). It is an “automatism of repetitions” (1992/2004:40), “in the course of which interested parties can imagine themselves elsewhere: as being *absent*, not present in the presentation” [*sic*] (1992/2004:39). Dressage through training “fills the place of the unforeseen” (1992/2004:40) with “phases”, a “linear series” with ‘a beginning and end’ that relies solely on “a general organisation of time” (1992/2004:39), and is ‘reinforced by identification with the chief, the sovereign, the models that have great power and influence’ (1992/2004:42). ‘Breaking-in’ has an astonishing resonance with the percipient lived experiences of reflective practice that have been Captured and Curated.

Lefebvre explains that “in the course of their *being broken-in* animals work” [sic] (1992/2004:40): “under the imperious direction of the breeder or trainer, they produce their bodies [...] their bodies modify themselves, are altered” (1992/2004:40). Further, dressage “determines” rhythms, it “Is the training that counts: that imposes, that educates, that breaks-in” (1992/2004:41) – and in fact Lefebvre likens it to a “military model” (1992/2004:41), based on information that “stocks up on itself, trades itself, sells itself” (1992/2004:49). His analysis has a striking similarity to Hannah Arendt’s notion of work and its contrast with action. Arendt’s political philosophy leads her to observe that action can be “positively dangerous” (Canovan, 1992:132) in the face of neoliberal pressures for “a stable human order” (Canovan, 1992:133). Containment and control operate through rule and ‘work’, work having predetermined outcomes and means, and where people are “the material to be dealt with” (Canovan, 1992:73) to be certain that they conform. In her commentary on the rich contribution of Arendt’s philosophy, Kristeva (1999/2001:40) writes of how this ‘work’ feeds into “the cult of the ‘individual life’” that is at the core of Arendt’s critique – but now also core to reflective practice.

A reflective practice that domesticates, that ‘breaks’ student/practitioners ‘in’ to the Identity-Of a ‘reflective practitioner’ through ‘work’ is far from its roots of professional artistry - and indeed far from the rhetoric of mainstream literature; and, Curation has illuminated an engineering paradigm instead and the *experience* of being ‘broken-in’, a slow and incremental violence of being domesticated.

CHAPTER 4

Describing

Describing is the act and process of giving semblance (Langer, 1953) through a “logical expression of dynamic patterns and ideas” (Ryan, 2012:210). It aims to reconstruct, not in the sense of mapping something out but in communicating somebeing, that is, meaning as it was meant, in this case, as meant by the percipients.

1 Introduction

I began this thesis by identifying reflective practice as the anchor to my professional practice in its process of curiosity, inquiry, openness and scrutiny, therefore the importance of encouraging others to engage too because it will be positive for their professional practice and professions. Yet so far this is a different experience to those of the percipients. Chapter 2 establishes that social professionals are not “free agents” (Taylor *et al*, 2002:151), but also that this Identity-Of weaves with reflective practice such that they can be scribes of practice as well as inscribed. However, *lived experience* of engaging in reflective practice from chapter 3 ‘carves out’ how that too concerns Identity-Of, the opposite of claims in mainstream rhetoric, that are contradictory, confusing, or not borne out. Therefore, chapter 3 has advanced a “counter-stance” (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:15) to taken-for-granted understanding of reflective practice, but a particular *kind* of critique:

It is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought, the practices that we accept rest (Foucault, 1988:154).

It is Schostak & Schostak’s (2008:13) contention that this is where qualitative research typically ends, research applied to literature leading to conclusions as if instructions that “solve puzzles”. But, ‘radical research’ requires more than this: a counter-stance is followed by “action”, an ‘engaged committed movement for change’ (2008:12).

In sum, reflective practice can be argued to be a ‘system in ruins’ (Taylor *et al*, 2002:156) but left there would not lend to action.

Whilst Taylor *et al*’s focus is higher education, their contention has relevance. They guide that a label of ‘ruined system’ projects “pessimism” which *impedes* movement and erodes conceivability of change. Yet “progressive change *is* possible, indeed necessary given both the fundamental contradictions in the system and its irrationality and immorality” [*emphasis added*] (2002:151). Thus, applied to this thesis, they advocate viewing the

'carved out' (*cf.* Peters) Curation of chapter 3 as "a 'battleground', a site of conflicts" (2002:156) because unlike 'ruins' a 'battleground' offers mobility and imaginable alternative action. Even so, considering the extent and nature of issues 'carved out' (*cf.* Peters) in chapter 3, one might wonder why this thesis is progressing with reflective practice at all if doing so risks merely reinforce its domesticating acts, the slow and incremental violence of being 'broken in' that diverges so acutely from professional artistry and service to others. After all, "a diminished and uncertain self can pose no questions and offer no challenge to anyone" (Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009:104). Reaching a similar conclusion by different routes has led others to re-name and re-conceptualise reflective practice to, for example, "critical practice" (Fraser & Mathews, 2008), "practical wisdom" (Yunus Eryaman, 2007), and "critical pedagogy" (Ledwith, 2016). Whilst certainly addressing confusion linked to emphasis from the word 'reflective', broader framing alone does not address the breadth and depth of issues that have been Captured and Curated. Indeed, here it has been understood that self and interior processing *are* involved in professional practice; it is the assumptions that go along with this *and the* means and ends to exploring that knowing in practice which are problematic.

The emerging phenomenology (non-capitalised) allows for 'analysis that dismantles what would otherwise not speak' (Welton, 1987:xiii) but, further, critical phenomenology supports action 'arising out of' that (Canovan, 1992:102). However, if I imposed that direction/action on to the research it would work against my principle that momentum should come from the percipients themselves. However, the percipient experiences in the RPRGs offer their *own* 'action' that addresses and considers the issues Curated in chapter 3. This, then, is the focus of Describing.

2 The process of 'grasping' percipients 'action'.

In phenomenology, commonality and differences in lived experience are "creative shorthands" and "helpful guides" (van Manen, 2016:312) in a "process of carefully spinning out a detailed phenomenological text" (2016:312). Unlike general qualitative research, these are not identified "from the data" by the researcher but come to light through "grasping and formulating" the meaning of phenomena via "a complex and creative process of insightful invention, discovery and disclosure" (2016:320). To this end, Describing "dwell[s]" in (2016:358) and "evoke[s]" (2016:367) percipient lived experiences where semblance *between* them exists. To support and recognise difference, where an individual percipient shares their own experience (as opposed to semblance in common), 'describing'

(the word) is not capitalised. The purpose is not to map experiences out, as in typical qualitative research, but to “grasp the naked now” (2016:369) by ensuring *their* voices and “meaning speaks and resonates” (2016:37) for itself, with as little commentary as possible. Chapter 3 closed with reflective practice as “a ‘battleground’, a site of conflicts” (Taylor *et al*, 2002:156), but, writing in the field of conflict resolution, Hicks (1988:81-82) points out that a creative and positive movement forward will be found when it is “firmly rooted in a vision of what might be”.

3 A vision of what might be

The percipients ‘action’ on ‘a vision of what might be’ that addresses and considers the issues Curated in chapter 3 begins with their *positive* experiences of engaging in reflective practice: recall earlier Geoff sharing how his reflective practice enabled him to “*stop and think*” about his intervention with two young men who had been fighting (10Jan2015, Geoff:44), Jeanette describing its significance with regards to thinking about herself and her values (14Nov2013, Jeanette:14), and Sadie that reflective practice means she can be “*more effective [...] in the workplace*” (15Nov2013, Sadie:100).

This took me back to the transcripts to mine further their positive experiences of reflective practice.

3.1 Management of feelings, emotions and reactions.

Just holding in mind their higher education course requirement that they *ought* to engage in reflective practice gives Carol and Jason something tangible to cognitively coalesce around during practice sessions that otherwise feel overwhelming (29Nov2013, Carol:2; 21Nov2014, Jason:75). Differently, but perhaps linked, Duma talks about reflective practice being the way that he “*protect[s] himself*” (15Nov2013, Duma:2). When asked to say more, he explains “*you think about it and see where you went wrong. What you could have done better. Or how you....could change your personality or your reaction should things like that happen again*” (15Nov2013, Duma:6). He describes himself as a “*short-fused person*”, sharing an example from his practice. Employed in a new part-time role that gives him the opportunity to apply his university course to practice he recounts how he reacted ‘*angrily*’ (15Nov2013, Duma:62) when his colleagues did not do as he instructed. He “*start[ed] shaking and....shaking my mind actually.... I got out of being professional a little bit*” (15Nov2013, Duma:52) because he is used to working in a very different work context for “*many years giving orders [...] And orders should be taken and should be done*” (15Nov2013,

Duma:66). As he got angry, voices rose (15Nov2013, Duma:39), his colleagues began to “*point the fingers*” at him (15Nov2013, Duma:62) and another member of staff arrived and “*calmed the thing*” (15Nov2013, Duma:39). Duma thought about “*reporting*” the staff who had not followed his orders (15Nov2013, Duma:39) but reflecting afterwards he thought about the implications for their families, how it could be “*devastating*” (15Nov2013, Duma:39). For him, then, reflective practice is a “*process*” in which he has “*the time to actually sit back and control the level of anger. And when I control that level of anger then it helps me not to attack because I’ve always believed that attack is always the best defence*” (15Nov2013, Duma:17). It is a process of being “*thoughtful*” (15Nov2013, Duma:11) through which he is beginning to connect why he might have reacted so angrily, consider alternative actions he can take, and, in doing so, consider consequences of actions in his professional practice (15Nov2013, Duma:21).

In a different RPRG, Dasia also talks about ‘*calming down*’ through reflective practice (18Oct2014, Dasia:42). Dasia is studying a social science degree alongside being a mother to young children. She recalls how she would react to situations at home, “*“why this happen to me’ I used to think, I used to get in a bad way”* but by engaging in reflective practice “*later*” (18Oct2014, Dasia:40) she:

42	Dasia	<i>will calm [her]self down, ‘no don’t stress up’, I, like, give myself advice, and I might find something but like when I am angry I can’t think but later when everything is back to normal I can start to think properly</i>
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(18Oct2014)

Geoff sums this up as reflective practice being “*talk[ing] yourself down*” (18Oct2014, Geoff:43), which resonates with him given that in the next RPRG he speaks of how he had been taught to manage his anger as part of group therapy earlier in his life (6Dec2014, Geoff:263). To illustrate, he tells of a situation just before leaving his home, of being woken early by a neighbour’s delivery of building material. He explains that in the past he would have been “*hanging out the window*” (6Dec2014, Geoff:259) getting angry but now he “*kind of track[s] back what shaped that feeling and you process that*” (6Dec2014, Geoff:259) likening this to reflective practice, at which point Jason interjects describing reflective practice as “*feeling management. It’s a feeling management*” (6Dec2014, Jason:264).

This reflective practice as distance from and management of one’s feelings, emotions and reactions is described by Dawn as:

28	Dawn	<i>adopt[ing] the witness position [...] so that for everything involved in it you step back and have a look at what you do, having distance [...] and then from there having a look at why did I react that way and unpack the reasons for my behaviour in that session and content</i>
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(14Nov2013)

by questioning *“whether your own activities are appropriate”* (14Nov2013, Dawn:28). In a different RPRG Jason also adds to reflective practice as questioning, specifically, after an *“uncomfortable”* or *“good situation”*, *“you sit down and are reflecting looking at the feelings it brought up, and the actions that you took, and why there’s negative and positive feelings about it”* (18Oct2014, Jason:2). Joseph shares similarly but in broader terms, reflective practice *“sort of maps a journey and learning, and learnedness is how they best deal with that reflective practice”* (14Nov2013, Joseph:2).

Jeanette describes the purpose to all this: *“improving us as practitioners”*, to *“be a better, you know, more improved practitioner”* so *“if you do something bad or you do something wrong then you kind of say look I did this but I did this to resolve it and actually you’ve learnt from that so...you’re going to be better in future”* (14Nov2013, Jeanette:42), echoing Sadie’s description of reflective practice as a ‘professional responsibility’ referred to previously. Along similar lines in a different RPRG Jason describes

36	Jason	<i>a lot of lessons to be learned from [‘good and bad’ experiences in the workplace], for me reflective practice is how we can learn the most lessons we possibly can from those situations, I was like, well looking at it like it’s turning the negatives into positives ...</i>
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(18Oct2014).

Joseph puts into words his experience of the value of reflective practice in a slightly different but related way: reflective practice means that he can *“constantly [...] reinvent the wheel, I constantly need to look at practice, [...] it’s always a new piece of paper, which I love”* (14Nov2013, Joseph:2). Reflective practice *“gives”* him and his practice *“that vitality back, [...] new things that can be planned, new ways of expression, new ways of looking at experiences [...] in order to pull new information out”* (14Nov2013, Joseph:6).

Thus the percipients are Describing the significant contribution from reflection-on-practice of distance: carried out after an intervention, action, situation, session, reflective practice enables practice management, overview, questioning, and development, and, as a result, facilitates practitioner vitality. Their positive experiences are the rationale for progressing with reflective practice in this thesis.

However, the *nature* of that distance is unclear. Above Duma, Dasia and Geoff speak of reflective practice-on *and* -in practice without differentiation, and when Dawn talks of 'everything you do' it is unclear if she means at the time or later. In a different RPRG Clare is less ambiguous. She speaks of reflective practice whilst she is "*doing*" practice, so when she is "*going 'Oh, this isn't working, I'll try this way'*" as well as afterwards by reflecting "*well I've tried this way, but coz we've also tried that way'*" (6Oct2014, Clare:3) so "*I'm gonna go back and deal with that again and approach it differently'*" (6Oct2014, Clare:105). Having noted that Geoff blurs reflection on and in practice, later in that RPRG he speaks of the way that something can "*put you in a certain mood that you don't consciously know [...] at the time, you just find your day goes that way because something put you there'*" and it is reflective practice that helps him to '*track back'*' (6Dec2014, Geoff:237) and identify the "*shape*" that mood is making in the moment (6Dec2014, Geoff:235). Carol talks of "*reflecting on other people's practice'*" (6Oct2014, Carol:4) in the moment, by which she means making judgements and then adopting or rejecting those elements in her own practice (6Oct2014, Carol:7).

What stands out here, then, is the percipients positive experiences of reflective practice related to the opportunity of distancing or 'witnessing' that it brings, but the nature of that is unclear. It is also significant to recall that they - and mainstream literature - approach reflective practice as synonymous with writing, conflating reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action anyway. For some students/practitioners, of course, writing will be useful. In the RPRG of 15 November 2013 Sadie describes how it helps her "*to sort thoughts out'*" and in that process "*other questions come up'*" resulting in her having "*more understanding of why I did what I did'*" (15Nov2013, Sadie:7). Yet looking to the Curated experiences of all percipients this is not common. Even having spoken about reflective practice positively, Carol says it is "*writing it down'*" that she "*struggle[s] with'*", and reflective practice in her degree programme is all about that (18Oct2014, Carol:4). She contrasts this with a time when she engaged in reflective practice differently: by "*pick[ing] it right apart in my own head and then came to 'well that probably was the best outcome I could have hoped for', it wasn't the ideal but it was the best I could have had'*" (18Oct2014, Carol:30) which does not happen when preoccupied with imposed diary protocols. Joseph shares that his most powerful experience of reflective practice, when it gave him his 'vitality back', was when talking in a group; this "*enable[s] you to get reflection that you can't get out of the diary'*" (14Nov2013, Joseph:10). Geoff's frustration with the limitations of journal writing were highlighted in chapter 3, an experience he contrasts with being

taught how to manage his anger in the moment (6Dec2014, Geoff:197; 6Dec2014, Geoff:207).

So, there are two overarching elements to consider here. First, it brings into sharper focus how their *negative* experiences of reflective practice are related to the current typical mainstream reflection-on-action *process*, their experience of being domesticated and its slow and incremental violence of being ‘broken in’. Second, it is also clear that there *is* value to be had from reflective practice. Together this provides lead and reason for proceeding with reflective practice in this thesis, plus these Descriptions so far signal possibilities for their ‘vision of what might be’ and its action: de-coupling the association of reflective practice with always and only writing; and, exploring in the moment, i.e. reflection-in-action.

Acknowledging van Manen’s (2016:315) observation that expressed experiences are “already transformations”, if I remain as close to them as possible “the messages [they] bring to the surface from the depths of life’s oceans [will] have not entirely lost some of the natural quiver of their undisturbed existence” (2016:313). Therefore, chapter 4 remains close to their voice with as little commentary as possible.

4 Reflection-in-action

Starting the RPRG of 10th January 2015, as usual I reflected back their previous discussion, that they had been sharing their experience of:

6	JT	<i>reflecting in-the-moment being fast, and about scribbling it down, unlike reflecting after the event when you can take a long hard look or not so just get the job of it done, you just write about whatever it is you’ve got to write about in your diaries. A second thing was how what was important to you was the things you do in that moment, like dealing with anger, or with the many things going on all in the same time, but whatever they are they’re very quick, [...] a different kind of time experience</i>
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(10Jan2015)

Jason responds, “Yeah, you’re not, they’re very fast, you’re really conscious of everything, you just, well you just get on” (10Jan2015, Jason:7). For Carol this is about “*having a plan and sticking to it*” (29Nov2013, Carol:88) but Sadie says it is not so linear, you can have “*A path unless something else happens*” although “*having a path reduces panic*” (29Nov2013, Sadie:90). Looking across the RPRG transcripts to further explore ‘being conscious of everything in professional practice with or without a plan’ further, Carol and Mary describe how their “*immediate reaction*” is “*structured*” in to their practice. By ‘structured’ it

appears they mean something like habit or reaction because they explain it as their “*knee jerk*” reactions in a moment. At first Mary says she would not be able to change this (6Oct2014, Mary:117) because they are hardwired and thus fixed in the moments of her practice, but then recalls a colleague pointing out that she *had* changed the way she reacted to something, although does not know if this was due to having greater role responsibility thus greater “*opportunity to express*” herself or her reflective practice (6Oct2014, Mary:121, Mary:123, Mary:180). In a different RPRG Carol speaks of her “*instinctive practice*”, so “*instinct of what I should do in that situation*” which is “*I didn’t think at the time ‘I’m feeling vulnerable’ but there it was, I didn’t think, I didn’t put that into words in my head, I just felt it*” (29Nov2013, Carol:36). In a different RPRG Rob relates his to intuition and says it is “*not like some amazing gift that you get given*” (10Jan2015, Rob:155) and Jason agrees, describing it as a response that develops and changes in relation to “*new experiences*” (10Jan2015, Jason:156) to which Rob adds “*when we challenge, when our thoughts and behaviours are being challenged*” (10Jan2015, Rob:157), although Jason describes “*if you’ve never experienced a certain situation before it may take you a lot longer to react to it because you’re thinking ‘what do I do’*” (10Jan2015, Jason:124). In his fourth RPRG Geoff also talks of responding from ‘instinct’, this time noting that it does not have to equate to desirable or effective action (10Jan2015, Geoff:104). As he later says, “*that’s the sort of crux of it, stuff that is originally instinct isn’t always all good for you, so it’s sort of trying to unlearn that and come back the other way*” so “*undoing some learned behaviours and learning new ones*” (7Mar2015, Geoff:190).

Being Described here, then, is a felt sense of a significant and prescient knowing in the contexts of professional practice structured in to their reactions and responses. Asking about their experience of this, Carol speaks of how it “*sort of coalesces very quickly, in a flash really. All of that coming together*” (29Nov2013, Carol:46). In a different RPRG Dasia and Rob describe it as:

69	Dasia	Like a quick peek?
70	Rob	Yeah a snap picture.
71	Dasia	A quick peek

(4Apr2015)

Rather than a flash, peek or snap, it is a process for Geoff that starts with a “*niggling at the back of [his] mind*” (10Jan2015, Geoff:178). It ends with making a decision, an idiosyncratic unfolding that means other people would make “*a completely different set of links*” leading to a different action/intervention (29Nov2013, Sadie:42). Because journal writing does not

help with any of this, Jason asks *“How do we get more effective in the moment?”* (10Jan2015, Jason:101) and Geoff agrees, journals do not help because *“your reaction straight away, it’s instinctive”* (10Jan2015, Geoff:102), it’s *“what right in front of you”* (10Jan2015, Geoff:120) in contrast to the retrospective activity of diaries, and they need and want something that helps with ‘in the moment’.

So, in contrast to reflective practice as reflection-on-action and its associated journal/diary writing after an event/session, the percipients are Describing professional practice in terms of moments, and their immediate reactions and actions in those moments, articulated as a process, individually differentiated, and are wondering how they can become *more* effective in this. To remind, reflection-*in*-action is a neglected area within Schönian (mainstream) understanding and practice of reflective practice but the percipient Descriptions are picking it out as necessary and important.

Following van Manen’s (2016:312) “method” of “spinning out a detailed phenomenological text”, I went back to the transcripts with reflection-in-action in mind. It led to a deeper Description of their lived experiences of it in context of their ‘vision’ and action ‘of what might be’.

In the RPRG of 21st November 2014, Clare describes reflection-in-action as a counter-balance to the *“big scope”* of *“goals, targets that you try and achieve”* in which she works (21Nov2014, Clare:46). In contrast to *“plate-spinning”* (21Nov2014, Clare:48), reflection-in-action is an experience of *“Break[ing] it right down”* in the moment (21Nov2014, Clare:46), without which she would be unable to give her clients *“what they really need”* (21Nov2014, Clare:46). Asked to further describe the experience of ‘breaking it down’ she says

47	Carol	<i>It’s a skill though isn’t it ‘coz we want to focus on one thing but we also need to keep our peripheral vision alive, both metaphorically and literally you know ‘coz there’s a whole lot of other stuff we can miss if we’re so in blinkers. So the real skill is sort of moving in, moving out</i>
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(21Nov2014).

Moving attention in and out, or ‘breaking practice down in the moment’ is *“the significant time”* because without this *“things get missed out, [unclear words] when things happen that could be catastrophic”* (21Nov2014, Carol:152). Indeed, a year earlier she had described her experience of reflection-in-action as *“trusting in your own instinct and your own aporias”* (29Nov2013, Carol:58), that is, trusting the experience and process of *“having no path”* (29Nov2013, Carol:60). Having spoken previously about having a path, here no path takes prominence. In brief to explain her reference to aporia, Heidegger

(1945/2002:41) describes it as “A lack of resource [...], a perplexity achieved by an encounter with the previously unthought, an uncertainty about where to go next driven by a desire to progress”, from its Greek etymology of *poros*, meaning path, passage, a way, and *a-poros*, meaning lacking a path, passage, way (Burbules, 2002). Jason shares from his experience that having no path is not the same as chaos because essentially it works on the landscape discussed in chapter 2 as Being Prepared, Performance, and Qualities Of Me: his experience of reflection-in-action is all that he knows about a person, the connection he has built up with them, what they are saying in the moment, and the feeling that he has in that moment, all coming together, in a “snap”, “*all that does happen while they’re actually there speaking to me*” (10Jan2015, Jason:214). This Describing of having no path but everything one knows about a person related to the interaction coming together in one moment, trusting that experience, which has the quality of a ‘flash’ and ‘quick peek’, is described by Jeanette as a ‘*gelling together*’(29Mar2014, Jeanette:8). Like Mary, Debra tells of unconsciously repeating habits of action and wondering how and if she might be able to change them (6Dec2014, Debra:534, Debra 536), but Geoff replies, “*a moment’s reflection can stop you doing them, breaking that cycle*” (6Dec2014, Geoff:556). I ask him to “*tell me more about that moment*” (6Dec2014, JT:560), and he describes it as “*interrupting*” (6Dec2014, Geoff:563), of “*stopping and going ‘whoa’*” (6Dec2014, Geoff:618), Jason of conscious choice to “*pay attention to it now*” (6Dec2014, Jason:562), and that this requires “*getting over a hurdle*” of not paying attention (6Dec2014, Jason:568), which, to both Geoff and Jason, involves “*making yourself*” (6Dec2014, Geoff:570) ‘*make that moment*’ (6Dec2014, Jason:571).

Thus the ‘sneak peek’ of reflection-in-action is making oneself make a moment of interruption to one’s unconscious action, a conscious paying attention to the now of all one knows, a feeling in a flash, all this gelling together.

4.1 ‘Moments’

Exploring the nature of ‘that moment’ further, during a later RPRG Jason and Geoff put emphasis on “*know[ing] everything you possibly can*” (10Jan2015, Geoff:218, & Jason:216) about those they are working with so that they can respond (10Jan2015, Geoff:218), a process described by Debra as “*your mind instantly draws [...] on the bits of information you know about them, it fills them together*” (10Jan2015, Debra:217). Playing devil’s advocate I ask “*So could anybody do that as long as they’ve learnt all that information?*” (10Jan2015, JT:219). Jason says no, what is needed is a ‘*receptive mind*’ in addition to “*I’ll call it*

patience" (10Jan2015, Jason:226) to which Geoff interjects with *"empathy"* (10Jan2015, Geoff:227). 'Empathy', Debra, Jason, and Geoff Describe, is something that comes out of *"life experience"* (10Jan2015, Geoff:233, Jason:235) as well as being related to caring, the latter being a crucial lever because without it a practitioner simply *"wouldn't get it"* (10Jan2015, Debra:230). Invited to elaborate further, Debra describes it as the extent to which a practitioner has had the same experiences as their clients/users such that they can empathise (10Jan2015, Debra:236) and Geoff adds a finer distinction, the extent to which you can empathise even in situations when out of your *"comfort zone"* but *"know how to deal with"* it in contrast with those not *"encountered"* before wherein one reacts in *"fear"* (10Jan2015, Geoff:237) or *shock*" (10Jan2015, Debra:238). The difference is connection with their clients/users. During the times in which they must make a *"snap decision"* (10Jan2015, Jason:261), connection with those they work with (10Jan2015, Geoff:290) is a powerful shaping variable in their reflection-in-action.

So, 'that moment' involves what they already know about the person they are engaging with, but also and significantly a receptive mind, which is about having empathy because of one's own life experiences but also the connection one has with the person, and importantly all of this therefore relates to the connection they have with themselves.

Further still, Rob describes it as *"like an impulse reactions" [sic]* (10Jan2015, Rob:240), which Jason refers to as *'pre-judgement'* (10Jan2015, Jason:243), Debra *"preconceptions"* (10Jan2015, Debra:259), and Rob *"snap social stereotype"* (10Jan2015, Rob:262), to which Geoff adds that he *"tr[ies] and fit[s] people into boxes"* (10Jan2015, Geoff:262). Jason elaborates that he too is not *"neutral"* so will make judgements about his clients based on appearance, for example (10Jan2015, Jason:248), which *"can start the conversation negative"* (10Jan2015, Jason:248), but that *"the difference I can do now is let that go and actually talk to the person, those thoughts aren't there when I start to talk to them whereas they would have been before..."* (10Jan2015, Jason:256). Rob describes this as *"challeng[ing] that within [him]self"* (10Jan2015, Rob:272) to which Jason reiterates, *"you notice things fast and then you've got to let that go"* (10Jan2015, Jason:277), and Geoff adds *"you do, you put your own feelings, you have to put your own feelings to one side"* (10Jan2015, Geoff:293). They summarise this as being *"integral to practice"* (10Jan2015, Jason:291) and something that *"not anyone could do"* (10Jan2015, Geoff:295).

Here, then, in 'that moment' what they (think they) know about the person they are interacting or intervening with is based on preconceptions, judgements, and stereotypes, as

well as feelings that surface on 'impulse', that they endeavour to 'let go' in the moment to be able to 'actually' talk to the person, and this is 'integral' to professional practice.

Whilst this Describes the nature of 'that moment', their sharing also pivots around what signifies 'a moment' in the fast and complex flow of professional practice. To begin with Geoff speaks only in terms of journal writing and waiting for something to stand out to focus on but *"most of its normal sort of, you know. So it's hard to pinpoint anything in the general hubbub of it all"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:128), a view shared by Jason, a reiteration of their experience of reflective practice as reflection-on-action, and that unless something is written down it is not a moment and gets lost (6Dec2014, Jason:121; Geoff:124).

Here, then, the diary effect is that they do not see that they react, respond, and shape their practice *all* the time: 'moments' are just the tangible things that they write about afterwards, and writing is the product and the signifier of those moments.

I remind them of an alternative activity introduced during their RPRG of the 21st November 2014 because they had shared vivid experiences that had not involved writing. It was a Sound Walk during which Jason, for example, had poignantly noted his feelings and thoughts in moments at the time, so I offer *"maybe a different kind of noting not writing lots down is possible. What d'you think?"* (6Dec2014, JT:122; JT:132). Initially Debra and Geoff respond literally: immediately after the RPRG and its Sound Walk they had gone to the canteen to eat and had not thought about it further which might have been different had I set reflecting on the activity as 'a piece of homework' (6Dec2014, Geoff:151), falling back to reflection after an experience as being the only event possible *and* to responsibility for doing so existing with someone in authority telling them to do it. With that in mind I prompt further Description by playing 'devil's advocate': *"Maybe we can only think after, so on-the-moment, on action, and we have to have a set day and time to do it. What do you think?"* (6Dec2014, JT:196). Geoff recalls that he now manages difficult moments all the time where previously he would have reacted angrily, that he *"stand[s] back [...] and approach[es] things differently"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:197), although it was something he was *"taught"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:199, Geoff:201) to do in the *"instant"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:205). Jason notes sharp contrast with Geoff's attempts to facilitate clients to reflect on their behaviour by writing in a diary which does not work (6Dec2014, Jason:227). Asking Geoff what it was that he was taught to do is where he refers to reflecting-in-action as being *"aware"* of his mood and how it sets the tone for his interactions (6Dec2014, Geoff:235). To encourage deeper description, I ask Geoff *"How are you aware?"* (6Dec2014, JT:236).

He articulates a process whereby he notices what he is feeling, why he is feeling it, and “tracks” its impact on the moment (6Dec2014, Geoff:259), which for Jason is a moment of “stepping backwards” (6Dec2014, Jason:242) during a moment of practice.

Therefore, catching a moment in an instant both involves and makes possible tracking back to identify the shape of feelings, the effect of that shape on the moment and therefore interaction, identifying what shaped it that way, and then ‘managing’ the shape differently. It is a moment of ‘stepping backward’, although initially this still revolves around dependence on others. For example, adding to Geoff’s describing of being *given* strategies as part of anger management, he and Debra also share the value of having a superior practitioner observe them in practice and give “instant feedback” (6Dec2014, Debra:432), useful because they “may pick up on things that we’ve missed and so or just put to one side” (6Dec2014, Geoff:438).

4.2 Moments and improvisation

At this point Rob interjects: “*basically what we’re talking about in terms of practice is teaching people how to improvise aren’t we*” (6Dec2015, Rob:459). He gives the analogy of comedians in an instant constructing an unplanned joke in response to audience comments, this being the result of “*different connections in their head ping, ping*” (6Dec2014, Rob:465). Rob says that to be able to do that requires “*repetitive practice*” (6Dec2014, Rob:469) which for Geoff is not “*structure*” (6Dec2014, Geoff:470). By ‘structure’ this time they mean externally imposed control because when asked to explain Geoff refers to strict school routines (6Dec2014, Geoff:470), Rob to “*communist states*” (6Dec2014, Rob:471), the felt experience of this being ‘*boring*’ (6Dec2014, Rob:473) and all this not “*encourage[ing] improvisation*” (6Dec2014, Rob:475). In contrast they speak of ‘*an improvisation approach*’ (6Dec2014, Rob:472) which requires “*lessons*” on improvisation (6Dec2014, Rob:484) as well as lessons that model improvisation by being “*improvised*” (6Dec2014, Rob:479). Then, Rob relates all of this to reflective practice: “*we need instruction and guidance to be able to reflect, [...] a lesson of guidance so [we] can improvise*” (6Dec2014, Rob:492), and facilitators with “*a structure in [their] approach to getting it across to us*” but who do not know what will happen and how it will go (6Dec2014, Jason:519), in essence, having clarity of process but not content and outcomes so that students/practitioners would be “*clear enough*” to be able to improvise themselves (6Dec2014, Rob:531), so Being Prepared, enabling them to be able to be consciously flexible and responsive in the moment.

Thus, in relation to reflection-in-action in a moment of professional practice, having initially put their locus of control for this in others, here they are considering themselves as central to the process and signifying being able to improvise as an artful practice that requires Being Prepared, whilst also that it will be supported through input on improvisation as well as modelling by facilitators.

To this Sadie adds her experience that “*purpose*”, “*intention*” and “*deadlines*” of context in any moment changes the “*backdrop*” for and impetus to her “*action*” in the moment (29Nov2013, Sadie:22), illustrating by contrasting her actions from “*stick[ing] to a list*” when shopping with the intention of “*get[ting] around [...] as quickly as possible*” with the complexity and messiness of professional practice (29Nov2013, Sadie:18, Sadie:26). Carol adds a further dimension: although in a specific moment in professional practice she might feel vulnerable, the longer she holds a job the more confident she feels in her purpose and intention, and this in turn helps her practice in the moment (29Nov2013, Carol:98). She also talks about the employing organisation being significant too in terms of whether she feels “*safe*” in any moment dependent on whether it ‘*adheres*’ to relevant regulations and has a positive inspection record (29Nov2013, Carol:98). Jason speaks of knowing the routines of an organisation but this not “*helping you be a, an effective practitioner, [...] just feel a bit more easy*” (6Dec2014, Jason:623).

Summing up, reflection-in-action is a neglected area within Schönian (mainstream) understanding and practice of reflective practice but the percipients pick it out as central. They Describe reflection-in-action as:

- an artful practice, one that involves breaking practice down in a moment by moving one’s focus in and moving out, trusting in one’s own aporia, connection with those they are engaging with and with oneself, all in a snap, flash, coalescence, gelling together, in a moment.
- In contrast to reflection-on-action, it is a moment of interruption, a paying attention to it now. This moment does not make itself, like an identified critical incident, but a practitioner makes the moment, which requires a receptive mind, so patient empathy developed through considered life experience.
- This is not always about being on familiar territory, and it will involve improvisation, as well as feeling prepared enough to be able to improvise.
- The fast movement of all of this means that stereotype and prejudice kick in, but the moving in and moving out of awareness in conjunction with connection, means one lets this go in the moment.
- Reflection-in-action involves identifying the shape of ones feeling in the moment and its impact in one’s practice, a tracking, a stepping backwards.

- One's practice and reflection-in-action will be shaped by purpose and intention from context.
- Reflection-in-action can be facilitated by given strategies and individual feedback after direct observation in professional practice; experiencing someone who themselves improvises and reflects-in-action; *and* from engaging in it oneself over the course of time.
- Finally, reflection-in-action is supported by organisations that offer structured routines and facilitative environments.

5 Problems with reflection-in-action

The percipients are also clear from their lived experiences that reflection-in-action is not without difficulties.

Sadie talks of the need for “*balance*” in order to “*function*”:

56	Sadie	<i>you've got to get on with practice, you can't be noticing every minute second event and going 'do I need to attend to this, do I need to attend to that?'. You know, you've kind of just got to get on, so it's quite a skill and an art isn't it actually. You have to weave the way through dealing with and getting on, just getting on with whatever it is you've gotta do</i>
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(29Nov2013)

Similarly, a year later Carol is talking about the importance of making judgements in the moment as part of professional practice, and shares:

45	Carol	<i>we do it all the time. And partly we have to, you know we can't possibly go around naive, particularly if it's completely new to us, you know we have to go around judging also. If you think about it if you look out the window there's so much stimulation, there's so much going on that we have to decide what we're going to focus on and tune in but equally we're missing things so much including ourselves. We're so busy sort of tuning into one thing and another out there and basically making judgements and making decisions that there's so much else that we miss</i>
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(21Nov2014)

Jeanette also talks of “*go[ing] about things and you don't notice*” (28Nov2013, Jeanette:26), Sadie of “*being distracted*” as well as not “*pick[ing] up on that clue or cue*” (29Nov2013, Sadie:26).

So, in essence Carol, Sadie and Jeanette are Describing how they are to know what to notice or pay attention to, what they might miss, the extent to which it involves a pause, and how long a pause is needed given that they need balance to get on with whatever it is they are doing at that time.

Further still, in a different RPRG Geoff, Mary and Becky caution that authentic engagement in reflection-in-action could generate adverse, even abrogating experiences: it could be *“confusing and overwhelming”* (28Nov2013, Becky:140); trigger significant change which *“could change other things”* that have unintended or unexpected *“knock-on”* effects (4Apr2015, Geoff:59); be a process in which one *‘hears [ones] own noise louder’*, difficult if one *“doesn’t like [its] sound”* (21Nov2014, Mary:228); and misunderstood or executed incorrectly reflection-in-action could tip into being *‘detached’*, *‘phasing out’* in the moment rather than engaged (10Jan2015, Debra:210, Geoff:211).

Indeed, and in contrast to Carol’s experience of trusting the no path of aporia, in the fast and messy moment of practice in which she does not immediately know what she is going to do Sadie experiences *“that sort of not knowing”* (29Nov2013, Sadie:64) as a *“sense, the sense”* (29Nov2013, Sadie:80) of *“a black hole, a pit”* (29Nov2013, Sadie:62), of *“going into [...] numbness”* (29Nov2013, Sadie:64), a *“complete, I really, I really don’t know what to do, I can’t find a way out”* (29Nov2013: Sadie:66), *“a paralysis of the mind”* (29Nov2013, Sadie:68), *“a panic paralysis”* (29Nov2013, Sadie:70), of *“being drowned in the head”* (29Nov2013, Sadie:82), and once there, she adds a *“layer”* of judgement, of *“I’m rubbish, because I’ve gone wrong, I’m thinking, you know, oh god, I’m here again, can’t think what to do next and all I want is the hole to open under me* (29Nov2013, Sadie:72).

Attention to reflection-in-action therefore brings awareness to the experience of *not* knowing. It is clear for some this is about trust and connection, but it cannot be assumed to be the case. Even so, Sadie feels that finding a way to work with her ‘pit’ would be essential to her professional practice: she can *“get away with it [...] socially”* but not professionally (29Nov2013, Sadie:76). Carol wonders whether some aporias are *“normative cognitive”* and others *“are possibly produced by some experience in the past”* (29Nov2013, Carol:78). It is not entirely clear what she means here but perhaps paths/no paths that are created by societal norms and those that come from one’s own personal history.

6 Glance

With their caution noted, reflection-in-action was still obviously important to the percipients. During the RPRG of 10th January 2015, I remind them that they had spoken about it as being more than learning information about a person or *“some techniques and applying them”* (10Jan2015, JT:321).

Jason says this is because it *“wouldn’t be enough”* (10Jan2015, Jason:322). From his experience what else is needed is *“something in you that [...] deal[s] with the, you know, and how you react to it”* (10Jan2015, Jason:322). I invite him to say more about *“something in you”* (10Jan2015, JT:323) and he describes embracing *“self-development”* (10Jan2015, Jason:324) and Geoff adds the *“desire to develop”* (10Jan2015, Geoff:331). In describing what stimulates this, Geoff speaks of a significant event or period that *‘changes your outlook’* (10Jan2015, Geoff:333) or having an *“inbuilt”* positive world-view (10Jan2015, Geoff:347). For Jason it is a *“change”* that *“clicks in”* (10Jan2015, Jason:361), and Debra of *“that thing that changes you, fitting you”* (10Jan2015, Jason:365). Specifically, Jason talks of a ‘click’ as a moment in reflection-in-action, and in that ‘click’ of a moment the situation/person he has been working with has *“altered”* and so has he (10Jan2015, Jason:363). So here, then, reflection-in-action is Described as not being about applying tips and techniques but wrapped into a desire to develop, a desire that *can* be in-built, created by a pivotal experience, a change that fits, or something that just ‘clicks’, but clearly not something that is externally imposed and expected.

I reflect back this Describing as *‘the process of what informs us in the moment’* (10Jan2015, JT:366) and to this Rob responds by introducing an idea that he has had - and in doing this he uses the word ‘glance’. Checking through the transcripts I used the word ‘glance’ two RPRGs previously and Jason had responded at that time using the same word, but Rob had not been present. Perhaps Jason and Rob had talked together outside of the RPRGs, Rob catching up with what he has missed, or perhaps the word at this point Describes Rob’s understanding of the percipients experiences of reflection-in-action. Either way, it is a term that would go on to take ‘threshold’ significance and therefore I Describe its emergence in full.

Referring to the previous RPRG Rob says

367	Rob	<i>I was just thinking, I think again when we sat, had a glorious day sat in the sun, it’s like the reflection, we don’t have like a pause button on life to actually go ‘oh that was interesting, why are we doing this’. So it was like what can we do to actually think ‘hold on, stop and have a think’. And I was then on the idea of like freezing time and I thought just have a really horrible looking watch and when you see it you think of the time and stop and think, or glance, right. So I sort of thought well I can’t buy everybody a watch so ‘oops that’s no good’, so my idea was this bright thing, you’ll look at it and you might actually think, ‘I’m going to think’. That was it, yeah</i>
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(10Jan2015)

Rob had brought to the RPRG brightly coloured silicone wristbands that he had commissioned with “*Reflect, learn, action*” (10Jan2015, Rob:371) printed into them. He explains his idea and its application to reflection-in-action, referring to examples from practice that percipients had shared earlier and in previous RPRGs:

371	Rob	<i>Reflect, learn, action [unclear words]. You just pay attention to everything that's going on in that moment. So the minute you play with it, or look at it so you're not waiting for two boys to start fighting or some young kid to...[interrupted]</i>
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376	Rob	<i>...It's about you know not waiting for the two boys to fall out or the guy telling you all this weird stuff, it's actually in the moment when you play with it I think right then you glance, like 'what, how am I feeling at the moment, what am I thinking, what's going on'. So those are the things you kind of quickly take a glance at. So rather than waiting, so I might be having a conversation with you about 'did you have a nice weekend', could be anything ...[interrupted]</i>
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378	Rob	<i>... it's in that moment so you go 'oh yeah, what was I thinking and feeling then'. It's rather than wait for some big dramatic some event to happen, just to start informing what is it that we pay attention to. In some ways like you said when there's something big and dramatic it's easier almost to go 'well I paid attention to that, I have this relationship and I know they're in touch with Social Services and I know their house got burned down' but actually most of what we do is fast, fast, fast.</i>
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(10Jan2015)

Discussion follows:

379	Geoff	<i>Where's my head the rest of the time when I'm just there.</i>
380	JT	<i>Exactly.</i>
381	Geoff	<i>It's a good point.</i>
382	JT	<i>So its [Rob's] way of saying you know 'where's your head and body now?'.</i>
383	Rob	<i>So it's not, I was trying to work out how to record, how I feel, how I can smell things where I am, what it is, they're a multitude in that moment. You know I can't record everything else, I was thinking 'how do you just grab hold of this moment'. But it is, it's almost like say the 'time-pause button' as I was saying when you go 'woah this is where everything is'. But that's almost a long, that's not your gaze that's a glance, yeah.</i>
384	JT	<i>That's a, a glance, right?</i>
385	Rob	<i>... a 'hey this is where everything is' because it's more of a slow moment than a react now, which is what we've been saying, it is a react now, it's not a, you know, 'this is where we all are and it's nice or not working out right'. But this is your own reflections of it, the, like, snap ones. Whereas I went off on a slow gentle relaxing [unclear words] like not a meditative type thing ...</i>

(10Jan2015).

Glance, then, is both 'the moment' and how one works with and processes the moment. At the same time, the word conveys and he Describes its qualities of speed, flash and coalescence from earlier, attention to feeling thinking emotion in a moment. Jason goes on to contrast things that “*stick in your memory*” (10Jan2015, Jason:388) such as when you enjoy something, “*you remember it because you were enjoying it*” (10Jan2015, Jason:390), with all other aspects involved at the same time that are not remembered, and therefore, as Rob puts it, get “*completely lost*” (10Jan2015, Rob:392). So there is a difference between merely remembering something (the something you enjoyed) or not, with “*reflectively learn[ing]*” (10Jan2015, Rob:389) in a moment, and what makes the difference between the two is “*watching*” (10Jan2015, Jason:408) or Glance. I sum up and reflect back:

410	JT	<i>Yeah. So [Rob's]s bands then, so just rather than wait for these big critical moments it's the moment you play with [the wrist band] or you find yourself looking at them that you just pay attention to [...] to where's your head, your body and your feelings and what are you processing in that moment. So, kind of, in that that moment just kind of glance, watch, pay attention, is that right? So Jason's 'watch', yeah? And go 'oh yeah that's what's happening', rather than wait for the big incidents...</i>
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(10Jan2015).

Discussion follows:

413	Geoff	<i>[...] But yeah it is interesting to think about that, 'coz I spend quite a lot of the session generally you know over like three hours or whatever you know just standing back and watching and I don't really think I've thought about what I'm watching.</i>
414	JT	<i>Yeah, yeah it will be interesting just to see...</i>
415	Debra	<i>...But it's just like, it's like when you're watching the [clients/users] you know when they're coming in in the morning and sometimes [they] are all right sometimes they'll be really happy and others [unclear words] they'll be really quiet sort of thing, you end up watching them during the day to see how their mood changes and things like that. So I suppose you could see that as a reflection as well.</i>
416	Geoff	<i>Yeah. Although the bands are different Rob?</i>
417	Jason	<i>I think what he's said is it's not reflecting on an incident ...</i>
418	Rob	<i>... [unclear word] it's reflecting on the ...</i>
419	Geoff	<i>...what you're picking up on them.</i>
420	Rob	<i>...how you process all the time but in that moment</i>

(10Jan2015)

Here, then, they are differentiating between watching *without* glance, a mindless general seeing, and watching *with* glance, and how glance is not reflecting *on* practice but reflecting *in* a moment.

7 Gaze

In the subsequent RPRG Geoff speaks first: “*So I suppose the main thing is we’re looking at the difference between sitting down weeks later or days later and writing, or, reflecting in the moment*” (7Mar2015, Geoff:1), to which I reply that “*something jumped out at me when looking at the transcript from last time, [Rob] used ‘gaze, and ‘glance’ to describe those*” (7Mar2015, JT:2). In his idea of silicone wrist bands to draw attention to and facilitate glances in the moment, Rob had contrasted it with gaze to underscore what he meant, that is to contrast glance with the long unpacking of practice after an event that is typical of mainstream understanding and practices of reflective practice.

Whilst this chapter is founded on Describing by dwelling in the percipients experience, a brief detour is needed to offer a frame at this point. According to Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory (1977:10), a construct is “a reference axis devised by man for establishing a personal orientation toward the various events he encounters” [*sic*] for “psychological guidance” whilst making sense of experiences. Each construct comprises two contrasting poles, what it is and is not, with the meaning of the construct derived from both at the same time even if only one is given expression. At this point in the RPRG, then, I was highlighting the percipients notion of Gaze as the dichotomous aspect to Glance (capitalised from here on in the thesis to distinguish them as concepts) and in doing so underscoring the role the percipients had given them as “insight cultivators” (van Manen, 2016:324), that is, “distinctions that help us explore or deepen our understanding of a certain experience, a phenomena” (2016:327). To recall from chapter 1, insight cultivators are a feature of phenomenological research that

Help us to interpret our lived experiences, recall experiences that seem to exemplify these insight cultivators, and stimulate further creative insights and understanding with respect to our phenomena under investigation (2016:324).

They facilitate “‘grasp[ing]’ things and ‘know[ing]’ the things that the concept names” (2016:324), and the percipients embracing and embedding of Glance and Gaze shows the extent to which this was the case, indeed such that they became “threshold concepts” (Meyer & Land, 2003), i.e. concepts that enable crossing the threshold of “troublesome

knowledge” (Perkins, 1999:9), knowledge that is otherwise counter-intuitive, alien, conceptually difficult, incoherent, ritualised, inert, tacit. ‘Threshold concepts’ are therefore akin to a portal, opening up a new and previously inaccessible way of thinking about something. It represents a transformed way of understanding, or interpreting, or viewing something without which the learner cannot progress (Meyer & Land, 2003:1).

Whilst critical phenomenological research inevitably requires the researcher to name the *broad phenomena to be* explored, the finely grained content of lived experience and action forward comes from the research: from the outset I named reflective practice as the focus and the possibility of alternative practices related to reflection-in-action as the inquiry; the insight cultivators of Glance and Gaze and their action taking on life as threshold concepts came from the percipients in the RPRGs.

8 Glance and Gaze

Dasia had been missing from the RPRG of 10 January 2015 when Rob had given out wristbands, so in the following RPRG she asks what the percipients are talking about. I reply, clumsily, still clarifying their concepts for myself:

6	JT	<i>Ok, so before Christmas when we sat in the sun and it was so nice, there was something that came through, the difference between reflecting on practice after the event, really pulling it apart and really inquiring into it. And, we’ve been slowly over the weeks wondering how much that is relevant to or helps you make decisions in the moment and what happens in the moment. And then after [Rob] brought bands in for everyone that had ‘reflect, think, action’ on and said every time you looked at it, played with it, that you noticed what you were thinking and feeling, so not waiting for a big dramatic event, and said this was Glance, you Glance at something really very quickly and you make sense of it, and Gaze, when you think about something afterward, thinking this, applying that, is that it?</i>
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(7March2015).

Discussion follows:

7	Dasia	<i>So Glance is straightaway?</i>
8	Geoff	<i>Right there and then, yeah.</i>
9	Rob	<i>Gaze is that thing of afterwards you might think ‘oh I’d have done that differently if I’d had time’, is ‘Gaze’, you know.</i>
10	JT	<i>So, Gaze is when you start really pulling something apart?</i>
11	Geoff	<i>Yeah. ‘Coz actually practice is mostly about Glancing and getting on with it.</i>
12	Dasia	<i>Reacting, responding.</i>

(7March2015)

Going further Rob says it is possible to “*perfect the skill of Gazing*” (7Mar2015, Rob:16) to which Geoff says this is why he joined the research project in the first place because he “*wasn’t very good at that*” (7Mar2015, Geoff:17). I ask “*So does perfecting the skill of ‘Gazing’ impact on the decisions you make in the moment when you’re talking to young people, or making decisions?*” (7Mar2015, JT:18), and Geoff replies

19	Geoff	<i>I don’t think, no I think they’re more sort of two separate things, yeah because I think now when I’m Gazing I’m bringing in experiences since it happened or whatever I’m thinking then, or stuff we’ve, other things that have come to me. So this is why I’ve left and I’ve done my diaries, I scribble every time I get home and then slowly building it on the computer and maybe going back two or three times to some bits because you can just layer it up. Yeah. So I would say it’s quite separate, yeah</i>
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(7Mar2015)

Therefore, Glance is Described as having the quality of a click, a pause, an interruption, a freezing of time in the moment, a slow moment, a ‘hey this is where everything is, where’s your head, body and feelings that you are processing in that moment’. It is a quick Glance, watch, pay attention, that is fleeting but an extremely significant aware experience. In contrast, Gaze is the process of attending to an event, that may be big and dramatic, the event being the trigger, and sitting down afterwards to think or write, pulling some thing/s about it apart, wondering if you could/should have acted differently, and revisiting that thinking and/or writing to layer it up. Indeed, in the final RPRG Geoff talks more about that layering up. Writing in his diary is where “*in hindsight [we] tell ourselves the same things even if we think we aren’t*” (30May2015, Geoff:136). However, I remind him that in an earlier RPRG he had spoken of how his university tutor and fieldwork supervisor had encouraged him to “*see how you wrote your diary and what that said about you*” (30May2015, JT:137), so perhaps layering had potential? To this Geoff describes “*one kind of Gaze or another*” (30May2015, Geoff:138), that is, Gaze of reflection-on-action by pulling things apart in the diary (where practitioners tell themselves the same things), but also reflection on that reflection-on-practice, “*the Gaze of hindsight on your reporting*” (30May2015, Geoff:141). To this he clarifies “*yes it could help you Glance, bloody hell, did you hear that! [laughs] but it’s got to be something different, not diary diary diary, not that, it just doesn’t, does it [laughs]*” (30May2015, Geoff:141).

Thus, he is differentiating between ritualised and domesticated reflection-on-action that is reporting one’s practice, with subsequent deliberate purposeful Gazing on that reporting. Referring to this as ‘hindsight Gaze’ this *could* help with professional practice if it isn’t through the activity of journal writing – or, at least, journal writing as he currently

experiences it, involving domestication, the slow incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ to adhere to Identity-Of reflective practice in its established domesticating practices. His point is that ‘hindsight Gaze’ could serve a purpose in identifying one’s adoption of those domesticating discourses and in this way Gaze *could* offer critical space, a response to his need for reflection-on-action to be ‘something different’.

9 An exposition of Glance

In this way, together Glance and Gaze offer a reimagining of reflective practice, a radical return to its roots of professional artistry, given that artistry as defined earlier is knowing *and* being, so when, how, *and* the skills, imagination and qualities to “go beyond” (Fish, 1998:56) the established taken-for-granted understanding of reflective practice to ensure it fundamentally concerns service to others. Glance and Gaze offer a “dis-solv[ing of] the puzzle” (Schostak & Schostak, 2008:13) of reflective practice, a “conceptual gateway” to “a transformed way of understanding, or interpreting, or viewing” (Meyer & Land, 2006:3) it. With that in mind, I returned to the RPRG transcripts again, this time asking “what does this sentence say about the experience” of the phenomena” (van Manen, 2016:320) of Gaze and Glance. It is an activity that needs to be – and was – carried out in the spirit of “wonder”, a key “methodological feature of phenomenological inquiry” described by van Manen as “that moment [...] when our [attention] has been drawn by the [attention] of something that stares back at us” (2016:360). Describing Glance and Gaze as it ‘stares back at me’ in the transcripts gives further illumination to these percipient threshold concepts.

After the Sound Walk in the RPRG of 21st November 2014, Carol talks about memories from childhood “flooding” her (21Nov2014, Carol:185), triggered by certain sounds, and Mary interjects, describing that experience as fully “facing something” in contrast to more typical “skirting on top of thoughts about it” and not “really settl[ing] with it” (21Nov2014, Mary:186). Jason takes up that theme, describing “pay[ing] attention to the sounds” (21Nov2014, Jason:205), in his case the “sound” and “rhythm” of footsteps, wind, leaves, birds, water (21Nov2014, Jason:205, Jason:213, Jason:215) whilst also being “aware of everyone” at the same time as “doing my own thing” (21Nov2014, Jason:215), an experience shared by Carol, Debra, and Mary, Mary describing it as ‘waves coming in’ (21Nov2014, 8:218).

Clare makes a direct link from all this to professional practice, an “analogy for practice”, sharing

279	Clare	<i>there's so much that is just background and it's just there and it's happening all the time, that triggers. It's only when it's out of place that you suddenly go 'oh what's that about'. And it really is just like that, and there's so much that you have to put to the background and you just have to get rid of, but you still have to be listening to it, and listening out for what's not normal, what's not right, what's not in the right place</i>
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(21Nov2014).

Here, then, are moments of attention created by that which surprises as well as by 'listening out', that is, 'listening but not having a conversation with it in your head' (21Nov2014, Mary:284, Mary:286), which for Carol is 'getting in the moment' (21Nov2014, Carol:292). Like Mary, Debra contrasts this to thinking that "washes all the time", "things" that "you don't really think about [...], not properly" (21Nov2014, Debra:298) and Jason adds that as a consequence different students/practitioners experiencing the same will not pay attention to it – or Glance - in the same way (21Nov2014, Jason:280). To this can be included Jason's observation related to the process stemming from wearing his wristband. He says "I'm very aware that I'm wearing it and I've happily worn it every day. But it's making that connection with when you're aware of it to go 'what am I Glancing' at', yeah" (4Apr2015, Jason:115). Geoff responds by joking "I might reflect on the sleeves are too long and that [laughter]" (4Apr2015, Geoff:116). I reply, and conversation follows:

117	JT	<i>And actually that's the thing though, it could be anything. It's not about ...</i>
118	Geoff	<i>...I suppose it is small things isn't it, yeah.</i>
119	JT	<i>So that's [Rob's] point 'coz we're very good at 'Gazing' at the big significant stuff, but actually for the most part our life is made up of 'Glances', right?</i>
120	Jason	<i>And that's the thing, you know we're not, there isn't big things going on that we're 'Gazing' at in practice it is the trillion Glances but we have to make them into big things</i>
121	Geoff	<i>Yeah, you can perhaps work out why you sometimes end up where you do, you know if you could see the little things and take those steps.</i>
122	Rob	<i>Yeah, it's those connections</i>
123	Geoff	<i>Yeah.</i>

(4Apr2015).

Further to Jason's comment that the nature of Glances will differ between individuals, Dasia is curious about the extent to which the way one engages in Glance is to do with "personality", so whether a student/practitioner is able to "deal with spontaneous things or sudden things" (7Mar2015, Dasia:21). Hence, she wonders if "some people" are more prone to Glance rather than Gaze, asking

41	Dasia	<i>Can the difference between these two be the person himself [sic], like some people pay attention to lots of details or very quick to spot things and very</i>
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		<i>adaptable, flexible, they can quickly respond. And some people are like they are learning style if you can say or their individual style, personal styles affect</i>
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(7Mar2015).

So, pulling together percipient experiences to Describe so far, Glance is a fleeting watching moment, that coalesces very quickly in a flash or a gelling together, is linked to a receptive mind, and can involve bringing forward a niggling at the back of one’s mind. It is an immediate process that is both a skill and an art and involves noticing, interrupting, attending, tuning in, moving attention/tuning in and out, tracking, trusting the experience/process of having no path, working with sensing, by capturing, getting at it, clicking, a thing that changes you in that moment in context of experiencing that otherwise ‘washes’ over you. It is a felt sense of the feeling, the rhythms, sounds, rather than the ‘whole thing’/the story of the event that led to that feeling, but in that way as result one gets a sense of the whole. It is, as Jeanette puts it, *“multifaceted, like your reflection, instead of”* the *“false” “contradiction”* of *“trying to get something multifaceted into a table, like a grid, like they say ‘this is how you write your diary and your portfolio, this is what you have to do’ and so you do it”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:127).

Whilst Jason describes that the made moment of a Glance differing between individuals, Dasia that individuals might approach it differently, the percipients Describe Glancing at any time, the power of *“picking out rather than just seeing the whole thing, reflection in the moment like”* (21Nov2014, Sadie:26), a view echoed by Carol:

47	Carol	<i>It’s a skill though isn’t ‘coz we want to focus on one thing but we also need to keep our peripheral vision alive, both metaphorically and literally you know ‘coz there’s a whole lot of other stuff we can miss if we’re so in blinkers. So the real skill is sort of moving in, moving out</i>
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(21Nov2014).

Later in that RPRG I refer to her word ‘focus’ to reiterate her experience at a point in which Describing had drifted, although ‘focusing’ becomes something I return to later in this thesis. For now, though, Jason says the power of Glance is its fleeting focus, the *“there and then [...] in the moment”* (6Dec2014, Jason:66).

10 How to engage with the Glance of reflection-in-action

When Describing *how* to engage with Glance, Sally shares the need to *‘re-educate ourselves to slow, slow down’* (21Nov2014, 16:114) which links to Mary’s earlier description that they need to learn how to *“just let it be there but come back here”* to oneself (29Nov2013,

Mary:287). Carol distinguishes between getting back to oneself as part of the process of Gance (reflection-in-action) and being swamped by “*self-consciousness*” (21Nov2014, Carol:292), the difficulties of reflection-in-action Described above, whilst ‘getting back to oneself’ resonates with her experience on the Sound Walk which, like Jason, she described in terms of a “*rhythm*”, “*like a mindfulness meditation kind of thing*” (21Nov2014, Carol:214). Mary agrees contrasting this with her usual “*life*” of “*one noise from the moment I open my eyes to the minute I shut my eyes*” (21Nov2014, Mary:220) and competing pulls on how she ought to spend her time (21Nov2014, Mary:222), and Carol describes a Sound Walk moment when she was “*both in [the moment] and enjoying it and then just sort of breathing*” (21Nov2014, Carol:292), which for Jason was the experience of “*just be[ing]*” (21Nov2014, Jason:291). Clare thus describes it as “*more than a Sound Walk, it was ‘all your senses’ walk*” (21Nov2014, Clare:247) whilst emphasising that what made it significant was doing this with others because it meant that the activity remained purposeful (21Nov2014, Clare:266). In a later RPRG and talking about the facilitation of reflection-in-action, Geoff talks about a book with “*practices in it [that] help you*” to deal with ‘*tension and stress*’ (4Apr2015, Geoff:61). Asking them to consider if those experiences have application to professional practice, Geoff speaks of “*taking the time, knowing you need to take the time to just analyse*” (4Apr2015, Geoff:65) which he names “*mindfulness*” (4Apr2015, Geoff:61, Geoff:65); Sadie of “*giving yourself time to get that gut feeling of how you’re feeling stops you making assumptions*” (21Nov2014, Sadie:310); and Carol of memories being triggered that were

311	Carol	<i>very much in the back of my mind at the moment but I’ve not brought them forward to think about. But that’s giving me time to sort of do the whole lot, whereas normally you’d be so busy you’d just be ploughing on</i>
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(21Nov2014).

More, Dasia speaks of “*memory in the body*” (7Mar2015, Dasia:235). Conversation follows:

238	Jason	<i>Memory in the body?</i>
239	Dasia	<i>Memory in the body, OK, you know our experiences are stored in lots of ways not just in our heads</i>
240	Rob	<i>...and you can never let anything go ‘coz something may bring it to the fore. It’s just about trying to ...</i>
241	Jason	<i>...manage it somehow...</i>
242	Geoff	<i>... slot it further down so it appears less I suppose if it’s a negative thing, we feel it’s a negative thing.</i>

(7Mar2015)

Here, then, they are Describing engaging with the Glance of reflection-in-action as involving slowing down, switching out outside influences; and listening without having a conversation with it in one's head, so being both *in* an experience that is embodied, but not swamped by it, of focusing on breath and all the senses, which they relate to 'mindfulness', 'gut feeling' and 'memory in the body'. Thus, in further illumination of the threshold concept of Glance they are adding flesh to it, literally.

However, initially they Describe how to reflect-in-action through the domesticating established frame of typical practices of reflective practice. For example, in her second RPRG Jeanette talks of reflection-in-action in terms of writing a diary albeit doing so during the practice itself, but it is *"not practical to carry a diary around with you"* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:6). Geoff shares similarly (6Dec2014, Geoff:120) but this means the experience *"get[s] lost very quickly"* (6Dec2014, Geoff:124), shared also by Jason: *"How do you do that because if I don't write it down at the time I forget"* (6Dec2014, Jason:121). Yet Geoff says if he writes and *"start[s] to think about all these things"* during interacting with a client he would no longer be *"listening properly"* (10Jan2015, Geoff:200), a *"phasing out"* (10Jan2015, Geoff:202) that he compares to becoming distracted during a lecture (10Jan2015, Geoff:206). Debra says *"Yeah, which is the downside isn't it of reflecting in the moment"* (10Jan2015, Debra:203), to which Jason and Rob agree (10Jan2015, Jason:204, Rob:205).

Here, then, whilst Glance enables a reimagining of possibility for the percipients, their experiences also point to confusion about *how* to engage with it, reinforcing reflective practice as synonymous with reflection-on-action and writing even when explicitly discussing reflection-in-action.

However, getting to that place opened a door to wider Describing, Jeanette asking *"How can we do it differently, how can we do reflection-in-the-moment?"* (28Nov 2013, Jeanette:74), with Becky adding *"it's such a complex thing"* (28Nov2013, Becky:76). Answers come from the percipients, practical ideas and strategies for Glance.

10.1 Noticing the now

Rob speaks of the importance of *"learn[ing] technique to notice the now"* (30May2015, Rob:33), which Geoff amends to *"having the skill to notice the now"* (30May2015, Geoff:34). In the RPRG of 18 October 2014, Jason says *"If we could improve our focus in the act [of practice] that should help me, well us, to deal with the moment or better..."*

(18Oct2014, Jason:55) and Debra interrupts with *“...and not how to learn about writing about it, tell a story about it, like how is that helping”* (18Oct2014:56). Dasia’s earlier query about the extent to which ability to Glance is related to an individual’s personality leads into dialogue about whether Glance is innate or a skill that can be learned, but in any case they conclude its facilitation would *“give [them] the experience, the knowledge and the experience”* such that professional practice in the moment would be less likely to be *“personal reaction without thinking, unconscious reactions* (7Mar2015, Dasia:20). In other words, with the *“knowledge and background”* of Glance/reflection-in-action encouraged through its facilitation a practitioner will inquire *“deeper”*, building their *“conscious reaction. He know what he’s doing, why he is reacting in that way to this situation” [sic]* (7Mar2015, Dasia:23). So whilst Describing differences in how individuals *“process the Glance”* (7Mar2015, Geoff:42) they also need *“a tool-kit or making people aware or teaching people for Glance”* (7Mar2015, Geoff:207) which will *“enable”* them to identify approaches for Glance of reflection-in-action (6Dec2014, Jason:94), which, in turn, means they will grow in Glance.

10.2 Tool-kit for Glance: reflective scraps

So far, then, this ‘tool-kit’ requires ways to notice the now, i.e. ways to make moments of fleeting interruption (linked to mindfulness), in ways that respect individual difference, and discussion around what happens in those moments (linked to memory in the body).

In the RPRG of 21 November 2014, Sadie, Carol, Mary, Jason and Debra are talking about their experiences of activities I had introduced to the RPRGs and how they have applied that to their professional practice. Building on the *‘skill of moving in and moving out’*, Carol describes it as the ability *“to focus on one thing but we also need to keep our peripheral vision alive, both metaphorically and literally”* (21Nov2014, Carol:47) because her attention can be easily drawn to a particular significant experience thus *‘blinking’* (21Nov2014, Carol:47) everything else. At the same time, attempts to ‘focus in’ can be hindered by distractions, whether from others, or context (space and place), personal associations, and their own senses (21Nov2014, Clare:247), as well as from *“really giving yourself a hard time, self-critical all the time...”* (21Nov2014, Jason:346) which can *“play on your mind”* (Mary:350) long after the original interaction (21Nov2014, Debra:355, Clare:357). All this *blocks* them from noticing the now in the moment (21Nov2014, Carol:353).

Jason offers one idea for a tool-kit for Glance:

362	Jason	<i>So, like just watching all of that somehow. [unclear words] write it down, just words or whatever and then just put it away, a quick Glance and put it away and look at it later and go 'oh that's right'.</i>
363	Carol	<i>And then you get rid of it from being on your mind?</i>
364	JT	<i>So, you are saying that instead of getting caught into all of that you could capture it, catch yourself in the act, in the act of something really playing on your mind, write a word, write, there it is ...</i>
365	Carol	<i>...better than thinking about it all the time. You just write a word, it doesn't have to be like reams of it just like, so like 'useless' and that's it done. And then just forget about it, 'that's it, done', you've dealt with it, no need to think about it. I'm starting to do that a little bit, but it's everything you've done, the translation, it's, you've got to think about it as a process – it's gone from here, out of here, let's close the book, just fast, like a quick look at it, let it go</i>

(21Nov2014).

Jason suggests

371	Jason	<i>you could just put it on a post-it note and shove it in a book and then at some point have a look at all the words and see 'well what does that say' you know. If they're all 'crap', 'useless' 'rubbish', well where does all those come from, what do they get, give birth to? You know what is that all about?"</i>
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(21Nov2014)

I offer that they could try that out but in the following RPRG, Jason, Debra and Geoff share that they had approached it much like a diary, so after an event and this means in the meantime *"life gets in"* the way (6Dec2014, Geoff:156). Geoff also adds that he had not tried it out because I had not insisted that he does so (6Dec2014, Geoff:151), leading to discussion about agency and responsibility, essentially, who the *"habit"* (Jason:70, Rob:178, Rob:189) of reflective practice is for, whether lecturer (or researcher) or themselves. However, I take their idea of writing single words - as well as their discussion of agency and responsibility - into my teaching and tell the percipients in the last RPRG about how that had gone. Dasia had not been present so I recap their idea by referring to it as *'keeping reflective scraps'* rather than a diary or journal (30May, JT:42), which Debra qualifies as *"one or two words"* (30May2015, Debra:48) *"in the moment"* (30May2015, Debra:48) and I concur, *"Exactly, a scrap"* (30May2015, JT:49). I explain that *"anything they do with [those] after is something else, it might be important or helpful but it is something else"* (30May2015, JT:42), encompassing Geoff's 'hindsight Gaze', which Rob describes as *"...building something up, building it up..."* (30May2015, Rob:143). In that way Geoff says *"you could get that feeling in the moment and then later add another thought about that feeling..."* (30May2015, Geoff:147). Because of the *'quality and nature'* of that process he

describes this as an entirely different experience to typical diary writing where he is *“telling a story, telling specific parts, like an essay, it becomes more unnatural, bringing in theory, it takes the magic of the reflection out”* (30May2015, Geoff:43). To illustrate, Debra describes her experience of a young woman she works with that *“winds me up, she grinds on me...[...]... there’s just something about her that grates me”* (30May2015, Debra:52). I ask *“So how do you use your diary with this?”* (30May2015, JT:53), and conversation follows:

54	Debra	<i>Well I just explain what happened, like that</i>
55	JT	<i>How would it be if you wrote a scrap about ‘grating’, its quality and nature right in the moment</i>
56	Geoff	<i>Trying to get that, so ‘grating’, not describing the whole thing, that’s the thing isn’t it?</i>
57	Rob	<i>Yeah, can you notice that</i>

(30May2015)

Here, then, coming out of the percipient lived experiences are ideas that work as an alternative to diary writing that I named ‘reflective scraps’. It works with reflection-in-action, capturing Glances in the moment, *and* can be part of reflection-on-practice through ‘hindsight Gaze’. It is a process that allows for ‘noticing’ all ‘that’ is in a moment in practice.

10.3 Tool-kit for Glance: alternative reflective scraps

In relation to not being able to use a diary in the moment Jeanette talks of *“captur[ing] her practice with some sort of voice”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:4) as this would enable her to be *“voicing exactly the moment”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:8). For instance, she says if she *“could speak, take a photo [...] at the time, you can get it”* and then look at the photo or listen to the recording afterwards,

151	Jeanette	<i>even if not in the moment coz it’s not appropriate, you could get it [...] very quickly, afterwards, as soon as you can, you know, you can find places and times, and that would make it all more meaningful</i>
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(29Mar2014).

It contrasts sharply with her ‘words in pink’ experience of reflective practice earlier in this thesis. She experiments by using a digital recorder and lapel microphone in practice but the organisation was *“quite wary of it”* so she carried it out *“just after”* instead but when listening back it still felt that *“something gets lost in translation [...], something gets lost”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:2). I asked for her *“sense of what gets lost”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:3), and she explains *“being there you’ve got that sense but as soon as you are talking about it”* afterwards it is different, accompanying that with an example of talking *“about body language”* not being the same as *“that sense”* of the actual experience

(29Mar2014, Jeanette:4). She also tried taking a photo in combination with the digital recorder. She describes a moment *“when talking to [a client which] was just exasperating”* and used her phone camera to take a picture of her own face as well as immediately record her felt experience of ‘exasperating’, and put together *“that got it”*. Trying that combination again later she says *“it didn’t matter if there was 10 minutes of words”*, it was the image in the moment that *“felt more real, kinda more real, closer to that moment...it’s like that moment it was how I felt so if I look at my face and the words behind it together that kind of gave me that real sense”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:6). She explains this is because *“I could have taken a picture”* of the people she had been interacting with *“but that wasn’t it, the sense, it was me, you know, the sense was with me, within me, they were the focus for it but that was me, so the whole feeling”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:8). To underscore that experience she contrasts it with keeping a reflective diary: reflection-in-action is *“not a story”*, you can’t *“tell yourself anything, it’s like a real moment”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18); she can’t *“down play it”* or *“make it look better than it was”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18), and she doesn’t have to *“dredge”* through *“layers”* in order to *“get to any reflection”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:22). Instead *“well to be honest it was like that was there that and there that was”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18), *“with the picture and the words you are right there”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:22), a more *“relaxed way for reflecting”* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:18) but then says

58	Jeanette	...but like in a story you can give more away, you can unpick, take you places where a picture couldn’t, more out of my control, like with the camera I knew what face to pull and someone else can look at it and say ‘well you do look a bit angry’ and I can say ‘well no I wasn’t’ but with a story well that could be taken in all sorts of places
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(29Mar2014).

I was not clear here whether she was saying writing on practice can be ‘taken’ by her as its author in a range of surprising (positive) ways, or whether others reading it could interpret it in whatever way they choose, this being out of her control - so I ask her *“which is the diary like, the camera or the story?”* (29Mar2014, JT:59). She replies *“I know how to write [a diary], you know, I know how to do it good”* so even when her supervisor suggested that she *“leave it messy”*, i.e. uncensored and unedited, she only did it once. Although she could *“see the benefit”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:144), that leaving her diary messy would be *“a transformatory process”* (28Nov2013, Jeanette:114), she did not repeat it because she prides herself on *“get[ing] good grades”* for which she needs to be *“in control, can control*

it, at the end of it” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:60), using the example “when I am writing I can get the word right” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:64).

Thus, it would appear when writing a diary she can control the direction of its story whereas digitally capturing her felt sense in a moment through recording words and an image is more dynamic. In fact, she refers to being able to “talk the hind legs off a donkey” compared to digitally recording words in the moment being “trying to be real” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:64). When “trying to be real, to get to the realness in those recordings [she] stumble[s] a lot” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:64), whereas in her diary she will use a different word even though it is not “the right word, it’s not what I meant but its job done” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:66). Later she adds

103	Jeanette	if you’re thinking back on an event you can go ‘yeah I can remember that’ but when it’s on a voice recorder you’ve got your actual voice and you pick up your tension, and where you are stuttering and with the picture too you’ve got the emotions so it’s real, like so it’s real it’s as real as I think I can get it then that’s really helped, like it’s really helped me in my third year, so in that sense for me it’s working, do you know what I mean, it’s a more immediate process, I would not say it’s an easier process, because I’m putting my soul out there, but its more immediate... if you can understand it as a positive thing then it makes the process easier too as well
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(29Mar2014).

10.4 Capturing moments of practice

Therefore a ‘reflective scrap’ can be a single word scribbled down fast or a photo and/or digital recording. Perhaps choice links to the percipients point that different people will meaningfully engage with reflection-in-action/Glance in different ways. As Geoff puts it, “not everyone is ever going to be able to process the Glance” in the same way “because it’s just not the way their mind processes information” (7Mar2015, Geoff:42). To illustrate Becky says that she would find digitally recording her reflections in a moment to capture her practice “a real struggle” (29Mar2014, Becky:61), “embarrassing” (29Mar2014, Becky:105) and therefore it “may not go anywhere” (29Mar2014, Becky:61). Yet she posits

61	Becky	it probably would be in some ways more truthful rather than writing it down and embellishing it all over the place, but there’s something about my brain and writing, whereas talking ties my brain in a knot
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(29Mar2014).

She wonders if she is “assuming that I’m not going to be able to do it, so it might be good to try” (29Mar2014, Becky:64) which in turn “might give me confidence to speak more, or just

experiment with expressing myself" (29Mar2014, Becky:107); and Geoff's experience of becoming aware of reflection in the moment was that it is a long slow process, that he had to deliberately "*stick with it*" for "*four or five years*" but eventually it "*becomes your instinct*" (10Jan2015, Geoff:109).

Whether reflective scraps are written, vocal or visual, the importance is in the "*experience of trying to capture the moment*" (29Mar2014, Jeanette:100) because this "*puts the soul back*" into reflective practice (29Mar2014, Jeanette:10). I ask if her own experiments with capturing the moment "*get[s] to the soul*" (29Mar2014, JT:98) and she replies "*maybe it doesn't matter if it's not the actual moment but it gets you to think about the moment more, like that's the point anyway isn't it*" (29Mar2014, Jeanette:100) and Becky agrees, "*reflective practice is not the thing, the practice is, so if it gets us to think about our practice more than its working*" (29Mar2014, Becky:101). As Rob puts it

40	Rob	<i>If we're going to make anything any different we've got to do it in the moment, we can't you know afford to steam off and then put things down in a diary, blah blah, you know, we can't do that all the time. We've got to get it in the moment. So they're still, yeah, they're important but different. You're talking about reacting, so seeing that moment of reaction</i>
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(7Mar2015)

11 Glimpse, Gaze.... and Leaving Go

During their Describing of Glimpse and Gaze a further 'insight cultivator' emerges. Whilst referring to the '*quick look and let it go*' (21Nov2014, Carol:365) of reflective scraps, the 'letting it go' element gathers momentum, taking on life of its own.

To begin with, as part of his experiences of reflection-in-action Geoff speaks of how important it is that he "*get[s] absorbed in*" other things (4Apr2015, Geoff:31), so "*unconsciously... looking for things to get absorbed in*" (4Apr2015, Geoff:138), shared by Rob:

34	Rob	<i>When I do jewellery bits or 'coz I'm short-sighted anyone gives me the little screw that falls out your glasses or the little pin on your watch, I love doing that.</i>
35	JT	<i>Yeah, yeah.</i>
36	Rob	<i>Just doing something different with my head.</i>
37	Geoff	<i>Yeah.</i>
38	Rob	<i>And you have to sit down and concentrate on it and not go quickly 'that's the end of that'. It's just like that's what I'm zoned in on that.</i>
39	JT	<i>So it is all you are doing, yeah?</i>

40	Rob	<i>And I think years ago it might have been I'll sit down and do a jigsaw, which I haven't done for a little while now. But it's the kind of thing, it's not reflecting, it is just zoning in on nothing and just flushing everything through</i>
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(4Apr2015).

'Letting it go', as initially termed, therefore can be associated with doing something different 'in one's head, by zoning in on it but also engaging the body, an embodied act that serves to flush everything through. Rob refers to this as his "therapy" (4Apr2015, Rob:32), a term that Dasia later adopts when referring to baking:

136	Dasia	<i>For me I find it quite therapeutic. Because the cake 'coz it isolate me and makes me concentrate on one thing and forget all negative things around me. And when I finished I look at the negative in another way because I take a step away or I separate myself. And I look at in fresh perspective</i>
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(4Apr2015).

At that point in the RPRG I highlight what they have been saying and in doing so underscore 'letting it go' as a new 'insight cultivator':

139	JT	<i>[...] You're digging something completely new here. It's like something about the 'not moment'. You were talking about Gaze after the event when you're really pulling something about and you're talking about Glance in the moment, but, do you see, you are also talking about something about 'not the moment'. Do you see what I mean? You are saying that this too is important when, I think you said flushing earlier, and zoning in on something through not concentrating, not thinking about practice</i>
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(4Apr2015)

Discussion follows:

140	Jason	<i>That's post - you're talking about post-moment of action?</i>
141	JT	<i>Well more you were talking about 'not moment'?</i>
142	Jason	<i>Ah okay.</i>
143	JT	<i>You are baking a cake, you're doing your thing, you are doing a jigsaw, or I go for a run, but it's not a moment 'cause we're letting everything, what did you call it? It feels like you've washed through, flushed through..</i>
144	Rob	<i>...Oh it's my therapy.</i>
145	JT	<i>Yes, you called it that and you described it as flushed through or something..</i>
146	Geoff	<i>..Flushed, yes, flushed.</i>
147	Rob	<i>I generally call it my therapy. So it's like everything sort of flushes, is flushed through, yeah I will really concentrate but everything kind of you know I sort of get to the end and that was my connection. It's like it doesn't matter what terrible thing has happened because now I'm looking at it differently. So there's when we Glance and also when we Gaze at it really hard and then</i>

		<i>we all go 'oh yeah', and there are things when we're doing something that's completely different, distracts us but it's really important...</i>
148	Jason	<i>..Subconscious kind of distillation.</i>
149	JT	<i>OK! So this is a thing...</i>
150	Rob	<i>...That's what I, when I'm making, doing something else it's then, and you think of something else and then you get to the other end and you go 'well it couldn't have been important 'coz I've forgotten' [laughs]. But it was important at the point, you know.</i>

(4Apr2015).

Discussion becomes general so at that point I bring it back by summing up where it had got to:

161	JT	<i>So, the Gaze, Glance and the 'flushing it through' or the ...</i>
162	Rob	<i>You need a 'g' word then don't you?</i>
163	JT	<i>... yeah that's it, we do we need a 'g' word [laughs]</i>
164	Rob	<i>...'Flush', no....</i>
165	JT	<i>...Oh that would be great I see can a model coming on! [laughter]...</i>
166	Rob	<i>...Synonyms for 'flush'... [laughter]</i>
167	Geoff	<i>Yeah.</i>

(4Apr2015)

To facilitate deeper Description, I remind they have talked about “*flushing through, but also automatic pilot*” and ask “*Are they the same, or different, or linked?*” (4Apr2015, JT:188). Geoff feels that this would be a “*very personal experience*” (4Apr2015, Geoff:189) to which Jason adds “*So sometimes it could be flushing through and sometimes automatic pilot. It depends on what happens after..*” (4Apr2015, Jason:192) and Geoff interjects “*... or if what you were doing before is personally important*” (4Apr2015, Geoff:193) but then confuses it with being distracted whilst trying to concentrate on something (4Apr2015, Geoff:151), a process that Rob refers to as a ‘*brain jump*’ (4Apr2015, Rob:154) although offering that he keeps a notebook to “*park*” such thoughts so he is able to resume focus (4Apr2015, Rob:158). But in the next and final RPRG Rob returns to ‘letting it go’ in its meaning of ‘not the moment’ and says that he had been thinking about what to call it. He explains it is “*not 'letting go' because that sounds like you are doing it deliberately and we were saying about not doing it deliberately*” (30May2015, Rob:5), a “*stand[ing] back away from stuff and hav[ing] a brain wash, a mind wash, just clear it...*” (30May2015, Rob:7). Debra had not been present at the previous two RPRGs and is confused, interrupting Rob with “*...I'll do anything to not reflect on things....*” (30May2015, Debra:8)... “*like a task avoidance kind of thing*” (30May2015, Debra:10), to which, and significantly, Geoff responds “*...no, that's*

reflective practice, avoiding reflective practice” (30May2015, Geoff:11). Geoff, Rob and Dasia then Describe the new emerging ‘insight cultivator’ further:

12	Geoff	<i>...it’s kind of doing the dishes, and cogs just go ‘click’, and suddenly...</i>
13	Dasia	<i>...so it’s not doing something to distract or put off something...</i>
14	Rob	<i>...its like having a brain wash...</i>
15	Geoff	<i>...doing something completely different, not consciously to do that thing necessarily, and something entirely different</i>
16	Rob	<i>...and something clicks, so not working on something but something works...</i>

(30May2015)

At this point I offer

17	JT	<i>...and maybe just ‘leaving go’, so taking time out, whether or not something clicks, you were saying that it was important in its own right, or your ‘brain wash’ [Rob]. So, the three things, Glance, Gaze, and Leaving Go? Or Brain Wash?”</i>
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(30May2015).

Rob replies, speaking of *“hitting that point when your mind wanders away from those thoughts and you’re able to relax...so the mind wandering away”* (30May2015, Rob:18).

Debra checks *“...so start to think about something else and suddenly it makes more sense, that’s it?”* (30May2015, Debra:21). In answer Rob describes the process as:

23	Rob	<i>[...] the other things that you might be doing might have a tiny splinter of an aspect that might relate to what it was, so not deliberately, or maybe it is, but that’s not why you are doing it, but suddenly you are thinking how does that relate to it, so you find yourself at a certain place and you start to think ‘how come I ended up here’ and then you go ‘ah yes because it’s a focal point’ and ‘focal point’ is relevant to the thing you had gone away from, so, you know, it might just spin things [...]</i>
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(30May2015).

Dasia sums this up as it enabling *“coming at things with fresh mind”* (30May2015, Dasia:29), speaking of getting *“blocked”* so *“it needs time, your brain saying it needs time to organise things and when you do that it’s like its ready”* (30May2015, Dasia:29). Rob replies,

30	Rob	<i>Mr Muscle brain cleaner! [laughter]</i>
31	Dasia	<i>A fresh brain, you can see things clearer</i>

(30May2015)

Thus the ‘insight cultivator’ of Leaving Go is *not* engaging in the Gaze and Glance of reflection-on or -in action; it is involvement in a tangibly different activity or no activity such that the mind wanders, an alternative absorption that flushes or washes thoughts and feelings through, and as a result a student/practitioner might return freshly at something in

their practice that they was previously blocked: by *not* working on something a block is cleared and/or seeing is clearer. This is not via deliberately setting about a different task, nor is it about merely getting distracted from ones focus, but the significance of realising, naming and valuing Leaving Go. In the meantime, I had explored their Describing of Leaving Go to see if it connected with anything established in mainstream literature on reflective practice. I share (clumsily!) how this had produced nothing, although

32	JT	<i>literature on creativity, so there's stuff to do with performance theory and a creative act, the creative act of putting things down to give space for those, you said it, cogs to go click, and the things we do as practitioners are creative acts aren't they, always creating in the moment</i>
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(30May2015).

This was the final scheduled RPRG, therefore Leaving Go had been given life by the percipients as a third dimension to Glance and Gaze but there was no time for further exploration in the primary research period during which it may – or may not – have grown through their Descriptions of their lived experiences of reflective practice and become a third ‘threshold concept’.

12 ‘Journey-man-woman’ reflective practitioners

Being the final RPRG we reviewed the research process. In that context Rob mentions that on his *“father’s birth certificate it says his father was a ‘journeyman boot maker”* (30May2015, Rob:235). Not knowing that phrase I ask if it means he was a *“travelling salesman making or mending boots?”* (30May2015, JT:236). Geoff explains *“No, I’m a journeyman [names trade], it’s like in history it meant you had completed your full apprenticeship, you had made that journey”* (30May2015, Geoff:237). Conversation follows:

239	Rob	<i>...so that make us journeymen reflectors then [laughter]</i>
240	Debra	<i>....and women! [laughter]</i>
241	Geoff	<i>Yes, that’s it, journey men and women reflectors</i>
242	JT	<i>Lovely, journey men and women reflectors right to the end [laughter] [...]</i>

(30May2015).

Even so, and poignantly with regards to their experiences of reflective practice, Geoff worries that by referring to themselves as ‘Journey-men-and-women-reflectors’ they would be staking a claim in its engagement, which could come across as arrogant (30May2015, Geoff:117), and Rob worries about it inferring expertise (30May2015, Rob:114). To this I respond that the journey *“is about knowing yourself, not saying expert, or not expert, but just knowing, and being able to know yourself* (30May2015, JT:118), to which Rob agrees,

saying *"In order to know we need to name"* (30May2015, Rob:119) and Geoff concurs adding *"if you know what it is you do, all the little, the very little things that you do, then you can know"* (30May2015, Geoff:124).

Thus, finally I returned to the transcripts to consider facilitating the journey of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go from the percipients expressed experiences.

12.1 Facilitating the journey: percipients expressed experiences

The percipients are clear that they want something that enhances their reflection-in-action – or, as I Describe it, to grow their Glances – to support them in their ‘journey’. Along with a tool-kit for this they want some kind of ‘input’ that is also modelled in action. They want to know how to notice, pay attention, interrupt, in the moment of practice without becoming distracted or blinkered, but they also do not want to become paralysed by the intensity of that action in the moment. The Trappings of one’s job as well as the imposed routines of accepted practices of reflective practice, i.e. reflection-on-action, provides familiarity and safety, but the percipients want support to engage with the *"tiny"* and *"fleeting"* rather than only the *"quite significant"* (29Nov2013, Sadie:86) and indeed, whilst acknowledging The Trappings, they want to be able to approach practice ‘fresh’, to create it. Their contention is that current understanding and practices of reflective practice do not facilitate this. The slow incremental ‘breaking in’ to adopt and adhere to accepted practises means that the ‘soul’ of reflective practice, its possibilities as well as that of potential professional practice, get ‘lost’ in ‘translation’.

They are clear that enhancing their ability to Glance will take time because it is a ‘complex thing’ and they recognise that it requires them to ‘make themselves make that moment’, a *"real slow process to start with"* (7Mar2015, Geoff:32) that is *"hard to pick up"* (4Apr2015, Geoff:9), but *"once you get the handle on it, it actually changes your approach to everything if you want it to. So it is about that quicker reflection"* (4Apr2015, Geoff:6). Jason agrees, *"like learning a technique, it’s difficult at the beginning but when it becomes part of your life, part of your, you use it in every single aspect of your life"* (4Apr2015, Jason:10). As Geoff puts it, *"it becomes a natural thing, most of the time"* (7Mar2015, Geoff:34).

Sadie says that the more facilitators of reflective practice *"talk to people"* about aporia and *"about how they are gonna work with that, the more it might help them in these moments"* (29Nov2013, Sadie:86). The percipients have also spoken of facilitators needing to be aware of potential ‘knock-on effects’ of reflection-in-action; of individual personalities,

preferences and life experiences; and the risk of it becoming tuning out and ‘detached’ rather than tuning and connected. In sum the facilitation of Gance would need to be thoughtful, skilled and prepared for a range of different start points and processes. This is important because, as Jeanette and Becky describe, it will be about ‘*unpicking who you are*’ (29Mar2014, Jeanette:117), of your “*inner self coming out*” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:115), such that I propose I would need to “*pre-warn people*” and “*provide a safety net or some tasks to engage in that provides a platform to stand on*” (29Mar2014, JT:118) from which they can build. Jeanette concurs adding this would be important because unlike current mainstream and typical practices of reflective practice, Gance is like “*opening yourself up raw*” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:119). Indeed, the percipients are clear: facilitating Gance, as well as Leaving Go and a re-imagined Gaze will require clear and supportive ‘*instruction, guidance and lessons*’ (6Dec2014, Rob:492) but, importantly, these must not take the shape, imposition and power of ‘breaking in’ and Identify-Of, so not a process of input where they passively learn and perform technique. Whilst it needs to “*fit*” (7Mar2015, Geoff:217) with the “*protocols and the boundaries... laws and different regulations*” (7Mar2015, Jason:216 & Jason:218) of the organisation in which they are working, it requires individual student/practitioner motivation through a process that supports and promotes them to “*feel ready for change*” (4Apr2015, Geoff:21) and “*commit to do it, dedicated to do it*” (4Apr2015, Rob:30), even when, or perhaps especially because it won’t “*work every time, of course it doesn’t [...] you might, you know, still miss things*” (4Apr2015, Geoff:13).

Exploring this further, in the RPRG of 29 March 2014 and playing devil’s advocate, I point out that their valuing and signifying of Gaze, Gance and Leaving Go had come from their *poor* experiences of current practices of reflective practice so would facilitating it differently from the outset of their higher education programmes “*be taking that process of experience and development away?*” (29Mar2014, JT:138), a question summed up by Becky as “*does it rob them (i.e. future students) from that process?*” (29Mar2014, 3:139). In response, Jeanette and Becky, are very clear: if they had started from where they are now in their understanding of reflective practice (in light of the RPRGs) they would be “*putting so much into it at some many different levels*” (29Mar2014, Becky:143). To provoke further Description I ask:

145	JT	[...] I was thinking when you were describing the first year, like new friends and learning how to write an essay, so much going on, should we even ask people, first years, to be reflecting, reflective practice, have they got enough going on, and then maybe they wouldn’t approach it as just
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		<i>another of the many things they have to learn to do, to do, do you see what I mean? What do you think?</i>
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(29Mar2014)

In answer Jeanette replies that reflective practice “*should*” be included from the beginning of a higher education programme so that students:

147	Jeanette	<i>[understand] it's just different but equally important right at the start, coz it's not separate is it, I think the opposite, make it be equally significant, it can't be stressed enough, reflection's important, but not in the way, like 'reflection's important, there's the template for it'</i>
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(29Mar2014)

So, rather than “*devalu[ing] it*” by making it be a “*task to do*” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:149), a “*chore, job done*” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:151) inevitably approached through the mindset of just another “*deadline*” (29Mar2014, Becky:155), the facilitation of Gance, Leaving Go, and a different kind of Gaze would “*make [reflective practice] all more meaningful*” (29Mar2014, Jeanette:151, Jeanette:154). Jason and Geoff’s response takes a broader frame, of how it’s about “*how to teach them emotional intelligence, how to get them to sort of think about how their emotions affect what they do and that sort of thing*” (7Mar2015, Jason:194) by “*step[ping] back*” and “*think[ing] a bit deeper*” (4Apr2015, Jason:81; Geoff:74). More generally in this regard Jason, Geoff, Rob and Dasia speak of needing a ‘*simplified way to direct*’ people (4Apr2015, Geoff:21) and “*distil*” all that has emerged through their RPRGs “*into one*” (4Apr2015, Rob:58) through clear and coherent approaches based on experiential discovery as “*early*” as possible (4Apr2015, Geoff:27) which ‘*gives them the base*’ (4Apr2015, Rob:24), to be ‘*built up, improved or reinforced*’ (4Apr2015, Geoff:27) throughout the higher education programme.

12.2 Facilitating the journey: connected and interwoven Gaze, Gance, and Leaving Go

In the RPRG of 7 March 2015 Geoff, Rob, and Dasia stress that this needs to be more imaginative and creative than current facilitation practices, which I sum up as “*how to enable people to be more conscious in the Gaze as well as Glances*” (7Mar2015, JT:29). To illustrate, in contrast to the controlled, prescribed, assessed and judged process of current reflective practice, Dawn speaks of “*truly creative artists, musicians, actors, creative people*” (14Nov2013, Dawn:69) who are “*in the moment, and its mojo isn’t it*” (14Nov2013, Dawn:69) which is “*energy and passions and alertness, being on the ball, right there*” (14Nov2013, Dawn:71). Jeanette also speaks about creativity. Unlike “*normal reflection*” where “*you write something anything and you’re told how to write it, things, like you’re*

learning to write an essay" (29Mar2014, Jeanette:144), she talks of *"the importance of the creative mind"* (29Mar2014, Jeanette:144). Creativity enables them to see *"how past experience shapes [...] beliefs"* (7Mar2015, Jason:221), at *"how that affects the decisions you're making in the moment"* (7Mar2015, Jason:225 & Jason:233), therefore a creative, imaginative Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go bringing energy, passion and alertness to its processes. The percipients have also emphasised how *'hindsight Gaze'* would be about explicitly identifying domesticating discourses in their written accounts, paying attention to where they have adopted and adhered to them.

Therefore, in contrast to literature that explores reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action as separate, or related but does not explore or theorise that relationship, the percipients Describe Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go as connected and interwoven. In the final RPRG I refer to how I have been acting on their two threshold concepts and one insight cultivator: *"I've started a course, it's a form of therapy but I'm doing it to see how it might work as a form of practice, but it's about noticing feelings before we tell stories about them"*. I pick up on an illustration shared by Debra about a client *'grating'* on her, saying: *"before you've gone 'oh my goodness she's really grating on me' you are noticing before it's become that thing, 'grating', in case you can do something differently with it"* (30May2015, JT:58). Debra replies:

59	Debra	<i>So that would help because otherwise it is grating, grating is a fact, and that's how I treat her, you know, it's really hard, because I'm constantly waiting for her to do something that's, you know how you just don't like people, there's just a clash...</i>
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(30May2015)

The course I was referring to was on Focusing, a phenomenological philosophy and practice created by Eugene Gendlin, which, as will be seen, becomes significant in chapter 5's Narrating of their Describing.

12.3 Facilitating the journey: the research process after-thought

To further consider the facilitation of the journey of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go I looked to percipients expressed experiences of the research process to see if and what that might highlight as relevant to illuminating the radical *'journeying'* of reflective practice.

The percipients speak of the significance of its group dialogue and facilitation, specifically how this had been the ground from which their insight cultivators and threshold concepts had emerged. They compare it to their experience of reflective practice facilitation in their

higher education programmes, speaking of how that was based on the very different process of typical mainstream practices of reflective practice/reflection-on-action, with a very different impact. As reminded earlier, being phenomenological research the broad phenomenon was named by me as researcher, i.e. it was not *any* phenomena but *this* one, thus from the outset focus was overtly and explicitly an exploration of whether there are alternatives to typical mainstream practices of reflective practice. The assertion of percipients and therefore this thesis, is not that they introduced reflection-in-action where it wasn't before, but *their* dialogue in a group, *their* sharing of lived experiences related to the nature and qualities of reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action, *their* queries, confusions, and what it needed to or could be, all led to their 'insight cultivators' of Glimpse, Gaze and Leaving Go, and *their* Describing of Gaze and Glimpse led to those becoming 'threshold concepts'.

The significance of being in a group for "*get[ting] reflection that you can't get out of diary*" was expressed by Joseph in the very first RPRG (14Nov2013, Joseph:10) and reaffirmed by Clare in relation to the Sound Walk. In a later RPRG Becky also talks about the importance of "*dialogue, bringing it all up to the surface, going into an understanding*", and Jeanette agrees adding this was the reason she opted to take part in the research project in the first place (29Mar2014, Jeanette:121). Becky concurs saying that the group is them '*doing critical consciousness*' (29Mar2014:123).

In the final RPRG Geoff says *his* reason for joining was to "*understand about reflective practice and do it differently*" (30May2015, Geoff:210). In answer to whether it had "*been helpful for that*" (30May2015, JT:211) he responds "*O yes, like I did it a college before I came here, and here as well, but this, this has transformed it*" (30May2015, Geoff:212). This, then, involves me, the facilitator of the RPRG dialogues, so I looked to the 13 transcripts with that in mind. Across them I can see myself as a 'journey-woman-reflector' too. It is apparent I was learning how to ask questions that supported exploration of the phenomena whilst maintaining equanimity and equity, without ignoring or pretending that I did not have power, privilege and advantage. I note where I may not have got that balance right. For instance, before the RPRG of the 29th March 2014 I had introduced the idea of writing an account of practice as creative non-fiction, inviting percipients to come prepared with a try-out (sending guidance and a copy of one of my own beforehand to assist). Jeanette came to the RPRG having elected not to do it and explained her reticence, but by the end decided she would give it a go. Although I repeated it "*might not be the thing that works for you*" (29Mar2014, JT:62 & JT:162), given that the other percipients

were doing it, in conjunction with me initiating it and following it up, I now wonder about her experience of that. Indeed, in response to her offer to try the activity I say that doing so “*would be very helpful to me*” (29Mar2014, JT:163). Having been to every other RPRG, after this one Jeanette did not return. She contacted me to let me know she was withdrawing to focus on her dissertation but looking back at all the transcripts another interpretation is my power as lecturer/researcher putting a student/participant under pressure, more so when considered in relation to her expressed experience throughout of wanting to do what is required by those in authority to ‘do well’ and be perceived and judged in such terms. Whatever the reason, applied to considering the facilitation of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go it points up the power of facilitators - and groups – in relation to influence and compliance.

Extending that observation, prompted by the notion of journey this time in relation to what comes next as a *result* of the percipients Descriptions, I am mindful of Meyer & Land’s warning that questions should always be asked about *whose* threshold concepts are being applied and how. Whilst Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go are those of the percipients, Meyer & Land caution against threshold concepts being used in ways that produce a “‘totalising’ or colonizing view”, by becoming “a measure” that “exert[s] a ‘normalizing’ function” (Meyer & Land, 2003:10) – essentially taking the form of a new incremental violence of being ‘broken in’. Indeed, perhaps, this could be posited as what happened to Schön’s original threshold concept of *reflective practice* in the first place: rather than being what practitioners *do* as part of their artistry of professional engagement, reflection-on-action with its neglected and under-theorised neighbour of reflection-in-action has become a function that practitioners must develop by *learning* how to do it, and this necessitates *what* it is that they have to do and *how* they have to do it, this all becoming ever more determined, imposed and controlled, a normalising function that is then measured to judge competence. In relation to facilitating the journey of reflective practice, by this argument Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go have vibrancy but should not be applied and utilised in ways that colonise subjective experience.

Finally, I am also clear from looking to the transcripts that initially organising ‘open’ group membership was *not* an effective facilitative process in the journey of reflective practice. In the (academic) year of 2013-2014, out of the total of eight RPRGs six involved new people joining, inevitably meaning those six returned to a Start, with introductions, explanation, and not being able to fully extend or build on what had been discussed and described before. It was of course relevant – it was still research – and brought insight into the

experience of reflective practice as currently practiced. However, percipients also began leaving (Jeanette, Becky, Joseph, Dawn, Sadie, Carol, Mary, Clare), sometimes due to their time at the university coming to an end (Jeanette, Becky) but also, I felt that the group experience was not doing something they needed – it needed – to do. There is no way of knowing if they would have stayed longer had it been a ‘closed’ group – and in fact Sadie, Carol, Mary and Clare left even with the change to a closed group – but it is noticeable that once I ‘closed’ the group to newcomers in 2014 through to the end of the primary research, a total of seven RPRGs, there was a change in depth and nature of exchange. Changes in membership still happened, Sally could not make the first meeting - and then she – and indeed Jack - only came once. But Jason, Debra, Geoff, Rob, and Dasia also started at this time and whilst missing occasionally for other commitments or illness they continued until 30 May 2015. It could be of course that this combination of percipients created a different dynamic, and/or that I had become more confident and rounded in my role. However, when considered in conjunction with their Describing of the significance of group dialogue then closed membership must have relevance. Geoff, for example, speaks of how named experiences could be embedded in *“tak[ing] it forward and remembering it and acting on it”* (6Dec2014, Geoff:600). So whilst closing the group might disadvantage membership inclusivity, those present could take their experiences and ideas forward, to remember and act on them, to embed them. In sum, it made possible the journey that the percipient assert is involved – indeed required – for a radically new reflective practice and for me to facilitate it as a meaningful experience: not having to return to a Start each RPRG meant we could together journey in a more connected way.

13 Describing Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go

- The dominating, even sole emphasis on reflection-on-action in mainstream literature and practice of reflective practice, is Described by the percipients lived experience in terms of a slow incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ to its requirements and expectations. Instead, they signify and value reflection-in-action, Describing this in terms of play, creativity, imagination and aporia. Reflection-in-action was Described as a feeling sense of significant and prescient knowing in the moment, a coalescence, a gelling together in a flash through a process of ‘metaphorical and literal peripheral vision’, a noticing, capturing, interrupting, of a focused breaking practice down in the moment by moving in and moving out whilst also trusting the experience of that process, not knowing its outcome in the moment of that moment, of having no path. It requires from a student/practitioner connection with self, a receptive mind, and connection with others, involving letting go of preconceptions, stereotypes, judgements in the moment, tracking the

shape of their feelings and the effect of that on their interaction, identifying what shaped it in that way and then 'managing' the shape differently.

- Their Describing of Glance became a 'new portal' (cf. Meyer & Land) that enables reflection-in-practice, this being absent from mainstream theory and practice. Glance is a vehicle through which to deepen understanding of the experience and qualities of reflection-in-action. Glance has the quality of a click brought on through a pause, interruption; it is a freezing of time in the moment, a slow moment, a 'hey this is where everything is, where's your head, body and feelings that you are processing in that moment'. It is a quick Glance, watch, pay attention, which brings attention fleetingly to embodied knowing. It is 'that thing that changes you', so 'that moment, that feeling' from moving ones focus in and then out. Glance is a skill and an art involving noticing, interrupting, attending, tuning in, tracking, trusting the experience/process of having no path, working with 'sense, the sense', capturing, 'getting at' the whole of a moment. Glance is embodied and involves memory in the body. It is Described through improvisation, mindfulness and embodied knowing.
- The percipients do not reject reflection-on-action altogether. They Describe a value for some and/or at some times from reflection-on-action. Further, through Describing Glance the threshold concept of Gaze emerges, a vehicle through which to deepen understanding of the experience and qualities of reflection-on-action. Their Describing of Gaze catalyses a more imaginative, creative and dynamic reflection-on-practice that re-imagines and repositions it away from being a slow, incremental violence of being 'broken in'. Gaze is the process of selecting an event/interaction after its happening, that may be big, dramatic or small, but either way the event is the trigger and Gaze is staring at it, to pull some thing/s about it apart and in detail, wondering if you could/should have acted differently, breaking what existed as a complex dynamic whole into small fixed and static pieces for analysis, and, typically, writing that down and 'layering it up' by 'bringing in' experiences and thoughts 'that have occurred' to the Gazer since the selected event, to better 'report' and therefore perform themselves in familiar, acceptable and expected ways as required to those in authority. However, the percipients also Describe instances where Gaze *could* be 'good', that is, if re-imagined and re-positioned as 'hindsight Gaze' where a practitioner writes an account of their practice as one activity, fronting up that this could be fiction, but then as a second activity deliberately returns to it to identify within it their adoption of domesticating discourses, an avenue of reflection on oneself as a reflective *writer* from which one may learn 'something different'.
- In the last two RPRGs a final insight cultivator emerges, research time running out to explore whether it too would become a threshold concept. They spoke of Leaving Go, involvement in a tangibly different activity to the one they were engaged in. They Describe this in terms of mind wandering, absorption that flushes

through and washes or freshens the brain/mind. Leaving Go is not deliberately setting about engaging in something different for this to occur, or merely getting distracted, but they know it has happened because by not working on something something works, clicks, a block is cleared, seeing is clearer.

- They Describe Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go in terms of their distinctive qualities but also at the same time as connected and interwoven *and* that there would be differences in the way that individuals engage in all of them.
- Finally, the percipients Describe what they want or need from facilitation of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go, framing this as a 'journey', but importantly their emphasis here is on the experience as 'journey-men-women'. So, although a 'tool-kit' and 'modelling' will be important for all, alongside cautions about what to pre-empt and look out for they also highlight individual difference both in the nature of that journey and engagement in Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go.

Together, Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go, offer a radical reclaiming and reimagining of reflective practice. This is important. Although I am Describing in this chapter, so making connections between the RPRGs and individual experiences, and in the chapter to follow will Narrate this through connection with theory, I know that Carol's lived experience of 'flash' and 'coalescence', Dasia's 'quick peek, and Jeanette's 'gelling together', for example, will have *different* felt sense physicality, tones, qualities and associations, as well as different dichotomous poles (*cf.* Kelly) that construe what these are not. With more time (indeed such as the time a university degree programme brings, albeit time-limited), as well as noting connections *between* experiences as is the case in this research inquiry, a radical reflective practice that is reclaiming its roots would be able to encourage students to immerse themselves further into their own *distinctive* natures as well.

CHAPTER 5

Narrating

Narrating in this work is neither an “exercise of imagination” (Peters & Besley 2012:119) nor the telling of a story (Cobley, 2014) but a process that connects, frames, and gives expression to that which has been Described. It “draws” the Descriptions of chapter 4 into “a plot, emplotting” them (Peters & Besley 2012:119) through connection with theory. Thus Narrating involves “responsiveness” (2012:119) to what has been Described, therefore “mutual recognition” (2012:119) from the reader and those implicated in the Narrating that it does indeed honour what has been Described. Narrating is a deeply moral undertaking.

1 Introduction

Having Captured theory related to professional practice in order to advance a rich appreciation of reflective practice (chapter 2), chapter 3 Curated its mainstream literature with percipients lived experience of engagement, making possible a depth and breadth of insight into the appropriation of reflective practice, and asserting it to be a ‘battleground’, a site of conflicts’ (*cf.* Taylor *et al*). Chapter 4, Describing, ‘evoked and dwelled’ (*cf.* van Manen) in the percipient experiences from the RPRG transcripts, this offering insight into the reclamation of reflective practice: it brought out their ‘vision of what might be’ (*cf.* Hicks). Now, the focus is Narrating. Narrating connects and frames by ‘drawing into a plot, emplotting’ (*cf.* Peters & Besley) what was Described by identifying connections with theory and the research aims and sub-aims: it Narrates *what* their lived experiences connect *to*.

More precisely, this chapter concerns whether and how their Describing connects to a radical reflective practice, all the while ensuring that it “tell[s the percipients] experience as lived through” (van Manen, 2016:315). As Polkingthorne (2007:476) explains, “Readers should be able to follow the presented evidence and argument enough to make their own judgment as to the relative validity of the claim”. Therefore, validity stems from the integrity of the Narrating.

Framed by critical phenomenology it also needs to have “catalytic” value (Lather, 1986:67). From this perspective it could be that the phenomenological themes and insights only have relevance to the 16 percipients and still be valid – although, just on this van Manen’s (2016:355-6) scrutiny criteria presented in chapter 1 ensure *broader* relevance and trustworthiness, to which Narrating plays an important part. However, it also needs to be a

'catalyst' for action, which for this thesis is the purpose of developing facilitation of reflective practice in higher education programmes.

Therefore, Narrating as worked in this thesis is a deeply respectful and moral endeavour.

Summarising the concluding section of chapter 4, the percipients Describing of reflective practice took the form of:

- Signifying and valuing reflection-in-action, Describing play, creativity, imagination and aporia;
- Articulation of Gaze (reflection-in-action), Described through improvisation, mindfulness, and, embodied knowing; and the need for a re-imagined Gaze (reflection-on-action);
- Introduction of Leaving Go; and,
- The facilitation of the 'journey' of Gaze, Gance and Leaving Go.

The Narrating of this chapter will therefore be structured around each of these in turn, but will end by applying that discussion to revisiting the purpose of reflective practice and its radical roots. Thus, attention now turns to reflection-in-action to explore if and how the percipients Describing connects to theory, by first returning to Schön, and then beyond.

2 Reflection-in-action

Instead of the slow and incremental violence of being 'broken in' to the current mainstream practices of reflective practice and its emphasis on reflection-*on*-practice, the percipients Describing gives prominence to reflection-*in*-action. They speak of the former not supporting or addressing their practice in the "hot action" (Eraut, 1994:53) of professional contexts, the word 'action' having particular significance as will be seen. Indeed, the significance of Professional Practice: Connected Practice shows the extent to which mainstream reflective practice is not fit for the complex and multi-layered nature of professional practice, so whilst, of course, as Schön asserts, some aspects of practice can be met through the 'high ground' of technique, guidelines, and procedures it is in the 'swampy lowlands' where issues and decisions are messy and confusing with no possible 'blueprints and formulae' to guide where a practitioner relies on 'in-the-moment' practice artistry. In fact reflection-in-action is "core" (Finlay, 2008:3), the "artful practice" of professionals (Schön, 1983:19) characterised as the 'art of implementation and improvisation' (Schön, 1987a:13).

Significantly, rather than the artistry of their professional practice being required in the occasional (or even frequent) confusing 'swampy lowland' *situation* as articulated by Schön, the percipients Describe making complex decisions and taking action in contexts that are inherently fluid, confusing and messy *all the time*, exemplifying professional practice as complex action within a "stream-of-consciousness flow" (Lyle, 2002:212). In their expression of this reflection-in-action is Described as a feeling sense of significant and prescient knowing in the moment, a coalescence, a gelling together in a flash through a process involving 'metaphorical and literal peripheral vision', noticing, capturing, interrupting, breaking practice down in the moment by moving focus in and out whilst also trusting the experience of that process, not knowing its outcome in the moment of that moment, of having no path. It requires from a practitioner connection with self, a receptive mind, and connection with others, which involves letting go of preconceptions, stereotypes, judgements in the moment, or tracking the shape and effect of them on the interaction, identifying what shaped it in that way and then 'managing' the shape differently.

'Moment' is pertinent – and moments do not happen *to* the percipients but they make them, fleeting junctures in which they 'pay attention to it now'. But also, by 'moment' the percipients are acknowledging times in their professional practice of *not* moments. 'Not moments' has been understood in different ways. Discussion Curated in chapter 3 established how not reflecting is healthy and appropriate in some practice circumstances. The percipients also Describe how they do not always create moments and would like to become more 'effective' in doing so, as well as more effective *in* their moments. They also Describe 'not moments' in the terms of Leaving Go, but this will be the focus of later Narration.

Narrating this reflection-in-action finds connection with research elsewhere.

Rather than reliance on application of theory alone, Benner (1984) refers to professional practice of nurses in the terms of how they engage promptly, creatively and holistically. Fook *et al* (1997) found that practitioners in a *range* of social professions highly evaluate peers who can adapt in complex situations, work with a range of variables and interests, and respond rapidly with imaginative and resourceful interventions. Fish (1998:123) writes of this as artistry, 'mysterious and ineffable' based on "the kind of knowledge that is endemic in doing" (1998:93), whilst less amorphous, O'Sullivan (2005:222) refers to 'reflective judgment', "the ability to base sound judgements on deep understandings in conditions of uncertainty". Nelson's (2013b:60) "liquid knowledge" referred to in chapter 2

as part of Being Prepared in the heuristic tool Professional Practice: Connected Practice is an elegant epitome of all this.

Yet it is ironic to recall how reflection-in-action is the least theorised element of Schön's work, a fact that has perpetuated in mainstream literature on and in reflective practice. Attempts to address this have for the most part been "incoherent logically and irrelevant practically" (Newman, 1999:154), and "elaboration of the psychological realities" it involves have been missing (Munby & Russell 1989:74, cited in Eraut, 1994:147). Consequently, where reflection-in-action *is* considered, we have seen that it is perceived and approached as *inferior* to reflection-on-action. To illustrate, Zeichner & Liston (1996:45-6) identify five levels of reflection. The first, "rapid reflection", is where practitioners "reflect immediately and automatically while they are acting", the second, "repair", is similar but with a "quick pause for thought". It is not until the final levels of four and five that attention is "systematic and sharply focussed" but attained through reflection *after* the event. Moreover, all levels only involve (and therefore require) cognition and reasoning as the form of knowing. Similarly, Mezirow (1991) distinguishes between 'reflective action', a very brief break in practice to question what is wrong (this being its sole emphasis), whilst 'critical reflection', framed as the superior practice, involves the retrospective questioning of underpinning assumptions and beliefs involved in the action taken.

Could it be that the percipients have got it wrong, that their reflection-in-action is nothing more than their sudden realisation of background cognitive processing involved in routine and automatic reactions, and in any case would never compare in significance nor usefulness to deliberate, disciplined post-practice analysis? Perhaps they are seduced by their own poorly conceived colloquial notions of 'instinct', this being a word they used several times when describing reflection-in-action, seemingly confusing displays of speedy reactions with tacitly wise responses. And if this is the case for them, why not in general? This may explain why reflection-in-action does not feature in a Schönian-inspired reflective practice.

The questions suggest the relationship between reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action needs articulation. In Narrating this, my attention returned to the integral assumption of mainstream conceptualisation of reflective practice discussed earlier in this thesis, that through reflection-on-practice ones in-the-moment engagement *will* inherently and inevitably improve. Drawn out as problematic in that Curation, now in the context of Narrating it can be seen to stem from Schön. He writes that "reflection on knowing-in-

action *goes together* with reflection on the stuff at hand” [emphasis added] (1983:50), framing this within a “constructionist view”: ‘practitioners construct situations of their practice’ that are “rooted” in their “practice worlds” (1987a:36). For Benner (1984) this is *how* nurses become able to understand situations rapidly and holistically, although, and importantly, she argues this to be cumulative, based on years learning The Trappings (in the terms of this thesis) of the profession, adopting and adhering to its practices *including* reflective practice such that one exhibits Identity-Of nursing - or any social profession - through the slow, incremental process of being ‘broken in’. In fact this is why Schön (1987a:36) accentuates the role of the “practicum”, the period of time during which students/practitioners are “initiated into the traditions of a community of practitioners and the practice world they inhabit”, where one

learns their conventions, constraints, languages and appreciative systems, their repertoire of exemplars, systemic knowledge, and patterns of knowing-in-action (1987a:36-7).

It is this cumulative repetition of reflection-on-practice that is assumed to positively affect reflection-in-practice. As argued by Dreyfus (2001) (building on Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) in his seven stages of competence, it is not until the fifth stage of ‘expertise’ that an individual can competently engage with surprises and act appropriately without having to deliberately reflect-on-practice. Indeed, as seen, it is Schön’s (1983) contention that novice practitioners *lack* the ability to know-in-action; they merely apply rules and procedures unthinkingly and need to develop reflection-on-action if they are to become expert – even competent - professionals. He describes this as a “ladder of reflection” (Schön, 1987a:114): by “climbing up the ladder, one makes what has happened at the rung below an object of reflection”, the implication being that at the ‘lowest’ rung there is no reflection-on-action therefore without this one is merely reacting automatically. Dreyfus (2001:48) goes beyond ‘expertise’ with ‘practical wisdom’ as his seventh and final stage of competence, only attained once an individual has been “an apprentice to [their] parents and teachers” for a significant length of time (2001:120). Thus, reflection-in-action is the outcome *of* a disciplined, incremental and successful approach to reflection-on-action over time, again reinforcing reflection-in-action as the inferior of the two, although Usher *et al* (1997:170) go further, contending reflection-in-action to be “little more than accommodative and loses its critical edge”.

A re-examination of Schön’s canonical texts of the 1980’s at the point in which he asserts the significance of reflection-in-action is therefore germane. There he defines it as “central to the art through which practitioners sometimes cope with the troublesome divergent

situations of practice” (Schön, 1983:62), but immediately confounds it with reflection-*on*-action: he writes of “action-present”, the “zone of time in which action can still make a difference”, offering this to be minutes which would equate with ‘in-action’, but then proceeds to add ‘days, weeks, even months’, the timeframe of reflection-*on*-action. He follows this with what he pronounces to be an illustration of a practitioner reflecting-*in*-practice:

He may reflect on the tacit norms and appreciations which underlie a judgement, or on the strategies and theories implicit in a pattern of behaviour. He may reflect on the feeling for a situation which has led him to adopt a particular course of action, on the way in which he has framed the problem he is trying to solve, or on the role he has constructed for himself within a larger institutional context [*sic*] (*ibid*).

This is patently reflection-*on*-action. Another illustration that Schön refers to earlier in the same text is of a baseball pitcher “finding the groove” of practice in their game. First declaring he “do[es] not wholly understand what” ‘finding the groove’ means, he offers that they “are talking about a particular kind of reflection”, a line of analysis that sounds promising. But, he then lists the possibilities of ‘that kind of reflection’, summing that up as “reflection *on* their patterns of action, *on* the situations in which they are performing, and *on* the know-how implicit in their performance” [*emphasis added*] (1983:55). Later he returns again to baseball pitchers, this time contending that “*even if*” reflection-in-action is “feasible” [*emphasis added*], so inferring it may not be, it could be “dangerous” (1983:277): reflection-in-action can “interfere with the smooth flow of action”, the player becoming “paralyse[d]” when what was ‘unconscious is brought to consciousness’ (*ibid*). Schön’s own confusion of reflection-*on* and reflection-*in* practice is strikingly similar to the Curating and Describing, and following Schön, the confusion and perceived inferiority of reflection-*in*-action that follows in mainstream reflective practice theory is hardly surprising. In fact, key writers such as van Manen (1990), Court (1988) and Atherton (2010) go on to assert reflection-*in*-action as a misnomer, and Moon (1999:97) reviews (some) relevant literature and concludes “there is no empirical evidence [for] the existence of a form of reflection that occurs within action”, a condemnation that Eraut (1994:148) lies entirely at the feet of Schön and his lack of “evidence that reflection-*in*-action is occurring”.

Accordingly, it appears that the percipients *are* over-estimating the significance of their reflection-*in*-action. It would also appear that reflection-*in*-action is not qualitatively different to reflection-*on*-action, and the inferior process. In fact, in view of Schön’s theory

it is not even clear that reflection-in-action is a form of reflective practice sufficiently distinct to warrant having its own label. So it appears that the percipients should be directed to turn their attention to reflection-on-action alone.

However, it must be remembered that this is abductive critical phenomenological research, framed to “create new narratives about the phenomenon” (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014:5) through the percipients “conscious experience and subjectivity” (Varela & Shear, 1999:3). The puzzle (*cf.* Schostak & Schostak) of reflective practice is *not* to be solved through comparison and contrast with *literature* but, and importantly, through the percipients first-person lived experiences. Of course, in empirical terms the percipients numbering 16 could be held at issue if “belief in the truth of a generalisation is proportional to the number of instances that have been observed” (Blaikie, 2007:60) but matters pertaining to validity, relevance and trustworthiness were addressed earlier. It could also be levelled that group-think shared experience of the value of a distinctly different reflective practice in terms of reflection-in-action merely says something about the particular group, and to that extent myself as researcher/facilitator. Whilst specifically discussed in the Epilogue, van Manen (2016:348) explains in abductive phenomenological research it is not the ‘experiential accounts or anecdotes that validate its quality’ but whether

the phenomenological interpretations of the underlying meaning structures of [those accounts] are valid and executed in a scholarly manner, and whether the phenomenological themes and insights emerging from [them] are appropriate and original.

If judged positively on those terms, applied to this thesis as the extent to which percipients Described lived experiences connect with each other and with theory, and the clarity of meaning of those connections, then the research has broader relevance. Therefore, because the percipients’ experiences appraise reflection-in-action as markedly different to and distinct from their experience of reflection-on-action and positive for professional practice, this must lead the direction of Narrating to follow, taking me to a broader exploration of Schön’s work beyond his most typically and frequently cited sources (*The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think In Action*, 1983, and, *Educating The Reflective Practitioner*, 1987).

From sight of his body of work (via Newman & van der Waarde, 2018) Schön’s early focus was technology, industry, innovation and change, in his PhD completed in 1954. Titled *Rationality In Practical Decision-Making*, he explored circumstances in which

the inquirer is presented with a situation that troubles him, calls a halt to action, seems to require certain transformations: the problematic situation [*sic*] (Schön, 1954:4).

Early evidence of Schön's Pragmatism is evident in his description of those "troubling" times – or "exceptions" of practice: he writes that practitioners do not draw on "practical criticism", i.e. comparison of their practice with the "givens" of their profession (1954:2), but engage in 'practical decision-making', the "series of operations performed by an inquirer and directed toward the resolution of that situation as their goal" (*ibid*). This he calls "rationality", that is "conformity to those procedural principles which tend to resolve problematic situations" (1954:3). In that work, then, Schön is articulating two differing forms of engagement but *both* describe practitioner deliberation *on* the action they have taken albeit with contrasting levels of agency.

Yet 17 years later in *Beyond The Stable State* (1971) Schön asserts the significance of "existential knowledge" in a landscape that is *otherwise* 'dominated' by "the rational/experimental model of knowing" (1971:232). In his application of this to professional practice, the last chapter of that text, he declares the absolute significance of what he refers to as "case history": he writes "where we cannot establish controls we form judgements about 'what has happened' or 'what has led to these effects'" (*ibid*) by deliberating on the situation afterward, which has clear association with what he was later to term 'reflection-on-action'. But the illustrations he provides for this are *not* of 'case history' reflection-on-action dissection after an event. He writes of a teacher being aware of his [*sic*] students "growing commitment" in the learning "venture" having initially been 'distrusting and disinterested', an awareness the result of "receiv[ing] a thousand little indications" *in* practice moments; and, of a "consultant to the board of a neighbourhood corporation" becoming aware of the members' emerging "confidence" in him [*sic*] from noticing its "unfolding" *as it* unfolds (*ibid*). The process involved is the practitioners 'watching one thing grow out of another' (1971:233), 'synthesising' their 'experience with theory' (1971: 235) whilst "*in the situation*" [*emphasis added*] (1971: 236), combined with their skill in "confront[ing] multiple, conflicting perspectives on the situation [...] *in the interpersonal here-and-now*" [*emphasis added*] (1971: 236). He refers to such a practitioner as a 'learning agent', someone who is "willing and able to use [themselves] as an informational instrument *within* the learning situation", who 'listens rather than asserts', and can abide with "anxieties" and "suspend commitment to the last possible moment [...] while it is *in process*" [*emphasis added*] (*ibid*). So having introduced 'existential knowledge' but going no further, then exacerbating that lack of substantiation by returning to his

favoured reflection-on-action, the *illustrations* offer clear association with what became 'reflection-in-action'.

Given the difference between his thesis of 1954 and publication of 1971 I tracked the evolution of Schön's 'learning agent', finding that in 1963, *Displacement Of Concepts*, he explicates how a practitioner's existing and established concepts make possible engaging with "received" situations but become "displaced" when they no longer work (1963:30-31) so instead of "static" transposition of understanding that risks inappropriate intervention, new concepts 'dynamically' (1963:41) "emerge into view" (1963:59). It suggests a process that is 'mysterious' and 'reductive' (1963:59) but in actuality involves "preconscious sensing" and "feeling-clues" (1963:69) in the "programme for exploring the new situation" (1963:59). 'Preconscious sensing' and 'feeling clues' have striking resonance with the percipients lived experiences of reflection-in-action. Critical reviews of Schön's work at the time challenged his proposition of this being a sufficient and adequate explanation of that process (e.g. Buchdahl, 1966), but in any case, it has been established that Schön did not take up those ideas or extend them in his writing on reflective practice and reflection-in-action in 1983 and 1987.

However, my research objective is to radically reclaim reflective practice by returning it back to or expound its roots, so this being its early lineage means it must be considered whilst Narrating connection with the percipients Describing of chapter 4. Moreover, despite his confused articulation of reflection-in-action in the 1980s Schön picks up his earlier ideas in 2001. In *The Crisis Of Professional Knowledge And The Pursuit Of An Epistemology Of Practice* he ascribes reflection-in-action as "a kind of knowing [...] inherent in intelligent action" (2001:194) explained to be "react[ing] to the unexpected by a kind of on-the-spot inquiry" (2001:196) via a fast "stop-and-think" process that is "close to conscious awareness" (2001:198), or "smoothly embedded in performance" with "no stop-and-think, no conscious attention to the process" (2001:198). In either case, reflection-in-action is a "kind of production" out of "making" (2001:199), a description that manifestly builds on his 1987 notion of practitioners as 'makers of artifacts'. Here, then, professional practice *can* be understood as created, expressive, creative, and subjective, reflection-in-action as valid and valuable in its own right. Again, Schön provides illustrations, and, whilst these are repeated from earlier works, brought together it is striking to note his articulation of professional practice as embodied, from tight-rope walking to jazz playing, and building a

gate to sports coaching. Referring to their professional practice through the metaphor of 'tool', he writes that

to be skilful in the use of a tool is to learn to appreciate, as it were, directly, the qualities of the materials that we apprehend through the tacit sensations of the tool in our hand (2001:195).

Thus, he is casting reflection-in-action as visceral, a sensate embodied felt experience, a conceptualisation that strongly resonates with reflection-in-action Described by the percipients. This connects with (some) other writers on reflective practice and professional practice too. Beckett (2000), and Beckett & Hager (2000), state the case for recognition of 'the whole person' in professional practice and learning, and Johnson (2007:91) reminds that "all our meaning, all our creativity, all our knowledge is grounded in our bodily engagement with our environment and intrinsically shaped by it".

Here, then, practice decisions and interpretation of meaning may well involve or can be organised in the mind, but there is a process of experience inherent to and shaping this that is realised through the medium of the embodied practitioner. The percipients Described experiences of chapter 4 clearly evidence and elucidate this. The lesser known work of Schön that connects to their Descriptions does not *prove* their experiences in the same way that earlier discussion did not disprove it, however the process of Narrating *connects, frames and gives expression* to that which they Describe, i.e. Narrating is essential to Describing in order to complete 'grasping the naked now' of their lived experiences of reflective practice expressed during the RPRGs by 'rescuing it from just now' (*cf.* van Manen) through rooting it in theory. In consequence, it is relevant to critically speculate on the confusion and change in Schön's writing. It could be considered that his focus on providing a new 'epistemology of practice' is at crux here. Epistemology being "how human beings come to have knowledge of the world around them" (Blaikie, 2007:18), presupposes first 'a world', and second one's 'knowledge of' it, so no matter how 'a new epistemology' is articulated it will inherently involve a gap between a situation and how one makes sense of it. Accordingly, a Schönian 1980s-inspired theory of reflective practice rooted in epistemology would not significantly differ from any other established approach to problem solving in professional practice contexts. In fact, in *The New Scholarship Requires a New Epistemology* (1995b) Schön himself points up the clash of working in institutional contexts dominated by "theories of knowledge [...] built into [their] structures and practices" (1995b:np) with practice characterised as "experience, trial and error, intuition or muddling through". However, in that work his exposition of reflection-in-action involved in the latter concerns "restructur[ing] his understanding of the situation" [*sic*] by reflecting *on* "the

problem he has been trying to solve, his picture of what is going on, or the strategy of action he has been employing” [sic] and “invent[ing] a new strategy of action” that “he tries out [...] running an on-the spot experiment whose results he interprets, in turn as a ‘solution’” [sic] (ibid). Whilst it would have been interesting to hear more about his notion of ‘running on the spot experimenting’, his focus remains on “reflecting *on* reflection-in-action” [emphasis added] (ibid).

Yet, in *The Reflective Practitioner* Schön writes that it might be possible to develop understanding of “reflection-in-action [as] rigorous in its own right”, referring to “the art of practice in uncertainty and uniqueness” as potentially holding the key (1983:69). Implicit in this, then, is emphasis on reflection-in-action *process* not problem solving, and the *nature* of social reality rather than knowing, in other words, ontology rather than epistemology, but tied as he is by his epistemological endeavour this does not follow through. One can also consider that his epistemological tie will be compounded by his Pragmatism. Although Pragmatism recognises knowledge as something that changes over time, it takes the view that the best way to construct it will depend on what kind of knowledge is required, therefore overarching attention on outcome (Denscombe, 2010).

Thus, although Schön is expressly attempting a new theory concerning practitioner *processes*, by default its emphasis will be on product, on what needs to be done to reach certain solutions; and, although his ‘new epistemology’ (Schön, 1983; 1992; 1995a) *strives* to articulate a process of reflection-in-action, his theory is based in outcome achievement. Nevertheless, following the percipients lead in their Describing of reflection-in-action as visceral, sensate, embodied fleeting felt experience, an argument can be made for a radical re-examination of reflective practice to return it to its roots by picking up and developing his pre-83 and post 2001 convictions. Indeed, in *The Crisis Of Professional Knowledge And The Pursuit Of An Epistemology Of Practice* (2001) Schön marks out as troublesome the linear association of reflective practice with putting ones practice into words and the cognitive processes this involves, essentially an invitation to theorise it otherwise.

To do so calls for a full and deep Narration of the Described percipients reflection-in-action. The first aspects of this to surface in chapter 4 were play, creativity and imagination, so attention now turns to connect, frame and express the lived experience of these with theory.

2.1 Play, creativity and imagination

The percipients Describing of play, creativity and imagination throws into sharp relief the slow incremental violence of being 'broken in' to current practices and understanding of reflective practice. Its Narration could offer passage to a more visceral, sensate embodied felt experience of practice.

In the exposition of Professional Practice: Connected Practice, play, defined as possibilities created in the moment without a predicted or intended goal (*cf.* Bell; Bateson & Martin; Gordon), and playfulness, a mood, mind and embodied state (*cf.* Bateson & Martin), were expressed as core to Performance and central to the 'artistry of imaginative, inventive and creative practices' (Key, 2013:186). 'Performance' itself was conceptualised as 'provisional, in-process, existing and changing over time [...] marking identities, bending and remaking time, adorning and reshaping the body, telling stories' (Schechner, 1998:361), with emphasis given to kinesis, "breaking and remaking [...] movement, motion, fluidity, fluctuation, all those restless energies that transgress boundaries and trouble closure" (Conquergood, 1995:138 cited in Bell, 2008:13). In fact, like Key, Clark's (1995:576) contention is the "discipline" of practice *is* 'creativity and imagination' [*emphasis added*].

Firstly, it was the percipients' 'playful play' (*cf.* Bateson & Martin) with creative engagement that brought life to a radical reflective practice: play and creativity gave space, even permission, to disrupt the traditional epistemology and practices of reflective practice. Percipients played with reflective practice, experiencing that in different ways, but it created shared methods, distinctive activities and playful engagement as a general approach. In this way, lightness and playful "spirit [was] a catalyst for inventiveness, attentiveness and openness in thinking and practice" (Warren, 2013:2630) enabling rich dialogue about the 'in common' regardless of and separate to outcome, so about the *experience* of process rather than the product of current configurations of reflective practice. They/we played with ways to capture individual and shared 'all-about-ness' of experiences, by

- recreating the felt sense of embodied experiences in modelling clay;
- experimenting with digital recordings and photographs, and collecting abstract doodles, as 'scraps' in the fleeting moments of practices;
- collecting artefacts that symbolised and signified feelings in the moment; and
- participating in activities, including Sound Walks, contemplation of given and found objects, and exploration of embodied felt sense in familiar physical movements.

The purpose was to cut away from preoccupation with traditional and typical forms of domestication and domesticated activities plus the associated impact and driver of 'audience', and to do this with others, a playful collective and collaborative endeavour within dialogue, this being very different to the typical isolated and isolating mainstream practices such as diary keeping. James & Brookfield (2014:xiii) write of the power of playful activities being to "jolt ourselves, and students, out of our normal and routine ways of understanding and practicing". It contrasts sharply with Captured and Curated *current* practices and understanding of reflective practice, which, to use percipients words, has '*lost its soul*', this being "buried beneath a raft" of technical-rational practices (McIntosh, 2013:5) in The Trappings higher education and professional practice.

Secondly, in Describing their playful experiences of reflection-in-action the percipients use the word Glance, and contrast this with the Gaze of typical practices of reflective practice. So, where the Gaze of reflection-on-action pins down and fossilises knowledge, the fleeting quality and interruption of Glance is playful and invites creative and imaginative engagement. Schön's reflective practice was not meant as skills that practitioners *should* develop – which impels assessment as to whether and how much they have developed when embedded in higher education programmes. It concerned what practitioners *do* as part of their professional artistry, and what the percipients Describe they do is engage in the fast flowing, messiness of professional practice. They contrast the nature and quality of this with 'having a plan or a list', the former being the aporic complexity and messiness of professional practice, the latter likened to professional practice as if 'shopping', the following of pro forma and instruction of *how* to engage in current practices of reflective practice. Introduced through Heidegger in chapter 4, Burbules (2002:172) refers to Plato's aporia, the moment when a 'misconception has been exposed, stripped away' such that 'a clean terrain now exists for the reconstruction of knowledge'. If something is known it is epistemic, the aporic moment dissolved; therefore aporia is ontological. Thus, play, creativity and imagination lend to aporic engagement. The percipients lived experiences of reflection-in-action concern *being*, not *knowing*; and whilst mainstream theory and understanding of reflective practice *extolls* being it does so through the slow and incremental violence of 'breaking' practitioners 'in' to practices that they must adopt and adhere, a rhetoric of *being* but a reality of *knowing*. Before an in-depth Narration of Glance and Gaze, examining the nature of percipients 'playful play' in the context of the RPRGs is germane.

The fundamental action of the RPRG process was of the percipients being “active”, defined by McIntosh (2013:6) as

not being fed information [but] actively exploring a subject;
deconstructing and re-constructing it as they dialogue and reflect upon
these dialogues as professionals and professionals in the making.

The intersection of social science and the arts was instrumental in this, its liminoid space offering opportunity to ‘create, co-create, and pause’ (McIntosh, 2013:6), to engage in the powerful interruption and disruption of traditional epistemology and practices. It provided ‘new possibilities to stitch, weave and knot narratives and transformations in a creative way’ (Lee McCartney, 2015:141), giving space to McWilliam’s (2009) “meddling” and Puwar & Sharma’s (2012:44) “becoming otherwise” through “unexpected combinations”. Indeed, Biesta & Anders Säfström’s (2011:540) *Manifesto For Education* argues that “what makes education educational” is “freedom”, *not* containment and control. ‘Freedom’ might infer anything goes dependent on whims of fancy and fantasy, which was not the case in the RPRGs and neither, as New Internationalism points up, is it for The Trappings of professional practice - nor those of higher education frameworks. Faced with any path dependent on whim could also result in experiencing impasse and paralysis not action (Burbules, 2002), and percipient Sadie’s ‘black pit’ jumps to mind here. But, by ‘freedom’ Biesta & Anders Säfström mean adopting *one’s own* “authority”, in our terms, as creator, so “adopting [...] an orientation towards freedom” (2011:540) that is “found in the tension between ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’” (2011:541), therefore *not* in compliance with being domesticated and ‘broken in’ to Identify-Of, reflective practices that impose what is and what isn’t. It is orientation to the spaces between, of dancing the line of no choice and endless choices, a process that enables something *other* or *more* than cognition alone, one that invites and includes messy, rich, complex experience. It is a dynamic that

concerns the way in which ‘what is’ is interrupted by an element that is radically new rather than a repetition of what already exists. This interruption – which can be called ‘dissensus’ – is the place where subjectivity ‘comes into the world’ (Biesta & Anders Säfström, 2011:541),

‘interruption’ being a word the percipients themselves used when Describing Glance.

In sum, then, the nature of ‘playful play’ that facilitated and supported this interruption was the percipients individual and collective authority as embodied creators, their authority to dance the lines of ‘what is and what isn’t, and this without fear of judgement, in the liminoid space of social science and arts, this, then, being relevant to a radical reflective practice.

However, it begs the question where this fits in employer demands for “technically proficient workers” (McIntosh, 2013:3), i.e. the relevance of a social science/arts opportunity and a subjective individual and collective lived experience that encourages play, creativity and imagination in professional practice within a New Institutional analysis suffused as it is by The Trappings. Student employability is a “contentious concept” (Harvey, 2003:3), but even in that debate is agreement of employers needing graduates who can “‘get up to speed’ quickly” (2003:6), and, significant to our purposes, according to Harvey (2003) and Emery (1997) this does not involve being able to engage in play, creativity and imagination. These are not identified within the employer-determined graduate skills gap nor (typically) recognised as a necessary element in preparing for work during higher education because as McIntosh (2013:3) contends, higher education is as much “embedded in the consumerist economy [...] as any other industry in the public or private sector”. Therefore,

At university, it is all too easy for a learner’s spirit of enquiry, playful experimentation and curiosity to be stifled by a misplaced perception that ‘student engagement’ and ‘student satisfaction’ will only be achieved if courses are delivered in certain unplayful ways (Lucas, 2019:vii).

Here, then, the “traditional educational paradigm” (Emery, 1997:232) of adult learning has shown a “remarkable ability” to resist change, even in the face of challenge from research (1997:230). It is a 200+ year-old epistemology that views subjective experiences of individuals as “treacherous, unstable material from which knowledge must be processed” (1997:233-234) and shared perceptions as only valid when defined as such by those with appropriate authority, so, individuals recognised as accomplished in “the accumulation of tried and true associations” as a result of “intellectual processes of abstraction and logical inference” (1997:234). This is not to argue that all in higher education reinforce such a paradigm, and indeed resistance/difference comes from authors already mentioned in that regard in this thesis. However, it is salient to note the extent to which Emery’s point both articulates and emulates the percipients Descriptions of mainstream reflective practice in higher education programmes, their ‘treacherous unstable’ experiences needing to be trawled for knowledge to process, this being determined by externally defined methods as well as the particular knowledge outcomes, these defined by those in ‘authority’. To use the words of Emery, it is a process that ensures “garbage does not enter the system” (1997:234), i.e. “fitful, random individual experiences” (1997:235) are not valued because “the path to knowledge is the memorization of established associations and the knowledge of the rules of classification and the logic of implication”.

A final aspect to consider is that unlike play, creativity and imagination, this imposed 'path to knowledge' is time dependent: i.e.

The right time for teaching B is when A has been learnt. C can be taught only when B has been learnt. The disciplined student accepts that the appropriate time for studying is that laid down by the curriculum, which in turn is presumed to be dictated by the nature of the socially accumulated body of knowledge (*ibid*).

Successful progress is measured through staged tests of that memory for which literacy is sovereign given its ability to "pin down" learning and 'report' it to those in authority (1997:236). Again, it is striking to 'hear' the percipients lived experiences in Emery's quote, their preoccupation with time as a theme in the RPRGs. In sum, "all must be taught to distrust their personal experience as a guide to knowledge" (*ibid*) and trust those who gate-keep what, when, and how learning can happen and the boundaries of success in that endeavour. The aim of this epistemology can thus be appreciated as 'production' of "the critical, disciplined and literate mind" (*ibid*), so cognitive functioning that successfully performs compliance with, and adherence to, these requirements. More recently Simmer-Brown (2011:107) has written about the power of this "third-person" focus in engendering critical thinking. Less brutal in argument she observes how it works to "assur[e] fairness, respect, personal privacy and objectively determined standards of academic excellence as the benchmarks in higher education" but to the marked loss of, and detriment to, "first-person" understanding of one's own experiences.

Resonance with percipient experiences of current practices of reflective practice is striking - and what stands out in this Narrating is the absence, indeed mistrust, of play, creativity and imagination. Where, then is Narrating that connects to the percipients valuing of playful play, creativity and imagination in relation to reflection-in-action?

Play, creativity and imagination find accord with an alternative employability paradigm and discourse, one of practitioners as responsive, innovative learners, life-long (rather than time-dependent) and autonomous (rather than authority dependent) (Störmer *et al*, 2014; Barnett, 2008), all of which involve key skills and qualities associated with first-hand experience of, and confidence in, playful play (Bateson & Martin, 2013; McIntosh, 2013; James & Brookfield, 2014). For James, play is not "the marginalised stuff you do when all the grown-up business has been attended to" (2019a:13-14). She argues "we need to play [...] because play makes us better at the complex, challenging, horizon-stretching work" (2019a:14), indeed befitting Schön's own notion of a 'learner agent'. In such a paradigm, practitioners are understood as already and always "quite efficient learners" who 'learn on

their own terms rather than in response to what they might be told', a paradigm cast in heutagogy (Hase & Kenyon, 2003:1).

The *tension* between the two perspectives aside, they are referred to as 'mode 1', "conventional academic propositional knowledge" (Barnett, 2009:431) and 'mode 2' 'creative, imaginative knowledge production and use in situ' (Barnett, 2004:251), or as above, 'third person' and 'first person' respectively (*cf.* Simmer-Brown). Like Simmer-Brown, Barnett asserts dominance of the former in higher education. Consequently, he asks

By what pedagogical processes might a student – whose initial state of understanding might be rudimentary or even opinionated – be brought into a state of forming well-founded claims about the world? (2004:251).

However, he argues that adopting a singular focus based solely on "driving up mode 2 knowledge as especially important" is 'unduly simplistic' (2009:431). His emphasis is on "the *process of coming to know*" (2009:433) [*emphasis added*], so, "neither knowledge or skills but *being*" [*emphasis added*] (2004:259) and the "formation of [that] authentic being" (*ibid*) through specific learning "dispositions" and their "manifestations" in expression of individually flavoured "qualities" (2009:433). In that always-process-of-being, creativity and imagination are critical (Barnett, 2013).

Yet, finally in this aspect of Narrating it must be remembered that the aim of this research is to have catalytic validity (*cf.* Lather) in the facilitation of reflective practice in higher education programmes, but a playful, creative approach to reflective and professional practice as a process of being within a heutagogical paradigm does not sit easily within higher education's constituent of assessment (Moore, 2004). In our terms, it is once more preoccupation with, and dominance of, epistemology over and to the loss of ontology (Dall'Alba, 2009; Barnett, 2008; Moore, 2004). However, the percipients Described their experiences of the *freezing* impact of assessment on reflective practice. With the focus of mainstream understanding and practice of reflective practice being self and practice control and development, what *should be* produced becomes more easily assessable when it is based solely in the critical thinking of reflection-on-action, or, in Barnett and Simmer-Brown terms, when Mode 1/third-person and Mode 2/first-person inquiry and expression are conflated as if one and the same. It is a fact not lost on the percipients when they share how it makes reflective practice much easier for their lecturers to mark, and in this way reflective practice is reduced to/has become a set of expectations about the way one is to *think/be seen to think* about ones practice, controlled by those in authority, a performed

‘development’ that is time dependent and pinned down in ways that enable its reporting for judgement of success. It is not concerned with the facilitation and support of play, creativity and imagination that was so critical to percipients individual and collective authority as embodied creators, to facilitation of their authority to dance the lines of ‘what is and what isn’t’ without fear of judgement.

More specific Narrating of *how* play, creativity and imagination can be included and facilitated as part of reflective practice will not be needed in this thesis given that the work of those referred to identify activities which could be considered for their fit in higher education and indeed I introduced my own to the RPRGs which can be repeated. So instead, focus will turn to the *percipients* Describing of reflection-in-action illuminated through Glance, the second theme arising from chapter 4.

3 Glance (reflection-in-action)

As tracked in chapter 4, the emergence of Glance as a “handle” (Gendlin, 1962:32) to the felt sense of reflection-in-action speaks from within it *and* creates a shift in understanding as a result, a ‘threshold concept’ that enabled a reimagining of reflective practice.

Glance is a concept that names and conveys the brief interruption in practice, the fleeting paying attention to a moment; Glance is both ‘the moment’ and how one works with and processes that moment. Glance is taking in all one’s senses at that moment, letting the experience wash over whilst noticing at the same time. It has the quality of a click brought on through that pause, interruption; freezing of time in the moment, a slow moment, a ‘hey this is where everything is’, your head, body and feelings in that moment. It is quick, watch, pay attention, that brings attention fleetingly to embodied knowing. It is ‘that thing that changes you’, so ‘that moment, that feeling’ via moving ones focus in and then out. Glance is therefore the skill and art of attending, tuning in, tracking, trusting the experience/process of having no path, working with sense, capturing, ‘getting at’ the whole of a moment. It is embodied and involves memory in the body.

In Narrating Glance it is fascinating to note the strong connection of this with Casey’s (2007) phenomenology and philosophy of *The World At A Glance*. Initially I came across his publication by title alone but he describes glance (not capitalised to distinguish it from that of the percipients) as something that

happens by actions of leaping from the zone of the familiar to the very edges of the unfamiliar, all the time while taking in the intermediate stretches, and then leaping back again (2007:xii).

Further, it can be considered as a “theory of moments”, i.e. “significant times when existing orthodoxies are open to challenge, when things have the potential to be overturned or radically altered” (Elden, 2004:x), Glance likened in concept and process to a “blink of an eye [...] a gateway where past and future collide” (*ibid*). Glance resonates with North Whitehead’s ‘withness of the body’ of chapter 1, his portrayal of the body as a chain of “transmission” of experiences “inherited” (1929/1978:312) and “enacted” (1929/1978:237) with “vector character”, this meaning ‘emotion, purpose, valuation and causation’ through a “conrescence of prehensions” (1929/1978:35), a ‘growing’ into something ‘concrete’, enabling ‘grasp’ (1929/1978:166). The ‘withness of the body’ is, in his words from chapter 1, the “becoming of experience” (*ibid*). Thus, it is clear, the percipient concept and practice of Glance is about a different kind of engagement in reflective practice, one that is fit for purpose in relation to the fast, dynamic “entangled relationalities” (Barad, 2010:264) of professional practice in chapter 2.

In Narrating Glance, connection can also be found in Greene’s (1978:165) articulation of engagement in ‘learning landscapes’ that take the form of

an active attention [...] to life in its multiple phases, not the kind of passive attention in which one sits and stares – not the kind of focalised attention that permits one only to see the track ahead of one.

It is about messy, rich, experience emerging from and within the ‘entangled’ complexity of professional practice, a fleeting Glance in flow rather than a retrospective singular isolated act. Glance is noticing “threads of past, present and future” (Lee McCartney, 2015:141) as embodied in the percipients ‘head, body and feelings’, thus in the “context of a body sustained over time” (2015:139) as coalesced in a moment. Thus, Glances “create multiple entry points for stories of self and multiple renderings of [ones] experiences” (2015:143). So, with professional practice as repetition of the familiar *and* improvisation, Glance is essential in its moment of space and the opportunity to be “altered by these spaces” (Lee McCartney, 2015:143).

In sum, Glance is a “moment of eccentricity” in its position as “outside” the traditional and typical “realm of what counts as learning” (Sierk 2014:140). Where currently the discourse and climate of higher education emphasises Mode 1/third person fixing, predicting and evidencing, or “getting a grip” (Willis, 1999:98), reflective practice has come to work “as a kind of sheepdog” (1999:99) to that end. It too concerns ‘analysis, categorising, generalising and disseminating between things or the grouping of things’ (*ibid*) in the

production of accounts of practice made of “dull moments that tend to blur together” (Sierk, 2014:140). Conversely, in Glance

The mind does not ‘seize upon’ the object to analyse and subdue it but attempts to behold it, to allow its reality, its beauty and its texture to become more and more present (Willis, 1999:99).

Glance is ‘returning anew’, “to go back or come back again [...] in a new and different form” (Sierk, 2014:146). As seen from the percipients it is about “intuitive/contemplation” (Willis, 1999:99), or, in Sierk’s (2014:140) terms, “the beauty of soulful moments”. Casey begins his book (introduced above) with a call to “regain” glance in Global North paradigms and epistemologies that favour gaze [*sic*], and consider it as ‘unworthy of investigation in its own right’ so ‘dismiss it as inconsequential’ (2007:xii). Indeed, Glance in our terms is essential,

A scopic scout stationed at the outposts of human perceptual experience. It discovers whole colonies of the to-be-seen world: places where sight has never before been – or if it has, it now sees differently [...] leading it out of more staid and settled ways of looking (*ibid*).

Thus in its “second of solace, a liberating leap” (Casey, 2007:xiii) Glance is a “flickering, ungovernable mobility [that] strikes at the very roots of rationalism” (Bryson, 1983:121). Indeed, Sierk (2014:145) would consider teaching and learning that does *not* involve Glance as “inauthentic and contrived”. Here, then, Glance is “an agent of change in the midst of the stasis induced by established modes of seeing [and knowing] that favour gaze” (Casey, 2007:xiv). Casey’s work explores the phenomenology of glance in everyday life, Bryson, the semiotics of paintings, Sierk, the soulful moments in classroom teaching, and for the percipients Glance takes on life as a ‘threshold concept’ that Describes their experiences of reflection-in-action of reflective practice. The connection between all these strikingly construe its significance and qualities.

4 Reflection-on-action: Gaze

Gaze is the concept through which percipients name and convey reflection-on-action, thereby the typical mainstream practices of reflective practices in higher education programmes. Initially named as a dichotomous pole to better exemplify Glance, Gaze also took on life as a threshold concept. Gaze is the process of selecting an event/interaction after its happening, and can be big, dramatic or small, but in any case the event is the trigger and Gaze is staring at it afterwards, pulling some thing/s about it apart and in detail, wondering if you could/should have acted differently, breaking what existed as a complex dynamic whole into small fixed and static pieces for analysis, and, typically, writing that

down and 'bringing in' experiences and thoughts 'that have occurred' to the Gazer since the selected event to better 'report' it and perform themselves in familiar, acceptable and expected ways. The percipients lived experience of Gaze is therefore of being 'broken in' to its externally defined theory and practice (that is confused and contradictory), under the perpetual shadow of judgement from authority, thus crafting, editing, censoring, exaggerating, lying, embellishing, planning, rehearsing, even entirely 'hamming' up Gazed accounts of practice.

Gaze is clearly experientially different to Glance. It is also clearly different in relation to outcome, one that was Described by the percipients as not (sufficiently) supporting or facilitating present and future professional practice, potentially not even relating to it at all (particularly when its accounts are entirely made up). This said, the percipients also Describe instances where Gaze *could* be 'good', that is, if it was re-imagined and re-positioned, 'hindsight Gaze' where a practitioner writes an account of their practice as one activity, fronting up that this could be fiction, but then as a second activity deliberately returning to it to identify their adoption of domesticating discourses, an avenue of reflection on oneself as a reflective *writer* from which one may learn 'something different'. But as it stands the percipients Describing is dominated by their current experiences of 'bad' Gaze based on mainstream reflective practice, where students/practitioners tell themselves the same things, sing the same tune, even when they do not think that they are. The percipients emphasise how Gaze contrasts with fast, fleeting Glances that make up their actual professional practice. Indeed, it is for this reason that the percipients speak of having nothing to write about, other participants of giving reflective practice up, a clear indication of the extent to which professional artistry, professional practice, and reflective practice are disconnected.

In Narrating Gaze again the liminoid space between the arts and social science proves fruitful. In his book *Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze*, Bryson (1983:94) refers to the colloquial meaning of gaze as "prolonged, contemplative, yet regarding the field of vision with a certain aloofness and disengagement, across a tranquil interval". His assertion "the gaze [is] victorious over the glance" (1983:95) foreshadows the same argument made by Casey some 20 years later. For Bryson, gaze creates 'fissures': the viewer fixes on one something at a time as if "confronting a new scene, one which has broken free of its sequence" which is 'viewed in isolation" (1983:98). So, in our terms, Gaze (capitalised) encourages and facilitates a "particular narrative segment, a segment that less and less

implies the original circle from which it is taken” (*ibid*) and therefore less and less the rich complex multidimensional professional practice elucidated in *Connected Practice: Professional Practice*. Gaze concerns “distancing and disengagement” (Craig, 2012:27), which, for reflective practice produces depleted, flat, reduced outcomes and cynical, inauthentic, doubtful and frustrated, engagement. Narrating Gaze by identifying and exploring its connections in social science and arts literature has a surprising fit with the percipient Descriptions of their lived experiences of established, mainstream practices and understanding of reflective practice.

Continuing this Narrating prompts reference to Foucault. He tracks 17th century publicly displayed punishment of some individuals with the aim to frighten *all* into a ‘good way of life’ via introjection of surveillance, applied to contemporary analysis of a compliant citizenship who go about their everyday life in the shadow of a controlling, judging, invisible audience which he likens to the enclosing function of a “dungeon” (1975/1977:200). His contention is that we are both victims of surveillance *and* introject its control to enact it on ourselves and others, Narrating that lends appreciation of Gaze as enclosure via introjection of control that forces performance to be curated such that the narrow accounts of professional practice display required behaviours and meet certain expectations. Narrating Gaze also finds accord with feminist theory in its critique of male objectification and voyeurism. Here Gaze:

demands a story, depends on making something happen, forcing a change in another person, a battle of will and strength, victory/defeat, all occurring in a linear time with a beginning and an end (Mulvey, 1992:29).

It is a description that has striking resonance with percipients experiences of objectifying their practice as if voyeurs to it as they perform ‘reflective practice’ in the accepted mainstream narratives, an aloofness from messy experience, and demand of a tidy story, accounted for and objectified into constituent parts, through a lens of needing to do (not be) be better/different/else. From both a Foucauldian and feminist analysis, activities associated with Gaze close possibilities and align focus through to what, and how, to reflect.

4.1 Gaze with Arendt

Thinking with Arendt offers a frame for all this, not in terms of her full focus on totalitarianism but the practices of politics on the human condition. Her assertion is that focus on ‘individual behaviour and individuality’ (Arendt, 1958:41) has come to dominate

Global North society, and, like Foucault, argues it creates a “conformable body politic” (1958:49). It is a view that resonates with the percipients Describing: maintenance of a ‘conformable body politic’ is dependent on student/practitioners “*remaining* restricted” [*emphasis added*] (1958:49). More specifically, in our terms, Arendt argues that “reflective judgement descends from the particular to the universal [...] without any overall rules” (Arendt, 1971: 69), which means (and makes) “the quest for meaning is meaningless” (1971:59). But travelled out *as if* there are rules means any conclusions a practitioner reaches from engagement in reflective practice can only be merely “laws from and to itself” pronounced in diaries-as-artefacts in the form of “there we are, no questions asked” (1971:59). Further, “since it is always the same person whose mind thinks, wills and judges, the autonomous nature of these activities [creates] great difficulties” (1971:70), an observation that further accentuates the effect of isolated, individual diarying of reflection-on-action. As a result, extending argument of chapter 3 that anything more meaningful would be kept secret (*cf.* Issit in O’Reilly *et al*), Arendt attests that as a result any semblance of ‘action’ becomes banished to “the sphere of the intimate and the private”. Consequently, any professional practice and organisation problems become individualised, a student/practitioner’s own faulty “general humanistic development” (1958:49), requiring *their personal* change rather than change in “the world they move in” (1958:49). Each person as a “newcomer” (in terms of natality) “possesses the *capacity* of [...] acting” [*emphasis added*] (1958:9) in the potential of ‘radical unpredictability’ (Canovan, 1992:132) and expression of uniqueness and distinctiveness (Arendt, 1958:176), but, in our terms, in a context of being ‘broken in’ and its need for stability such capacity and action is “positively dangerous” (Canovan, 1992:132).

Narrating through Arendt lends insight into the appropriation of reflective practice. After all, Schön’s (2001:186) starting point was professional artistry, which he emphasises is “*not* reducible to the exercise of describable routines” [*emphasis added*], even though, for all the reasons and in all the ways identified, it has become exactly that, her argument illuminating process and impact. As Clark (1999:5) observes, the brain, i.e. “the physical medium of cognition”, has become inextricably linked to *being*, and therefore development and control of being dominates and becomes focused on “computational/information-processing” alone (1999:6). Consequently we become “prone to the illusion that we constantly command a rich inner representation” (1999:9) of everything around us when actually, as Curated, our perceptual framework is restrictive, narrow and flawed. Therefore “we must abandon the image of ourselves as essentially disembodied reasoning engines”

(1999:14), a view that chimes with Arendt, and instead “develop analytic and explanatory strategies that better reflect and accommodate [our] dense interanimation” (1999:15).

4.2 Reimagining Gaze

However, as Described, the percipients point up that Gaze can be re-imagined and re-positioned as positive for practice: reflecting via ‘the relative tranquillity of a post mortem’ can have advantages. Plus, it would be unnecessarily dogmatic to dismiss reflection-on-practice altogether, because to do so would involve *insisting* on adoption of a particular (albeit different) kind of reflective practice, a ‘breaking in’ already illuminated as problematic. The percipients Describe ‘good’ ‘hindsight Gaze’, and it has been argued that Gaze has a part to play in professional practice if it is understood for what it is, in its limitations, narrowness and partiality, which by itself contributes to the reclaiming and reimagining of reflective practice.

Continuing that line of argument, it follows that where theory, practice, facilitators and organisations/professions mean reflection-on-action it should be referred to as such, a clarity of expectation and intention otherwise hidden by the generic label of reflective practice. In accordance with the percipients ‘good hindsight Gaze’ it also follows that reflection-on-action will benefit from its purpose being emphasised as development of critical thinking in adult learning with professional practice as stimulus. Explained in chapter 1, critical thinking concerns an individual ‘converting’ (Dewey, 1993/2008:125) their fast, dynamic, rich, complex, multi-layered, multi-dimensional and ‘entangled’ (*cf.* Barad) experience into control by moving it into the “the best thinking [s/he is] capable of in any set of circumstances” (Paul & Elder, 2001:xii), an analysis with striking attunement to the Captured, Curated and Described reflection-on-action in this thesis.

Narrating this more transparent and clearly defined reflection-on-action, Paul & Elder’s iconic work proves essential. They differentiate between “high quality thinking” that “does the job set for it”, whilst that which “lacks a purpose [...] is aimless”. ‘Aimless thinking’ might stumble by “chance” on something that is of “value to the thinker. But more often it will simply wander into an endless stream of unanalyzed associations from one’s unanalyzed past” [*sic*] (Paul & Elder, 2006a:34). The authors refer to this as “shoddy” (Paul & Elder, 2006b:4), “bad thinking” (Elder & Paul, 2013:34) that is “left to itself”, therefore “biased, distorted, partial, uninformed or down-right prejudiced” (Paul & Elder, 2006b:4)

being based as it is in “personal agendas, interests, and values. People typically see things as they want to and twist reality to fit preconceived ideas” (Elder & Paul, 2013:34).

In contrast, ‘high quality’, or critical thinking, is “sound” (Paul & Elder, 2001:xii) “excellent thinking” (Elder & Paul, 2013:4), the “disciplined art of ensuring that you use the best thinking you are capable of in any set of circumstances” (Paul & Elder, 2001:xii). It is guided through ‘learning to write’ strategies set out by the authors and is assessable via its specified standards:

standards for thought; standards that guide us to consistently excellent thinking; and standards we can count on to keep our thinking on track, to help us mirror in our minds what is happening in reality, to reveal the truth in situations, and to enable us to determine how best to live our lives (Elder & Paul, 2013:34).

Their notion of critical thinking (and its aimless alternative) has a striking similarity to mainstream theory and rhetoric regarding reflective practice/reflection-on-action as Started, Captured and Curated in this thesis. More crucially, their work contributes to its re-imagination. To illustrate, their ‘standards’ of critical thinking comprise intellect (clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, logic, significance, fairness), and reasoning (questioning issues/problems, implications, consequences, points of view/frame of reference, assumptions, inferences). “Explicitly mastering” these standards (Elder & Paul, 2013:35) enables “commanding the quality of one's life and, more generally, to creating societies that genuinely value critical thinking” (2013:34), all of which being entirely in-keeping with the requirements of reflection-on-action and indeed, gradueness defined in the Preface. It would therefore be relevant - in fact significantly appropriate, useful *and* ethical - for reflection-on-action to explicitly and expressly refer to and assess critical thinking, leaving reflection-in-action to be a celebration of Gance. In addition, the percipients ‘good hindsight Gaze’ involves deliberately and purposefully returning to written accounts of practice to identify the ways in which they have adopted and adhered to domesticating discourses.

This reimagined reflection-on-action contributes to a reclamation of reflective practice as “multileveled awareness, multifold openness and appreciative curiosity” (Eberhart & Atkins, 2014:70).

5 **Glance (reflection-in-action), Described through improvisation, mindfulness, and, embodied knowing**

The Gaze of (un-reclaimed) mainstream reflection-on-action has been characterised through a technical-rational ‘plug and chug, cram and flush’ (*cf.* Bella) engineering science paradigm, yet it must be considered that meeting externally determined standards by producing favourable evidence has a place in higher education. After all, as Race (2014:80) remarks, not all learning can or needs to be “deep”. It also has a place in professional education in the social professions as articulated by The Trappings. But it is not obvious how this would facilitate this re-imagined Gaze and the new Glance of reflective practice. Not only does ‘plug, chug, cram, flush’ not match the percipients experience of play, creativity and imagination that is part of reflection-*in*-action, it does not fit the *nature* of Glance Described in terms of ‘improvisation’, ‘mindfulness’ and ‘embodied knowing’. Therefore, having Narrated the reimagining of Gaze, attention now returns to Glance to explore these elements.

5.1 **Improvisation**

Improvisation was scoped in the discipline of professional practice via the heuristic tool *Connected Practice: Professional Practice*. Indeed, it was noted that Schechner (2013) links improvisation to play, connection to earlier Narration of play as part of reflection-in-action. Lobman & Lundquist (2007:2) also link play and improvisation in their contention that “while people often live their lives as if there is a script, the fact is [they] are also capable of breaking from the expected”, a view that has resonance with the percipient Description (and now Narration) of Glance.

It also connects with theory related to kinesic performance of professional practice (*cf.* Conquergood). In chapter 2 it was noted that improvised practice does not just happen: it requires a practitioner to ‘carve out space for it, to produce it’ (Peters, 2005:305), in itself Narration that accords with percipient Descriptions of needing to create ‘moments’. It also has resonance with their request for ‘instruction, guidance and lessons’ that will support them in the art of ‘creating on the fly’ (*cf.* Smith) that is central to their Glance of reflective practice and therefore their professional practice. Lobman & Lundquist (2007:3) explicitly draw on the arts for their facilitative activities, and this in context of the “ensemble”, that is, through collaborative, creative work in groups, so not the individual isolated focus typical of mainstream reflective practice, and through experiential immersion, not deliberation after an event. Here, then, by following the percipient lead, reflective practice

would do well to engage in – and can explore – the creative improvisation of professional practice by facilitating the deliberate and conscious facilitation of improvisation. Indeed, Harris (2014:659) reminds that Schön refers to improvisation in professional settings, relating this to Schön’s expertise as a jazz clarinetist. Exploring this, in his 2001 work Schön specifically uses jazz music improvisation as an example of and metaphor for professional artistry, describing it as an “invention” (2001:199) that it is “organised [collectively] around an underlying structure, a shared schema of meter, melody and harmony that gives the piece a predictable order”. This is interwoven with ‘musical figures and variation’ of individual ‘players’, that are ‘combined and recombined’ as they “[feel] the direction in which the music is developing, out of their interwoven contributions, [...] make new sense out of it and adjust their performance to the sense they make” (*ibid*). Harris, a musician as well as lecturer, taught and assessed improvisation in jazz playing in higher education music colleges, more recently applying that to teach and assess improvisation in higher education social professional education. Therefore, in my Narrating there is no need to articulate *how* deliberate and conscious improvisation can be part of the facilitation of Glance. The ideas and activities of Harris, Lobman & Lundquist, and Peters (for example) can do that work.

5.2 Mindfulness

Alongside improvisation, the percipients Describe Glance as thoughtful, slowing down, switching out outside influences and listening but without having a conversation with that in one’s head, therefore of being both in an experience and out of it, and focusing on breath and all the senses. They talk specifically of ‘mindfulness’. Connecting to relevant theory as part of Narrating, mindfulness is defined as

the self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained on immediate experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition of mental events in the present moment [and] adopting a particular orientation toward one’s experiences in the present moment, an orientation that is characterised by curiosity, openness, and acceptance’ (Bishop *et al*, 2004:232).

Similarity with the percipients Glance is clear.

Langer (1989:14) contrasts mindfulness with “mindlessness” [*sic*], the latter being ‘rigid’ reliance (1989:23) on categories, distinctions, and “acting from a single perspective” (1989:28), in other words, minds that read signs and then “shut like a clam and do not let in new signals” (1989:29). It has resonance with the thoughtless and clichéd repetition of behaviours Curated in chapter 3. Indeed, Langer explains how “fixed mindsets” (1989:33)

are generated from education processes dominated by an “orientation” of “outcome” rather than “process” (1989:45). Thus “mindful awareness” (Smalley & Winston, 2010:1) is “a first-person, or *subjective*, methodology” [*sic*] (2010:3) that concerns being “aware of awareness” (2010:1) by “cultivat[ing] abilities beyond the verbal and conceptual to include matters of heart, character, creativity, self-knowledge, concertation, opens and mental flexibility” (Lief, cited in Poitras, 2005:6), so, “an awareness or attention to present experience” (Smalley & Winston, 2010:3). Bishop *et al*, Langer, Smalley & Winston, and Poitras are representative of a growing literature that supports, promotes and guides reflection through commitment to meditation and a compassionate approach to oneself and others. Wider research evidences the positive impact of mindfulness on professional well-being and practice through, for example, attitude (Krasner *et al*, 2009), connection to clients/users (Hutcherson *et al*, 2008); self-care/reduced stress levels (Irving *et al*, 2009); and, regulation of emotions and strengthening of memory (Roberts-Wolfe *et al*, 2012). Such work accounts for the “exponential growth” of mindfulness practice in professional practice in the Global North (Hyland, 2017:334).

Nevertheless, the *precise* meaning behind the percipients reference to ‘mindfulness’ is unclear; indeed, I have used the word myself in this thesis to refer to being cognizant of something, and it could well be that they mean the same. In fact, conceptualisation of ‘mindfulness’ is a moot point. Sherrell & Simmer-Brown (2017) adopt Welwood’s (2002) term ‘spiritual bypassing’ to question the extent to which, if at all, it is acceptable, indeed ethical, to disconnect mindfulness from its Buddhist roots. Broken off by and subsumed into Global North epistemology of control, the interconnectedness and interdependence of mindfulness becomes ‘refashioned’ (Purser, 2015:23) into promotion of individualisation, and appropriated as a “therapeutic form of self-help and self-care” (2015:33). This applied to professional contexts becomes a vehicle through which

Workers can labor longer hours without needing breaks; employees are more productive; students will have fewer behavioural issues. Emotions will be cooler and more manageable, and classrooms and workplaces will be more harmonious and manageable [*sic*] (Sherrell & Simmer-Brown, 2017:76),

an argument that reinforces critique from percipient experiences of current practices and understanding of reflective practice. Like mainstream reflective practice, this version of mindfulness resides in assumptions that individuals have “full control and agency for their own emotional reactivity” and “thoughts”, that they *can* “decenter from the contents of their experience”, and, therefore that they are “fully responsible” for their own

betterment. As a result, any “misery”, “suffering” and poor professional practice is “entirely self-made”, the result of an individual’s *own* lack of “motivation” and “willpower” (Purser, 2015:35), so mindfulness provides the way to “self-regulation, self-management, self-acceptance, and self-control” (*ibid*), resonant with earlier argument regarding reflective practice. It sits within a wider debate, with, for example, Kabat-Zinn (2017), widely acclaimed as establishing mindfulness practice in the Global North, assuring that it “has always been anchored” in its original roots (2017:1126) and is “prima facie a positive [...] and tremendous opportunity” (2017:1126), whilst others, such as Purser (2015), caution against such muddled and muddied claims. The detail to that debate being too broad for this thesis, it is enough to note Sherrell & Simmer-Brown’s call for critical attention to any suggestion that adopting mindfulness might, in our case, be an easy answer to the puzzle of reflective practice. For instance, they highlight how the Global North “mindfulness movement” (Sherrell & Simmer-Brown, 2017:80) obviates “marginalization, exclusion, separateness, and aggression” as “merely a function of [...] perceptions” (2017:81), whilst reinforcing a ‘very limited bandwidth’ of acceptable practice in terms of “be[ing] in one’s body, and to have voice” (2017:83). Essentially, it is the White-washing of rich, multifaceted and multi-formed cultural traditions and practices.

However, a growing number of writers sit mindfulness in a broader frame of contemplative pedagogy, a “form of inquiry and imaginative thinking [that] complement[s] critical thinking” (Bush, 2010:162), here, then, Gaze *and* contemplative practices that foster Mode 2/first person “investigations” (Owen-Smith, 2018:24). For Barzbeat & Bush (2014:viii-ix) contemplative pedagogy is the same endeavour “that is at the heart of *all* great scholarship: profound attentiveness to the phenomena that one is trying to understand” [*emphasis added*], i.e. that students/practitioners should “feel deeply and experience themselves within their education” (2014:3). Rodgers (2002:851) discusses this in terms of presence, applying it to discussion and practice of reflective practice, drawing on Dewey to develop “six phases” through which to facilitate presence in university programmes for being and becoming teachers. Subsequently, Rodgers & Raider-Roth (2006:267) beautifully craft this into enabling professionals to bring their “whole self to full attention so as to perceive what is happening in the moment”.

By this Narrating of mindfulness I am not suggesting that the percipients were aware of these matters in their use of the word but this is the point. Although they *spoke* of ‘mindfulness’ and their Describing of it has potential association with mindfulness practise, it is not clear if they were conceptualising it in relation to its roots, history and purpose, or

as being more conscious in and of their thoughtlessness. In similar terms, then, caution is required to ward against simplistic and uncritical adoption of 'mindfulness' as if this alone will provide direction for (even answer to) a re-imagined reflective practice. Indeed, how mindfulness and its broader base of contemplative pedagogy is differentiated or related to reflective practice is typically unclear, although for Morgan (2014) the key difference is in the cognitive bias of mainstream emphasis on reflection-on-action. In any case, Ergas (2013:4) states "we have not yet developed a rigorous conceptualisation of contemplative practice as pedagogy", in our case, in its adoption in higher education to support reflective practice. Even so, a broader frame of contemplative pedagogy, its scholarly underpinning, and its facilitation of a wider breadth of practices if in conjunction with critical awareness of diversity and developed through research in its possibilities and potential, appears to offer a promising contribution to theorising and practice of Glance - and Gaze. The recent growth of interest in and literature on contemplative pedagogy lends to that task, therefore further extension in this regard is not developed in this thesis.

5.3 Embodied knowing

Having Narrated the percipients Description of improvisation and mindfulness of Glance, attention now turns to embodied knowing, which builds on discussion above. Reference to 'mind', 'cognition' and 'thinking' has appeared in numerous places through this thesis, indeed often interchangeably and without definition, a reality that typifies discussion of reflective practice when used there too. For example, dominance of understanding concerning and practices to control the way one thinks, so reflective practice as a "state of mind" (Vaughn, 1990:ix) through the management of Gaze to sustain and produce this "proper" position (Hochschild, 2012:9) has been a strong feature in the percipients Descriptions. Even play was referred to as "special a state of *mind*" [*emphasis added*] (Martin, 1991:35). In terms of Glance and reflection-in-action, the percipients Describe 'receptiveness of mind', expressed as 'lightness' and 'patient being' although they speak interchangeably about 'mind' and 'head', these being different to their 'body, feelings, and soul'. A full Narration of theory connected to all this is too broad for the scope of this thesis, but it is useful to call on Arendt and her differentiation of 'thought' with 'cognition', and Ergas for his elucidation of 'mind' to develop understanding.

Briefly, for Arendt thought "has neither an end nor an aim outside of itself, and it does not even produce results" (1958:170), a definition that has a notable resonance with that of 'reflection' in chapter 3. She defines cognition as the

process by which we acquire and store up knowledge, [...] always pursu[ing] a definite aim which can be set by practical considerations as well as 'idle curiosity', but once reached the cognitive process has come to an end (*ibid*),

which has a striking correlation with discussion of reflection-on-action. Ergas (2013:6-7) explains mind from yogic scholarship: "lower mind", 'related to perception' that "gathers sense data, thinks and decides [...] at a rather crude level"; "higher mind", 'intellect, reason, and allows insight, reflection and discrimination'; and, finally, "I-maker", which "personalizes the experiences of the previous two components". Combining the three, 'mind' encompasses the "restless flux" of "thoughts *and* sensations" [*emphasis added*] (2013:7). In this context, the dominance of cognition through the 'plug and chug' (*cf.* Bella) technical rational approach to reflective practice is ironic. Rather than "artful practice" of practitioners (Schön, 1983:19), reflective practice has been shown as a practice where it is

presupposed one can 'get at' the understanding and competence of the practitioner through the act of representation. [...] Tacit, embodied understanding and competence are presumed to preserve their nature through the process of representation and therefore not bound in any significant sense to situated embodied action as such (Dohn, 2011:678).

Change as a result of reflective practice is also assumed to be cognitive – change in the way one thinks about one's practice and the assumption that this will impact on what one thinks when in practice. The elevation of "cognitive, rational knowing above other forms of comprehension" (Brookfield, 2000: 43) (such as improvisation, mindfulness, and embodied knowing) have been argued as steeped in the Humanistic roots of reflective practice and the established therapeutic and constructivist perspective in education – and Global North societies - with cognition as sovereign.

Yet the percipients Describe 'memory stored in the body', and felt senses captured by facial gestures. They speak of the *knowingness* of feelings without naming them; of being 'flooded', of 'waves coming in' and being 'washed by' 'memories'; of 'sounds and rhythms' of space and place; and of embodied experiences of 'fear' and 'shock'. They draw on bodied metaphor, such as 'blinker' in contrast to 'keeping one's peripheral vision alive' to contrast Gaze with Glance, and 'chewing over' negative practice. They Describe 'the shape moods make', of 'getting outside of self-consciousness to get in the moment', of 'breathing', 'noise', 'gut feeling', and, 'just being'. Rather than domination of mind and its cognitive processes as the singular form of knowing and a practice that is about control, *their* knowing is embodied and bodied and the practice they Describe is about recognising and dwelling in not controlling this, in a moment. Indeed, diverging from mainstream

reflective practice, Cowart (2005) asserts that all practice is realised through the body, echoing Heidegger's (1961/1979:99) central thesis

We do not 'have' a body; rather we 'are' bodily'. Feeling, as feeling oneself to be, belongs to the essence of such Being.

Here, then, body and mind are a "tight coupling" (Cosmelli & Thompson, 2010:367) in contrast to the Captured, Curated and now Narrated percipient lived experiences of mainstream reflective practice with its preoccupation of cognition, struggling to cognitively grasp what is required, engaging in cognitive (flawed) processes about their professional practice, and then carefully constructing the re-presentation of that in diaries through further deliberation. The percipients knowing through reflection-in-action paradoxically matches Dewey's (1916/2011:78) concept of 'reflective thought' on which Schön developed his thesis, 'reflective thought' being an embodied process, in contrast to the "evil results which have flowed from [the] dualism of mind and body", where the 'wellspring of bodily activity' is constructed as an "intruder". Here, then, separating mind and body "destroys the vital meaning of an experience" (1916/2011:84), yet in what was to become reflective practice, this is exactly what has happened. Bodily feelings are not *entirely* absent: Atkins & Murphy (1993), for example, propose three stages to a reflective cycle, the first being awareness of *uncomfortable* feelings or thoughts, and in Schön's (1983) original writing he asserts that reflection is (only) triggered by one's surprise or realisation of breakdown in routine practice. More generally, O'Neill (2009) refers to the sensing of bodied disquiet as a signal that something needs attention through the term 'uncanny' moments, which, for our purposes, can be understood as travelling a particular path of professional practice, familiar due to education, length of experience, The Trappings, and planning, but suddenly being thrown off, an experience of surprise, discomfort, unease, and of not knowing what to do. It is an uncanny or aporic moment, a surprise during events. Atkins & Murphy's (1993) second stage is 'critical analysis' of such uncanny moment against known knowledge, and their final phase is 'development of a new perspective' by combining "self-awareness, critical analysis, synthesis and evaluation" (Finlay, 2008:4). In this, then, although alluding or specifically referring to feelings, the typical focus of the practice of reflective practice is of these being instructive of something untoward, with practitioners moving quickly from them via and to cognitive functions to master the situation. For the percipients, however, knowing is embodied and bodied, that they might feel and not name, and their experience of professional practice is messy, and this *all* the time, rather than occasional surprising situations or breakdowns. O'Neill (2009:216) extends her analysis of uncanny to consider the '*canniness* of bodily knowing' [*emphasis added*]. In our terms, in

contrast to Schönian-inspired reflective practice centring on surprise and cognition, O'Neill's contention is that the *body* is canny *all* the time. Drawing on proprioception, she observes

the unconscious, effectively effaced, perception of whole and partial bodily orientation and movement derived from inner bodily sensations [...] highly modulated with tactile, vestibular, visual and aural sensations (2009:220).

Indeed, Vaquez Bronfman (2005:13) bemoans the weight of literature on professional practice that typically '*only* considers the small part of professional activity' [*emphasis added*] that concerns cognition. For similar reasons, Kinsella (2007a:408) advocates rejection of a Cartesian duality, instead to regard the body and mind as "intertwined". Here, then, thought, knowledge and action cannot be understood *without* their embodiment (Burkitt, 1999).

In Narrating the percipients experience, then, clarity concerning Descartes argument becomes salient. Indeed, the extent to which Global North epistemology and ontology has evolved on the basis of duality is well-established, typically reduced in reference to 'mind/body split' with the body essentially absent. In *Discourse On The Method* (1637/1975:15) Descartes is clear that 'mind' is indeed both the starting point and guiding principle. To illustrate, he asserts "never" to "comprise nothing more in my judgement than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly", this being his 'method of doubt'. The division between body and mind is proposed through 'six meditations': he writes that he was initially "undecided" but by the sixth he had "proved" it (1642/1954:130). This alone could reinforce popular understanding of his philosophy. However, in that final piece he writes "my body, by a special title really did belong to me [...] I could never separate myself entirely from it" (1642/1954:112) but given his 'method of doubt' he urges one must "not rashly accept all the apparent data of sensation", whilst on the other hand neither rashly "call them all into question" (1642/1954:114). Consequently, he argues that he 'has a body closely bound up with' himself but also a "clear and distinct idea of [himself] as a conscious and not an extended being, and a body which is an extended and not a conscious being" (1642/1954:114-5). Because he can consider his body as a number of parts he conceptualises it as "divisible", but when he 'considers the mind' he "can distinguish no parts within myself" (1642/1954:121). Therefore, his contention is that 'sense-perceptions' are purely for "indicating to the mind what is good or bad" (1642/1954:119) and "mind is not directly affected by all parts of the body; but only by the brain" (1642/1954:121), the prioritising of cognitive brain functioning

over the body. So finally he declares the body and its sensations to be present but different, working as a “machine” that serves the mind within which they are ‘more often true than delusive’, and that “memory [...] connects the present to the past, and my understanding (1642/1954:124). The body is made

in such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still carry out all the operations that, as things are, do not depend on the command of the will, nor therefore on the mind (1642/1954:120).

As a result, he is led to the belief that thinking is something that cannot rationally be doubted, hence describing “I am, I exist” (1642/1954:67), ‘information from the body is negligible’, and ‘bodies are only really perceived by intellect’ (1642/1954:75). Strictly speaking, then, rather than the commonly referenced body/mind ‘split’ or ‘divide’, Descartes’ philosophy is that body and mind are fundamentally different “substances”, in relationship with each other, but dualistic, the body being servant to the latter (*ibid*). But the percipients do not Describe being in relationship with body as an inferior partner, a Cartesian and Schönian notion of body as a source of information on the way to cognitive mastery; they Describe their experience of bodily knowing as important in its own right. This is more in accord with the Phenomenological philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002:94) in his appreciation of “the body [as] the vehicle of being in the world”, where the “inside and outside are inseparable” (1945/2002:474) such that “my existence as subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body [...] inseparable from this body and this world” (1945/2002:475).

From this Narrating, we can now appreciate how professional practice has become reduced to prioritising the technical rational perspective of Gaze, where only knowledge that can be ‘pinned down’ (*cf.* Emery), objectively analysed, and measured against externally ‘valid’ knowledge is the kind of knowing to be trusted and valued (Barnett, 2008; Saleebey, 1989; Gowdy, 1994; Kinsella, 2007b). Further, it underscores the role of ‘experts’ (*cf.* Emery) in authority because in such a context practitioners are dependent on them to provide and direct towards packages of appropriate knowledge against which they should interpret their practice, the same experts that judge the outcome and, in the case of professional education, assess against its production of acceptable forms. Reflective practice in such terms becomes constructions of identity and practice that are partial and limited, thus, “are not, by themselves, enough” (Saltiel, 2010:141) – but pretend to be. Like Descartes body being a machine that serves the mind, reflective practice is the machine that serves the cognitive self.

Thus, a broader Narrating to develop theoretical connections to phenomenology, the canny body and aporia proves useful to understanding Glance. Macintyre & Buck (2008:324) write of professional practices, in their case, teaching, as “bodily participatory engagement”; and in their discussion of acting Oida & Marshall (1997:14) describe the importance of practitioners ‘learning the geography of their body’ through “active awareness”. Estola & Elbaz-Luwish (2003:704) highlight two integrated elements: teachers’ awareness of their own physical bodies as it is the first aspect that students pay attention to; and, the toll of “physical labour” of their practice on their bodies. They discuss these in terms of “bodily presence”, so the “physical fact” of being there, and also, powerfully, their awareness of “body positions”. In a different social profession Pack (2009:49) also highlights the essential and integral understanding that practitioners (counsellors) have of their ‘bodies as a site of knowing’ to inform their practice. Further still, Dekeyser & Leijssen (2005) offer a more nuanced analysis, distinguishing between ‘body orientated responses’, where a practitioner is *aware* of their bodily knowing and *explicitly* refers to and uses it in their practice; and, ‘body-based responses’, where they respond it subconsciously. Shaw (2004) provides evidence of *three* different themes of bodily knowing in professional practice: ‘body empathy’ or resonance with clients/users; ‘body as receiver’, so awareness of being bodily affected by the interaction; and ‘body management’, that is, dealing with their own physical body and that of the client. In sum, analysis here refines understanding the ‘body as a tool of the language of practice’ (Estola & Elbaz-Luwish, 2003:714)).

Narrating further, Pack (2009) discusses the *process* whereby students/practitioners are aware of their bodily knowing, writing of “attuning” (2009:46) “with the experience of their own bodies” (2009:49). ‘Attuning’ acts as “a guide connecting them with [...] unspoken content” (*ibid*) received through somatic transference and countertransference (Ross, 2000) (emotional identification and transfer/contagion when working with clients/users), and supports them in ‘transcending disassociation’ (Pack, 2009:49) and “vicarious traumatisation” (2009:48). Specifically, Sodhi & Cohen (2012) write of students/practitioners being supported to become “more effective” (2012:131) in all this by learning to “tune in” (2012:120); and ‘tuning in’ was a phrase used by the percipients themselves. They Describe it in terms of paying attention to and engaging with their bodied responses, to understanding and trusting this as a valid source of knowledge and in contrast to the absence of “noncognitive ways of knowing” (Barnacle, 2009:32) in typical social professional education. Their lived experiences match Barnacle’s (*ibid*) assertion for

the “life of the gut” and therefore for “re-thinking the central role that reason has traditionally been accorded in accounts of learning and understanding”.

Whilst Schön aimed to provide a ‘new epistemology of practice’ through reflective practice that “*rejected* linear thinking as the primary mode for professional problem solving and knowledge building” [*emphasis added*] (Papell & Skolnik, 1992:20), this research has shown that in theorisation, conceptualisation and application it has become precisely that. Indeed, ‘epistemology’ has been shown to be instrumental here, now understood as compounded in the Global North, the dominant epistemology prioritising cognition, where embodied and bodied knowing become invisible, unvalued and denied.

Yet it has also been identified from a more complete reading of Schön’s work that he began to cast reflection-in-action as a “critically important” (1983:69) visceral, sensate embodied felt experience, such that by 1992 he is expanding his 1983 concept of “action-present” to a “conversation with the situation” that “need not employ the medium of words” (1992b:125). He writes of this as “the time to look, the patience to hear what the material has to say to you, the openness to let it come to you” (1992b:126).

First, then, we can see that the development and application of Schön’s ideas in mainstream literature, based as they are in his 1980’s work and not his whole body of writing, evidences that they have been “selectively plundered in such a way that the original vibrancy and open possibilities have been charged with a stereotyped cycle of reflection” (Sweet, 2010:187). Further, even in respect of this, reflection-in-action was clearly not something he fully worked through, made complicated by his own confusing of reflection-on with reflection-in action, a situation that he acknowledges himself (1992b:123). Accordingly, and perhaps as a result, embodied knowing as part of reflective practice has continued to be significantly misunderstood, underdeveloped and/or absent altogether. Here, then, Glance of reflection-in-action reclaims and redefines its significance.

6 Leaving Go

Having Narrated Gaze and Glance, focus now turns to the third theme Described in chapter 4. The percipients Described *not* engaging in Gaze and Glance or reflection -on and -in action. They spoke of Leaving Go, involvement in a tangibly different activity to the one they were engaged in. They Describe this in terms of mind wandering, absorption that flushes through and washes or freshens the brain/mind. Leaving Go is not deliberately

setting about engaging in something different for this to occur, or merely getting distracted, but they know it has happened because by not working on something something works, clicks, a block is cleared, seeing is clearer. The percipients name and value Leaving Go as important in its own right.

Narrating Leaving Go, it is interesting to note similarities with 'mind-wandering', defined and discussed in neuroscience. Reviewing its literature, Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna (2013:3-4) note that it first features in early 1960's research when its benefits were identified, i.e. "consolidate[ion of] recent [...] experiences into long term memory"; 'mental time travel' enabling connection of 'past, present and future' thus a renewal of 'self-identity and sense of continuity'; and 'prospection', the 'simulation of plausible outcomes' to actual and possible future events, "an adaptive process that helps us select the optimal course of action". Baird *et al* (2012) turn their focus to the *nature* of the mind-wandering task, referring to research that shows an increase in the benefits when the task is 'undemanding' rather than 'no task at all' (2012:1117). They use the term 'incubation' as 'paradigm and concept' to describe mind-wandering (*ibid*), which took me to an older source⁸ but nonetheless relevant to following percipient lead. In 1926 Wallas wrote on *The Art of Thought* as part of creative problem solving. Framed by recognising the complexity of consciousness, combined with discussing the extent of personal agency and control, he explains that the art of thought "is an attempt to improve by conscious effort [this] already existing form of human behaviour" (1926:24). Drawing on philosophical, psychological and introspective studies of the time, he compares day-dreaming, distraction and automatic thinking to the "achievement of thought" (1926:37). Day-dreaming is "the interrelation of verbal and visual imagery with rising and falling consciousness (1926:32-32); distraction, "when a fully-conscious train of thought is broken in upon a call for our attention to another subject" (1926:33); and automatic thinking is explained through etymology of the word 'click' (1926:29) (therefore different in meaning to that ascribed by the percipients use of 'click'). In contrast, 'achievement of thought' involves immersion in the problem followed by the defining feature of "incubation", "an interval free from conscious thought on the particular problem concerned" (1926:42). Because of incubation "illumination" happens, "the appearance of the 'happy idea'" (1926:38) which can then be 'verified', i.e. "both the validity of the idea [is] tested and the idea itself [is] reduced to exact form" (1926:38). 'Incubation' has resonance with the percipients lived experiences of Leaving Go:

⁸ With thanks to Dr. Judith McCullouch

Wallas describes it as “voluntary abstention” through “conscious mental work on other problems” (1926:41) and the percipients spoke of detailed and focused work such as ‘fixing spectacles’ and ‘doing jigsaws’; Wallas writes of “relaxation from all conscious mental work” (1926:41-42) and the percipients talk of ‘baking’ and ‘listening to music’ in the same vein. In other words, Wallas is describing a process that “restore[s] freshness to the mind” (1926:46) that precedes a “‘flash’ of success” (1926:47), a period on the “fringe of consciousness” (1926:47) or “intimation” (1926:48), a “state of rising consciousness” (1926:48) that a person may or may not be aware of, but will typically describe in terms of feeling something emerging (1926:48-49). He argues that through greater awareness of incubation, so “we can attempt to hold on to such a train on the chance that it might succeed” (1926:50). It is interesting to see that some 40 years later in his iconic final work before he died, Bachelard (1960/1969b) wrote of “reverie”, “a flight from the real” where “consciousness relaxes and wanders and consequently becomes clouded” (1960/1969:5) on the way to “an opening to a beautiful world, to beautiful worlds”, a state of “I a non-I which belongs to the I” (1960/1969:13); and thirty years on again, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) writes about creativity signifying ‘preparation, incubation, the ‘aha’ moment, evaluation and elaboration’, and how that process can involve many ‘iterations, loops and insights’, with the insight appearing slowly, perhaps years, through a series of many small “disconnected flashes”, or maybe a “thunderous aha”, or combinations of both (1996:81). Creativity as a generative, transformative process is taken up by Robinson (2011) in his important work on creativity and education, in fact echoing Wallas’ conclusion that “training in the art [of thinking] should be part of [education]” (1926:169) for a “life of creative thought” (1926:172).

Leaving Go can thus be understood as crucial in reflective practice alongside Gaze and Glance, *and* to support the creativity of Glance, *as well as* be important in its own right. However, like earlier Narration of mindfulness, it is vital to note Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna’s (2013) caution against naïve application of mind-wandering, in our terms, Leaving Go. They highlight how content underlying an individual’s mind-wandering plus the nature of mind-wandering itself can significantly alter the experience, and how it could be indication of “performance disruptions, cognitive problems, risk taking or low motivation” (2013:2). This, then, is important to consider in facilitation of Leaving Go.

In sum, Leaving Go is not something I have come across in literature on reflective practice and yet Narrating from the percipients lead shows it to compliment and be the foil for the deliberate activity of reflection-on-practice, and the partner to Glance of reflection-in-

action. Therefore Leaving Go is significant and to be facilitated in equal terms as Gaze and Glance within professional practice education. Consequently, I began to visualise and conceptualise Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go together as a rhythm, building on the percipients own use of the word as well as on the rhythmic nature of their Descriptions of bodily and embodied knowing, the rhythm of moving in (reflection-in-action), out (reflection-on-action) and away (Leaving Go).

7 Facilitating the 'journey' of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go.

Having Narrated Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go, attention turns to their facilitation as a 'journey', the fourth theme emerging in chapter 4.

Schön (1987a:13) writes of professional artistry as

a kind of knowing, though different in crucial aspects from our standard model of professional knowledge. It is not inherently mysterious; it is rigorous in its own terms; and we can learn a great deal about it – within what limits, we should treat as an open question.

His suggestion is that this should happen “by carefully studying the performance of unusually competent performers” (*ibid*), perpetuating an epistemological assumption that length of experience equates to extent of competence, a view that was challenged in chapter 2. Whilst no doubt it brings confidence, and confidence features in the percipients Describing, as well as that gained through time and promotion, they are also clear that Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go are essential at all levels of experience. Indeed, they expressly state that facilitation and engagement should begin at the start of their professional education. In any case, setting aside the thorny matter of how ‘unusually competent’ practitioners are defined and identified, Schön does not elucidate the process by which one’s own reflection-in-action develops by studying such practice. In *The Reflective Practitioner* Schön also writes of factors that ‘foster or impede’ reflection-in-action (1983:321), such as ‘fixed stereotypical categories’ and feelings of ‘shame, vulnerability and fear of failure’ (Schön, 1983:321), but he does not articulate ways to positively work with these or how to facilitate to lessen their likelihood. However, the percipients are clear: rather than instruction and guidance of current practices of reflective practice in its slow violence of breaking-in to and through its practices, they want support and facilitation to dwell in Identity-As (in contrast to Identity-Of) and reflection-in-action, a playful, creative, contemplative approach based in imagination, improvisation and embodied knowing. As a way to explore this, then it is recalled that chapter 4 noted the research process from which

Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go emerged must be significant in facilitating the journey, therefore the focus of Narrating that follows.

7.1 Dialogue and approach

In chapter 4 I offered that the research process being based in dialogue must be significant, and indeed, the percipients Describe this as giving vitality to their reflective practice which it had been missing. Dialogue is different to conversation or discussion. Whilst all concern individuals sharing their own “horizon of understanding” (Gadamer, 1979:143), in conversation and discussion this involves “problem-solving” (Goulet, 2005:ix) via expression or imposition of a “particular vantage point” (*ibid*), but dialogue is “the totality of human experience” (*ibid*), the purpose of which is “explicitly critical and aimed at action”. Those taking part “reject their role as mere ‘objects’ in nature and social history and undertake instead to become ‘subjects’ of their own destiny” (2005:viii). But being a process of ‘ruptures, disturbances and fusion’ (Gadamer, 1979:273) it necessarily must be underpinned by values of ‘concern, trust, respect, appreciation, affection and hope’ (Burbules, 1993) if it is to “discover or re-establish a genuine and creative collective consciousness” (Smith, 2001:np). As such, the role and nature of facilitation becomes significant, requiring careful and sensitive regard, a point underscored by the percipients themselves. However, because values are not always immediately/obviously visible, a claim to dialogue could be made when in fact it is absent. For example, in her iconic challenge to critical pedagogy, feminist writer Ellsworth (1989:298) picks out its practices of dialogue, empowerment and voice as potential “vehicles of repression” [*emphasis added*], that is, they can “perpetuate relations of domination” (1989:298) in their action as “code words” that ‘hide political agendas’ (1989:300) in the (well-meaning, or otherwise) practices of educators/facilitators and the space, place and systems of education (1989:298). Indeed, it is Gur-Ze’ev’s (1998:463) contention that simply an uniformed notion of “hope” held by professionals for their clients can be patriarchal, elitist, and ethnocentric, in Ellsworth’s (1989:300-301) words, a “violence” practiced through the “dogma of illusion of hegemonic versions of what is best for another” and well-intentioned but uncritical “practices” (1989:303).

Thus, *calling* a group conversation or discussion *dialogue* doesn’t make it be so; and absence of “meaningful analysis” (1989:306) of relations, roles, power, individual and shared purposes, and actual (political) interests risks silencing and repressing. It draws to mind a realisation I came to during the RPRGs. I became aware that I was becoming

increasingly irritated with one of the percipients whose comments seemed (to me) to take random trajectories. Ostensibly, then, I was perceiving her as other to what I wanted/hoped from her in her participation in the research process. It was not until an accumulative activity of noticing my irritation in the moment that I began to realise there was an association in her interjections that *she* was making and understood, I just needed to ask her to articulate it. With that small effort on my behalf I was able to comprehend her direction of flow – she, of course, knew it already. Reading the transcripts, before that eventual Glance of noticing (and my rather guilty realisation) I can see that my responses must have ‘closed’ her (comments, participation, self) down. Wellington & Austin (1996) identify five valid different and non-hierarchical orientations to reflective practice, and encourage practitioners and their facilitators to identify and value their own primary mode of engagement, although, patently, that I knew their theory did not mean I embedded it. Dialogue, then, like reflection-in-action, is as much an ongoing commitment as it is a political action. Indeed, it is Arendt’s contention that action and speech ‘actively reveals’ “unique personal identities” (1958:179) *not* self-knowledge. Therefore, dialogue has the power to ‘rescue a reflective group exercise from narcissism or psychologism’ (Goulet, 2005:ix).

To sum up here, in the facilitation of the journey of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go, the process of reflection-in-action, to what purpose, or, to what “initiative” in Arendt’s words (1958:185), what ethical moorings, *and* for this to be in the “interspace” or “inter-est” (1958:182) of dialogue, are all key in creating the difference between “authentic” individual and collective engagement, with pointless cyclical internal or external talk and “self-display” (Arendt, 1971:36) of mainstream reflective practice.

A positive impact on dialogue in the RPRGs came from critical phenomenology in view of its “clearly defined methodological form of reflection” (Luft, 2019:xxxvi) so this must also have relevance to facilitating the journey of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go in its potential to bring “renewal with more rigor than is [otherwise] possible” (*ibid*). It is a method that is widely acknowledged as an

an artful, assimilative experience for those who take it seriously and incorporate its premises, methods, orientations and perspectives – bodily, affectively, cognitively, and assumptively (Psathas, 2009:xi),

a description with a striking similarity to the percipients own expression of what is required.

The power of critical phenomenology method lies in its “challeng[e] to let phenomena reveal themselves” (Bentz & Rehorick, 2009:4). Thus, rather than imposing “a lens of

understanding”, its offers “a mirror” so that those engaging can “clear [their] focus” and ‘see themselves in a new way’ (*ibid*). The relevance of this to facilitation of reflective practice can only be significant. As discussed earlier in relation to the RPRGs, critical phenomenology as the method of inquiry catalysed during 2014, so half way through the research period meaning that the benefits of Petitmengin’s (2006) elucidation of its style of interviewing that informed my facilitation was not there at the Start. In future facilitation of a redefined and re-imagined reflective practice it would follow that foregrounding its approach from the Start for the emergence and exploration of subjective experience as part of the journey of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go would be helpful. In fact, Petitmengin uses it in her higher education *teaching* (so not only her phenomenological research) to enable students “to gain consciousness of their own cognitive processes, and to make them explicit, so that they can then use this technique in their professional practice” (2006:231), endorsement of its approach within this context.

Having Narrated the significance of dialogue with a critical phenomenological approach to overall facilitation, focus now turns to the particular, that is, the percipients Describing of facilitating a reclaimed redefined reflection-on-action through Gaze, reflection-in-action through Glance, and Leaving Go.

7.2 Facilitating Gaze

Starting with reflection-on-action, percipients are explicit in their need for it to be more imaginatively and creatively conceptualised and facilitated. Of course writing on and talking about ones professional practice after an event for some students/practitioners has the potential to be a “fundamental [way] in which we express ourselves and learn from others” (Barzbeat & Bush, 2014:135) but it is clear from the percipients Captured and Curated lived experiences that this cannot be the case, or at best will be unlikely, in the way that practice of reflection-on-action is currently configured. Gaze tells of a slow incremental violence of being ‘broken in’ that contradicts the value and intent of self-expression. As argued, in a context of ‘knowledge telling’ (*cf.* Sharples) and writing/talk as reporting via ‘pinning practice down’ (*cf.* Emery), a student’s focus will inevitably and necessarily land on their need to learn what and how to write/talk (*cf.* Allen *et al*), therefore focus on service of themselves rather than the artistry of professional practice for the service of others. In parallel the facilitator’s focus will be on the information required to support that endeavour as well as how to assess performance of ‘appropriate development’.

Of course, individuals *might* engage in reflective practice outside of this, indeed akin to a recommendation made by Kember *et al* (2001) in their assertion that reflective activities such as diary writing should be private with practitioners choosing what they share from them to be used for assessment purposes. But, this risks leaving professional practice ‘undiscussed’ (*cf.* Schön) and maintains reflective practice as an isolated, individual activity, with all the resulting issues that have been identified.

And of course, it must be acknowledged that *even* within current reflection-on-action as Described and Narrated, some percipients learned some things some times.

Going further than Kember *et al*, Stewart & Richardson (2000) argue for reflective activities not being assessed at all, and certainly their freezing effect Described by the percipients along with the shadow of audience and its impact on engagement could lend to this conclusion. But, not only does a concern with assessing reflective practice leave unaddressed the depth and breadth of issues explicated in this thesis, assessment as part of education and qualification is not per se problematic. What is at issue is the way its “central purpose” is understood, i.e. the way it features within broader ‘pedagogical approaches and goals’ (Moore, 2004:35). Moreover, and as highlighted through The Trappings, a recommendation for facilitation of reflective practice cannot sit entirely “outside or untouch[ed] by the larger social conversations, situations, ideologies and purposes within which it is situated” (2004:36): because it *is* part of professional education it *will* need to be involved with assessment. In accord with Moore, there is no reason that conception, theories, facilitation and facilitators of reflective practice cannot “contribute to [a] range of purposes” [*sic*] (*ibid*) that includes assessment in higher education frameworks, an important point I return to later, but surely doing so can be better than the current best of some student/practitioners learning some things, some times, hardly an illustrious exposition of professional artistry!

To start with, a radically (as defined in chapter 1) different - indeed appropriate, useful *and* ethical - reflective practice has been Narrated in terms of naming and conceptualising it as reflection-on-action when this is what is expected and intended. In contrast to hiding intention and purpose behind the generic term ‘reflective practice’, transparency is radical, and facilitating and assessing reflection-on-action through the established standards and principles of critical thinking is also radical. This is because at root reflection-on-action is a “secondary reflection practice with [specific] evaluative criteria” (Dohn, 2011:673) whereby individuals ‘master’ their thoughts and take command of themselves, their practice and

their practice situations by presenting some version and elements of past experience “in front of” themselves (Gendlin, 1997:4), “control]led], contain[ed] or capture[d]” (1997:3) through Gaze. Gaze reveals reflection-on-action to be an empirical epistemology of experience as “finished givens” that can be ‘simply observed, represented’ (1997:6), and analysed to reveal ‘the truth in situations’ (*ibid*) as if there is one. Even though the criteria for this are imposed externally it necessarily becomes a “self-referential [process] of practice representation” (Dohn, 2011:673) because individuals base their accounts on flawed cognitive processes and shape, amend, and make-up the details to meet requirements. Therefore, a radical facilitation of reflection-on-action is to explicitly, transparently and more usefully frame, understand and facilitate it in terms of Gaze, the ‘systematic cultivation’ (Paul & Elder, 2006b:4) and assessment of a practitioner’s critical thinking about their practice through the clearly worked-through standards. In doing so it would openly and tangibly reflect the technical-rational paradigm of reflection-on-action/Gaze and enable higher education practices to maintain a focus on learning outcomes and their evidencing (McIntosh, 2013).

Yet, the percipients also express the need for more imaginative and creative facilitation of Gaze. For instance, they offer that Gaze could be enhanced through ‘reflective scraps’, instead of whole accounts, that they deliberately return to and ‘layer up, Gazing again to identify how they have adopted domesticating discourses in the ways that they write about their practice. It also occurred to me that connection with theory through Narrating could assist further in exploration of a reimagined, creative Gaze

Kristeva’s *Tales of Love* (1987) proved significant in this regard. Love being a deeply subjective and private theme, it struck me that public exposure could leave an author vulnerable such that they elect to lie, ham up, edit, embellish, make it all up, or not write about it at all, paralleling percipients experiences of reflection-on-action. Yet, Kristeva enters into the task despite ‘finding it difficult’ (1987:1). Of course, she will have crafted her writing: she, like reflective practitioners engaged with reflection-on-practice, are writing for a purpose and in the shadow of an audience. Even so this does not prevent her from writing *and* doing so with authenticity. A case in point is in the chapter *Stabat Mater*, title from a 13th Century hymn and Haydn composition translated as “grief of a mother for the pain of her child” (van der Velden & van Osnabrugge, 2015). Here Kristeva writes on woman as mother whilst interweaving it with personal sensate, visceral, embodied ‘flashes’ (1987:234) of her own subjective experiences and felt senses from pregnancy, birth, the physicality of an infant, and her embodied responses as mother. Whilst writing in one

column about the relationship between Mary and Jesus, in the adjoining column she records her responses to her own crying baby. It is a deeply personal and subjective reflection, but as I read it I can feel her-my response to the crying of her-my newborn, and even if I had not had a baby of my own I would still be able to feel from within her writing. In places in Kristeva's writing, *on* and *about* take precedent, no personal reflection at all, in other places the two run alongside, illuminating, even entwining making it difficult to discern whether the focus is Mary, Kristeva – or indeed, me. I feel it in my gut. Thus, whilst exploring content *on* “the most refined symbolic construct [of] femininity, [that of] *Maternity*” [sic] (1987:234), Kristeva's writing deeply connects with her self *and* my self: I am invited in to the process, and she-I-we feel connections in personal sensate, visceral, embodied “flashes” whilst reading and learning *about* theology.

It is a powerful piece of reflective writing. If the Gaze of reflection-on-action of professional practice was like this it could also be powerful – and a radical difference to the Curated and Described percipient experiences of depleted, flat, reduced constructions of ‘meaningless’ and ‘pointless’ reflective diaries. It would of course still be a representation of their practice. As noted by Dohn above, this is inherent to the task and there are “essential changes in the epistemological relation between practitioner, actions, and events” (2011:675). In fact, during the RPRGs we experimented with *deliberately* writing accounts of practice in third-person as ‘fictions’. But/and Narrating via Kristeva offers insight into the potential power of first-person accounts in relation to a re-imagined Gaze.

Gaze has a purpose, and can be creatively re-imagined, but it is limited and partial. Indeed, from similar conclusions about reflective practice Dohn (2011:680) argues that “alternative ways of acting that challenge and change the practice logic *from within the practices*” [sic] are needed, but these “have not been developed yet”. Gaze is positioned as *outside* and *on* professional practice, but we have seen here that it can be radical, helping to return reflective practice to its roots of artistry.

7.3 Facilitating Glance

Glance offers a different conceptualisation and practice *from within* professional practices: it meets a different purpose, responding to Dohn's, and, more importantly, the percipients call for such innovation.

The *nature* of Glance is already Narrated, and along with this the percipients also highlight need for ‘awareness of’ and a ‘tool-kit’ for ‘teaching people for Glance’. This must not be

based on input, passively learning and complying with expectations and requirements, but involve recognising, honouring, and dwelling in one's embodied and bodied knowing, a process that should start as early as possible in higher education programmes and then be embedded throughout. They express how it will take time, and as with discussion above regarding 'journey, this is not to do with dependence on length of experience in practice – or extent of knowledge of The Trappings – but time to grow appreciation of and confidence in one's own 'canniness' (cf. O'Neill). I have argued that career experience can imbue practitioners with confidence when engaging in practice in-the-moment, yet, nevertheless, a very new practitioner bringing limited time-length experience to the role can still be – indeed, according to percipients and established Narration, will be - aware of and respond from their senses and feelings, their bodily knowing all the time (Gowdy, 1994) and facilitation can give them confidence in and validation of that bodily and embodied knowing.

In Narration of this, then, and echoing Heidegger's theory outlined in chapter 4, Burbules (2002:179) description of *aporia* as 'epistemic *emptiness*' appears germane here. In sharp contrast to epistemic *knowing* that characterises current understanding and practice of reflective practice, epistemic emptiness is:

at that moment, one knows nothing, and does not know what to think or say or do next [...] there is no path in sight [or] there are too many paths to choose from [or] one cannot recognise a path is already there [or]the path is apparent but one cannot or will not follow it (*ibid*).

This will be experienced by *all* practitioners regardless of career length. Derrida (1993) refers to it as "doubt", suggesting differing kinds: 'aporia of suspension' (when action cannot be mechanically applied); 'ghost of undecidability' (perplexity when faced with different choices); and 'aporia of urgency' (doubt created by having to make decisions in the moment, right there and then). By focusing on the 'uncanny' worked with in retrospect through epistemic knowing, Gaze/reflection-on-action misses the complex nature of professional practice Captured in chapter 2, here understood as moments of uncertainty, risk, doubt as well as ones canniness all the time. Burbules (2002:174) uses the metaphor of "labyrinth" to describe this although ironically a labyrinth has a single path to follow. Maze, on the other hand, might be more appropriate with its numerous possibilities, some of which lead to dead ends and double-backs, although even then a typical maze still has a single 'correct' path amongst the choices leading to the desired outcome and Schön's original argument was of no blue-print or formula in the messiness of professional practice. Therefore, Narrating provides theoretical underpinning to *why* the percipients Descriptions

emphasise the no-path of epistemic emptiness, whilst, significantly, also theorising Glance in its opportunity and grounds on which to discuss and trust doubt, to become mindful of epistemic emptiness, and connect to the notion of embodied action through felt sense in a moment. Glance is the moment when “one recognises something as something; one recognises the unfamiliar so that it becomes familiar” (Burbules, 2002:177). The percipients offer that the ‘tool kit’ of Glance they are looking for should necessarily introduce the notion of aporia. Derrida’s nuanced conceptualisation would bring depth to this, and a focus on aporia would open space for understanding and insight into felt sense during uncanny *and* canny Glances, the felt sense and associations that bridge Glance to action during the aporic moment.

Moreover, and importantly, this recognising, honouring, and dwelling in one’s embodied and bodied knowing of Glance requires its own specialist lexis and shared understanding. Without this practitioners will be unable or less able to recognise, identify, acknowledge and articulate their embodied and bodied knowing. Similarly, without methods that privilege bodily knowing that are at least comparable to the models and pro forma that favour visible as well as cognitive reflection-on-practice, it will remain invisible. The nature of these methods also require attention recalling Arendt’s point that speech *and* action are key. Finally, without theory to underpin all this *practice* focus will move into the theoretically weightier cognitive realm as soon as possible, if not start and end there in entirety. Embodied and bodied knowing is, nonetheless, complex, or, as Sweet (2010:187) puts it, it is “something of a tease”. Traditionally acknowledgement of bodies as part of professional practice has been met with apprehension (Macintyre & Buck, 2008) hence why the “power” of bodily knowing “to form and inform self and others continues to be marginalized, perhaps feared” (Probyn, 1991:108): it is “the fear of the near” (*ibid*). Acknowledging body is bucking the trend so will be met with resistance from facilitators *and* students/practitioners.

7.4 Naming and articulating embodied and bodied practice.

Furthermore, to do so is not straightforward. In contrast to ‘pinning down’ and ‘reporting on’ practice to account for one’s decisions and action after the event, practice that is embodied and in a moment “is changing, volatile and often contradictory, [...] we do not have a single static story to tell about ourselves” (Estola & Elbaz-Luwish, 2003:703). Reflection-*on*-practice and its cognitively based epistemic knowing tells an easier, contained and tidy story, even if partially or indeed entirely made up. Even the way that

bodies are “understood and made meaningful is a cultural question” (Estola & Elbaz-Luwish, 2003:714). Foucault’s (1975/1977; 1976/1978) influential work discussed earlier points up the controlling power of discourses *about* bodies, the way that its surveillance creates “social bodies and realities” (Henderson, 2007:236), i.e. “power incites, instils and produces effects in the body” (2007:226), an “inscription” that “occurs” as soon as “the body enters culture” (2007:231). This is also a theme within feminist literature. For instance, Schweik (2010) explores oppressive and repressive notions of ‘normal bodies’ applied to women, and hooks (2000) commandingly conveys the intersection of feminist theory and Black women’s experience in the complexity of bodies and bodily knowing. In fact, May Schott (2001:322) develops a feminist critique *against* using the body as “source of truth” since to do so risks ‘essentialism and biologism’ that *traps* women” [*emphasis added*] (2001:326). In other words, her argument is that the body as reference point can belittle and romanticize complex experiences and discourses, or be so subjective to be too inward-looking, all criticisms that could be made of reflection-*in*-action itself, illuminating Arendt’s contention regarding the risk of individualist, isolated, self-indulgent practices.

Glance is a powerful potential to a reclaimed and redefined reflective practice, but what is clear from this Narrating is the risk of it reinforcing surveillance on body and becoming a ‘commitment to internalism’ (Mossel, 2005:149), in other words, a return to a domestic and domesticated self. Yet with that warning in mind, it is in-keeping with the percipient lead to continue and consider bodily knowing, a view that finds accord with Saleebey (1989:560) in his argument that “it is the *denial* of the body, of sensation, of sensory experience that is the key condition allowing political and social oppressions” [*emphasis added*]. Freire’s (1996) contention that it is the technical rational model, in our case, mainstream reflective practice, that reinforces authority and perpetuates oppression. Indeed, it is Field Belenky *et al*’s (1986) assertion that when bodily knowing is denied or blocked the content of that knowing becomes disembodied and disconnected. As Gendlin (1984:144) puts it, in such a context it is the

intricate texture of ‘inwardness’ that does not fit. And what it fails to fit is the ‘external reality’ made of seemingly smoother patterns that make no room for the complexity.

The issue, then, is *how* to facilitate an embodied and bodied reflection-*in*-action so that it becomes a trusted and valid source for practice *and* involves socio-political awareness, and to do so in ways that are nuanced and informed. Glance *is* personal and individual but such facilitation would ensure its context, purpose and action reclaim it as authentic from its

cover of domestication and domesticated practices *and* would offer a radical perspective that contrast with a centrally controlled reflective practice

It has been argued that that this involves identifying, naming and valuing the “constituent parts” of bodily knowing (Powell, 2008:93-94), so “listen[ing]” to bodies as both “cultural constructions and real flesh and blood” (Estola & Elbaz-Luwish, 2003:714), but also importantly, engaging with the *processes* of that elicitation, so with how the parts and the processes “are mixed and ‘mated’ in specific situations” (Powell, 2008:94). It could be that the complexity in this explains *why* reflective practice has become dominated by a cognitive based reflection-*on*-action – but, either way, a bodied and embodied reflection-in-action remains “the real challenge” (Vasquez Bronfman, 2005:16), one that this doctoral research addresses. It is interesting to note that rather than “teachers” *of* reflection-in-action, the current state of affairs, in 2001 Schön writes that reflection-in-action requires “coaches”: coaches will demonstrate their capacity for professional artistry and reflection-in-action and at the same time “help” students/practitioners in their development of it. This has fit with the percipients call for facilitation, support, and modelling and whilst Schön continues with the point that

the development of forms of professional education conducive to reflection-in-action requires reflection on the artistry of coaching (Schön, 2001:204)

he does not elucidate further, thus in our terms, the *processes of elicitation* of Glance of reflection-in-action is yet to be identified in this thesis.

7.5 Facilitating Leaving Go

Attention must also be given to facilitating Leaving Go in its place of equal significance to Gaze and Glance within professional practice education.

The importance of practitioners *not* engaging in reflective practice at all times in professional contexts was discussed in the Curation of chapter 3. It was posited that practitioners need to know about circumstances in which deliberately not reflecting would be a healthy strategy and appreciate how to do so in ways that do not involve a “thorough-going closure down of the self [but] a temporary suspension and defence of that self” (Ferguson, 2018:423). This would be an important inclusion in facilitation of Gaze and Glance.

But Leaving Go is different to this whilst also vital. Leaving Go is not about ‘not engaging in reflective practice’ but deliberate engagement in a different task, a process of incubation

prior to illumination. Without language, methods and facilitation of Leaving Go, practitioners will be unaware of its significance and therefore will not consciously engage in the deliberate mind-wandering that waters the ground of creative and innovative practice. To this end, Baird *et al* (2012:1120) suggest, for example, that its facilitation should include *reinforcing* engagement in “simple external tasks (i.e. tasks not related to the primary task)”, explaining that this works because it “increases unconscious associative processing” through a period in which “executive and default [neural] networks [can] interact” (2012:1121). Further, the deliberate action of Leaving Go could also be considered as a core element of self-care, essential when working in the social professions (McGarrigle & Walsh, 2011).

8 Facilitating Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go – and the need to focus further on Glance.

Thus, taking the lead from percipient lived experiences shows a radical approach to the practice of reflective practice involves creative, enlivening Gaze of reflection-on-action, the introduction of Leaving Go, *and* understanding and appreciating Glance of bodily knowing and the way this informs practice in-the-moment, a summation that connects with Satina & Hultgren’s (2001:531) declaration for the need to “bring the body in from the educational margins” through a ‘pedagogy of embodiment’.

Yet, to remind, the first sub aim of this research is ‘To explore, discuss *and propose* innovative and creative ways to consider, work with, and facilitate reflective practices in radically different ways within higher education programmes as a meaningful and political personal, individual and collective engagement’ [*emphasis added*]. Gaze and Leaving Go have been discussed, but whilst the rich meaning, significance and value of Glance has been established, now understood as involving bodily knowing as well as playful creativity, improvisation and imagination, broadly informed by contemplative pedagogy, *how* to engage with the processes of that elicitation from inside the practice, indeed, how to listen to the body still remains an important question.

Narrating with this in mind, Macintyre & Buck (2008:318) write of ‘catching self in the act’, explaining this to involve ‘fostering inner attention’ (2008:322) by ‘seeking’ and ‘seeing’ within the “concrete realities” of the “context the practitioner is working in (which involves receptivity as opposed to labelling and categorising)” (2008:319), a process that requires ‘falling into trust with the body as the medium for sense-making’ (2008:316). There are lovely resonances here with the percipients Describing of Glance, but alone this could risk

the cautioned naïve, romanticised, biologism, and being “too inward”, so “‘too’ complicated, oversensitive, too emotional, too demanding, too dependent, and so on” (Gendlin, 1984:145) discussed above. It is also essential to heed Kinsella’s (2007a:109) warning that an embodied reflection-in-action could become “a new master discourse”, reinforcement of my earlier argument that it risks becoming something that students/practitioners must be ‘broken in’ to. But the potential of Glance is in its theorisation and practice of reflection-in-action. Therefore these are all lines worth dancing: to not do so would sustain reflective practice as “partial and perverse”, perpetuating understanding and practice as “only occupying one side of the dualities it has constructed” (Harstock, 1983:171). Here, then, Glance “revers[es] the proper valuation of human activity” (*ibid*). To-date where attempts exist in mainstream literature to focus on reflection-in-action they typically get snagged on the fact of a gap between experience and making sense of that experience, thus lost in a trail of debate as to whether that makes it reflection-*on*-practice, obscuring any possibility and potential theorising reflection-in-action might bring. Differentiation offered between Gaze and Glance helps here but Narrating further the facilitation of an embodied, bodied Glance and its contribution to a radical re-imagining of reflective practice is required.

8.1 Facilitating embodied, bodied Glance

Dohn’s (2011:680) stated contention is that “alternative ways of acting that challenge and change the practice logic” need to come “*from within the practices*” [*sic*] but these are yet to be developed. It is to this that Glance speaks. In Narrating here, Mossel’s *Action, Control and Sensations of Acting* (2005) proves a useful starting place. He attests the value of turning attention to the ‘real-time’ sensations of acting. Not only is it “faster [...] because it need not wait for an error to occur” (2005:142), or in our terms, need not wait for an uncanny event or feeling, it signifies our canniness all the time. Moreover, it does not concern judgement and control, whether externally imposed or individually introjected, and neither is it solipsistic. Mossel distinguishes between ‘activity’ and ‘action’. ‘Activity’ is where focus is on outcome, and “intended results [...] are controlled” (2005:142), so, for us, activity relates to Gaze. ‘Action’ comprises “sensation” and “process”, sensation being “either a part or an effect of the process” such that the *sensations* of action “provide us with real-time information” (2005:135). It is a definition that resonates with Arendt’s ‘action’ Captured in chapter 2. Thus, “in awareness of acting we find the agent at work”

(Mossel, 2005:136), and it is “sensations [that] provide us with information about our body, the world, and the relationship between our body and the world” (2005:140).

This conceptualisation connects the nature of Glance with bodily knowing, and dances the lines of: inward and outward; self-connection with the politics of self; and, body *and* practice *and* context. An elucidation of ‘agent’ is useful in this. Rather than agency in its implication of control and prediction, Mossel locates significance in “awareness of the process” (2005:154), agent is “experienced and the experience forms part of it” (2005:143) by which he is valuing that which “consists in interaction between body and mind” (2005:146). Arendt goes further. She too writes on fostering action, but for her this also concerns voice. In what can be considered a response to concerns of becoming ‘too inward’, Glance must necessarily involve ‘speech’, so giving shape and voice to, as well as ownership of, its ‘revelatory character, subject and comprehensibility’ (Arendt, 1958:178). Without this we are “performing robots” (1958:178), an analogy that takes us back to the percipients experience of current understanding and practice of reflective practice. In contrast to preoccupation with “‘what’ somebody is – his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide” [*sic*] (1958:179), speech ‘actively reveals’ one’s personal identity, a “disclosure of ‘who’” (*ibid*), so, and resonant with Mossel’s more recent work, illuminating the “agent in the act” (1958:180). Without this, action “is meaningless” (1958:181).

Thus, expressed Glance is deeply political.

Mossel’s offer to this Narrating, then, is not only in considering sensation as significant in ‘embodying’ practitioners as ‘agents’ (2005:148), but in reinforcing the argument that *absence* of that recognition positions students/practitioners as “passive” (*ibid*) and Arendt adds action, voice and dialogue. In our terms, it is a critical connection in understanding the process of domesticating and being ‘broken in’ to Identify-Of ‘reflective practitioner’, as well as the impact of positioning bodily knowing as a by-product or mere signal on the way to more important cognitive work. Mossel’s work begins to address the process of ‘tuning in’ expressed by the percipients Descriptions, echoed above by Sodhi & Cohen (2012), but termed “attuning” by Mossel (2005:146). However, these authors do not follow on to discuss *how* it might be facilitated and in such ways to avoid drift into an individual, solipsistic, inward-facing perspective.

In Narrating that element, the canon of Eugene Gendlin proved significant, initially identified during the latter stages of the research period as Described in chapter 4. Gendlin is a Phenomenologist who developed ways of thinking about and working with lived experiences, but specifically bodily felt sense and its implicit nature in knowing through Focusing.

Rather than being snagged on the gap between experience and making sense of that experience Gendlin begins from the position that we need a way of conceptualising, understanding, and practice of ‘entering and speaking *from*’ the gap [*emphasis added*] (1997:3). Secondly, he proposes this is fundamentally “*more than*” [*sic*] ‘controlling or containing’ the gap as if merely “*excess*” (*ibid*) to be cognitively tidied away. Consequently, he writes of the gap and of entering and speaking from it as being

more than [the] conceptual patterns (distinctions, differences, comparisons, similarities, generalities, schemes, figures, categories, cognitions, cultural and social forms [*sic*] (*ibid*))

that happen as soon as we speak about – or, in our terms, on - experiences. Along similar lines, Roth (2012:6) writes of “experience” being “more than can be put into words” because experience comprises the “entire span” of “the immediate and the embodied”. However, in *his* description of experience Gendlin goes further. He expresses it as “that partly unformed stream of feeling we have every moment [...] to which you can every moment attend inwardly if you wish” (1962:3), a “*raw, present, ongoing functioning* (in us)” [*sic*] (1962:11). More than Roth’s characterisation of experience as difficult to verbalise which anyway jars with Arendt’s emphasis on speech and voicing, Gendlin’s explanation is subtle and nuanced. He offers that experience cannot be ‘exhaustively examined’ (1997:4) because “it is never completely in view”: experience is “dispersed *in* our situations; we are *in it*, and there is always more of it in us (*with, under, and behind us, and out there...*)” [*sic*], whether or not we ‘name or divide it’ (1962:11). Therefore, within the terms of this thesis, experiencing and then making sense of that experience in the moment *cannot* be represented through typical mainstream understanding and practices of reflective practice as if that experience is “given in already-formed units which cognition could simply observe, represent, or approximate” (1997:6).

That said, Gendlin is also anxious not to give the impression that the gap between experience and making sense of it is a “vague no-man’s land” (1962:3) about which students/practitioners can “say whatever [they] wish” (1997:7), accounting for or interpreting it in whatever way they please.

In those two points, then, Gendlin's work points up the limitation and partiality of reflection-on-action/Gaze as Curated, Described and Narrated, whilst also reinforcing a platform for the process of Glance.

A consequence of his assertion that the gap is important but should not be 'vague' means that it makes difficult his task of writing about it in order to develop his theory. Therefore, he sets about referring to it as " '....' " (1997:7). In elucidation – and with powerful resonance to the percipients notion of Glance – he writes

We can let a '....' come in any spot where we pause, and we can think from it, even if we don't write it (1997:7).

In different texts he puts words to '....' that are also significant to theorising Glance. He refers to '....' as "thinking at the edge" (2004:1), and, "thinking from an intricacy, a spider web" (1996:np). Poignantly, he asserts that '....'/thinking at the edge/thinking from an intricacy is "very exact and precise" (1997:16) although at the same time qualifies this is *not* the same as arguing doing so is inherently clear, in our case, to a student/practitioner.

Resonance between Gendlin's exposition of the gap between the experience and making sense of that experience with the percipients Describing of Glance that has been Narrated in this chapter is striking. Importantly in this regard, Gendlin next turns his attention to the *process* of 'entering and speaking from' '....' (1997:16), in our terms, his response to the matter of how to enter and speak from Glance.

He begins this by explaining the process as going "into a murky sort of *down* or *in*, or allow[ing] some sort of coming *from* it" [*sic*] (1997:16), which he argues is consonant with all "life and situations" but also, importantly for our argument, as being more "intricate" than the cognitive activity of identifying "historical determinants" (1962:xvii), in our terms, identified retrospectively to fill the gap. Through this analysis and applying his non-dualistic gentle challenge to the more typical understanding of reflective practice, he does not go on to advocate dismissal of the conceptual and cognitive, but offers that we should "think with both '....' [*and*] 'zigzag'" (*ibid*) between the experiential and the conceptual to let the former "make new sense and modify our concepts, rather than being confined in them or ending in mere contradictions" (*ibid*). Here, then, in our terms, meaning would not be domesticated or domesticating, Trapped to known, abstracted "dead objects of study" (1962:2) in a narrow, limited and limiting direction. Here meaning "is not only *about things* and it is not only a certain *logical* structure, but it also involves *felt* experiencing" [*sic*] (1962:1). In critical pedagogical and feminist terms, the personal *is* political.

Gendlin's notion of 'zigzag' brought back to me that I had begun to visualise and conceptualise Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go as a rhythm, building on the rhythmic nature of the percipients communication of their bodily and embodied knowing, so, the rhythm of moving in (reflection-in-action), out (reflection-on-action) and away (Leaving Go). It was reminiscent of 'zigzag'. Using emotions as an example, current practices of reflective practice approach them as if objects to identify, account for, and escape from in cognitive mastery and control of practice, but Gendlin's proposition is that they can be 'entered in and spoken from' as felt experiences in the moment, and then one can reflect on those concepts later in an approach of curiosity about what they tell that person – as opposed to the other way round. It is a perspective that finds confluence with neuroscientist Damasio (2000:50-51) where he distinguishes between 'primary, universal', 'secondary, social' and 'background' emotions. He articulates them as 'body states', the body being the "theatre" for emotions, whilst at the same time noting that their "expression and meaning [is] given by learning and culture". Thus, a finer grained reflective practice is a rhythm between the felt sense of an emotion in the moment *and* its "stereotypicity" (*ibid*), and, indeed,

Damasio's neuroscience lends insight to Gendlin's (1962:3) subsequent articulation of

prelogical, 'preconceptual' experience as it *functions together* with logical symbols, [without] substituting one for the other [*sic*]

that are located 'within *this* body' [*emphasis added*] (1962:13). It leads Gendlin to contend

if we do not have the felt meaning of the concept, we haven't got the concept at all – only a verbal noise" (1962:5-6),

a statement that could have been directly written with the percipients Descriptions of Gaze and advocating for Glance in mind.

Yet, still, in the context of this section of Narrating, accessing, and therefore facilitating, the process of Glance still needs attention. Gendlin's process of "Focusing" (1978:10) is significant here. Focusing is the term he gives to his method for the way one 'makes contact with felt sense', i.e. the "felt dimension of experience that is prelogical" which is important "in what we think, what we perceive, and how we behave" (Gendlin, 1962:1). It has a striking resonance with Arendt's (1958:39) articulation of the self comprising 'inner sensations that present themselves to us'.

Before going further, this could be interpreted as taking argument back to asserting a process that represents practice rather than practice itself (*cf.* Dohn) and indeed this is an argument that parallels Munévar's (2014:np) criticism of Gendlin 'conflating self with sense of self'. If Gendlin's theory ultimately takes us full circle back to the critique of reflection-

on-action/Gaze/typical understanding of reflective practice, then it is of no help to Narration of Glance - but perhaps it finally reveals Glance *not* to be a radical reclaiming and redefining of reflective practice that expounds it as crucial to the roots of professional artistry?

In his writing Gendlin is clear, concepts emerging from the felt sense “cannot fully represent it” [*emphasis added*] (1962:33), but *the process* is an *action* (cf. Mossel; Arendt) that help us to “grasp this preconceptual way experiencing behaves” (Gendlin, 1962:34). It is, therefore and in fact, an elucidation of Mossel’s “attuning” that mirrored the percipients Description of, and need for help in ‘tuning in’ that has been missing so far from Narration. It lends insight into how one might ‘attune to the sensations of acting’ (cf. Mossel), and even there Mossel highlights that “Much of what happens when we act does not reach consciousness” (2005:148) and can be “non-deliberate” (2005:153). The latter, then, weaves in earlier Narrating regarding not-reflecting as well as Leaving Go, but, still and importantly, reinforces the assertion that “our *agency* is found in the sensation of acting” [*emphasis added*] (*ibid*).

Focusing has relevance to Glance. Briefly, it involves attuning to the sensations of acting, or experience, the felt sense, from which emerge ‘handles’, i.e. the qualities of the felt sense described through a word, image or phrase *that speaks from within it*, creating a received shift in understanding as a result. Focusing is therefore ‘process rather than content’ (Gendlin, 1962:32-33). More specifically, Gendlin explains the process as comprising “six movements” that he fully articulates and in which practitioners can be supported (in Schön’s words, ‘coached’) to engage. The ‘movements’ are:

- ‘clearing the space’;
- experiencing the ‘felt sense’;
- an emergent ‘handle’ that speaks from that felt sense;
- checking-in, back and forth, to ensure the ‘handle’ ‘resonates’;
- followed by ‘asking’ for meaning; and, finally,
- ‘receiving’ (1978:43-64).

It has a clear utility to Sodhi & Cohen’s call for practitioners to ‘tune in’ (2012:120) whilst noting that even if aware of somatic reactions and responses social professionals have “difficulty linking these sensations to specific knowledge” (2012:113). From that research they state

They were unable to articulate what was actual bodily knowledge and what was cognitive knowledge. Participants recognized and valued their bodies as sources of knowledge but it was also difficult for them to isolate body-specific knowledge (*ibid*).

Therefore, Gendlin's Focusing provides a process for naming, but importantly with regards to dialogue, for sharing that knowledge as well.

It must be noted that Glance through Focusing still involves a selection of moment and the percipients themselves spoke of the importance of making moments. So, a question arises whether Focusing needs to happen all the time – and if so how, particularly when applied to the context of professional practice, otherwise how would a student/practitioner know *when* to Focus/select the moment? Thinking with Mossel is useful here. He highlights that “awareness is a precious and limited resource” (2005:154), therefore, in our terms, a student/practitioner *does not have* to be aware of every sensation, or all the time, indeed “some activities are so rapid that feedback to the brain's central processor is impossible” (2005:156). Thus, the issue is more one of “what she can become aware of” [*sic*] (2005:156), not how much and when. He continues, explaining that activity (for us, Gaze/reflection-on-activity) and action (Glance/reflection-in-action) “are not separated by an abyss” (2005:158), so we need only to ‘attune attention’ to a “small part” of the sensation of acting such that “it is this part that makes my behaviour an action” (2005:159). In that way “subintentional movements become actions the moment we notice them” (2005:163). Helpfully he also asserts anyway “Awareness is not an all-or-nothing affair”, we can be “fully aware, peripherally aware or totally unaware” (2005:166) but if *totally* unaware, i.e. not engaging in Glance at all, “then we do not act” (2005:166).

Thus, Glance is not about Glancing all the time, or spending facilitation /guidance/ instruction struggling with identifying which moments to focus on (as happens with current practice of reflection-on-practice), but is *a process* for engaging that grows what it is that practitioners can be aware of, for more of the time albeit still fleeting in nature, and in doing so signifies bodied and embodied knowing in the moment. This resonates with Willis's (1999:99) intuitive/contemplative reflection introduced earlier. He writes

Even here consciousness is still active, but the act of thinking is different: it is an act of reception which holds the thinking mind back from closure and returns again and again to behold the object, allowing words and images to emerge from the contemplative engagement (*ibid*).

For Damasio (2000:173), importantly, this will not be a “single track and a single sequence” as suggested by the common metaphor of “stream of consciousness”, one that I drew on myself from literature as part of chapter 2. As Mossel suggests, Glance is multiple and generates “more than one narrative” (Damasio, 2000:176), consonant with a messy, rich professional practice as Captured in chapter 3.

Focusing has most commonly been integrated into psychotherapy, but a literature search shows that more recently it has been drawn in to the disciplines of geography (Banfield, 2016), medical education (Alexander *et al*, 2015), creative writing (Perl, 2004), and Human Computer Interaction design (Núñez-Pacheco & Loke, 2018). It might also be considered that Focusing has ground in common with contemplative pedagogy “as a *practice* [so] turning our attention *inward* to explore our first-person experiences – *our own embodied mind*” [*sic*] (Ergas, 2017:14), however, there are differences in practice, principles and theories concerning *whether* mindful practices *should* be about that or instead work to *create* a gap *between* oneself and experience in order to distance oneself from it to function more effectively (Traversa, 2017). In contrast, Focussing is about deepening “*in* and *with*” the gap [*sic*] (Schoeller & Dunaetz, 2018:123), to abide and dwell in the felt experience of a moment and see that emerging as part of a shift.

In sum, Focusing beautifully conveys the nature of Glance *and* contributes to its theorisation and facilitation: it offers a specialist lexis and shared understanding such that students/practitioners would be enabled to recognise, identify, acknowledge and articulate Glance, engage in theory and methods that privilege Glance in ways that match those of Gaze, and value it as significant in its own right. In Narrating, I find one instance of connecting Focusing with reflective practice. In *Reframing the Concept of Reflection: Consciousness, Experiential Learning, and Reflective Learning Practices*, Jordi (2011) also begins from a position of critiquing the constructivist and cognitive basis for current notions of reflection. He then proceeds to present his case to ‘rescue and rehabilitate it’ (2011:182) through Focusing, “the purpose of [which] is to ‘dip’ into [ones] subjective space in order to formulate and make explicit [the] implicit and vague felt-sense of experience” (2011:192). He concludes his paper by stating

if we can conceptually engage with the complex intricacy of experiential learning with precision, then we can develop reflective practices that seek to facilitate an integration of the range of implicit and cognitive elements of our conscious experiencing. By identifying and engaging with elements that are characteristic of the integrative and meaning-making journey of experiential learning, I propose that we can develop a more expansive concept and practice of reflection (2011:195).

However, whilst he uses the term ‘reflective practices’ in his conclusion, the *focus* of his paper is, as expressed in its title, reflection, which means that he would appear to be referring to activities that support this more expansive notion of processing in contrast to reflective practice as understood in this thesis. His work is also theoretical, so not led by

primary research and lived experiences of reflective practice. In this sense, then, this thesis significantly builds on whilst also complements Jordi's work.

9 Narrating reflection-in-action/Glance as part of a radical reflective practice

Reflective practice is explicitly about practice, and therefore needs to and must be "thicker" (Gendlin, 1997:9) than Gaze/reflection-on-practice/critical thinking alone. What makes it 'thicker' is Glance/reflection-in-action and yet, even as important as it was to Schön in his original theory, it is and has remained to be the least theorised element of reflective practice: weight of attention in literature and practice of reflective practice is on reflection-on-action. This thesis has reimagined and repositioned reflection-on-action as Gaze, and theorised and proposed practice of reflection-in-action through Glance. In final analysis of the significance of Gendlin's work to reclaiming and redefining reflective practice, his overarching contention is that we are "lost" if we either lose "touch with our own personally important experiencing", or, if it becomes "too clouded, narrowed", and yet society

allows so little pause and gives so little specifying response and interpersonal communion to our experiencing (Gendlin, 1962:15-16)

'Society' has been unpicked in this thesis in terms of The Trappings, New Internationalism and neo-liberalism applied to its impact on the practices of reflective practice. In this regard, then, Glance is further underscored as a political act.

9.1 Purpose: the nature of 'practice as service to others'

Having radically reclaimed and redefined the practices of reflective practice by following critical phenomenological inquiry into the percipients lived experiences of reflective practice, for this to be *fully* actualised in the terms of the research aims and sub-aims, application to the purpose of reflective practice must be involved, a point inferred above.

It has been argued through this thesis that the current practices of reflective practice have become service for self, despite literature claims and intentions to the opposite, and despite 'practice' itself meaning 'service to others' (*cf.* Argyris & Schön). It has been argued that reflective practice has become appropriated such that it mirrors, feeds, and has become shaped by the Capitalist market principle of socially required outcomes, a process that necessitates individualised nurture, surveillance *and* control and reflects an engineering not artistry paradigm. To fully return reflective practice to its roots, then, its radical theory and practice must (re)locate it to professional artistry as service for others.

Without this even a radical theory risks becoming (seen, understood as, appropriated by, or misinterpreted as) engagement in self-development with therapeutic undertones and for solipsistic purposes.

However, there is an interesting tension here when recalling the roots of reflective practice *were* Humanist, Protestant and Pragmatic, a focus indeed on self and situation improvement, development and mastery. One could assume, therefore, that a 'return to roots' must accommodate this. But we have seen how this relates to Schön the *person* – and of course Schön-the-person is in his theory, just as I am in this thesis - but Schön based his theory on "cases of professional practice" that *he* 'selected' from "actual practice and some records of professional education" to 'exemplify' the points *he* wanted to make (Schön, 1983:74). Thus, his very different approach and inductive base to his research is about articulating the concepts, constructs and assumptions that he already held, which means he is more deeply sewn into its claims and conclusions. The premise of *my* research, from the outset and throughout, was expressly *not* to 'colonise' (*cf.* Erdmans) the inquiry and its methods nor its subsequent Narrating, achieved by following and honouring the percipients, this approach and its writing *being* the research (*cf.* van Manen). Of course, to reiterate, I am in this – I am not neutral, and I bring into it my own experience, including my valuing of reflective practice declared at the 'gateway' to the thesis and set out in chapter 1. But in fact the deliberate positioning of percipients in methods as well as in all that emerged from that process revealed the extent to which the Humanist, Protestant, Pragmatism of a Schönian-inspired reflective practice *confuses and confounds* established understandings and practices of reflective practice. A radical reclaiming and redefining of reflective practice, then, must work reimagine it as professional artistry for others, which was the original intention in Schön's work but not given life. Indeed, more than not given life, reflection-in-action was not given flesh, literally and metaphorically in relation to embodied and bodied theorisation and practice. Where Schön *began* to re-cast reflection-in-action as visceral and sensate, Glance takes it further, Narrated to show where and how it connects to theory. Yet it could be considered that Narrating Glance through Focusing could still be an individualist, solipsistic, even self-indulgent, 'commitment to internalism' (*cf.* Mossel) that counters the premise of reflective practice as service to others not service to self. Indeed, Gendlin refers to such critique levelled against his work (Gendlin, 1984). Similarly, Arendt warns against the pointlessness of endless internal dialogue with oneself, a solitary act that at best produces nothing (Papadimos, 2009). Finally, and overlapping with these points, Glance can be accused of alienating away from critical awareness of

social structures, the one positive element that can be said of current practices of reflective practice/reflection-on-action (Fook *et al*, 2006; Fook, 2016) given that the distance of Gaze on practice events (potentially) provides opportunity to deliberately unpack actions and take critical socio-political stock.

Thinking with May Schott's (2001:327) 'feminist materialism', here, however, returns us to the importance of

seeking to be 'attuned' to the *authority of one's own experience [at the same time as] being aware of the limits of one's locatedness, of falsely generalising from one's own perspective [emphasis added]*,

within a context of "concrete historical analysis", the platform from which to consider that experience (albeit whilst bearing in mind her caution referred to above). Indeed, Damasio (2000:145) reminds that 'ownership and agency are related to a body and requiring a body' and without this they are "meaningless".

Moreover, thinking with Arendt, it can be argued that reflective practice has become tied down *only* to 'work' as she defines it (and discussed in the Capturing of chapter 2) *because of* its emphasis on fixed, solid, durable artefacts that create stability, through which students/practitioners "retrieve their sameness, that is, their identity", an 'objectivity out of the subjectivity of men' [*sic*] (Arendt, 1958:137). As Kohlen (2015:162) puts it, in her application of Arendtian argument to healthcare practice,

the whole production process [of work] is orientated towards a goal, and those who participate have to adjust to the programme, that is to say they have to function within the programme.

Indeed, Gendlin's response to his critics is relevant here too. He explains that awareness of the "more complex texture of experienced reality" leads to the *creation* of social structures, "new liveable patterns" that give opportunity and space for change, a movement that involves 'resilience, energy' and action (Gendlin 1984:146). Inherent to such "form-making" is "structural understanding" (1984:147), in other words, "the structural political and economic detail *must* be seen, else form-making will be superficial" [*emphasis added*] (*ibid*). Thus, *engaging with* the intricate texture of one's experience challenges "a social system in which form-making itself becomes routine" (*ibid*). In sum, he declares that "'inwardness' is social, and constitutes the very rejection of social forms" and is at the foundation of political argument (1984:148). So,

If we reject the (very common) thinking which unknowingly splits individual and social, we quickly see the social and political character of

the so-called 'inward' liberation; it liberates from narrowly 'external' social forms. (1984:150).

As Arendt argues "it is a mistake to take freedom to be primarily an inner, contemplative or private phenomenon" (cited in Yar, 2006:7). It is for this reason that reflective practice in Professional Practice: Connected Practice is depicted as cutting out and away from The Trappings.

This said, Gendlin also qualifies this does not mean that "Focusing steps necessarily free us from oppressive social forms" – he continues "They do; but we can not say that they always do so in every respect, that every oppressive form will change" (1984:154). Using his argument to apply to Glance, then, Glance is, of course, a 'translation' (1984:157), but it is *what* we are aware of that is crucial, of the political *into* the personal, to see how we embody it – and to "crash the party" (1984:157); Glance means that we can. The percipients 'good hindsight Gaze' adds to this process. Betz Hull (2002:36) cites an Arendt speech from 1972, that

The common and the ordinary must remain our primary concern, the daily food of our thought – if only because it is from them that the uncommon and the extraordinary emerge.

10 Narrating Glance, Gaze and Leaving Go

Narrating Glance, Gaze and Leaving Go finds connection with Schön's original view of the artful and "active construction of and conversation with the situations of practice" (Kinsella, 2007b:110). Yet, as argued, whilst stating the critical importance of professional artistry and reflection-in-action within it, he stops there. Kinsella (2007a:408) highlights an "'embodied' mode of reflection as distinct from the 'intentional' mode" in his work, and concludes that, although weight of attention has been taken up with the latter, i.e. "education that appeals to cognitive understanding and *knowing-that*" [sic], it "*must incorporate*" [emphasis added] bodied and embodied knowing "into its conceptions" (2007b:408). Theorisation and practice of Glance does just that, and combined with a reimagined Gaze/reflection-on-action, and Leaving Go, reflective practice is reclaimed and redefined.

As stressed above and important to restate here, my aim is not to replace one dogma with another, with "a new master discourse" (Kinsella, 2007a:109), but, reclaiming and re-defining Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go, reinvigorates and reimagines the entire artistry of reflective practice. Theorisation of Glance specifically addresses that which was previously 'logically incoherent and practically irrelevant' (cf. Newman), signifies reflection-in-action,

and offers direction for practical engagement, *as well as* 'elaborates the psychological realities' (*cf.* Munby & Russell) involved. Identified and articulated in this way gives Glance 'catalytic validity' (*cf.* Lather) so it can be facilitated in higher education programmes (and post-qualification practice).

CHAPTER 6

Mittere

1 Introduction

Having theorised, and articulated the facilitation of, a reclaimed and reimagined radical reflective practice and identified the intention to not replace mainstream reflective practice as if this is a 'new master discourse' (*cf.* Kinsella), I was still struck by how this could be achieved when applied to higher education programmes. How could the value of this radical reflective practice through the vehicles of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go be recognised at the same time as not 'colonising' (*cf.* Meyer & Land), containing and controlling messy, subjective experience?

It occurred to me that this mirrored my opening dilemma of wanting a form of research inquiry that would support engagement in messy, rich experience. Setting out I recognised it to be an ambitious project, but as Law & Urry (2003:7 cited in Haggis, 2008:164) contend, qualitative research methodologies can reflect a lack of imagination and courage such that much that is complex 'escapes' – and the same can be said of mainstream reflective practice. It had been right to take that approach because it gave life to a 'strong' theory (*cf.* Sutton & Staw) that emerged from, within, and engaged with complexity, temporality and embodiment, entangled with contexts of professional practice. In sum, by not domesticating and taming entangled intersections of multiple trajectories of 'opportunity, risk, and dead-ends' (*cf.* Burbules), the research inquiry did not reinforce or mirror the discourse of traditional mainstream conceptualisations and practices of reflective practice, therefore, the research methods, its process, *and* that which emerged were intertwined and authentic.

Thus, it followed that detailing this activity could lend to resolving the dilemma of facilitating the radical reflective practice in higher education without losing its rich vibrancy.

2. The 'imaginary'

First, I note resonance with Deleuze's (1990:66) conceptualisation of the imaginary, the space between opposing forces where emphasis is on the "circuit of exchanges" *between* them and that which 'crystallises' as a result. In my case the 'opposing forces' were of social science and the arts already discussed, but also the dilemma above, of how to facilitate the reclaimed, reimagined reflective practice without imposing on messy

subjectivity. I surprisingly discovered this endeavour had resonance with Arendt's desire to not "freeze into a static construction what is actually a dynamic and unfinished process" (Canovan, 1992:6) and 'sacrifice' "spontaneity, plurality – everything that is genuinely human" (1992:11). In other words, Arendt - and I - 'set off to think - without a bannister to hold on to' (1992:6). In this, however, the potential risk is process and outcomes that are haphazard and confused, a critique levelled against Arendt's writing (Canovan, 1992), indeed the same caution put to my research (at 'upgrade'), i.e. rather than rich seams from messy complexity it might simply become a mess. In fact, it is a tension that can be said of lived experience, and professional practice, on both reflective practice is based, inherently messy tensions of: intention and disarray; the expected, unexpected, and confusion; the explicit and implicit; and, the interplay of fixed, stable, and 'ever changing shards' (cf. van Manen), of which we may or may not be conscious. Current practices of reflective practice assume a process of (supposed) mastery over and on this, of containing and control. Developing an approach that would honour the messy, complex dynamic befitting the messiness and richness of professional practice would be appropriate to a radical reflective practice. To this extent it can be argued that the research inquiry is already of value *because* it 'disrupted conventional methodological practices' in its action of a "positive intervention into [traditional] hegemonic disciplinary means" (Ellingson, 2009:3). Yet still, how could I ensure/enable Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go do not fall into being something that students would be 'broken' in to and impose a hierarchy of reflection-in-action *over* reflection-on-action.

3 The rhythm of reflective practice

It occurred to me that one thread of Narrating not yet woven in to the thesis was my response to the percipients Descriptions of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go as a rhythm, noted in several places in chapter 4 and 5, in response to the rhythmic nature of their references and words in Describing their lived experiences of reflective practice, alongside the rhythm of moving in (reflection-in-action), out (reflection-on-action) and away (Leaving Go). For instance:

- It is a rhythm of different paces: the prolonged slowness of Gaze, the fast fleeting Glance, and the fast *or* slow of Leaving Go.
- It is a rhythm of different qualities: the delayed, enclosure and surveillance of Gaze, the here-and-now presence of Glance, and the being elsewhere of Leaving Go.
- It is a rhythm of different felt senses: of being flooded, waves coming in, being washed by memories and sounds, and rhythms of space and place, of sharper

hotter embodied experiences of fear and shock, and cooler focus of jigsaws and cooking.

Having expedited reflection-on-action as a “particular narrative segment, a segment that less and less reflect the original circle from which it is taken” (Bryson, 1983:98), it struck me that *in common* between Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go is that they are *all* ‘narrative segments’ that *together* more closely imply the whole. In contrast to typical attempts that consider reflection-in-action but become snagged on the extent to which there is a gap between experience and meaning-making and debates about the nature of that gap, and this to the extent that for some reflection-in-action is a misnomer, *this* thesis offers that the Gaze of reflection-on-action, the Glance of reflection-in-action, and Leaving Go, interweave. Together they are reflective practice, and reflective practitioners dance the rhythms of each and *all* together.

In the same text that brought me to the notion of ‘breaking in’, Lefebvre writes of ‘rhythm’ as a ‘mode and tool of analysis’ to “examine and re-examine a range of topics” (Elden, 2004:xii), as well as the activity of ‘rhythmanalysis’. Lefebvre’s rhythm and rhythmanalysis, ‘a little known and used scholarship and concept’ (Elden, 2004:xiv), is now taken forward in this thesis.

Lefebvre (1992/2004:64) explains rhythm to be

neither a substance, nor a matter, nor a thing. Nor is it a simple relation between two or more elements, for example subject and object, or the relative and the absolute [...] It has these [...] aspects, but does not reduce itself to them.

It is about energy, an ‘unfolding, increasing by diversifying’ (1992/2004:65) that is “founded on the experience and knowledge (*connaissance*) of the body”, so, ‘consciousness *and* knowledge’ (1992/2004:67). Indeed, in rhythmanalysis the “body is the first point” of ‘contact and analysis’ (Elden, 2004:xii).

Thus rhythm and rhythmanalysis has direct relevance to the redefined and reclaimed reflective practice:

- Rhythm is interdependent: Lefebvre writes of it being “slow or lively only in relation to other rhythms” (1992/2004:10), which has direct interrelation to the rhythm of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go.
- Rhythm is “natural, spontaneous, with no law other than its unfurling” (1992/2004:8), but this does not mean it is haphazard or chaotic: Lefebvre explains that it “*always* implies a measure” [*emphasis added*] (1992/2004:8), ‘measure’ meaning “harmony”, the “simultaneously quantitative and qualitative” (*ibid*)

'reuniting' of that which 'marks and distinguishes with aspects and elements that link them together' (1992/2004:9). This 'reuniting' is reminiscent of the percipients call to 'make moments' as well as the need for uniting Glances *and* Gaze, i.e. uniting fleeting and embodied knowing with "the monotony of actions and of movements, imposed structures" (1992/2004:8) of the Trappings of New Institutionalism.

Thus, the *rhythm* of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go concerns

repetition and difference; mechanical and organic; discovery and creation; cyclical and linear; continuous and discontinuous; quantitative and qualitative... [*sic*] (1992/2004:9);

and a redefined and reclaimed reflective practice is this "synthesis" (1992/2004:12) through Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go. It is this that "animates" (1992/2004:30).

Therefore I am led to contend that a radical theory of reflective practice articulates the rhythm of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go *even whilst* understanding this to be a "difficult task and situation: to perceive distinct rhythms distinctly, without disrupting them, without dislocating" (1992/2004:19). So it is that Lefebvre describes that "rhythmanalyst[s] will not be obliged to jump from the inside to the outside" but to "listen to them as a whole" (1992/2004:20), as 'bundles or garlands or bouquets' of 'different but in tune' rhythms (*ibid*). It is a description that fits Gendlin's Focusing for Glance, *with* a reimagined approach to Gaze, *and* the deliberate activity of Leaving Go.

Relevant to Glance alone, Lefebvre writes of "grasping", "when the body makes a sign" (1992/2004:64), through the practice of calling on "all [ones] senses", (1992/2004:21) rather than "privileging any one of [them]" (*ibid*). This is a practice of 'thinking with [ones] body', "not in the abstract, but in lived temporality" (*ibid*) and the "unforeseen", and is 'the magic at the heart of the everyday' (1992/2004:40). In sum, a practitioner "garbs [themselves] in the tissue of the lived, the everyday" (*ibid*), 'arriving' "at the concrete through experience" (*ibid*). Thus, the contribution of theorising reflection-in-action through Glance in a radical reflective practice is that it 'garbs' the student/practitioner in the tissue of the lived and the everyday in their professional practice, by calling on all one's senses, tuning in to what was previously 'unforeseen' as well as to what is already known. And, we can understand and facilitate (or coach) this through appreciation of it as a 'journey', via dialogue and the method of critical phenomenology and Focusing, that supports articulation of bodied and embodied knowing, whilst also bearing in mind the warnings cautioned in chapter 5. In conjunction with Gaze and Leaving Go, this reclaimed and redefined reflective practice contrasts sharply with the experience of mainstream reflective

practice characterised as ‘singing the same tunes’ over and over as percipients “contain [them]selves by concealing the diversity of [their] rhythms” (1992/2004:10).

Thus, in the words of Lefebvre, the rhythmanalysis of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go integrates what is present *with* presence, ‘presence’ being “here (and not up there or over there)” (1992/2004:47) “in a dramatic becoming, in an ensemble full of meaning, transforming them no longer into diverse things, but into presences” [*emphasis added*] (1992/2004:23). It is a radical reflective practice that concerns ‘going deeper, digging beneath the surface, listening attentively instead of simply looking’ at the “surface, spectacle” (1992/2004:31).

- The rhythm of Glance, Gaze, and Leaving Go still “demands attention and a certain time” (1992/2004:32) of course, but in contrast to the Described, Narrated attention and time of Gaze/reflection-on-action requiring a leading to and Identity-Of, alone it “bring[s] to it a multiplicity of (sensorial and significant) meanings” (*ibid*) resonant with Identity-As.
- The rhythm of Glance, Gaze, and Leaving Go still involves memory, “to grasp this present otherwise than in an instantaneous moment, to restore it in its moments” (1992/2004:36). But it does so “in the movement of diverse rhythms” (*ibid*) without getting snagged on that as an issue, instead seeing the matter to be one of interweaving and growing what student/practitioners are aware of (*cf.* Mossel), and this for a different purpose, i.e. “not to isolate [but] in order to live it in all its diversity” (Lefebvre, 1992/2004:47).
- There is still a product, as such – but in the rhythm of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go this is a “simulacrum” (*ibid*), a semblance, not a fixed artefact.

4 Facilitating the rhythm of reflective practice

Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go as a rhythm bears a beautiful synergy with a reimagined and redefined reflective practice. Using Lefebvre’s words, it ‘deregulates’, i.e. “throws out of order and disrupts”, and in doing so “produce[s] a lacuna, a hole in time, to be filled in by an invention, a creation” (1992/2004:44), one that honours improvisation, creativity and curiosity. In fact, the application of this to professional practice is further illuminated in Lefebvre words that “Interventions [...] *should* be made through rhythms, without brutality” [*emphasis added*] (1992/2004:67), in itself reinforcing the significance of this radical reflective practice.

Even so, bearing in mind the ‘catalytic validity’ (*cf.* Lather) of this thesis in view of its title, aims and sub-aims, it still feels somewhat nebulous to imagine introducing this radical

reflective practice to students/practitioners, social professions, and higher education as a 'rhythm' when recalled that to be truly catalytic in its radical formulation it needs to work within their necessary frameworks.

Whilst explaining that a 'rhythmanalyst will not be *obliged* to jump from the inside to the outside', Lefebvre extends from that point to more fully describe the process, helpful when applied to facilitating reflective practice as a rhythm. He writes of 'grasping and analysing rhythms', that is, "it is necessary to get outside them, but not completely [...], a certain exteriority enables the analytic intellect to function" (1992/2004:27). Here, then, the rhythm of reflective practice can be explained as a more nuanced dancing the line of exteriority and interiority, in our case, underscoring the need for an explicit focus on critical thinking when related to Gaze and its assessment, *and* the significance of theorisation and practice of Glance/reflection-in-action. As Lefebvre emphasises, "to grasp a rhythm it is necessary to have been **grasped** by it; one must *let oneself go*, give oneself over, abandon oneself to its duration" [*sic*], therefore "in order to grasp this fleeting object...it is therefore necessary to situate oneself simultaneously inside and outside" [*sic*] (1992/2004:27). The Describing and Narrating of this thesis has offered that this involves play, creativity, imagination, improvisation and embodied knowing, facilitated through a frame of contemplative pedagogy, dialogue, and questioning relevant to phenomenological inquiry that prioritises subjectivity. Indeed, Lefebvre writes of the significance of dialogue as part of rhythmanalysis, "intense moments of communication" compared to "banal and superficial" 'floods' of conversation (1992/2004:49). He posits that "restoring the value of dialogue [...] does not oblige us to devalue the informational: [...] its social and historical reality" (*ibid*), but rhythm is "more" (1992/2004:64). In this way this thesis progresses reflective practice.

4.1 Mittere

Yet, even still, in final utility of this in its facilitation I wondered how one could retain the complexity of rhythm whilst ensuring that it could be conveyed to students/practitioners in its richness; and, how its facilitation incorporated into a redefined and reclaimed reflective practice set within higher education could hold the space for the rich messiness of experience without tidying or imposing on it.

It was a line of inquiry that took me to explore the root of the word 'mess'.

'Mess' stems from the Latin verb *mittere* [mee-tear-rey] meaning 'to send, to let go' although in late Latin it evolved 'to put, to put in place' and by 1400's to specifically refer to the nature of what was being 'put in place' to ensure equal attention. However, from there it mutates into referring to the state prior to being 'in place', i.e. jumble, concoction, as well as mixed mass of food, such that by the 1800's 'mess' meant untidy and disordered, referring to both a state/place that is untidy/disordered and to the production of untidiness and disorderliness (O'Conner & Kellerman, 2014). But, significantly originally *mittere* was not about being disorganised, chaotic, jumbled; *mittere* is letting go.

Bearing that in mind, it follows that to let go one first needs to have a sense of what it is that one is to let go of, in conjunction with courage to step into the unknown, so, into a liminoid space after one has let go and before one emplaces. The process of *mittere* is complex.

Further, we can also appreciate that in that liminoid space 'letting go' is not about anything happens, nor, conversely, is it about imposing methods that bridge the space. *Mittere* needs an approach that can "deal with 'the fleeting', 'the distributed', 'the multiple' and 'the complex'" (Haggis, 2008:161), that, in Gendlin's terms, speaks *from it*. It is a dilemma that can be appreciated through a lens of Complexity Theory in its distinction between 'messy complexity' and 'ordered complexity' (Bachman, 2008). Ordered complexity holds the *promise* of richness but is snagged on a neo-positivist ontology and epistemology. Messy complexity recognises and works with ambiguity; it is a process described by Bachman (2008:22) as being at the "edge of chaos" with "nascent and pregnant possibilities" whilst all the time "reeling in and organising" the information to find its "unique essence [...] so its true nature can be addressed" (2008:21). This has striking resonance with the spirit of my research endeavour, and, significantly, the spirit of the radical reflective practice of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go that has emerged from it. Therefore, *Mittere*, now capitalised as a thesis concept, has fit and relevance.

The originality of this doctoral work lies in its reclaiming of reflective practice, and now the research approach *as well* can be understood through the frame of *Mittere*, 'frame' being defined as a loose structure that gives space for methods to arise whilst providing the process for this to happen (Stiles, 2003)

Yet, this still required clarification if it was to contribute to a 'strong' theory of *Mittere*, therefore, I re-visited the transcripts with it in mind, hence its key elements are embedded in and integral to the percipients' voices and the spirit of the research endeavour. These

are: Starting, Capturing, Curating, Describing, Narrating, and in recognition of their framing significance I drew them into the thesis frame as chapter headings, each with a brief explanation in italics. These are explained in full here.

- **Starting**

Reflective practice starts somewhere, and indeed, with a nod to the early Phenomenology of Heidegger and Sartre, it has been established that it is always-starting, always-becoming. However, germane to any particular period of reflective practice, there is a Start somewhere. So it is that Trimmingham (2002:57) writes of the “arbitrary starting point of entry”, in our terms, to professional practice awareness, to which we bring our “own level of understanding and knowledge” such that “no two people would start at the same point”. Starting can start anywhere and be *in* the moment and *on* a moment; Starting might also be about not reflecting, and it can be Leaving Go. Starting is not about creating a tidy story with a beginning, middle and end – that is to say, it might be, for some at some times, but it does not have to be – and indeed to be encouraged not be – but it is to acknowledge a Start.

- **Capturing**

Once Started one must Capture, and to ‘Capture’ one first must notice: Capturing is reliant on noticing. Noticing is active attention and marked consciousness, an awareness to be honed. Indeed “every act [of practice] depends on noticing: [...] what you do not notice, you cannot act upon; you cannot choose to act if you do not notice” (Mason 2002:7). De Waal’s (2011:13) discussion of moments of “reverence and respect” is relevant here. And one Captures what is noticed. Capturing can be the Glances of reflection-on-action, this thesis having proposed improvisation, creative, playful and imaginative forms of practice informed by contemplative pedagogy, and not the story-telling, reporting on and accounting for one’s practice of currently established methods of reflective practice. Examples from the thesis include: single words or phrases; doodle, drawing, or clay models; photographs taken in the moment; an artefact collected at the time that holds the moment in its form; and, recording on a mobile device of a noise or words expressed to sum up the experience. Capturing *can* also be of traditional Gaze, although as a radical movement going forward this has been guided towards the principles and standards of critical thinking, but can also be facilitated through creativity and play, and through using written accounts to identify domesticated discourse adoption.

Moreover, Capturing can be by Glance, this thesis having theorised reflection-in-action and articulated its nature, qualities and practice, one that is enabled by Gendlin's Focusing, the gentle surfacing of handles of felt sense. The 'movements' of Focusing: modelling and facilitating improvisation; developing a language for and awareness of embodied and bodied knowing; facilitating awareness and practice of *not* reflecting: and, the creative 'incubation' of Leaving Go, are all involved here. Thus, Capturing invites comparison with presence when it is defined as

the self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained on immediate experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition of mental events in the present moment [and] adopting a particular orientation toward one's experiences in the present moment, an orientation that is characterised by curiosity, openness, and acceptance (Bishop *et al*, 2004:232).

Importantly, however, whilst in some quarters such approaches in the form of 'mindfulness' have become something of a bandwagon, jumped on by a range of professions wherein the purpose is to ensure that students/practitioners 'seek relief from the soul-crushing conditions' (Ghodsee, 2016:np) of their contexts and practice through focus on inner self and compliance (Martin, 1991), the purpose of an orientation to mindful presence in Capturing is action (*cf.* Arendt; Mossel). Although action and inward attention do not have to be mutually exclusive (Berila, 2016), according to Stanley (2012), and the percipients, they often are. The radical reflective practice through Capturing brings them together.

Captured Glances and Gazes are all handles to a felt sense experienced in and on moment, specifically referred to as 'scraps' to emphasise that they cannot be conceptualised as a whole, complete, replete. Here then, Capturing is about being present to and sensitive in the moment and grows the points of conscious awareness of what a student/practitioner can be aware *of*, an awareness that is embodied and bodied, the canniness of the body all the time (*cf.* O'Neill), an 'inner readiness', the 'raising of awareness of now' (Jakube *et al*, 2016:76), on one's own, *and* together shared in dialogue.

- **Curating**

After a period, on one's own and with others one looks back over the stored 'scraps' of Glances and Gazes to see what they have in common between them as well as what is different, distinct and surprises. It is a process of Curation, 'bringing elements into proximity with each other, making junctions, opening new routes' (Ulrich Obrist, 2015:1) through fresh perceptions, connections, and insights which are 'put forward for

exploration' (Bohm & Peat, 1991:27), a process broadened through dialogue with others. This is not for its own sake: it is held in context of professional practice engagement. In other words, Curation should not become the driving force and end-point, because this would risk a return to performativity, the (re)production of what one thinks one ought to Curate as is the case in current practice of reflective practice. The process of Curation needs to be fully grounded in Gazes and Glances with emphasis on curiosity and openness, not cultivating and telling stories, a process that includes space and time for Leaving Go, and 'layering up', i.e. returning to that which has been Curated with new Gazes, Glance, and Leaving Go.

- **Describing**

The ideas, implications and possibilities from that Curating then unfold through a process of creative and divergent thinking and feeling in which new possibilities are given space to coalesce and crystallise via their own discovery paths. These are 'composed or put together' (Bohm & Peat, 1991:27) through Description, that is, Describing coalescences to convey the way the ideas, implications and possibilities of the Captured and Curated Glances and Gazes can be understood (Andersen, 1991). Importantly, the significant motivation here is curiosity and surprise, so unlike current practices of reflective practice the student/practitioner does not know in advance the direction and outcomes of those discovery paths.

Whilst an obvious approach to this Describing would be words, Wittgenstein (1953/2009:36) raises caution. Through an analogy of fibre and thread he explains 'the strength of the thread resides not in the fact that one fibre runs through its whole length but within the overlapping of many fibres' (*ibid*). Describing, then, requires finding symbols that satisfactorily express the Curated Glances and Gazes, a thoughtful choice of words, but it could equally involve other forms of thoughtful expression such as drawing, doodling, 3D modelling, collage, installation, etc., in our terms, their activity being simulacrums to the 'all-about-ness' of the Curated Gazes and Glances.

Thus, the simulacrums of discovery paths of Describing do not story-tell but 'dwell in process as a method of inquiry' (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005:959), remaining 'deeply intertwined' (2005:962) with the person's Glances and Gazes. In doing so Describing 'produces *different knowledge* and produces *knowledge differently*' [*emphasis added*] (St. Pierre, 1997:175). Old and familiar stories do not get 'rewritten or repeated' to 're-describe

the world and ourselves', and it sustains the possibility of 'be-do-live something different' (St. Pierre, 2014:5), by:

- retaining the principles of playfulness and surprise: attention is given to the chosen form of expression such that they do not draw on familiar narratives, cliché and 'old, worn-out metaphors' because to do so would result in 'ideas and imagination' becoming 'inflexible' and 'unstretched' (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2008:973);
- not being concerned with creating something that conveys the 'all about-ness' of the Captured Gazes and Glances in a way that is 'right', or complete, or about solutions, answers, fixity or stability: emphasis is on the 'discovery of new possibilities for exploration, not right or wrong' (Bird, 2006:5);
- and, importantly, it is not an isolated activity: dialogue and community builds the bandwidth of exploration, courage and appreciation, *and* is facilitated to include Leaving Go.
- **Narrating**

Finally is Narrating, where what was Described is considered in its own right by asking what it tells about the practice/phenomena that has been Captured and Described. Here new Narratives are created whilst retaining freshness. Emphasis is on exploring 'in one's own voice, its meaning in the present' (Pinar, 1975:12) through connection with theory and community of practice, so with what it connects *to* and *with*, in the spirit of openness to 'the unexpected turn' (Dewey, 1934/1980:139), i.e. that which the Gazer/Glancer did not 'foresee'. Thus, in contrast to the 'plug and chug, cram and flush' engagement, process and outcome of typical approaches of reflective practice, focus is sustained on 'what is not yet present' (Pinar, 1975:9) through creation of 'new possibilities that are stitched, weaved and knotted' by Narratives that offer creative and innovative ways forward (Lee McCartney, 2015:141). Thus, new Narratives are created and told about practice that are not rehearsed and have not been limited and constructed by the finite and fixed methods of traditional reflective practice.

5 Mittere

Mittere, of Starting, Capturing, Curating, Describing and Narrating, is not to be understood or approached as categories to comply with but a *frame*, a loose structure that gives space (*cf.* Stiles) to 'circuits of exchanges' (*cf.* Deleuze). To further appreciate this an analogy of suspension is useful: a suspension – in our case, Mittere – is a form utilised to bring forth something of significance, a vehicle that works as an 'investigative workshop' (Dosse, 1999

cited in Lather, 2006:47). Thus, *Mittere* is not the thing itself; *Mittere* is true to its name, it is about letting go and stepping into the unknown, creatively and innovatively, a vehicle that supports emplacement of oneself in one's individual and shared professional practice.

Therefore, *Mittere* is not a return to "the sphere of the intimate and private" (Arendt, 1958:48), a "there we are, no questions asked" (Arendt, 1971:59) process previously critiqued in relation to current practices of reflective practice. *Mittere* emerges within dialogue, a community of practice (Barnett, 2008), and is a movement: of perpetual moving in (to oneself) and moving out (to dialogue and action).

The end point or outcome of *Mittere* is not a fixed product, artefact, or the only way of understanding something. It should be considered and shared confidently in light of its authentic process but also perceived and appreciated as a fragment of something ongoing albeit satiated at that point. Thus, rather than the typical approaches of reflective practice where stories are told in one's reflective diary, supervision, or to a line manager, this new approach to reflective practice requires that its Narrating is shared with the community of practice for resonance and comment, in turn creating space for new Gazes and Glances, contributing to a rich learning landscape (*cf.* Greene) and organisation (*cf.* Senge).

As noted, *Mittere* requires courage. Whilst it celebrates messy and is not a mess, telling familiar stories in expected ways is safe territory, whilst the messiness of professional practice (and research) can take one along all kinds of avenues where the temptation is to impose and/or engage with methods that are habitual, taming and domesticating, indeed the current reflective practice state of affairs. During the research process we all, percipients, supervisory team, and myself, found ourselves dancing along, falling off, and getting back on lines (as such) as we endeavoured to trust the journey, to trust *Mittere*, 'journey-man-women' of a radical reflective practice, indeed mirroring the experience of engaging in professional practice itself and on which reflective practice is applied. In this, , the radical reflective practice as anchor to and steer for professional practice is reinforced by *Mittere*: *Mittere* provides a frame, and discipline (*cf.* Clark) for the rhythm of Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go, which "prevent[s] it from spiralling out of control" (Trimingham, 2002:56) whilst at the same time enabling authentic engagement.

Here, then,

- *Mittere* frames an approach to a radical reflective practice as rhythm, enabling the rhythm of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go to remain intertwined and authentic.

- Mittere prioritises creativity and playfulness, a creative, lightness of engagement in the moment, creating rich, new Narratives that facilitate fresh and potentially innovative discovery. It refuses the watchful eye and scrutiny of audience and its freezing impact on process and outcome.
- Mittere holds the rhythm of a reimagined Gaze and theorised Glance as well as a notion of Leaving Go, together a radical practice.
- Acting freshly through Mittere offers ‘freedom, meaning, worth-whileness and self-esteem’ (Mason, 2002:8) via divergent thinking (Goff & Torrance, 2002) and a discovery orientation (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976) key to ‘innovative mind’ (Claxton, 2000), ‘imaginization’ (Morgan, 1993), and the creation of new Narratives, all of which are valued by learning organisations (*ibid*).

In sum, Mittere returns reflective practice to its roots of professional artistry and Identity-As, in juxtaposition to the hoop jumping of traditional reflective practice and its advancement of an external locus of motivation and engagement of Identity-Of. Mittere holds experience in

interstitial spaces with no beginning or endings, but as always becoming, as being open to transformations, where rhizomes create interconnected networks and multiple entry points (Lee McCartney, 2015:142).

6 Mittere – and currere?

Having articulated Mittere it struck me that it was similar in sound to, as well as possibly similar to the process of, currere, such that I wondered, at the end, if I had arrived at the door of something already there. This, of course, is not a problem, my research reinforcing the concept of currere, but the more significant question was whether Mittere is needed: perhaps currere was already sufficient. I had not previously encountered currere; in fact, it was at a conference where I was presenting engagement in the theoretical underpinning of Mittere that I was introduced to it.

‘Currere’, in its Latin meaning ‘to run’ as a current that runs or flows, was adopted by Pinar to encapsulate his autobiographical method of inquiring into lived experience of curriculum, ‘curriculum’ also stemming from the Latin ‘currere’. Thus, his currere is a “postmodern philosophical approach to education that acknowledges personal and temporal dimensions of the learner” (Sierk, 2014:135). Its method is referred to as “a dynamic entity, constantly changing as it continues to develop” (2014:137) although Pinar himself described it as a step-by-step procedure (1975) which by 2004, he refers to as “moments” (2004:xiii). That said, a quick review of the way in which it has been typically used shows that it *is* applied as steps, these being: remembering the past (regressive),

followed by imagining the future (progressive), then analysing and synthesizing emergent themes (analytical), and, finally, identifying meaning (synthetical) (Pinar, 1975; 2019).

In general, then, *currere* has tones that appear similar to *Mittere*, and like *Mittere* it is approached as “not fixed, it is motion and it is lived” (Lee McCartney, 2015:138). Similarly, and echoing earlier discussion, Sierk (2014:140) writes that “To the untrained eye [...] *currere* [...] may be seen as chaotic or disorganized” but in fact is a mirroring of the responsiveness and spontaneity of curriculum practice.

There are also resonances with *Mittere* in the *detail* of Pinar’s ‘steps’/‘moments’.

Regression (step 1) involves a deliberate “return to past to capture it as it was and as it hovers over the present [...], one is on the past while in the present” (Pinar, 1975:6), which has parallels with *Glance*. In the past where research and discussion of reflection-in-action have been stalled by debate on the gap between experience and making sense of experience (therefore whether *all* reflective practice is reflection-on-practice), in step 1 of *currere* Pinar (1975:7) argues that the “present is veiled, the past is manifest and apparent”. In our terms, then, *Glance* *will always* be about what just happened – it is always ‘the past manifest and apparent’ but it is not telling stories about it, and *not* interpreting means it is Narrated freshly because as Pinar (1975:8) puts it, “interpretation will interrupt your presence in the past”. In this sense, then, *Glance* is a snapshot – and Pinar (1975:9) talks about “coalescence to form a photograph”, as it were, and ‘studying the detail’, likened to “holding [...] the picture and one’s responses to it” (*ibid*).

This is followed by ‘progression’, a second look at the ‘photograph’ in Pinar’s terms. He writes of this as “looking at what is not yet present” (*ibid*). For both *currere* - and *Mittere* - it requires what Pinar refers to as “free association”, that is, ‘avoiding rational, critical’ mind (1975:10). He advises to do this for “as long as it is comfortable” whilst “not forc[ing] the process”, which means, as Sierk (2014:137) puts it, “leaving loose ends”.

Currere’s third step/moment is ‘analytical’. Here one marks “what one [has] drawn” (Pinar, 1975:11). To this end, Pinar writes of “bracketing what is, what was, what can be”, and as a result one is “loosened from it, potentially more free of it, hence more free to choose the present and future” (*ibid*). Like Narrating in *Mittere*, the purpose is to offer “clearer light” on the present, that should surprise and ‘take on new meaning’ (*ibid*).

Finally, Pinar instructs this should ‘all be put aside’ (1975:12) to then articulate “In your own voice [...] the meaning in the present” (*ibid*). Here one is “mak[ing] it all of a whole”

(1975:13). It is the last step/moment, 'synthetical', "where pieces are made whole" (Lee McCartney, 2015:142), or, in Pinar & Grumet's (1976:61) terms, "where I am placed together" and "new structures evolve in the process of naming old ones" (1976:115)

In this, then, *currere* would appear to have resonance with *Mittere*.

However, *currere* also has a noticeable likeness to established models of reflective practice, i.e. 'what happened, where would you like to be/how would you like it to be', free association around this, and then pulling in analysis and meaning. To the same critique of mainstream reflective practice, then, it risks being, as indeed has been argued of *currere*, all about "self-display" (Apple, 1999:227) and 'racialized and gendered indulgence' (Smith, 2013:6). So, and despite attempts by some to do otherwise, *currere* spins, in our terms, on 'singing the same tunes to oneself' over again, and service to self rather than others (Smith, 2013). It is, also, obviously about curriculum, its strength lying in being a different way of thinking about curriculum theory and development, but obviously not, therefore, professional practice in the social professions, which clearly would go some way to explain its limitations in focus on service. Finally, and relatedly, *currere* is an autobiographical tracking and exploration of one's *orientation to curriculum* – it *not* about rich messiness that emerges within and from the 'hot action' of practice. *Mittere* is all this, *and* recognises what would be considered as irrelevant to *currere*, the significance of 'other' and dialogue being central to its frame.

Mittere has emerged from this doctoral research, and is embedded in it. Unlike *currere*, it is a frame for the messy rich complex nature of professional practice *and* it is a frame for reflective practice that is radically reimagined and redefined as comprising the rhythm of Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go. *Mittere* is different to *currere*, but can be considered as a relation in ways that have been identified.

7 A reclaimed and redefined reflective practice

This thesis has radically reclaimed and redefined the practices of reflective practice from neo-liberal appropriation that formulates it as a reified, cognitively dominated, panoptical form of therapeutic analysis and professional assessment, a narrowing process that imposes habitualised and repetitive routines (via models and pro forma) on to what otherwise could be innovatory practices.

Its contribution lies in its critical exploration of what is taken-for-granted in mainstream understanding and practices of reflective practice. Using percipient threshold concepts and

insight cultivators, a radical reflective practice is theorised through Gaze (reflection-on-action), Glance (reflection-in-action) and Leaving Go (moving away).

Reflection-in-action, that Schön and subsequently Schönian inspired reflective practice confuses and conflates with reflection-on-action, if it features at all, is given life and flesh. Glance takes forward Schön's introduction of reflection-in-action as visceral, a sensate embodied felt experience, and progresses it through theory and practice.

Moreover, in contrast to the slow incremental violence of being 'broken in' (Lefebvre) to current understanding and practice of reflective practice, and a dichotomised reflection-in-action *or* reflection-on-action, this thesis contends that reflective practice should be understood as a 'rhythm' (Lefebvre) of moving in - Glance/reflection-in-action, and moving out - Gaze/reflection-on-action, and away - Leaving Go.

The thesis also has 'catalytic validity' (*cf.* Lather), identifying the implications and facilitation of this radical reflective practice, both in relation to Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go, but also in a frame that models and sustains them as a rhythm.

Finally, this thesis offers that the process of inquiry by which this emerged is also central to a radical reflective practice, *Mittere* in its roots of mess and letting go, the name given to the frame that facilitates the rhythm of this reclaimed and redefined reflective practice.

EPILOGUE: STARTING OUT AGAIN

Setting out the Starting landscape of this thesis (chapters *Starting Out*, *Starting On* and *Starting*) and the principles of its research (chapter 1), I introduced my interest in reflective practice and personal journey from it being a 'natural fact' to regarding it critically; and, explicated key terms, such as 'experience' and the 'self' who is experiencing it. In-keeping with the declared aims and sub-aims, set within an understanding of 'radical research', the research was articulated as Practice-Led inquiry (rather than methodology), in the Faculty of Arts, an interpretive and critical phenomenological endeavour with methods that would emerge through deliberate siting of percipients as central, the desire being for its process to match those of professional practice. It also set out the process of research and thesis writing in terms of spirals (*cf.* Trimmingham), informed by van Manen's 'phenomenology of practice', specifically drawing on his process of 'seeing meaning' as well as 'scrutiny criteria', applied to the context of RPRGs.

It was proposed that only by fully scoping the discipline of professional practice through Capturing can one come to a rich, deep appreciation of the professional artistry involved and therefore fully appreciate the essential role and nature of reflective practice within it. Here, informal interviews, re-visiting my MA dissertation, and critical reflection led to Professional Practice: Connected Practice, offered for its heuristic value in enriching discussion through deep consideration of its elements. Practitioners weave The Trappings with Connected Practice, Being Prepared, Performance, and Qualities Of Me in their daily, indeed moment-by-moment decisions, actions, thoughts, feelings, of what it is to be that particular profession and professional, in that particular situation of clients/users and other practitioners, and context of space and place. Individually and collectively, practitioners are prescribed and inscribed, working in and with agreed notions of professional, user/client, procedure and policy, a landscape where these territories are contested and discourses clash. The Trappings is about a rigidity and fixing of practice and professional selves, of adopting and adhering to the relevant Identity-Of. In that process, and with reflective practice at the core of Professional Practice: Connected Practice, it was shown that in their Identity-As a professional in that profession, practitioners also scribe their practice, reflective practice cutting through The Trappings. It is an analysis that leads to a rich appreciation *of* and *for* reflective practice and through that elucidation core tenets of reflective practice emerged: that the practice of reflective practice is widely accepted as clear and understood; that it involves the development of emotional, affective, self-awareness; that self-development happens and leads to positive change in their practice

competence; that individual development leads to change at an organisational level; and, that one needs to learn and develop reflective practice as a skill in order to be able to engage in it.

Having 'drawn out' (*cf.* Schostak & Schostak) reflective practice in this way, and, as a result, Captured those vital tenets, chapter 3 focused on them in turn, elaborating the ways they are discussed in literature but, importantly, bringing that 'into proximity' (*cf.* Ulrich Obrist) with percipients experiences of engaging in current understanding and practices of reflective practice. This jostling together or 'meddling' (*cf.* McWilliam) made possible 'unexpected combinations' (*cf.* Puwar & Sharma) that surfaced questions about reflective practice. It was offered that reflective practice has become, or has always been, an exercise of interiority, self-surveillance, impression management and control. Students/practitioners explore and 'integrate their instrumental, expressive, affective and cognitive' processes (Gould, 1996:3) within arrangements that determine priorities and agendas, a process of articulating externally determined relevant information for utilitarian purposes: they learn to perform and evidence legitimate narratives, and become competent in the skill of "being seen to be reflective" (Barnett, 1977, cited in Rowland, 2006:54) in service of themselves rather than in scrutiny of their professional practice for the service of others. Thus it was argued that reflective practice is based on a limited and narrow notion of what it is to know and how one must and can evidence, indeed, perform this, wherein cognition is sovereign, a process more in-keeping with an 'engineering science' paradigm (*cf.* Soler *et al*) based on input and output, characterised as 'plug and chug, cram and flush' (*cf.* Bella) rather than professional artistry. It was offered that at best individuals might engage in reflective practice as was intended in secret, but either way professional practice remains 'undiscussed' (*cf.* Schön) and reflective practice to be accused of being self-indulgent (Issit, 1999, in O'Reilly *et al*, 1999; Brookfield, 2000). The lived experience of this as expressed by the percipients is of a slow incremental violence likened to Lefebvre's (1992/2004) concept of 'breaking-in', whereby "under the imperious direction of the breeder or trainer, [students/practitioners] produce their bodies [...] their bodies modify themselves, are altered" (1992/2004:40).

Here, then, we can see that current mainstream understanding and practice of reflective practice does not encompass or support the complexity of professional practice, of knowing, of change, and of what changes. Change is socially situated, messy, and the outcome multifarious, often invisible, indeed, change may not always be the outcome – in fact the opposite, we orientate ourselves to constancy. A reflective practice that

domesticates, that 'breaks' practitioners 'in' to Identity-Of reflective and professional practitioners and perform both as required is far from the professional artistry roots and rhetoric of mainstream theories.

Contrary to research being applied to a literature review leading to conclusions as if instructions to 'solve puzzles', 'radical research' requires 'active, engaged committed movement for change' through "action" (cf. Schostak & Schostak). As befitting to critical phenomenology, chapter 4 Described experience and meaning 'as it presents itself' (cf. Canovan) by 'evoking' and 'dwelling' (cf. van Manen) in the percipients lived experiences of an alternative 'vision of what might be' (cf. Hicks). The percipients emphasis was on reflection-in-action, which they Described in terms of their threshold concept Glance. Glance is trusting the experience/process of having no path. It is about working at the edges of the familiar (cf. Casey). It is about 'active attention' (cf. Greene), working with 'sense, the sense', the 'fleeting', 'capturing', 'getting at' the whole of a moment, from 'multiple entry points' (cf. Lee McCartney) and 'returning anew' (cf. Sierk). Glance is embodied and involves memory in the body; it is about improvisation and a wider frame of contemplative pedagogy.

They also re-imagined a creative and dynamic reflection-on-action, their threshold concept of Gaze. Gaze is the process of selecting an event/interaction after its happening, that may be big, dramatic or small, but either way the event is the trigger – and then staring at it, to pull some thing/s about it apart and in detail, breaking what existed as a complex dynamic whole into small fixed and static pieces for analysis, and, typically, writing that down in order to perform self in familiar, acceptable and expected ways in order to 'report' as required to those in authority, construction of a 'conformable body politic' (cf. Arendt). This thesis argues that where reflective practice means reflection-on-action it should be stated as this but Gaze also offers that it can be reimagined to be more playful, imaginative, creative in its facilitation and appropriately aligned to the principles and standards of critical thinking.

The percipients also offered the insight cultivator of Leaving Go as important to reflective practice as Gaze and Glance, the deliberate activity of not engaging in reflective practice through mind-wandering tasks as a process of incubation and then illumination, but also self-care (cf. McGarrigle & Walsh).

They surfaced difficulties with Glance and, from their experience, what they wanted in its facilitation. Through Narration the qualities, nature, practice, and facilitation of Gaze,

Glance and Leaving Go have been theorised, and in their facilitation, it has been identified how established work on play, creativity and improvisation can be utilised; alongside building a language for and awareness of bodied and embodied knowing; and uniquely drawing on Gendlin's focusing, all within an approach of contemplative pedagogy, dialogue and critical phenomenological inquiry.

Gaze, Glance and Leaving Go have vibrancy in their illumination of what has become the 'troublesome knowledge' (cf. Meyer & Land) of reflective practice, and of a 'vision for what might be' (cf. Hicks) that reclaims its role as action (cf. Arendt) in service to others. The percipients Describe Gaze, Glance, and Leaving Go as interwoven, which led me to consider them as a rhythm, subsequently theorised through Lefebvre's work on rhythmanalysis. *Mittere* offers a frame, a structure to the process for the rhythm of the radical reflective practice, comprising Starting, Capturing, Curating, Describing and Narrating, which became the chapter headings (and in the final spiral of the doctoral period I took *Mittere* in to my teaching and demonstrating/disseminating, for critical feedback and refinement, see Trelfa, 2016c; 2016d; 2017a; 2017b).

Starting Out again

This thesis is now ending. As Trimmingham (2002:57) puts it, like the 'arbitrary starting point',

the point of exit or 'pausing' in the spiral is [also] arbitrary: the research could continue indefinitely and may well be picked up again later, but for the purposes of a writing-up we 'exit' the spiral temporarily.

In such terms, the end of this doctoral research and thesis is the Start for what comes next. With that in mind, it is pertinent to critically consider the activity so far.

In chapter 1, "intersubjective agreement" (Velmans, 2007, in 2017:68) was emphasised in its value to the research endeavour, where views and descriptions are shared and converge in the expressions of lived experience. Thinking with Reich helps here, explaining intersubjective agreement as "a device for coordinating interdependent social actions" (2010:60) based on turn-taking and time for "repair" but also individual responsibility to make oneself understood (2010:59). This was all evident in the RPRGs, moreover, it was emphasised as strong – and there is a risk in this: it can be considered as a device for 'groupthink' (popularised by Janis, 1972), i.e. where agreement is assumed and disagreement made invisible through compliance and conformity. Added to this, as reminded throughout the thesis, I am 'in' the process too, not just as author but present in the RPRGs. The transcripts attest to my careful attention through my requests to "say

more” to encourage reflecting back *all* that has been said in equal terms, and deliberately playing devil’s advocate to offer alternative possibilities. But of course, by simply being there my presence will influence groupthink (Roberts & McGinty, 1995).

Sunstein & Hastie (2015) discuss three key elements that counter groupthink: active participation of all present; women in a group; and, members who can read others emotions. These increase the likelihood of “collective intelligence”, dynamics the authors refer to as ‘Factor C’ (citing Woolley *et al*, 2020).

It is reasonable to consider reading emotions will be present in the percipients inclination towards this in their choice of degree programme in the social professions, and indeed because it is inherent to the radical reflective practice being explored. The other two dimensions can be observed in the RPRGs, but importantly women members was by accident not design, and all participating the result of my own community work background. Therefore, facilitating the radical reflective practice through Mittere going forward must deliberately factor in these elements, including identifying what it is that ‘women in a group’ bring if membership is to be all men to ensure this is enabled in other ways.

My role and power is relevant in other ways too, discussed within Narrating already, but also it should be noted that at the stage of analysis Miles & Huberman (1994:56) warn “what you ‘see’ in a transcript is inescapably selective”.

In relation to analysis and thesis writing, I addressed the tensions and challenges thrown up by this critique by close adherence to the transcripts, honouring individual difference whilst at the same time declaring Describing is where I am *not* asserting that all percipients agreed but identifying similarity because that is what required to advance ‘catalytic validity’ (*cf.* Lather). Furthermore, putting out a call to percipients I was still able to locate, one volunteered to read the thesis to offer comment regarding detail and findings to check if it met with their remembered experience. They also happened to be taking a PhD themselves and so by happy coincidence were also able to scrutinise it with research inquiry standards in mind. Therefore, although it is only the view of one percipient, I have confidence that ‘what I see’ honours the research inquiry.

It is also important to consider in facilitation as part of higher education programmes that time can – and should – be given to exploring the felt sense handles of *individual* subjective experience to the full, for example, by drawing on the nature of dichotomous corollaries (*cf.*

Kelly) referred to in chapter 4, to appreciate, for instance, how shared similarity of experiences expressed in agreed words, like 'click' or 'interruption', are also *different*.

Furthermore, and linked to this, in consideration of future application and facilitation of the threshold concepts of Gaze and Glance, insight cultivator of Leaving Go, and their theorisation, it has been insisted that that they should not be used to 'colonise' (*cf.* Erdmans) lived experiences and processes of others. This will be achieved by utilising them *in support of* a radical reflective practice through practices that assert the individual's *own* authority and subjective experience; they are vehicles, not stages, held so by rhythm and the frame of Mittere. To ensure that this does not become a return to interiority and isolated acts of reflection, it has also been asserted that this should take place within a context of dialogue and sharing, with the intention of action (*cf.* Arendt) and service to others. Given the power of rhythmanalysis (*cf.* Lefebvre) in the expression of this radical reflective practice and its untapped scholarship, there is room to continue to explore this going forward.

Finally, in building evidence that 'this works', critique and refinement are invited as this thesis is disseminated, through adopting the redefined and reclaimed rhythm of radical reflective practice and carry out one's own research into its concepts, theories, and practices. As a closing epilogue to this thesis, this too is my Starting, as I continue to work with this radical reflective practice in my current role in higher education.

*

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GLOSSARY

Word	Meaning
<p>Mainstream literature</p>	<p>That which is taken for granted and commonly understood in relation to the principles, aims, practices and facilitation of reflective practice in professionally qualifying programmes, continuing professional development, and gradueness in higher education.</p>
<p>Mittere</p> <p>Comprises:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Starting - Capturing - Curating - Describing - Narrating 	<p>Latin word, etymology of ‘mess’, meaning ‘letting go’, adopted to name the process through which the radical reflective practice emerged. Mittere facilitates the rhythm (<i>cf.</i> Lefebvre) of this reclaimed and redefined understanding and practice and comprises five elements, utilised as the five main chapters. Brief definitions of each element appear immediately following the chapter heading and are explained fully in chapter 6.</p>
<p>Percipients</p>	<p>Describes a particular approach to research and involvement of those more typically in research referred to as ‘participants’, or even ‘subjects’, percipients being recognised in terms of their “active, embodied and sensorial engagement” in process and outcomes (Myers, 2008:173).</p>
<p>Professional Practice: Connected Practice</p> <p>Comprises:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Trappings, incl. Identity-Of and Identity-As (<i>cf.</i> Schechner) - Connected Practice - Being Prepared - Performance - Qualities of Me - Reflective practice 	<p>Heuristic tool that captures the complex “discipline” (<i>cf.</i> Clark) of professional practice in the social professions. It comprises six elements, introduced in chapter 1, and the focus of chapter 2 where they are discussed in turn and in depth.</p> <p>The heuristic tool enables a rich appreciation of and for reflective practice, this being at its core.</p>

<p>Props</p>	<p>Metaphor as a device for descriptive effect to convey influences that run throughout the research inquiry and therefore thesis. The props support the strands. are the props of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ radical research (<i>cf.</i> Neill; Freire; Schostak & Schostak) ▪ liminoid space (<i>cf.</i> Turner) of art with social science ▪ Practice-Led research (<i>cf.</i> Candy) ▪ value and significance of emerging research method from the research process itself
<p>Spiral</p>	<p>Based on Trimmingham (2002), a metaphor as a device for descriptive effect to convey influences that run throughout the research inquiry and therefore thesis, that conveys the progress of a doctoral journey as “circular, a spiral which constantly returns to its original point of entry but with renewed understanding” (Trimingham, 2002:56). My research with its thesis comprises five spirals of activity, described in the prologue and chapter 1.</p>
<p>Strands</p>	<p>Metaphor as a device for descriptive effect to convey influences that run throughout the research inquiry and therefore thesis. The strands weave through the spirals of the research doctoral journey, and are the strands of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ overall structure and style of the thesis ▪ deliberate (judicious) use of personal pronoun ▪ ‘strong theory’ (<i>cf.</i> Sutton & Staw) ▪ deliberate adoption and siting of ‘percipients’ (see above)
<p>RPRG</p>	<p>Abbreviation of <i>Reflective Practice Research Group</i>, the core action of the research inquiry, comprising the percipients and myself as facilitator, and based on a ‘co-operative inquiry’ (<i>cf.</i> Reason) practice.</p>

APPENDIX A

This is an extract of **my own publications and presentations**, these being referred to in the thesis, sources of dissemination and feedback in the process of developing the work incorporated in to the thesis.

Trelfa J. (2010) Emperor's new clothes? Exploring student experiences of reflective practice. Submitted to the University of Exeter as a dissertation towards the degree of Masters of Education: Professional Development (*unpublished*).

Trelfa J. & Telfer H. (2014). Keeping the cat alive: 'getting' reflection as part of professional practice. In Z. Knowles, D. Gilbourne, B. Cropley, & L. Dugdill (Eds.) *Reflective practice in the sport and exercise sciences: contemporary issues*. London: Routledge, pp.47-56

Trelfa J. & Tamai K. (2014) Emperor's New Clothes? Exploring Japanese and British student experiences of reflective practice. *Unpublished research*

Trelfa J. (2016a) What is reflective practice? In K. Tamai, I. Nakamura & J. Trelfa (Eds.) *Current issues and new thoughts on reflective practice*. Vol.53. Kobe: Kobe City University of Foreign Studies, pp.1-21 (also available from: https://kobe-cufs.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_opensearch&index_id=500)

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Trelfa J. (2016c) Reflective practice: gaze, glance and being a Youth and Community Worker. TAG Annual Conference: Devolved, diverse and interdependent: Making Professional Connections. Wednesday 22-24 June, Ulster University, Derry, Northern Ireland

Trelfa J. (2016d) Reflective practice/curating practice 1. Performance. Art of Management and Organisation: Conference: empowering the intangible. Stream: Making the intangible tangible: stories as a process for Organisational and Management Inquiry. Bled, Slovenia, 2-4 September 2016

Trelfa J. (2017a) Telling stories in organisations: reflective practice/curated practice. *The International Journal of Professional Management*. Special edition: arts and management. Vol.12, Issue 3, pp.32-41. Available from: http://www.ipmajournal.com/articles/Vol12_Iss3_Article4.php

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Trelfa J. (2017c) Atmospheres and hauntings of place: feeling and knowing. European Outdoor Education Network Seminar. Plymouth, 28th June - 2nd July.