Abstract
The question of why humanity first chose to sin is an extension to the problem of evil to which the free-will defence does not easily apply. In De libero arbitrio and elsewhere Augustine argues that as an instance of evil, the fall is necessarily inexplicable. In this article, I identify the problems with this response and attempt to construct an alternative based on Peter van Inwagen's free will 'mysterianism'. I will argue that the origin of evil is inexplicable not because it is an instance of evil, but because it is an instance of free will.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 255-269 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Religious Studies |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Libertarianism
- Sin
- Fall
- Van Inwagen
- Mystery
- Inexplicability
- Free will
- Evil
- Augustine